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Abstract 
Over the last decades, surveillance has transformed into a pervasive phenomenon woven 
into the fabric of socio-economic life. In this process, surveillance has itself undergone a 
structural transformation as its principal agents such as prison guards and CCTV 
operators have been replaced by algorithms and data-driven technologies. Contemporary 
surveillance then is embedded in, and expression of, a fundamental remaking of the 
world, where human decision-making is increasingly supplanted by computational 
mechanisms, and lived experience is mediated, and even constituted, by computation.  
This thesis is a sociological work with an emphasis on the role of communication at the 
intersection of computation and surveillance (‘computational surveillance’). Current 
debates have predominantly focussed on the systems and mechanisms of computational 
surveillance. Less emphasis has been placed on the lived experience of inhabiting a 
computed world, and specifically how people can query and act towards computational 
surveillance. This thesis makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to this 
question.  
Through a framework rooted in the sociology of knowledge, the thesis develops a theory 
of agency towards computational surveillance. It outlines the changing conditions under 
which knowledge of social reality is constructed in a computational world and theorises 
modes of reclaiming these conditions for human agents. This theory informed, and its 
further development emerged out of the findings from a qualitative study of 40 young 
people in Germany and the UK about their everyday encounters with computational 
surveillance, which was conducted as part of the thesis. It highlights how participants 
obtain knowledge about invisible computational mechanisms through their everyday 
activities and documents practices through which they collaboratively frame computers 
as interlocutors that they act towards. Lastly, this thesis documents the tactics and 
strategies employed by participants to hide from, or manipulate computational 
surveillance, and how they adopt a logic akin to computers in this process.  
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 Chapter One: About This Thesis 
In Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment To Calculation, computer 
scientist Joseph Weizenbaum (1976) sketches out the contours of a debate that three 
decades later came to occupy a central position in the social sciences. He forecasts an 
algorithmisation of the human lifeworld, where processes of human decision-making are 
increasingly supplanted by computational judgements, risking, as the German translation 
of his book puts it vividly, the ‘impotence of reason’1 and changing the self-image of 
humankind. Weizenbaum warned that the proliferation of computers needs to coincide 
with human sovereignty over them and their output, already emphasising the role of ethics 
in computers at a time when the internet, artificial intelligence and other concepts were 
still in their infancy. Today, the implication of computation in the fabric of society has 
been adopted by and embedded in the domain of social theory (e.g. Lash 2007; Kallinikos 
2009; Beer 2009). These discussions coincide with another macro-trend, the pervasive 
growth of surveillance in contemporary society, which is itself increasingly 
computational in form (Deleuze 1992; Lyon 2007) and in a feedback loop informs 
computational decision-making (Andrejevic 2007). 
This thesis is a sociological work situated at the intersection of these societal 
developments of computation and surveillance (‘computational surveillance’) with 
particular emphasis on the role of human agents and their capacity to act. Its original 
contribution is both theoretical and empirical. As I detail below, theoretical work has so 
far predominantly focussed on the integration of both computation and surveillance into 
the large-scale conceptual thinking of the social sciences and their investigation as 
phenomena that make up society. Less emphasis has been placed on how to theorise the 
role of human agents as individuals and social beings and their lived experience within 
the context of such a society. With reference to Weizenbaum’s original concern, this 
thesis applies a communications framework rooted in the sociology of knowledge to the 
phenomenon of computational surveillance to provide an additional perspective to the 
theoretical debate. It approaches the notion of agency from the perspective of how people 
communicate about and towards computational interlocutors, and how communicative 
                                                
1 The German translation is entitled Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft (Weizenbaum 
1978). 
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tactics and strategies themselves are manifestations of agency.2 As agency is lived 
practice and escapes the confines of pure theory, this needs to be reflected empirically. 
The lived experience of surveillance has similarly been of marginal concern in 
surveillance studies, although its importance as a field of research has been underscored 
(Lyon 1994). This thesis, therefore, also investigates empirically through a qualitative 
study how people act towards computational surveillance, adding to a small body of 
existing empirical work on other aspects of life with surveillance, such as CCTV.  
Although this thesis is sociological in nature, it draws on material and debates from 
various other disciplines and texts as sociology is itself being redefined through the influx 
of new social phenomena and concepts like computation and surveillance. Despite a 
growing range of theoretical material available, the topos of this thesis is both emergent 
and interdisciplinary. Yet it is not sociological by accident or purely by virtue of its 
authors’ educational background. As Joas (1996) has argued, part of the value of 
sociology lies in the fact that it is paradigmatically unstable and therefore self-reflexive 
in its paradigms which makes it open to new types of problems and their interpretation. 
This thesis, therefore, uses sociology to go beyond sociology. The longer introduction 
below describes in greater detail the motivation, context and scope of this thesis to allow 
readers a better understanding of the both the real-life, as well as the scholarly 
environment in which it takes place.  
1.1. A Culture of Surveillance 
Sometimes people reveal too much about themselves, French magazine Le Tigre found. 
In 2009, it released a dossier on Fred, an regular internet user from France, soley derived 
from information about him that could be gleaned from social media profiles and other 
publically available online sources. Developed without his knowledge, the dossier 
features information about Fred's job, goes into detail about his family life, leisure 
interests, documents his past holiday destinations and explores his social outings with 
friends. Le Tigre also published Fred’s full name, mobile phone number, mused about his 
                                                
2 I use the term ‘agency' to denote a general capacity to act. I use it instead of ‘action', which is often 
employed synonymously. ‘Agency' additionally points to the wider sociological debate about the 
constraints and determinants to act, which is the focus of this research. For specific instances of agency, I 
use the term ‘act', following Isin (2008). 
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current relationship to his former girlfriends and drilled into Fred's dating preferences 
(Laurent 2009). 3 
Discovering the article, Fred was shocked and sleepless for days, as he later revealed to 
a newspaper. It was a lesson learned: Fred claimed he had not been aware that such 
personal information could be extracted and set out to remove all data about himself on 
the internet, vying to be much more careful about what to reveal online in the future 
(“Magazin veröffentlicht Profil” 2010). By instrumentalising the unfortunate Fred, Le 
Tigre sought to raise wider public awareness that personal information provided on the 
internet runs constant risk of being gathered, rearranged and analysed. The magazine 
intended to place on the public agenda and make visible the hidden and increasingly 
pervasive mechanisms of surveillance on the internet by emulating those very practices 
and taking the place of the surveillors.  
Only a few years later, Le Tigre's story would hardly stand out. Revelations of 
surveillance on the internet have rapidly ceased to be a novelty and become normalised 
as everyday occurrences. They are everyday in Durkheim's sense of a regularly 
reoccurring feature of social life (Durkheim [1912] 1995), not routine in that attitudes and 
sentiments towards surveillance are numbed and muted. For instance, when Google Street 
View launched in Germany, emotions ran high, eventually leading Google to blur the 
facades of addresses where residents had issued a complaint (Lischka 2010). As part of 
everyday life, the topic of surveillance has become detached from a niche interest 
reserved to specialist publications, professional expert or academic circles. It is negotiated 
in the wider public sphere.  
Through films, TV shows, novels and songs, surveillance has long been reflected in 
popular culture. It forms people’s perception of how surveillance works, and this 
surveillant imaginary also influences surveillance itself as the media co-shape people’s 
attitudes and actions towards surveillance (Marks 2005). Levin (2002) speaks of a 
rhetoric of surveillance in cinema, and Gary T. Marx highlights “the close links between 
surveillance and culture, and control and entertainment” (Marx 2009: 377). However, 
surveillance has ceased to be a theme only explored in distinct cultural works. On a nearly 
daily basis, surveillance is discussed in the news, from targeted advertising and Facebook 
                                                
3 I first referenced the anecdote about Fred in Screen Digest (Knapp 2009), an industry bulletin for which 
I worked at the time.  
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data leaks, over suggestions that Your iPhone is watching you (Lischka, Reissman & 
Kremp 2011), reflexive accounts postulating a Completely Examined Life (Albro et al. 
2011), biographical narratives about the everyday experience of being observed (Roth 
2011), to advice on how to trick Facebook algorithms into gaining higher exposure in 
your friends’ newsfeed (Khunkham 2014). Arguing the topic is so pervasive and that it 
demands a newspaper rubric just like politics or sports, The Wall Street Journal has 
established a dedicated internet surveillance beat called What They Know that sheds light 
on the practices and implications of digital tracking and monitoring.4  
Accounts that document, debate, and explain surveillance are so plentiful that they 
afforded Barnard-Wills (2011) to conduct a discourse analysis of how practices of 
surveillance are represented in UK newspapers. Such discussions coincide with public 
debate on how to act towards surveillance. Fred still had to figure out himself how to deal 
with what Le Tigre had uncovered. Today, popular interest books include calls to action 
such as Program or Be Programmed (Rushkoff 2011), and arguments in the news media, 
blogosphere and beyond more specifically discuss tactics and strategies to escape the gaze 
of Facebook and other entities that gather and calculate personal information. These range 
from how to prevent LinkedIn from using profile data for advertising purposes (“How to 
Stop LinkedIn” 2011), over instructions for deleting personal data from Google and other 
websites (Aschermann 2015), to software tools like SimpleWash which claim to clean up 
people’s Facebook timeline.5 These narratives are not merely cultural manifestations of 
surveillance, but emergent Cultures of Mediatization (Hepp 2013). Surveillance as a 
feature of modern societies is increasingly mediatized. It is taking place as media, as well 
as articulated and negotiated through media by those subjected to it. 
1.2. The Rise of Computation as a Social Force 
While graffiti artist Banksy famously depicted a Nation under CCTV (“Council orders 
Banksy art removal” 2008), contemporary public attention towards surveillance stands in 
the context of a much broader debate on the structural transformation of societies brought 
about by a set of computational forces denoted as artificial intelligence, robots, 
                                                
4 The Wall Street Journal’s surveillance beat website indicates activity spanning 2010, 2011, and 2012. 
However, it is still online in September 2016 and can be found at: http://www.wsj.com/public/page/what-
they-know-digital-privacy.html 
5 The SimpleWash website can be found at: http://simplewash.herokuapp.com (last accessed: 15 September 
2016) 
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algorithms, and related terms. These issues have taken centre-stage in a growing range of 
general-interest books. They range from highlighting the socio-cultural impact of 
artificial intelligence (Schirrmacher 2009), over the dystopian fiction of The Circle which 
relocates the all-encompassing control of Orwell's 1984 into the age of Apple and Google 
(Eggers 2014), to a story of an algorithm come protagonist who reflects on its own being 
as it has taken over the world, written in an attempt to introduce a broader population to 
the technological forces that increasingly shape our world (Meckel 2011). Formerly a 
term confined to computer scientists and expert circles, the media now regularly highlight 
how algorithms shape what we see in the Facebook newsfeed, Tinder profiles and online 
search results (Lobe 2015). The didactics of computational surveillance are even 
gamified: Data Dealer is an online game that allows internet users to change sides from 
being under surveillance to taking the role of those conducting surveillance. Starting as a 
small dealer with a limited stock of customer data, players are supposed to invest in data 
collection methods, psychographic tests, gather IP addresses, acquire hospital patient data 
and other material via ethically dubious middlemen, link it together and sell it, to 
ultimately become a data tycoon (Kuechemann 2012). Such narratives of surveillance as 
computational in nature are reflected in academic approaches that de-emphasise 
surveillance per se in favour of the broader role of computation in its operation and logic 
(Zuboff 2015). Abstracting from the theme of surveillance, these narratives are 
expression of the role of computation more widely in modulating and constituting social 
life, which Alaimo (2014), Kallinikos and Tempini (2014) have termed ‘computed 
sociality’ and which Kallinikos (2009) has earlier articulated through the ‘computational 
rendition of reality’. Media, surveillance, and corresponding cultures of mediatisation 
themselves then stand in the broader context of a social world shaped by computational 
principles and operations. 
1.3. The Janus-Faced Nature of Surveillance 
Surveillance is an ambiguous concept. Lyon (1994) has highlighted the Janus-faced 
nature of surveillance between good and evil. Facilitating both care and control, 
surveillance either watches over people in the form of Machines of Loving Grace 
(Markoff 2015) or appears as a totalising power governing people with an often 
dehumanising gaze (Foucault 1977; Sartre [1943] 1993). Amidst prevailing critical 
stances towards surveillance in public debate, there is a normalisation of cultural practices 
that consider surveillance not as a threat, but as a feature. In 1945, Vannevar Bush 
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published an article in The Atlantic called As We May Think, where he took the end of 
World War II as an opportunity to speculate what domains research and innovation could 
focus on now that weapons were not needed anymore (Bush 1945). He anticipated 
advancements in photography, which would yield much smaller, dot-sized cameras that 
people wear on their foreheads. He termed them memex - memory extenders that archive 
everyday life. Bush’s prediction was accurate. In 2004, Microsoft engineer Gordon Bell 
may have looked odd when he started to wear a camera device around his neck at all 
times, the size of a cigarette package, which regularly takes photos of his surroundings. 
Called SenseCam, his device is equipped with a sensor that detects body heat. When an 
interlocutor stands vis-à-vis Bell, it takes a picture. The device can also be programmed 
to make photos at short intervals of up to a minute, or when the light changes, signalling 
a chance of context. Two decades on, the practice of life-logging has become 
commonplace. Ambient sensors in smartphones, smartwatches, fitness trackers and other 
devices record their owners' every move and vital body functions through individualised 
surveillance as a service (Wilkinson 2007). 
1.4. Understanding the Lived Experience of Surveillance 
The contours of this wider public debate hint at profound social changes at the intersection 
between media and communication, technology and surveillance. The rapid and complex 
proliferation of debate in recent years suggests that surveillance has become a fixture in 
the world of lived experience. Notions of surveillance have entered the cultural fabric of 
the everyday. Debates about its digital manifestation in the form of algorithms, or other 
computational concepts are a matter of public attention and people as citizens and 
consumers navigate the perils of exposure and complicity in an increasingly complex web 
of surveillance. Despite such signals, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical research 
that systematically seeks to understand and embed into a sociological context how people 
live under conditions of pervasive surveillance, and in particular how far they are able to 
act towards forms of surveillance that are increasingly located in the realm of computers.  
The urgency to facilitate such an understanding is greater than ever. In the Post-Snowden 
Age, the canvas on which manifestations of surveillance are narrated has changed. 
Previously, they stood out as deviations from a public consensus that while surveillance 
was rampant and colonising ever more areas of everyday life, it took place against a 
default of not being tracked, monitored, or analysed. NSA surveillance and its global web 
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of political and corporate complicity revealed by Edward Snowden and Wikileaks 
changed this default in the public mind, where a lack of surveillance has become the 
exception. In Surveillance After Snowden, Lyon (2015) recognises this new default. He 
argues that the ability for human agents to maintain their individual agency in the context 
of pervasive computational surveillance is a fundamental prerequisite for the future of 
democracy and society at large. This research seeks to contribute to addressing this 
urgency, with particular consideration of the current state of research. 
1.5. Focus and Limitations of Existing Research 
Surveillance itself is a longstanding theme in the social sciences. Over the last decade and 
a half, a cross-disciplinary endeavour has emerged to bring together and systematise a 
growing range of theoretical and empirical inquiry across various social science 
disciplines to form a loosely organised sub-field labelled ‘surveillance studies' (e.g. Lyon 
2002; Dubrofsky & Magnet 2015). However, scholarly attention has mainly focussed on 
systems of surveillance and institutional aspects. While surveillance scholars highlight 
“the complex of surveillance practices” (Ball & Haggerty 2005: 130) as their scope of 
inquiry, their notion of practices tends to denote the ways in which surveillance is 
conducted. In fact, most research does not specifically consider practices of everyday life 
from ordinary people in relation to surveillance. 
An emerging field of empirical studies is seeking to shift this entrenched perspective. 
However, despite their merits, these contributions focus on isolated empirical domains 
such as shopping centres or webcams, or particular types of agents such as advocacy 
groups, instead of a broader context of surveillance in everyday life (e.g. Albrechtslund 
2008; Introna & Gibbons 2009; Koskela 2003). Such studies also tend to privilege a 
particular stance towards surveillance within the binary of resistance and complicity, 
instead of incorporating the Janus-faced nature of surveillance. Furthermore, there is a 
lack of empirical research on surveillance in the context of an increasingly mediated life 
– an area that Lyon (2007) has identified as a growth area for surveillance studies – and 
in particular considerations of the relationship between human agents and the 
computational nature of surveillance within this mediated environment. Existing studies 
also recognise both absence and need for a theoretical understanding of how people 
engage with surveillance in order to further advance empirical work (e.g. Albrechtslund 
2008). 
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Similar limitations apply to the partly overlapping debate around online privacy and 
personal data. This debate, which mainly emanates from a broader legal context (e.g. 
Nissenbaum 2009; Solove 2004; Rule 2009) emphasises the individual under 
surveillance. However, accounts of privacy do not delve into the actual lived experience 
of surveillance. Privacy also is not synonymous with surveillance. While privacy is 
generally framed as an individual matter, surveillance has social aspects (Franklin 1996). 
Lyon (2007) cautions against the focus on privacy as a token of ‘possessive individualism' 
(Macpherson [1962] 2011), and he is joined by other authors who argue that it downplays 
issues of social inequality, stereotyping, exclusion, governance and power that are 
constituent parts of surveillance and signal much wider social implications far beyond the 
conceptual limits of privacy (Lace 2005b; Mosco 1989). Understanding agency towards 
surveillance then requires moving beyond individual privacy to consider how people in 
everyday life act in the context of these much broader issues.  
Accounts that highlight the role of computation in society have begun to also consider 
life under such conditions. For instance, Crawford (2015) highlights the need to analyse 
the social spaces in which computation operates, and especially those through which it is 
contested. Van Dijck (2013) illustrates how developers and technology executives encode 
assumptions and rhetorics of sociality into online social platforms, and uses this 
perspective from the inside of platforms to demonstrate how such computational 
configurations impinge on people’s experiences. Similarly, Bucher (2012a) has studied 
how Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm programs visibility on the newsfeed and how 
sociotechnical processes on social media platforms produce affordances in which users 
consider the notion of friendship (ibid. 2012b). Alaimo (2014) offers a more experiential 
setting through an empirical case study of an e-commerce company. Documenting the 
company’s infrastructure design in its start-up phase, she demonstrates how user choice 
is represented through data-mining techniques and how corresponding personalisation 
engines reconfigure how consumers can imagine themselves in the context of computed 
sociality. These are examples of a growing body of work that advances the understanding 
of computation in a social context and documents its complex, agential powers. However, 
similar to the state of the surveillance debate, particular emphasis thus far been placed on 
interrogating the systems of power and social moulding forces inherent in computational 
systems. Building on the call to pay closer attention to the perspective of human agents 
themselves (Couldry & Powell 2014), the centrality of agency enacted by ordinary 
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citizens in everyday life under these conditions is becoming more widely acknowledged 
(Kennedy, Poell & van Dijck 2015). Most recently, Bucher’s (forthcoming 2017) 
empirical analysis of how Facebook users imagine its algorithms underscores the need 
for further systematic research under this prism.  
1.6. Thesis Framework 
In light of both the state of empirical work in surveillance studies and the limitations of 
the privacy debate, Lyon's (1994) nearly two-decade-old observation that agency in 
relation to surveillance demands further systematic research remains current. At the same 
time, the structural transformation of surveillance through computation and its growing 
implication in people’s everyday lives have lent it unprecedented urgency (Lyon 2015) 
that is echoed by discussions rooted in the study of algorithms and computation more 
widely. This project seeks to provide an original contribution to these debates. It consists 
of a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding agency in the context of 
surveillance that is itself embedded in pervasive computation.  
Chapter Two (In Search for Surveillance Theory), directly follows this first introduction. 
It provides a review of theoretical approaches to surveillance. Firstly, it documents the 
theoretical debates around surveillance, how they have changed in the context of wider 
transformations of modernity, and explores whether a grand theory of surveillance does 
justice to the complex and multi-faceted nature of surveillance. It places particular 
emphasis on the limitations of the panopticon as the predominant template for framing 
surveillance, how it has influenced the debate, and what conceptions of power and 
personhood it affords. Secondly, it is concerned with the ways in which theories of 
surveillance can inform a perspective on agency. It concludes that surveillance studies 
have been so focussed on systems and institutions of surveillance in their theoretical 
development, that they cannot facilitate a systematic account of agency. At the same time, 
it argues that wider transformations in the ways surveillance operates have changed the 
coordinates of inquiry, and that understanding agency towards surveillance demands a 
broader debate about computation as a social force.  
Chapter Three (A Framework for Agency in Computed Sociality) expands on this 
groundwork. It formulates a theoretical approach of agency towards computational 
surveillance. This approach is delivered as a communications framework that is informed 
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by a sociological perspective. It discusses how algorithms, big data, software, code, 
artificial intelligence and related concepts as agents of surveillance are increasingly 
embedded in the flows of everyday life, how they transform the fabric of society and how 
their internal logic fundamentally alters how people can make sense of the world. 
Drawing on wider debates around infrastructure and visibility, the chapter outlines the 
perceptual, cognitive and hermeneutic obstacles that human agents face in attempting to 
query and act towards such surveillance, the configurations of power this implies, and 
how these issues define new coordinates for the sociological debate about structure and 
agency. The chapter then embeds these themes in a broader sociology of knowledge to 
theorise the possible modalities of agency, the communicative relationships between 
human and computational interlocutors this presupposes, as well as the wider social 
context in which these relationships take place. This framework provides the basis for 
later empirical interrogations.  
A theory can only consider how agency is possible in principle, and not how it manifests 
itself as lived experience. The theoretical framework outlined above, therefore, is 
followed by a discussion on how the sense-making activities of human agents, both in 
relation to computation in general and surveillance specifically, can be operationalised 
empirically. Chapter Four (Methodology) addresses this. It develops a research design 
around in-depth interviews and think-aloud protocols. It proposes a modification of think-
aloud protocols that progress from tapping into working memory to long-term memory, 
and from descriptive and affectual statements to those that are reflexive, contextual and 
participatory. Core aspect of surveillance are power relationships expressed through acts 
of watching. Empirical studies of surveillance, therefore, need to adhere to particular 
ethical standards, especially if the proposed methods contain a degree of observation 
themselves, and this chapter takes account of those requirements. Lastly, it outlines the 
sampling and interview process across 40 subjects in the UK and Germany and reflects 
on the experience of ‘doing' surveillance studies as a researcher. 
The next four chapters contain an analysis of empirical material and how it relates to the 
overarching theoretical framework. These chapters are organised in a funnel structure that 
moves from a first chapter on general context over two chapters concerned with patterns 
of understanding revelations of computational surveillance, to a last chapter focussed on 
modes of agency. The theoretical material required to frame the empirical data is 
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contained in the previous chapters and will be referenced again where required. In cases 
where a chapter delves into the minute conceptual details of a theory, these are outlined 
at the beginning of each empirical discussion. In order to highlight a particular point, 
short references to scholarly material not part of the overall theoretical framework may 
occur. This is not intended to override the theoretical framework, but to provide additional 
nuances.  
Chapter Five (The Normalisation of Surveillance in a Landscape of Risk) explores the 
troubled relationship between human agents and surveillance. It documents the 
inevitability of surveillance and how human agents consider surveillance both as a threat 
as well as a set of practices that they embrace – be it through voluntary self-exposure or 
through conducting surveillance themselves. The chapter shows the fluidity of the 
surveillance landscape, that surveillance is not an abstract concept but firmly embedded 
in everyday life, and that human agents take multiple roles between watcher and watched. 
It also demonstrates that theoretical concepts of surveillance do not align with definitions 
of surveillance in everyday life and that some acts of watching are considered as 
permissible while others are not, indicating a complex set of ethics of surveillance.  
Chapter Six (Experiencing the Fleeting Conditions of Knowledge), shifts the focus on the 
relationship between human agents and computational logic. It explores how human 
agents encounter usually hidden computational surveillance in their daily experience on 
the internet, how they react to principles and assumptions of surveillance laid bare, and 
what tactics and strategies human agents employ in triggering surveillance to reveal itself. 
The chapter explores how such revelations foster a systematic knowledge about 
surveillance and what this means for the perceived individual powers to deal with 
surveillance. 
While the previous chapter considered the surveillance encounters of human agents as 
isolated individuals, Chapter Seven (Collaborative Inquiries and the Troubled Nature of 
Common Sense) sheds light on the social practices of interrogating computational 
surveillance. It demonstrates how human agents work collaboratively to inform each 
other about the way it operates, and how they jointly attempt to deconstruct the 
computational logic behind surveillance. The chapter documents the range of practices 
across which this collaboration takes place, highlights the conflicts within common-sense 
knowledge about the world that emerge from the fluid nature of knowledge about 
  
23 
computation, and also shows how such common-sense understanding is reproduced in 
everyday language and folk tales about computational surveillance. 
Chapter Eight (Negotiating Clashes of Reality With Unknown Interlocutors) is concerned 
with the tactics and strategies of interacting with computational surveillance. It proposes 
that computational agents are categorically unknown interlocutors and documents 
people’s attempts at establishing a social situation with these interlocutors to negotiate 
interpretations of reality. On this basis, the chapter explores people’s communicative 
practices to intervene in the ability of computers to ‘see’ them, and how they also adapt 
computational interpretations of reality through such practices. The chapter debunks the 
notion of human agents as hyper-rational actors and instead shows that negotiating 
relations of visibility involves failures, omissions and accidents. It highlights that in the 
process of dealing with computational interlocutors and imagining their logic, human 
agents themselves simulate computational principles. 
Chapter Nine (Conclusion) summarises the argument advanced in this thesis and 
establishes additional connections between theoretical and empirical material, as well as 
between the individual empirical chapters, that the necessarily linear nature of argument 
did not previously afford. It reflects on what this thesis has achieved and highlights its 
limitations. Lastly, it suggests further applications of the framework developed in this 
study and highlights additional areas of research in both the empirical and theoretical 
domain to support, expand, and critically engage with its analysis.  
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 Chapter Two: In Search for Surveillance Theory 
Etymologically rooted in the French verb surveillir (to watch over), surveillance stands 
for “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of 
influence, management, protection or direction” (Lyon 2007: 14). It contains a level of 
ambiguity that complicates its diagnosis and at least partly puts it in the eye of the 
beholder. For instance, intentions and practices of caring may not be considered as 
surveillance by a person watching over another, but can be perceived as an intrusive act 
of control by the very person that is being watched over. Similarly, while some people 
are concerned about online surveillance, others see appeal or benefit in self-exposure and 
actively collaborate in their own monitoring (Andrejevic 2005; Pridmore 2013), creating 
contradictory subjective assessments of surveillance in a given context. Defining 
surveillance also is a matter of semantics. While consumer advocates may talk about 
‘targeted advertising’, the advertising industry itself prefers the term ‘addressable 
advertising’ (e.g. Poggi 2014). Targeting implies maliciousness, vulnerability and 
intrusion, whereas addressability not only emphasises advertising as a service, but also 
hints at optionality and choice rather than determinate fact – it is not ‘addressed’ 
advertising. Prominent terms that are often used interchangeably for surveillance, and 
which complicate a distinctive conceptualisation, are ‘tracking’ and ‘monitoring’. The 
difference to surveillance lies in the context surrounding the act of watching. Both 
tracking and monitoring only refer to a set of acts over time. Surveillance incorporates 
the motivations and consequences of those acts, which constitutes it as a political and 
social concept.6  
This chapter provides a critical introduction to approaches towards surveillance and the 
theoretical development of surveillance studies. It organises and reviews multiple strands 
of surveillance theory in order to assess their merits for facilitating an understanding of 
agency, both bearing in mind that surveillance increasingly takes place in mediated 
environments on the internet, and that the principal agents of surveillance have come to 
                                                
6 While this conceptual distinction highlights the broader social and political entanglement of surveillance, 
it is difficult to uphold in writing about surveillance. Monitoring and tracking are terms closely associated 
with data-driven surveillance, or dataveillance, in a digital consumer context. Imposing the term 
surveillance in place of everyday language can sound contrived and artificial. In the case of the subsequent 
empirical part of this research, it can even be distorting. The research references people's everyday language 
about surveillance, and monitoring and tracking feature prominently. In this text, I then understand tracking 
and monitoring as expressions of surveillance itself, and not in the strict conceptual sense. 
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be computers in the widest sense. While the chapter considers the notion of computation 
to shed light on the socio-economic transformation of surveillance and to query its 
analytical potential, it leaves an in-depth discussion of computation as a social force and 
its direct relevance for understanding agency to Chapter Three, and merely paves the way 
for such an analysis. Arguably, debates around surveillance and computational issues like 
algorithms and big data are intertwined (e.g. Zuboff 2015; Kennedy et al. 2015). 
However, the conceptual history and paradigmatic focus of surveillance studies also 
extends beyond the social sciences’ relatively novel preoccupation with computation. My 
interest in this chapter is to interrogate the potential of surveillance as a master concept 
in understanding agency under consideration of the particular role of computation from 
within its own theoretical repertoire and conceptual history. Chapter Three then shifts 
focus to issues of computation in wider social theory.   
The chapter begins by documenting how surveillance has been discussed across classic 
sociological work, post-modern accounts, and approaches rooted in the tradition of 
reflexive modernity. It argues that while surveillance is an integral part of modernity, 
assessments about its nature and about its relationship with other concepts diverges across 
theoretical approaches. The argument follows and extends Lyon’s (2007) claim that a 
grand theory is ill-suited to capture the complexity of contemporary surveillance, in 
particular from a perspective that both considers its computational nature and the role of 
agency, and hence calls for a situated framework that focuses on particular configurations 
of surveillance. The chapter suggests that surveillance studies still carry too much 
conceptual baggage to systematically move towards such an approach, and that any such 
attempt needs to emancipate surveillance studies from the panopticon, Bentham’s prison 
design which informed Foucault’s theory of disciplinary society as the archetype of 
surveillance. Reviewing critiques of the panopticon (e.g. Boyne 2000; Yar 2003; 
Haggerty 2006), this chapter identifies the ‘docile bodies’ paradigm (Foucault 1977) as 
the central obstacle for considering agency and argues that later Foucauldian approaches 
rooted in a governmentality paradigm cannot overcome this issue.  
On the back of this diagnosis, the chapter then outlines the parameters for a situated 
approach via the notion of interactivity (Kiousis 2002). It proposes that interactivity is a 
concept which both delineates the surveillance context under study, and simultaneously 
offers an open framework to consider various manifestations of agency. Building on the 
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idea of interactivity, the chapter reviews existing, largely empirical approaches to agency, 
and translates them into a theoretical discussion. Concluding, the chapter considers two 
possible perspectives through which a theory of agency in the context of computational 
surveillance can be formulated despite the shortcomings of surveillance studies today. 
Comparing both approaches, it argues that surveillance studies ultimately are too narrow 
to provide an understanding of how people live with computational surveillance. As 
surveillance creeps into nearly all aspects of life, the chapter calls to de-centre 
surveillance studies and to embed the issue surveillance into the broader repertoire of 
social theory. This way, a more context-specific analysis of surveillance is possible, and 
frameworks become available in which agency plays a pivotal role, rather than standing 
on the periphery.  
2.1. Approaches To Surveillance 
In the following sections, I document how surveillance has been considered across 
various strands of social theory, and how conceptions of surveillance have changed as the 
field of social theory grappled with a transformation of society itself. I argue that a grand 
theory of surveillance is unable to capture the nuances and particularities of specific 
configurations of surveillance and needs to be replaced by a more situated approach. I 
reserve a separate section for a more extensive discussion of Foucault’s view on 
surveillance expressed through the idea of the panopticon, a particular prison design, 
which had considerable influence on the development of surveillance studies, and outline 
the notions of governmentality and technologies of the self as often postulated successor 
concepts within a Foucauldian paradigm. I conclude that Foucauldian approaches by 
themselves are unable to address the issue of agency, and that a situated approach requires 
a different perspective.  
2.1.1. Surveillance, Social Theory, and Modernity 
Surveillance occurs in all cultures, societies and times (Lyon 2006). Recent 
archaeological work even suggests that the panopticon, which Foucault (1977) thought 
of as a quintessentially modern surveillance architecture, already existed in antiquity 
(Yekutieli 2006). But as a political and social concept, surveillance has found a structural 
and systematic expression in modern societies. Such considerations of surveillance are 
not static over time, and linked to a broader debate about the make-up and transformation 
of modern societies. Below, I document conceptions of surveillance in classic social 
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theory and newer theoretical approaches. I understand classic social theory as theoretical 
frameworks that have been instructive for the emergence of sociology as a discipline, and 
which seek to understand modernity as such. The newer theories are those which 
problematise modernity and document its transformation, be it under the label of post-
modern or other theory. I conclude this section with remarks on the scope of theory as 
such, and whether changes in modernity and ergo surveillance still merit a grand theory 
of surveillance.  
 Classic Social Theory and Surveillance 
Early capitalist implications of surveillance are reflected in the time-and-motion-studies 
of Frederick Taylor, a 19th-century factory owner who went at great length to implement 
and study systems of workplace surveillance in order to rationalise production (Noble 
1986). Already Karl Marx7 hence saw surveillance as part of the political economy of 
capitalism, creating a link between surveillance and the exploitation of labour (Fuchs 
2013), and Weber considered surveillance as a constituent part of bureaucratic 
organisation, expressed through rationalisation and control in his ‘iron cage’ metaphor 
(Weber [1930] 2001). Giddens later argued that surveillance should not merely be 
considered as part of modernity by proxy of capitalism or bureaucracy, but as a feature in 
its own right that allows the direct supervision of social life through the state (Giddens 
1985). He sees surveillance as a systemic requirement for the modern nation state in that 
it affords the state with the administrative power to manage populations and territories at 
a distance. Reviewing earlier theorists, Dandecker (1994) proposed to connect 
surveillance across capitalism, bureaucracy and militarism. Other classic social theories 
of modernity account for surveillance implicitly. Considering changing notions of social 
solidarity in modern societies, Durkheim’s studies of crime suggested that rising 
inequality spurs an increase in surveillance, and Simmel’s ‘society of strangers’ in the 
emerging metropolis presents itself as a world of eroding trust relationships in which 
people monitor each other suspiciously (Simmel 1971).  
Examining the philosophical discourse around the eye and the concept of vision in France, 
Jay (1994) notes a transformation in attitude, a Denigration of Vision in the 20th century 
away from Enlightenment thinking to darker associations with power, perversion, and 
                                                
7 I use the full name of all authors named Marx to distinguish between Karl Marx and surveillance scholar 
Gary T. Marx. 
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ultimately surveillance. Accounts in the philosophy of history, in particular from a 
Foucauldian perspective, have also highlighted how a quantitative paradigm borne out 
the Enlightenment has facilitated and institutionalised systematic surveillance. Hacking 
(1990) documents the rise of statistics and measurement of people as a mode of 
governance. Rose speaks about the accountability through numbers emerging in the 19th 
century as a mode of governance for states and capitalist economies alike, which 
coincided with the rise of the ‘calculable person’ (Rose 1999). While these accounts are 
not directly rooted in social theory, their historical perspective provides a deeper 
understanding of the epistemological principles of surveillance, and how ways of making 
sense of the world are connected to particular expressions of power. They also serve as 
an analytical bridge to consider a second, newer strand of social theory that seeks to 
rethink surveillance in a changing social context. The critique of vision and the role of 
statistics and calculation are all referenced in the development of such arguments. 
 Surveillance and Critiques of Modernity 
The classic social theories that I mentioned above are foundational for sociology as a 
discipline. They place surveillance in the context of the structural constitution of modern 
societies and its master concepts of capitalism, bureaucracy, nation state, solidarity. 
Aiming to order the field of surveillance studies, some observers propose that such 
approaches can be juxtaposed with postmodern theories of surveillance (Lyon 2007). The 
notion of postmodernity is itself contested, but Lyon argues that one does not need to 
accept the validity of the concept to consider it a useful marker for organising surveillance 
theory. Yet as postmodernity comes with conceptual baggage and preconceptions that 
would narrow the range of theories included, I propose to broaden the scope to all those 
theories associated with changing social, political, cultural and economic paradigms of 
modernity from the last quarter of the 20th century onwards. This includes theories under 
the label of postmodernity, but also those which instead argue for the emergence of 
another type of modernity, either denoted as Second Modernity, Late Modernity, 
Reflexive Modernity, Re-Modernity, High Modernity, or Liquid Modernity (Giddens 
1990; Beck 1992; Beck & Bonß 2001; Beck, Giddens & Lash 1996; Bauman 2000). 
While postmodernity undertakes a de-structuration and de-conceptualisation of 
modernity, accounts that see another modernity emphasise a re-structuration and re-
conceptualisation of modernity (Beck, Bonß & Lau 2001).  
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A common trait among these theoretical approaches is that they consider surveillance in 
light of the transformation of society itself and the critique of modernity under these 
conditions. In this process, surveillance becomes associated with a range of additional 
concepts that have come to frame social theory, such as technology, information, 
databases, the body, gender, culture and consumption. At the same time, such theories 
suggest a changing nature of surveillance itself. For instance, Staples ([2000] 2013) charts 
the transformation of surveillance from the informal, haphazard and unstructured 
supervision in pre-modernity, over formal classification and categorization in modernity 
expressed in bureaucracy, to postmodern surveillance, which is systematic, automated, 
real-time, and takes place across complex digital networks.  
This echoes previous observations from Deleuze (1992), who documents a shift in how 
power operates through surveillance. For Deleuze, surveillance has ceased to be primarily 
concerned with disciplining people in enclosed and pre-defined social contexts such as 
the school or the prison, an idea central to Foucault’s argument that I explore next, and 
referenced in the bureaucratic, military and Taylorist workplace supervision connotations 
of surveillance. Instead, Deleuze claims that surveillance has shifted towards a more 
subtle, but all-encompassing notion of control reproduced across and designed into all 
aspects of social life. At the same time, surveillance is never complete, but perpetual. A 
final judgement call on the subject under surveillance, as guilty or innocent, as sick or 
healthy, is never undertaken. Surveillance operates in an endless loop. The spatial 
extension of surveillance then coincides with a shift in temporal focus from the past and 
present to the future. Bogard (1996; 2006) has underscored this future-focus of 
contemporary surveillance through his idea of surveillance as simulation, where future 
outcomes are generated on the basis of data analysis.  
Spatial and temporal reconfigurations of surveillance extend into broader considerations 
around the relationship between data and surveillance, and ultimately the agents and 
subjects of surveillance. Gary T. Marx (2002) has coined the term ‘new surveillance’ to 
highlight that alongside the changing make-up of society, surveillance relies on the use 
of digital data about people. Bowker & Star (1999) have emphasised the potential of 
social sorting facilitated through data, Poster (1996) proposed to consider databases as 
discourses in which surveillance becomes manifest, and other authors have underscored 
that the proliferation of data means that those under surveillance are not monitored as 
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flesh-and-bone individuals, but as representations of their data locked into code. These 
representations are variably termed ‘data-doubles’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000), ‘data 
persona’ (Clarke 2004) or ‘data images’ (Lyon 1994). Building on Deleuze’s idea of 
control, Galloway (2006) suggests that code and protocol have become the primary agents 
of surveillance.8  
Other authors further extend the point about changing agents of surveillance to set it apart 
from classic modern considerations. Giddens (1985) in particular focussed on 
surveillance as the exclusive domain of the state, and whereas Marx and others considered 
surveillance in the context of capitalism, they emphasised it in the context of the 
exploitation of labour. Among critiques of modernity, Staples ([2000] 2013) already 
hinted that the transformation of surveillance into a pervasive phenomenon needs to be 
considered in the context of consumer society. Bauman (2001; 2005) developed this idea 
more systematically and located surveillance in the broader domain of consumer 
seduction. The notion of seduction highlights several attributes of surveillance. Firstly, it 
documents the emergence of corporations as surveillance agents, secondly it argues that 
the aim of surveillance is neither coercion, nor necessarily control in an absolute manner, 
but influence. Thirdly, it incorporates the idea of the Janus-faced nature of surveillance 
(Lyon 1994) in that seduction can spark willing complicity in being surveilled, and that 
surveillance can generate at least perceived benefits to consumers.  
 The Fragmentation of Surveillance and the Quest for a Grand Theory 
More widely, considerations of surveillance beyond classic social theory demonstrate a 
growing diversity of surveillance itself, coinciding with an increase in scholarship that 
considers different fields of surveillance. Instead of a general narrative, surveillance has 
become situated in a range of different discourses from crime culture over CCTV and 
biometric filtering to consumer targeting on the internet, which complicates a 
comprehensive review.  
Social sciences have the tendency to elevate era-defining phenomena through labels. 
German sociology knows the term ‘Bindestrichgesellschaft' (Schelsky 1965), literally 
                                                
8 Galloway’s claim has considerable implications for understanding agency in the context of surveillance 
and intersects with broader debates about the role of algorithms, big data, software, code and other concepts 
in the constitution of societies. The next chapter emphasises this theme and I will hence not go into further 
detail here. 
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hyphenated society, whose name is a composite of ‘society’ and one dominant attribute 
that characterises it, such as ‘knowledge society’ (Drucker 1969), ‘network society’ 
(Castells 2009; van Dijk 2012), ‘information society’ (Webster 2006; Mansell 2009), 
‘post-industrial society’ (Bell 1976), ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) or ‘consumer society’ 
(Baudrillard 1998).9 The proliferation of surveillance has produced similar labels. Gary 
T. Marx (1985) first coined the term ‘surveillance society', which was soon adopted by 
Gandy (1989). Writing about the pervasive spread of CCTV cameras in the UK, Norris 
& Armstrong (1999) argued that the developed world is on its way to a ‘Maximum 
Surveillance Society’. Although he accepts the term, Murakami Wood (2009) more 
carefully uses inverted commas in referring to ‘surveillance society’. 
These ‘Bindestrichgesellschaften’ require careful evaluation in the tendency of each to 
denote what Schelsky (1965) calls a ‘pars-pro-toto’ (my emphasis) society that seeks to 
capture a given social system comprehensively. He stresses that contemporary society is 
so diverse in its inherent heterogeneity that it can accommodate a plurality of partial 
descriptions, but only as long as they do not take their pars-pro-toto literally and claim 
exclusivity of social explanation. As some authors argue, the merit of such all-
encompassing labels lies in the development of hypotheses to describe and accentuate 
phenomena that pervade social reality at large, and provided they retain this character of 
a hypothesis can coexist with other perspectives on society (Schelsky 1965; Tyrell 2005). 
The notion of a surveillance society has merit in that it elevates surveillance to a systemic 
feature of modern societies. It highlights that surveillance is not only pervasive but that a 
logic of surveillance is emblematic for social processes and conduct at large. This makes 
it possible to consider surveillance not merely as an expression of other phenomena, but 
as a foundational principle of society in its own right. Yet paradoxically, the pervasive 
spread of surveillance also undermines the usefulness of such a label. Its very rise 
fractures surveillance as a holistic concept. As I outlined above, surveillance exists from 
numerous scholarly perspectives, in multiple contexts, with multiple manifestations and 
is not homogenous in its intentions, distribution, and effects. This is especially pertinent 
                                                
9 These authors’ use of such labels does not imply the uncritical normative acceptance of the underlying 
concepts. For instance, Webster (2012) is himself critical of concepts of information society and Mansell 
(2009) documents the dystopian connotations of an ‘information society’ brought forward by theorists like 
Jacques Ellul ([1954] 1964). Also note that while Bell is commonly associated with the term ‘post-industrial 
society’, he is considered as the originator of the term ‘information society’ (Mansell 2009) that has been 
popularised by later theorists. 
  
32 
in the context of the ‘new surveillance’ that Marx (2002) outlines, and which is at the 
heart of this study, where data collection and analysis pervade nearly every aspect of 
everyday life (Beer 2009). Any blanket theory of surveillance would ignore such nuances 
and trends. Thus when Lyon (2007) argues that concepts like surveillance society are 
potentially misleading, he instead proposes a differentiated approach that considers 
distinct sites of surveillance to 
“[separate] surveillance strands out into different domains of social life such as 
work and leisure. This gives us a sense of the variety of surveillance situations 
that we might encounter, a sense of how one system gave rise to or facilitated 
another, and at the same time a sense of how one system will overlap with another 
or several others.” (Lyon 2007: 25) 
I argue that such an approach can be extended to take into account specific agents, 
subjects, means and intentions of surveillance which together with sites of surveillance 
form distinct configurations which each require their own theoretical framework. This 
has implications for the theoretical framework of this particular research and its emphasis 
on agency in the context of digital surveillance in mediated everyday life. A grand theory 
of surveillance would struggle to provide the necessary detail and focus. However, the 
theoretical development of surveillance studies itself remains an obstacle to developing 
such an approach, and the influence of Foucault plays a central role in this as I argue in 
the following section.  
2.1.2. Overcoming the Panopticon  
Despite the volume and variety of scholarship, Foucault’s influence and in particular his 
notion of the panopticon continues to dominate surveillance studies in the form of a grand 
theory. In fact, the panopticon has become the predominant scholarly template for 
analysing surveillance, invariably as a full-fledged theory or merely as a metaphor. Its 
continuing dominance in surveillance studies comes despite early criticism that Foucault's 
work was flawed (Ignatieff 1977) and arguments that understanding surveillance requires 
broader frameworks (Webster & Robins 1986; Baumann 1988; Zubroff 1989). In the 
following, I outline Foucault’s central surveillance concept, how it has come to influence 
surveillance studies, and trace a growing discourse that seeks to overcome it.  
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 Understanding the Panopticon from Bentham to Foucault 
The panopticon is a concept for a prison design originally invented by social reformer 
Jeremy Bentham who envisioned it to cure social ills. Bentham contemplated the 
panopticon for two decades, but it was ultimately never build to his original specifications 
(Bentham 2010). Its architecture intended to maximise the visibility of prisoners through 
careful arrangement of space and light, making inmates continually exposed to an 
invisible observer concealed in a central tower. While this observer may not see the 
inmates all the time, inmates do not know when the observer might be looking at them. 
The gaze is unverifiable but potentially present at any given moment, causing inmates to 
comply due to uncertainty of exposure. Foucault powerfully describes the panoptic design 
as follows:  
“At the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced 
with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric 
building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the 
building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the 
windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell 
from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a 
central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, 
a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the 
tower, standing out precisely against the light the small captive shadows in the 
cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theaters, in 
which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible.” 
(Foucault 1977: 200) 
Foucault appropriated the idea of the panopticon and made it central to his theory of 
power outlined in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977). For him, the panopticon is an 
expression of discipline as a particular mechanism through which power operates by 
minutely regulating space, time, and people’s behaviour. Foucault sees discipline as the 
dominant mode of power from the 18th century onwards with the objective to form ‘docile 
bodies’, that is bodies moulded into functioning for the specific socio-political 
requirements of the time, such as the military, penal institutions, classrooms and 
hospitals. In contrast to a previously dominant sovereign power expressed in public 
spectacles of torture and executions that induced compliance through fear and horror, 
governing bodies through discipline takes place without macabre physical force.  
Exercising power in these disciplinary societies requires so-called ‘total institutions’, 
which are distinct, heavily regulated architectural entities and social environments of 
constant surveillance (Foucault 1977). In these enclosures, the constant awareness of 
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being watched by an invisible force creates an internalisation of control. As subjects of 
surveillance are unable to pinpoint the overseer, they adjust and normalise their behaviour 
even when it is not necessary (Koskela 2003). Total institutions then “manufacture 
conscience” (Tabor 2001: 128) through surveillance. The panopticon is the archetype of 
such a total institution. It enables surveillance in its purest and most radical form: a linear, 
top-down relationship between the watcher and those under surveillance, totalising and 
dominating.  
 The Panopticon’s Changing Fortune: Appeal, Application, Critique 
The panopticon’s analytical appeal for understanding surveillance rests in its flexibility 
of application and multi-layered nature, it is “both fragmented and unified at the same 
time” (Whitaker 1999: 143). In surveillance theory, the panopticon can be understood as 
a panoptic spectrum, with Bentham’s prison at one end as the panopticon in its pure form, 
and strewn across it other real-world phenomena that appropriate specific panoptic 
attributes. The example of CCTV surveillance illustrates this, where subjects of 
surveillance are not physically confined, the aspect of coercion is weakened, and the 
ability of resistance increased (Albrechtslund 2008). What remains is the notion of a 
spatial architecture of surveillance and a vertical relationship of visibility between known 
subjects of surveillance and an unknown, omniscient watcher. In contrast to Sartre's 
‘gaze', which offers a similarly objectifying relationship of visibility (Sartre [1943] 1993), 
the panopticon stands in a broader social and political context that can be selectively 
historicised beyond Foucault’s 18th-century focus. 
Beyond the literal application of the panopticon, two general strands of theory have 
emerged that support the longevity of the concept. Out of these, one set of theory suggests 
that the increase of surveillance in contemporary societies further inflates Foucault’s 
concept into a ‘superpanopticon’ (Poster 1990), ‘global panopticon’ (Gill 1995) or 
‘omnicon’ (Goombridge 2000). A second set of theories conceptually reworks the 
panopticon in order to mould it to new realities, such as changed parameters between 
watchers and watched and new power relations inherent in those parameters. Hence the 
‘synopticon' suggests that in a mass-mediated society, surveillance is expressed by the 
many watching the few, and not the few watching the many (Mathiesen 1997). The 
‘polyopticon' (Allen 1994) introduces a multiplicity of relations of visibility and the 
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‘cybernetic panopticon' (Bousquet 1998) and the ‘neo-panopticon’ (Mann et al. 2003) 
seek to bring the concept into the digital realm of computers.  
Iterations of the panopticon have become so prominent that Lyon (2006) diagnoses a 
flourishing panopticism in surveillance studies. Haggerty (2006) laments that the inability 
to abandon the panopticon metaphor has effectively turned surveillance studies into 
panopticon studies, conflating the panopticon with surveillance itself, to worrisome 
implications: 
“The sheer number of works that invoke the panopticon is overwhelming. More 
problematically, the panoptic model has become reified, directing scholarly 
attention to a select subset of attributes about surveillance. In doing so, analysts 
have excluded or neglected a host of other key qualities and processes of 
surveillance that fall outside of the panoptic framework. The result has been that 
the panoptic model has been over-extended to domains where it seems ill-suited, 
and important attributes of surveillance that cannot neatly be subsumed under the 
‘panoptic’ rubric have been neglected.” (Haggerty 2006: 23) 
Yar (2003) finds three types of critical responses to the panopticon. There are those like 
Norris & Armstrong (1999) who see a problem of degree rather than kind. Such 
approaches accept the concept of panoptic power in principle but caution against blindly 
reproducing it across all surveillance settings. Another type of criticism focuses on the 
temporal and geographical applicability of the panopticon. It argues that the socio-
historical context of the panopticon was limited to 18th century Europe, failing to capture 
surveillance in globalised contemporary societies. So-called ‘post-disciplinary’ accounts 
like Bogard (1996), Bauman (1988) and Rose (1999) propose alternative frameworks for 
surveillance which, as their common label suggests, seek to realign socio-historical reality 
and theoretical approach. Lastly, Yar considers approaches that revise or extend the 
panopticon as a form of criticism. This is different from my own framing of these 
accounts which follows Haggerty (2006) and Lyon (2006). I share their interpretation that 
such revisions of panopticism are expressions of endorsement that hinder more relevant 
engagements with surveillance.  
In his critique, Yar subsumes Boyne (2000) in the category of those who reformulate the 
panopticon and grant it staying power. However, I argue that Boyne’s argument is more 
complex than Yar’s analysis suggests, and of particular merit to this particular research 
project. In his ‘post-panopticism’, Boyne advances a critique that joins up existing 
characterisations of surveillance in the context of changes in modernity into an explicit 
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argument against the panopticon and combines this with an interrogation of Foucault’s 
underlying assumptions. His account is instructive for the theoretical framework of this 
research project because it references both the mediatisation of surveillance, its 
computerisation as well as offering a perspective on agency.  
Boyne proposes a categorical transformation of surveillance in five arguments. Drawing 
on Bauman, he firstly highlights that discipline as a principle of social order has been 
replaced with the idea of seduction. Secondly, he argues that post-panoptic subjects watch 
over themselves instead of being watched over by “central executive functions” (Boyne 
2000: 300). Thirdly, he concurs with Bogard (1996) that as surveillance has become 
computerised, it has become future-directed and that such diagnostic surveillance is 
incompatible with the panoptic model. Fourthly, he sees a “reversal of the Panoptical 
polarity” (Boyne 2000: 299) through models like the ‘synopticon’, which changes the 
uni-directional and totalising notion of watching. Lastly, Boyne suggests that the idea of 
discipline itself is a historically specific manifestation of the self in Christianity which is 
under pressure today as concepts of self have changed towards a liberatory and self-
expressive paradigm. He argues that the contemporary self is not amenable to Foucault’s 
idea of 18th-century discipline and would rebel to such an extent that physical force would 
be needed to sustain order. Instead of producing ‘docile bodies’, the panopticon would 
dismantle itself. Boyne concludes that the panopticon should be dismantled, but also that 
it should remain as a reference point against which contemporary theory of surveillance 
positions itself.  
 ‘Docile Bodies’ and the Limits of the Panoptic Paradigm 
For the central question of this research, agency towards surveillance, the ‘docile bodies’ 
hypothesis stands out as an aspect of critique. While Boyne (2000) principally considers 
this idea in the context of a socio-historical transformation of the self, its limitations are 
much more poignant when it comes to agency and thus requires further exploration. 
Accepting the ‘docile bodies’ paradigm means acknowledging that individuals are 
passively exposed to power (McNay 1994). This a priori negates the very possibility of 
agency and renders any such inquiry impossible. The ongoing prominence of the 
panopticon in surveillance studies then helps explain why debates have mainly focussed 
on the perspective of watchers over those under surveillance. However, such a focus is 
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insufficient, and Lyon has underscored that beyond well-acknowledged issues of power, 
surveillance also is about personhood: 
“Persons, by which I mean social, embodied subjects, are often aware of 
surveillance and they interact with it in an imaginatively complex range of ways. 
At the end of the day, it is also flesh-and-blood humans who are affected by 
surveillance, for better or for worse, and thus whose life-chances and whose 
choices are at stake when any surveillance system is in place that touches their 
lives. Several debates about both power and personhood must be explored […].” 
(Lyon 2007: 24). 
The presumption that bodies are docile does not allow to consider personhood. Even total 
institutions themselves do not produce docile bodies and afford at least some agency, as 
Goffman (1961) has shown in his study of mental asylums, where the inmates subvert the 
guards' orders. Similarly, studies of resistance indicate how agency can be considered in 
surveillance research once researchers rid themselves of the docile bodies paradigm (e.g. 
Albrechtslund 2008). In a nod to Goffman, Yar then proposes that a theoretical 
reconsideration of surveillance requires a change of method as well:  
“Sociologically, it is suggested that the precise relation between surveillance and 
self-discipline requires us to attend, in ethnomethodological fashion, to the 
situated sense-making activities of subjects as the go about everyday practical 
activities […].” (Yar 2003: 254) 
Critiques of the panopticon, and in particular the dismantling of ‘docile bodies’, provide 
justification for abandoning a grand theory of surveillance. However, as Boyne (2000) 
indicated, despite the fact that the panopticon is dead, it remains analytically productive: 
Yar’s argument to emphasise the sense-making of subjects in everyday life itself is a 
consequence of the shortcomings of the panopticon. Paradoxically, in the debate for or 
against the panopticon, Foucault himself might have joined the side of critics and 
dismissed extensions and reinterpretations of the panopticon: 
“[…] to use Foucault’s concepts in the manner of universals […] goes against the 
grain of his own insistence on using concepts as a posteriori ‘principles of 
intelligibility’ rather than as a priori universals, even when they are historicized 
to fit current practices […].” (Voruz 2013: 127, original emphasis) 
Yet Foucault offers other principles of intelligibility beyond the panopticon, which means 
that his influence on surveillance theory remains notable. I illustrate this in the next 
section.  
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 Foucault After the Panopticon 
In light of the pervasive criticism of the panopticon, surveillance scholars have turned 
towards Foucault’s later idea of governmentality as an alternative paradigm for theorizing 
surveillance (Haggerty 2006). Unlike the panopticon that regards power as totalising, 
governmentality proposes that power is at once totalising and individualising (Foucault 
1991). On the one hand, the state aims to rule the individual continuously. On the other 
hand, it can best do so by involving non-state authorities in governance and by 
encouraging freedom, provided freedom is exercised in a well-regulated and responsible 
manner. This way, the state can avoid using force and outsource responsibility (Barry et 
al. 1996). In such a configuration, individuals participate in their own governance through 
‘technologies of the self’ (Rose 1999) which stand for techniques to watch over, and take 
care of themselves. While surveillance is the price paid for such freedom (Rose 1999), 
recent scholarship also shows that surveillance is itself a mode through which freedoms 
are enacted. For instance, Ouellette & Hay (2008) argue that amidst the retreat of the state 
in neoliberal societies and the privatization of welfare, the public gaze of often 
disenfranchised people on reality TV provides blueprints for self-help and self-
responsibilisation. Governmentality hence sees individuals not merely as subjected to 
power, but affords them an active role and thereby grants them the possibility for agency 
that the panopticon denied. At the same time, governmentality is not embedded in a grand 
theory of surveillance, which makes it more flexible in its application. Governmentality 
acknowledges that surveillance is designed into many aspects of everyday life and enables 
situated, meso-level approaches that recognise the particular rationale of each 
surveillance configuration. This is particularly useful for perspectives on types of 
surveillance that rely on data collection and processing across very different contexts and 
objectives, from urban policing to consumer monitoring (Lyon 2007; Haggerty & Ericson 
2000). Taken together, these attributes would suggest governmentality as a suitable 
candidate for understanding agency towards contemporary surveillance. However, 
governmentality falls short of its promises.  
Firstly, governmentality merely permits responses to surveillance that do not critique or 
undermine it. This becomes apparent through the technologies of the self that inform 
governmentality. Technologies of the self present themselves as a range of options which 
are provided by a governmental culture (McNay 1994). They only allow individuals to 
take care of themselves within a certain range of practices, as long as individual acts are 
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not detrimental to the ambitions of top-down power. Agency is thus constrained and pre-
engineered. Moreover, any such agency, however limited, depends on accepting 
surveillance in the first place, as surveillance enables the very freedoms that people are 
granted.  
Secondly, governmentality is concerned with issues of power and how they sustain a 
system and logic of governance. It is not preoccupied with the subjective, lived 
experience of such regimes and lacks the conceptual catalogue to develop such a 
perspective. The notion of agency, and human actors themselves, remain untheorised. 
Haggerty (2006) has therefore stressed that surveillance studies need to look beyond 
governmentality if they want to take serious the perspective of human agents. The idea 
of the self, and with that agency, becomes more prominent in Foucault’s later work on 
the history of sexuality (Foucault 1976). Foucault develops an ethics of the self which 
establishes an account of human subjectivity. However, this ethics stands removed from 
a wider theory of power and has received criticism for its opaque notion of a Baudelarian 
aesthetic, hampering its use (McNay 1994).  
As the applicability of the panopticon to surveillance wanes, surveillance scholars remain 
interested in Foucault, mainly due to his detailed work on power and governance, which 
are core aspects of surveillance. While governmentality overcomes many of the 
limitations of the panopticon, it still does not permit to look at relations among actors, 
and in particular subjects of surveillance. Doing so requires considering alternative 
frameworks outside of a Foucauldian tradition. 
2.2. A New Framework for Surveillance 
So far, I have documented the complexity of surveillance in contemporary society and 
have highlighted the proliferation of multiple theoretical approaches from classic social 
theory over approaches located in a critique of modernity, to Foucault’s panopticon as 
the predominant template for understanding surveillance. I have concluded that 
overcoming the legacy of the panopticon is a prerequisite for considering agency towards 
surveillance and that newer paradigms in the Foucauldian tradition by themselves fall 
short of this task. In this analysis, I have stressed that a grand theory of surveillance needs 
to be replaced by a situated approach specific to the surveillance problem at hand. Lyon 
offers a sense of orientation. To formulate a situated approach, he proposes a taxonomy 
  
40 
of surveillance sites that range from “military discipline and intelligence”, “state 
administration and the census”, “work monitoring and supervision”, “policing and crime 
control”, to “consumption and making up consumers”. (Lyon 2007: 27, 30, 33, 36, 40). 
Yet a focus on surveillance sites alone neglects the importance of choosing a particular 
perspective on such sites. Given the problems of surveillance studies with the notion of 
agency, my interpretation of a situated approach expands on Lyon’s original proposal. 
Instead of focussing on sites of surveillance per se, below, I outline a site-specific 
approach through the prism of agency. Specifically, I describe the parameters for such a 
situated approach, in how far the conceptual repertoire of surveillance studies is capable 
of addressing them, and whether a broader analytical framework outside of surveillance 
studies is required, in particular as surveillance now takes place within a wider 
computational transformation. What I outline below is not a theory of agency towards 
computational surveillance as such, which will follow in the next chapter. Instead, I 
delineate the factors that it needs to consider and propose a way forward. I begin by 
proposing the notion of interactivity as a concept that helps define the particular issue of 
surveillance in question. I then argue that interactivity provides a template on which 
numerous expressions of agency can be considered. Outlining these possible expressions 
of agency, I embed them in a broader framework of the self in contemporary society. I 
conclude by discussing two possible ways forward in translating such a situated approach 
to surveillance into a theory of agency.  
2.2.1. Information, Surveillance, and Interactivity 
More than two decades ago Lyon (1988) projected that the politically and socially most 
significant aspects of digital information technologies would be their data-processing 
capacities. However, surveillance is not merely a consequence of information. Rather, the 
two concepts are mutually constitutive and inextricably intertwined. Using interactivity 
as a binding concept helps to explain this relationship. Whilst there is a lack of clarity 
among scholars how to exactly define interactivity (Kiousis 2002), a key characteristic is 
the two-way flow of information it enables. Interactive space is a realm in which every 
action generates information about itself (Andrejevic 2007) through a feedback channel. 
Interactive space can thus be considered as both an information and a surveillance space. 
This mutuality of information and surveillance is documented by Andrejevic in the 
context of digital television platform TiVo. By the act of watching, audiences generate 
real-time information about their viewing habits which through a digital interactive 
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channel is delivered back in a continuous stream to the sender. The analysis of this 
information facilitates for instance targeted advertising and informs the kind of content 
which will be aired in future on the principles of the ratings industry (Andrejevic 2007). 
On the internet, the feedback opportunities far extend this example and are in principle 
endless.  
Whilst Andrejevic paints a grim picture, the interactivity afforded by the internet has been 
heralded as a liberatory promise by others. Pool ([1983] 1984) articulates a deep 
optimism, seeing electronic media as harbingers of freedom through their ease of access, 
low cost and distributed nature, that only wrong political choices could undermine. De 
Kerckhove recognises in interactivity on the internet a shift in power from the producer 
to the consumer. He considers interactivity as a genuinely democratic concept which 
holds a liberatory potential that an analogue politics has failed to put to practice (de 
Kerckhove 1997). More recently, Deuze (2012) explicitly turned against critical 
perspectives: 
“[…] we have to let go of seeing media as influence machines that will eventually 
make us disappear, instead considering media as part of our lives to the extent that 
they will make us visible (again).” Deuze 2012: 264) 
Against the stance these authors take, an etymological approach to interactivity reveals 
more troublesome implications. The concept of interactivity was originally coined in a 
military-technological discourse on computer sciences, known as cybernetics. Long 
before the proliferation of the internet, in the 1940s, a founding figure of this discipline, 
Norbert Wiener, developed the concept of cybernetics as referring to a mechanism of 
command and control, enhanced through feedback capacity. However, Wiener already 
pointed to potential social implications of this technical feedback mechanism and 
cautioned about misuse for purposes of social control (Wiener [1948] 2013). Before the 
concept became prominent, its technical developer already became its first critic.  
Andrejevic goes even further back in time and traces a use of the term cybernetics before 
it became a scientific concept associated with technology or even ‘the media’. While 
Wiener’s take on the term reveals that interactivity is much more ambivalent than Deuze 
and de Kerckhove frame it, Andrejevic highlights an outright anti-liberatory origin of 
cybernetics. He traces a first use of the term in an article by Clerk Maxwell in 1868 on 
governors. Maxwell borrowed the term cybernetics as a pseudo-latinism from the Greek 
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term kubernetes, which can be translated as ‘steersman’. This evidence leads Andrejevic 
to conclude that cyberspace from its very inception is a steered, a directed space which 
clashes with liberatory promises articulated by de Kerckhove and others (Andrejevic 
2007). Such assessments of interactivity offer two perspectives on the way towards a 
theory of agency.  
Firstly, the notion of interactivity helps specify the surveillance environment this study 
seeks to address. The role of interactivity has recently been recognised by a range of 
inquiries that combine the context of media and communications with a perspective on 
surveillance, such as in Turow’s (2006; 2011) work on digital advertising and 
personalisation, Halavais’ (2009) analysis of search engines and surveillance, debates 
around surveillance as a force in digital labour (Scholz 2013) and Zuboff’s (2015) 
diagnosis of surveillance capitalism that underpins Google and other online companies. 
These studies help specify the site of surveillance that this study seeks to address and fills 
a gap in the portfolio of surveillance studies. While Gandy (1993) put the issue of 
dataveillance - the collection, structuring and storing of information about individuals for 
surveillance purposes - on the agenda of surveillance studies, it had been principally 
applied to issues such as the merging of government and commercial databases or the 
multi-source tracking of individuals using credit card information, health records, and 
similar sources in a post 9/11 environment of political risk management (Gandy 2003). 
When it comes to the focus on media, surveying the past issues of the journal Surveillance 
and Society reveals that surveillance studies have predominantly emphasised 
representations of surveillance in the media over the media as a context in which 
surveillance (Surveillance and Society 2002-2015) takes place. Lyon (2007) posits that 
the intersection between media and surveillance remains under-researched, and an area 
in which surveillance studies should develop. The notion of interactivity allows this by 
neither prioritising surveillance nor the mediated environment that people find 
themselves in. Instead, it regards them as mutually constitutive. This perspective is 
particularly useful for this study because it connects the theme of dataveillance to the 
broader trend of ‘datafication’ (Kennedy et al. 2015), or the rendering of the social world 
as such through data and its computation, that will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
The competing utopian and dystopian narratives of interactivity secondly suggest that 
agency towards surveillance is a complex matter. They evoke the Janus-faced nature of 
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surveillance (Lyon 1994) and hint at contesting ideas of how agency should manifest 
itself – as a futile endeavour due to the notion of control inherent in cybernetics, as 
expression of resistance against those powers, or indeed as a liberational force. In the next 
section, I further specify these configurations of agency and how they inform a path for 
studying surveillance.  
2.2.2. Configurations of Agency 
Accounts of agency towards surveillance are scarce and come with a range of limitations. 
They generally focus on isolated empirical domains such as shopping centres or 
webcams, or particular types of agents such as advocacy groups (e.g. Albrechtslund 2008; 
Introna and Gibbons 2009; Koskela 2003) and are not supported by a theoretical 
framework. In one of the rare broader accounts, Gary T. Marx outlines eleven tactics to 
“subvert the collection of personal information” (Marx 2003: 369). His taxonomy 
transcends particular settings and is geared at forms of data-driven surveillance more 
widely. However, it is not generated from an empirical analysis and more programmatic 
than analytical. He also sees these techniques as exceptions and thereby relegates agency 
to a niche phenomenon. Inherent in all such accounts is an a priori focus on particular 
modes of agency as either resistance or complicity, with resistance as the dominating 
theme. This excludes more complex configurations of surveillance such as those implied 
in the notion of interactivity. 
Below, I propose that firstly, increases in depth and scale of commercial surveillance on 
the internet affect individuals throughout everyday life, and not just in limited encounters. 
However, the ways in which this happens are not transparent to individual agents. 
Secondly, I argue that the internet is not merely more interactive than previous media, but 
that there are new kinds of interactivity at play. Supplementing the concept of interactivity 
with the notion of generativity (Zittrain 2008) helps to better understand complex 
relationships between online surveillance and individual agents in a world where the 
general relation of humans to computers has been transformed: “Generativity is a 
system’s capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from 
broad and varied audiences” (Zittrain 2008: 70). This implies that a generative system is 
open and mouldable, which both invites participation as well as new and flexible forms 
of surveillance. The manifold implications of generativity provide a framework which 
can accommodate contradictory views on interactivity as liberating or dominating, and 
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which sees people as both subjects of surveillance and active agents in the surveillance 
process. This requires a more complex understanding of agency beyond straightforward 
resistance or complicity. I illustrate this through the awareness of consumer surveillance, 
user-generated surveillance, and the broader socio-biographical context in which 
surveillance on the internet takes place. On this basis, I evaluate two possible ways 
forward in arriving at a theory of agency.  
2.2.3. Consumer Surveillance and Individual Awareness 
In a review of consumer attitude surveys, Turow demonstrates that while most Americans 
are aware of the fact that websites gather information about them and are familiar with 
the concept of a web cookie, this knowledge does not translate into a deeper 
understanding of data flows and techniques by which online organisations derive, filter, 
manipulate and exchange information about them. Nor are websites’ privacy policies 
comprehensible to consumers:  
“[t]he reactions of most online-at-home adults to a common way websites handle 
visitors’ information indicate that they do not understand the collection, 
interrelation, and use of identifiable and anonymous data.” (Turow 2006) 
Such knowledge becomes more vital as the surveillance activities and capacities of the 
commercial sector are superseding those of the nation state, as Whitaker already observed 
nearly a decade ago (Whitaker: 1999). Even earlier, Oscar Gandy hinted towards the 
economic significance of personal data for targeting the right consumers. This economy 
of personal information has, Gandy claims, implications far beyond issues of privacy 
protection as it uses technology to enact a discriminatory logic which discards of less 
attractive potential customers while ‘skimming-off’ others as “high quality targets of 
opportunity” (Gandy 1996: 152). An increasingly sophisticated and interlinked process 
of data collection and analysis allows the institutionalisation of these processes through 
the categorisation of consumers based on social sorting techniques (Lyon 2007) and thus 
the variable creation of social divisions of which consumers may not even be aware. 
This emerging process marks a fundamental turning point in the relation between 
individuals and categories. For decades, marketing companies have been analysing social 
groups based on gender, income and other variables and tried to target people which they 
believed belonged to this group. However, with the rise of data-mining, this process is 
being reversed as marketers gather vast amounts of data on individuals to separate them 
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into desirable customers (‘targets’) and unnecessary expenses (‘waste’) to be avoided 
(Turow 2011). Together with the automation of advertising planning, buying, selling and 
delivery through algorithmic processes, this results in consumers being grouped in 
categories that are being built from the ground up, or individually tailored advertising 
messages (Turow 2006). Industry research suggests that this so-called ‘programmatic 
advertising’ is becoming the dominant mode of advertising on the internet (Knapp & 
Marouli 2015). As advertising-funded content on the internet comes under increasing 
pressure despite these advances in targeting, mainly due to low advertising margins and 
fragmenting consumption, these targeting principles are starting to be applied to editorial 
content itself, performatively modulating websites and the presentation of content to 
individual users based on their data signals to drive audience loyalty (Couldry & Turow 
2014). 
According to Turow, consumers become at least diffusely aware of the fact that they are 
treated according to certain data-driven assumptions. Trying to evade questions about 
privacy intrusion, marketers are increasingly shifting towards an invitation-based 
business model where they ask desired customers for personal information in return for 
special discounts on their products. This enables consumers to partly influence whether 
they are being elevated to a preferred customer category or not. However, the rationale 
behind such measures is difficult to comprehend for consumers and there is a great degree 
of uncertainty which actions will trigger desirable responses (Turow 2006).  
This has implications for the way in which consumers think tactically or strategically 
about their actions online. Whilst most surveillance writers focus on the categorisation 
aspect of data mining which acts upon consumers, (see Lyon 2007), Turow opens up a 
way to think of how consumers themselves deal with and act in the face of online 
marketing: 
“[consumers] will find it difficult to decipher what marketers and media think of 
their social status. The envy and suspicion that result from that insecurity will 
generate new worries about how to reveal oneself in public when doing so may 
reveal information that may be inserted into databases and may then have 
unknown consequences for one’s own social choices.” (Turow 2006: 187) 
What Turow describes is a two-way process of how consumers deal with information 
about themselves – either holding it back to be used for certain purposes or to actively 
use the display and exchange of such information for their own benefit. Whilst 
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acknowledging limitations which consumer action towards commercial top-down 
surveillance has, this approach goes beyond a linear model which suggests that consumers 
are merely exposed to data-mining surveillance and passive subjects in the process of 
category creation (such as Gandy 1993).  
The metaphor of the ‘glass consumer’ developed by Lace supports Turow’s argument. 
While a straightforward interpretation of the term would indeed merely suggest that data 
collectors “can almost see through us” (Lace 2005a: 1), she extends the metaphor to a 
more nuanced analysis about consumers themselves, likening their role in societies 
saturated by surveillance to “properties and capacities of glass - fragility, transparency, 
the ability to distort the gaze of the viewer” (Lace 2005a: 7). Apart from underscoring the 
vulnerability that people experience when being exposed to surveillance, Lace’s 
metaphor acknowledges ‘capacity’ expressed through ‘distortion’, and thereby highlights 
the possible active role of those under surveillance. The proliferation of data-mining and 
social sorting techniques demonstrates that people’s skills in dealing with such 
surveillance for instance through distortion to generate personal benefit or to avoid 
negative consequences, is increasingly relevant for the management of individual life-
chances. 
2.2.4. Generativity and User-Generated Surveillance 
Online surveillance does not end with surveillance based on a hierarchical and fixed 
relationship between watchers and those being watched. Turow already implied this when 
he attributed to consumers a degree of choice about what information they intend to hold 
back and what they want to communicate. This presupposes awareness about one’s owns 
potential to be surveilled and can go beyond making marketing choices to wider issues of 
self-surveillance, such as checking which information about oneself can be retrieved on 
the web through ordinary tools like search engines. In fact, a survey by the Pew Research 
Center noted an increase in American adult internet users who regularly search for 
themselves online by 22% to 64% between 2003 and 2007 (Pew Internet: 2007). This not 
only suggests an increasing user awareness about the role of search engines in the 
portrayal of personal information, but also the need to monitor and keep up to date with 
the flow of information about the individual self on the internet.  
In addition to self-surveillance, internet users may be surveilled by fellow users or engage 
in such practices themselves. Andrejevic (2005) uses two terms to frame this 
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phenomenon; ‘peer-to-peer surveillance’ and ‘lateral surveillance’. The term ‘peer-to-
peer surveillance’ grasps a new constellation of actors in the surveillance process. Both 
the watchers and those being watched are ordinary internet users, suggesting that no party 
with different structural properties (such as a company, or the state) needs to be involved 
in the surveillance process. The term ‘lateral surveillance’ underlines the power 
relationship between those parties. Lateral surveillance is not a top-down hierarchical 
process, but a more or less horizontal one. Although some users may be more internet-
literate than others, they do not have fundamentally different tools or infrastructures at 
their disposal. In contrast to Andrejevic, Albrechtslund (2008) uses the term 
‘participatory surveillance’ in order to highlight the active role of the individual in the 
surveillance process.  
The differences between Andrejevic and Albrechtslund are not merely terminological. 
Albrechtslund mainly regards participative surveillance as a form of entertainment, 
fuelled by the curiosity to find out what peers are doing, without seriously dominating or 
controlling implications (Albrechtslund 2008). However, although peer-to-peer 
surveillance involves actors with similar structural properties, it may have controlling 
aspects, such as the desire to conduct background checks on potential dating partners in 
the online dating culture, as Andrejevic (2005) highlights.  
I suggest a further distinction. Practices of peer-to-peer or self-surveillance are not merely 
forms of naïve surveillance which draw on information available in the public domain, 
such as using Google or browsing someone’s photos on Facebook. Consider the life-
tracking websites which employ sophisticated opportunities to chart and analyse 
information using algorithms. These websites represent a ‘function creep’ (Winner 1977), 
a spill-over of the logic used in commercial data-mining surveillance technologies to the 
consumer realm.  
User-generated surveillance practices, despite happening without clear-cut top-down 
implications which are characteristic of commercial data-mining, are far from 
straightforward phenomena, both in terms of their motives and technological 
characteristics. This is something which the concept of interactivity fails to grasp. Instead, 
understanding the internet as a generative system capable of accommodating unfiltered 
contributions from a variety of parties (Zittrain 2008) opens a way to understand that 
users can – at least partly – design and mould their own tools and environments of 
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surveillance. Not only can they adopt new practices towards existing technologies, such 
as turning Google into a tool for self-surveillance. More profoundly, they can also design 
and contribute to entire surveillance-based internet communities, such as life-tracking 
sites which create new surveillance environments. This implies that not only are 
individuals in their everyday actions online exposed to an existing surveillance 
infrastructure which they have to come to terms with. They are also involved in the 
creation and proliferation of new surveillance contexts and the voluntary submission to 
such contexts.  
2.2.5. Surveillance and Concepts of the Self 
Just as concepts of surveillance need to be understood in the context of macro-social 
transformations, so does agency towards surveillance need to be embedded in a broader 
framework of the self in society. As Giddens (1990) points out, in the break-up of the 
traditional world order the rule of God was replaced by the faith in rational progress. 
However, in contrast to the rule of God, the concept of rational progress was ill-equipped 
to be an ontological safe-haven for the subject. As Touraine points out:  
“Modern society was born of the break-up of the sacred world order and saw the 
divorce between rational instrumental action and the personal subject.” (Touraine 
1995: 215)  
What he means is that there is a dualism inherent in modernity: The detachment from the 
rule of God on the one hand features the advance of reason and on the other the 
disembedding of the subject. Giddens puts it more clearly when he states that  
“[m]odernity is a post-traditional order, but not one in which the sureties of 
tradition and habit have been replaced by the certitude of rational knowledge. 
Doubt, a pervasive feature of modern critical reason, permeates into everyday life 
[…] and forms a general existential dimension of the contemporary world.” 
(Giddens 1991: 3) 
This existential dimension fostered through doubt can be mapped as a threat to the 
ontological security of the self. Giddens understands ontological security as possessing 
answers to existential and fundamental questions of human life which are under siege in 
a late-modern order that cannot replace the certainties of tradition. Instead, self-identity 
has become a reflexive project in an environment of uncertainty and multiple choice. In 
contrast to the deterministic order of a traditional society, it is up to the individual self to 
sustain a coherent biographical narrative which has to be revised continuously in a context 
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of multiple choice (Giddens 1991). Surveillance is an aid to a biographical narrative as 
Ouellette and Hay's (2008) work on reality TV has shown through a Foucauldian 
framework. However, it can also be a threat to ontological security as it robs agents of 
their ability to craft their own narratives and, for instance through data mining, creates 
alternative narratives which are obscure and opaque to individual agents. In the words of 
Ulrich Beck (1992), surveillance is both an expression of risk society in that it produces 
unanticipated consequences for the very acts and people that it monitors, but acts as a 
way to mitigate risk as well by rationalising and ordering oneself.  
2.3. A Way Forward: De-Centring Surveillance Theory 
The question of agency is situated in a complex set of relationships between human agents 
and surveillance. These relationships reference several conceptions of surveillance 
summarised by Boyne (2000) in his critique of the panopticon. They contain the element 
of consumer seduction that Bauman (2001; 2005) has advanced, the distributed and 
networked nature of surveillance (Gandy 1993; 2003) that is aimed at control, 
management and foresight instead of discipline (Deleuze 1992, Bogard 1996), as well as 
the transformation of roles and distribution of power which concepts like the synopticon 
(Mathiesen 1997) propose. While surveillance itself may be driven by general (power) 
and specific motivations (e.g. marketing, terrorism), so are human agents’ engagements 
with surveillance expression of broader social forces. In order to take account of this 
complexity, two possible approaches to agency emerge. One is rooted within the 
paradigm of surveillance studies and merely extends it. Another argues that surveillance 
is too narrow as an analytical framework to capture the issues at play, and that 
consequently surveillance itself needs to be embedded in a broader framework. In this 
section, I outline and extend the first option based on existing surveillance scholarship. I 
then develop a second approach and offer an argument to pursue the latter. 
A first approach to develop a theory of agency towards surveillance from this scenario 
would be to follow in the footsteps of theoretical assemblages as propagated by Hacking 
(2004) that combine disciplinary or post-disciplinary surveillance theory with a micro-
sociological approach. While one has to be careful in merging such distinctly different 
perspectives, Hacking (2004) suggests that it is possible to combine a Foucauldian view 
with Goffman’s bottom-up approach by drawing on Foucault’s work on discipline 
(Foucault 1977) and Goffman's work on total institutions (Goffman 1961). Goffman 
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throughout his work developed a theory of rules which govern the way people interact 
with each other from the points of view of how they are performed. He was interested in 
how everyday situations are defined by actors aiming at a social consensus, being co-
operative and egalitarian, as well as in situations in which the definitions of a situation by 
one actor or team of actors could be used to control others and thus become a form of 
power. He studied this in the context of mental hospitals where his main interest was not 
in studying how supervisory staff exerts power on inmates, but rather in the ways in which 
patients were able to circumvent and avoid fulfilling the intentions of supervisory staff. 
While patients were watched over, they could not all be changed or ‘cured' in the desired 
way, due to their purposeful actions as subjects. This does not mean, however, that they 
remind entirely unchanged. As Goffman observes: 
“[the self] is not a property of the person whom it is attributed, but dwells rather 
in the pattern of social control that is exerted in connection with the person himself 
and those around him.” (Goffman 1961: 168, my emphasis) 
Hacking draws on this observation and summarises that:  
“The changes are not deliberately brought about by the system of control, but 
instead take place in the presence of another person, and by virtue of this presence 
[…] Each person learns to behave whether by concealing one’s feelings, by 
affirming one’s central role or by a tactical effacement.” (Hacking 2004: 194) 
As a Foucauldian scholar, Hacking thereby erodes firm distinctions between surveillance 
power and subjects of surveillance and re-introduces the subject into Foucauldian theory 
in a way in which it can both comply with or resist modes of governance.  
Such an approach gains additional value if complemented by drawing on de Certeau who 
engages with Foucault and sketches out commonalities and differences. De Certeau 
criticises that Foucault "privileges the productive apparatus [of power]" (de Certeau 1984: 
xiv), whereas he intends to look at not how order is reinforced through productive 
technologies, but “to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, 
and makeshift creativity groups or individuals already caught in the nets of ‘discipline’” 
(de Certeau 1984: xiv-xv). Goffman (1961) puts an emphasis on the performance element 
of social action and his concepts like ‘front’ or ‘backstage behaviour’ can provide 
valuable insights into how people try to negotiate their appearances in an online world 
where front and backstage cannot be easily maintained. Introducing de Certeau’s 
concepts of tactics and strategies emphasises a stronger element of power struggle and 
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allows the analysis of specific acts which emerge out of the surveillance situation and are 
not rooted in pre-existing role conceptions.  
Yet there are major drawbacks to formulating a theory of agency towards surveillance on 
this basis. It assumes that surveillance itself is the implied interlocutor that people relate 
and act towards. Post-disciplinary surveillance theory, in particular, has highlighted the 
role of data in concepts like ‘dataveillance' (Clarke 1988). But such reformulations of 
surveillance theory away from the panopticon have nevertheless assumed that 
surveillance has remained a standalone concept. They have not reconsidered how data 
and the proliferation of computation alongside it change the relationship between 
surveillance and its environment. In fact, the pervasive nature of surveillance today also 
means that it is embedded within other social processes. The notion of interactivity and 
the intersection between surveillance and information indicate this. Similarly, the 
informationalisation of surveillance coincides with a change of surveillance agents, from 
the guard in the watchtower to data, code, algorithms and software. A theory of agency 
towards surveillance, therefore, needs to be seen in the context of broader social changes. 
It needs to take into account the complicit, or even constitutive role of computation in 
shaping the social world, what Kallinikos (2009) has called the ‘computational rendition 
of reality’ and how such processes and operations bring about new configurations of 
agential forces (Van Dijck 2013). It also needs to explore the modalities of interaction 
which human agents can engage in and which emerge in such a world.  
Based on these shortcomings and requirements, a second perspective then emerges. I 
propose to de-centre surveillance studies and instead embed the question of agency 
towards surveillance in a broader framework of social theory that considers the role of 
computation in making up the social world. This also addresses another drawback of 
surveillance studies. Their historical focus on systems and institutions of surveillance has 
foreclosed a systematic debate around agency. If agency is being discussed, this mainly 
happens in an empirical environment (Albrechtslund 2008; Koskela 2003), and not 
through a theory of agency. As surveillance is about power and personhood (Lyon 2007), 
it requires a theory that considers the structural forces of surveillance and agency in 
combination. But theoretical approaches from within surveillance studies are not set up 
to provide such a perspective. Hacking’s suggestion to pair Foucauldian theory with 
Goffman points in this direction. Yet it appears disjointed because it forcefully merges 
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two distinct theoretical strands, one of which is concerned with power, and the other with 
agency. It also does not theoretically enrich the specific socio-historical context of 
computation and mediated communication in which surveillance takes place. In contrast, 
social theory itself offers a rich portfolio of approaches that allow an integrated 
perspective on both structure and agency. In the next chapter, I will develop such a de-
centred view on surveillance with the help of the broader range of social theory under 
special consideration of Kallinikos’ (2009) notion of the computational rendition of 
reality and Berger and Luckmann’s social construction of reality ([1966] 1991). 
2.4. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed approaches to surveillance, how they have changed over time 
alongside the make-up of society itself and manifestations of surveillance, and explored 
the suitability of those approaches to facilitate an understanding of agency towards 
surveillance. It has shown that approaches rooted in a critique of modernity and the 
panopticon develop a set of attributes characteristic to the surveillance which people on 
the internet encounter: distributed rather than concentrated in nature, residing in 
computers rather than in panoptic watchtowers, with the intent of control, foresight and 
consumer seduction rather than discipline. Yet the chapter has also argued that the 
pervasive spread of surveillance in contemporary society coincides with particular 
expressions of surveillance that vary by context, which a grand theory of surveillance is 
unable to address. Ultimately, it has highlighted that as surveillance becomes a pervasive 
part of everyday life, a surveillance-centric theory is unable to grasp the issue of agency. 
To address this, the notion of surveillance needs to be de-centred and embedded in a 
broader context of social theory that recognises computation as a social force, and which 
possesses the conceptual repertoire to query the tensions between human agency and the 
social systems that people live in. This chapter has provided a foundation and justification 
for this approach, which is developed in the next chapter. 
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 Chapter Three: A Framework for Agency in 
Computed Sociality 
This chapter aims to overcome the limits of earlier surveillance literature by integrating 
it within a broader theory of agency in a world where not just surveillance but sociality 
itself is transformed by computational processes. Contemporary surveillance manifests 
itself in a particular logic of accumulation and extraction of information that is expression 
of a much deeper transformation at the foundation of modern societies brought about by 
computation (Zuboff 2015). Silicon Valley venture capitalist Marc Andreessen (2009) 
proclaimed that Software Is Eating The World, diagnosing a comprehensive 
rearchitecting of commerce and consumption through programs, apps and digital 
platforms. The notion of big data is reconfiguring how data are produced, managed, 
stored, interpreted and applied, leading to "the worlds we inhabit to be captured as data 
and mediated through data-driven technologies" (Kitchin 2014: xv). These are not just 
epistemological developments that affect the modalities of mediation. They have acquired 
ontological status:  
“[…] the ‘stuff’ that makes up the social and urban fabric has changed – it is no 
longer just about emergent properties that derive from a complex of social 
associations and interactions. These associations and interactions are now not only 
mediated by software and code they are becoming constituted by it.” (Burrows 
2009: 451) 
This changes the coordinates in which an inquiry into the modes and possibilities of 
agency needs to take place, converting it from a question of surveillance into a broader 
investigation around the computational forces that underpin it. Against the background 
of a world constituted by software and code, Kallinikos has coined the term 
‘computational rendition of reality’ to denote the computational factors that “[remake] 
key principles upon which social agents frame and act on the world” (Kallinikos 2009: 
184). An important next step therefore is to investigate the implications for individual 
agency and the lived experience of actually inhabiting the world under these premises. 
Alaimo (2014) provides a precursor to such a discussion by expanding on Kallinikos’ 
concept to show how data-driven interpretations of acts of consumption by online 
companies disaggregate individual practices, reaggregate them according to their own 
logic and recast them to consumers as representation of reality that in turn shapes 
consumers’ experience. Bucher (forthcoming 2017) offers a perspective on how ordinary 
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people relate to computation on Facebook through the notion of ‘algorithmic 
imaginaries’. 
My aim in this chapter is to contribute to the broader debate around computation by 
emphasising the angle of human agents themselves, who live within the reified outcomes 
of computation. I intend to help develop a language and conceptual catalogue that can 
accommodate everyday life under such conditions. Although my approach transcends 
surveillance, it is also relevant to surveillance in that I draw on people’s experience of 
computational surveillance as a context in which the problem of agency towards 
computation manifests itself. Indeed, Kallinikos' idea of the computational rendition of 
reality underpins Zuboff's (2015) analysis of surveillance capitalism, highlighting the 
close relation between computation and the original theme of surveillance. 
Specifically, I propose a wider sociological contextualisation of the computational 
rendition of reality through Berger and Luckmann’s ([1966] 1991) social construction of 
reality. While Kallinikos is primarily concerned with the computational attributes that 
change the parameters in which human agents act, Berger and Luckmann provide a 
general theory about how people make sense of and legitimise the social world they 
inhabit as reality. At their time of writing, Berger and Luckmann could not anticipate the 
rise of computation as a constituent part of society. The computational rendition of reality 
offers an avenue to explore the modes and possibilities of constructing reality that Berger 
and Luckmann describe change through the introduction of computational forces. A 
reinterpretation of Berger and Luckmann in this vein ultimately allows considering the 
perspective of human agents under the conditions that Kallinikos outlines. 
I select Kallinikos' concept as an entry point to discussions about agency over other 
diagnoses of computational forces because it connects the principles and processes of 
computation with a realm of experience - reality itself. It underscores that people live in 
a world that is already computed, and that is being perpetually recalculated at the same 
time. This implies both that people cannot act outside of computation and that the ongoing 
computational modulation of reality produces a context for agency. Such a perspective 
echoes Berger and Luckmann’s assertion that people create and reproduce reality within 
the parameters of a social world that they already inhabit, and not in a void, underscoring 
the compatibility of both approaches. However, to augment the analytical potential of 
such a joint perspective, I add one complication. I incorporate the computational rendition 
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of reality by proxy of an associated concept. The notion of computed sociality specifies 
the computational rendition of reality through a more explicit social dimension. It stands 
for:  
“[the] complex technological arrangements that recast sociality in a network of 
social affinities that are shaped by computational operations.” (Kallinikos & 
Tempini 2014: 830) 
Computed sociality underscores that computational mechanisms structure interaction 
between people (Tempini 2014). The focus on interaction makes the ideas implied in the 
computational rendition of reality more amenable to analysis under the prism of social 
construction. Berger and Luckmann emphasise that people create and reproduce reality 
through intersubjectively shared knowledge about the social world. Constructing and 
legitimising reality is a product of interaction. This specifies the particular problem of 
agency that comes to the fore in a computed world. If computation modulates interaction, 
the notion of computed sociality brings with it problems of the conditions of knowledge, 
or on what basis people can make sense of the world they live in. Computed sociality 
lends new urgency to investigating the production of knowledge, specifically how people 
can understand, intervene in and shape sociality that is recast in such ways. Ultimately, 
this poses questions how people can query and interact with the computational operations 
they are embedded in, and in how far the modes, affordances and limitations inherent in 
their interactions with computational operations themselves are expressions of computed 
sociality. Agency10 becomes a problem of scrutinising and reclaiming the conditions 
under which knowledge of the social world is produced.  
This chapter is composed of two parts. I begin by problematising the conditions of the 
production of knowledge in a computed world. To do so, I reframe the notion of computed 
sociality as a communication problem for human agents. Drawing on debates around 
algorithms, big data and related terms, I isolate particular characteristics of computation 
that jointly form a computational logic that defines computation as an interlocutor for 
human agents. I then document how this logic is embedded in everyday experience and 
                                                
10 In a critical review of the sociological literature on agency, Emirbayer & Mische (1998) highlight that 
“the term agency itself has maintained an elusive, albeit resonant, vagueness” (ibid. 962, original emphasis). 
They disentangle the various conceptualisations across theoretical strands and offer a generalised 
understanding of agency that tackles the concept’s historic elusiveness. Acknowledging their argument, I 
outline my specific understanding of agency as associated with the conditions of knowledge in section ‘3.1. 
The Communication Problem of Computed Sociality’ and reiterate it again with the aid of empirical 
material in Chapter 9: Conclusion. 
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juxtapose it with human agents’ ability to make sense of the world. I propose a dichotomy 
of interface and infrastructure as a template to locate a communication problem. I argue 
that a computational logic operates through infrastructure, but that human agents’ acts of 
constructing knowledge take place on the level of the interface, rendering the 
computational logic conceptually invisible. Finally, I argue that reclaiming agency 
requires a reconstruction of visibility as a mode of perception and expression of power to 
overcome the communication problem between human agents and computational logic. 
In the second part of this chapter, I apply the communication problem of computed 
sociality to Berger and Luckmann’s social construction of reality. I begin by outlining the 
authors’ core concepts and probe their applicability in a world where computational 
forces structure reality. I then propose a reinterpretation towards the social construction 
of computed sociality. This reinterpretation is informed by various concepts within and 
outside of sociology, encompassing Lash’s media ontology, Goffman’s interaction rituals 
and glitch theory. Through such a revised account of social construction, I show how 
different social practices become possible through which human agents can interrogate 
and reclaim the conditions under which knowledge is produced.  
3.1. The Communication Problem of Computed Sociality 
A theory of agency ultimately asks how people can act in, and towards a computational 
world. Yet it needs to take seriously the nature of computation itself, how it affects the 
possibility of agency and how it structures the conditions under which agency takes place. 
Such a theory then requires a framework that explores the relationship between 
computational modes of shaping the world, and human agents’ abilities to make sense of 
it. The underlying complexity of technological configurations that Kallinikos and 
Tempini (2014) ascribe to computed sociality already suggest that interaction between 
human agents and a computational order is fraught with difficulties. In this section, I will 
develop such a perspective by recontextualising the computational rendition of reality 
(Kallinikos 2009) - the computational, generative processes that underpin computed 
sociality - as a communication problem for human agents. Below, I outline this 
communication problem in two steps.  
Firstly, I unravel the computational principles and processes that underpin computational 
reality with the aim for formulate a ‘computational logic’, which I understand as a 
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particular way of decision-making and acting on the world by computers in the widest 
sense. By describing such a logic, the constituent parts of computers as structural forces 
and new types of agents that shape the social world become tangible. A theoretical 
framework that places the lived experience at its centre, therefore, cannot start with 
agency itself, but requires a detour that systematically identifies those constituent factors 
that make up the computed world.  
Secondly, I explore how a computational logic is embedded in lived experience. I propose 
that such a logic differs categorically from how human agents make sense of the world. 
This problematises how people can relate to the computational rendition of reality, and 
outlines the conditions in which people’s construction of knowledge takes place.  
3.1.1. Towards a Computational Logic 
In recent years, several terms have gained prominence that seek to capture the 
computational principles and processes affecting socio-economic life, from ‘algorithms’ 
to ‘big data’, ‘code’ and ‘software’. The discussions and conflicts surrounding these terms 
help outline a computational logic. For instance, in their critique of big data, boyd and 
Crawford (2012) problematise the promise of objectivity and the quality of insight 
associated with it, and point to the mythological rhetoric surrounding the term. Barocas, 
Hood and Ziewitz diagnose a systematic confusion in the use and definition of algorithms 
and seek "to trouble the coherence of the algorithm as an analytic category” (2013: 1). 
Such confusion and critique is productive because it isolates specific attributes of 
computation without having to appropriate the conceptual baggage and preconceived 
meaning that comes with each term. My interest does not lie in a comprehensive 
theoretical review exploring the capillaries of these debates. Rather, I seek to identify 
conceptual attributes emerging through them that allow for framing a computational logic 
as a communication problem. The notion of algorithms, in particular, has received recent 
scholarly attention. As terms are overlapping, for reasons of clarity, I select this concept 
as my point of departure. On this basis, I develop four characteristics that make up a 
computational logic: (1) performativity of algorithms, (2) physicality of algorithms, (3) 
epistemology of big data, and (4) human-machine complicity. By describing such a 
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‘logic’, the constituent parts of computers as structural forces and new types of agents 
that shape the social world become tangible.11  
 The Performativity of Algorithms 
Despite assertions that algorithms are pervasive (Lash 2007), that they have crept into the 
fabric of everyday life (Burrows 2009), and the diagnosis of an ‘algorithmic culture’ 
(Galloway 2006), algorithms remain an elusive phenomenon. Even computer sciences 
struggle to formalise a universally accepted definition (Berlinski 2000), which Blaas and 
Gurewitch (2003) recognise as a foundational problem. Efforts to translate the notion of 
algorithms into the conceptual catalogue of the social sciences have sparked an array of 
competing interpretations that hamper a systematic understanding.12 Approaches to 
algorithms ultimately are fraught with unclear and conflicting definitions that coincide 
with often bold assertions about how they operate and speculations about their effects, 
converting them into “somewhat of a modern myth” (Barocas et al. 2013: 1), or rendering 
them intangible and inconceivable (Röhle 2010).  
However, from the perspective of theorising agency, the conceptual confusion is 
analytically productive. It hints at possible difficulties of grasping algorithms in lived 
experience, which in turn affects the ability to act towards them. The narrative of myth, 
and claims that algorithms cannot be studied, are connected to the idea that algorithms 
are performative; that they change in shape, form and intention. While performativity is 
just one among many characterisations of algorithms, it is a central computational 
characteristic for a theory of agency. Thrift has labelled algorithms ‘performative 
infrastructures’ (Thrift 2005) in the sense that they modulate outcomes for those who are 
subjected to them. Algorithms then have a capability for decision-making, which is at 
least partly autonomous and which generates flexible outcomes. Algorithms ‘sort things 
out’ (Bowker & Starr 2000), and they do so according to their own inherent, flexible, 
unstable rationales. This is particularly evident in the notion of machine-learning 
                                                
11 I understand the notion of ‘computational logic’ not as a monolithic logic that is the same across all 
contexts and manifestations. Acknowledging the multiplicity of configurations that a computational logic 
can take on the basis of its four constituent principles and their specific design and implementation, I use 
it as an ideal type and short-hand that always recognises its fluid nature.  
12 A detailed review of these lines of interpretation exceeds the scope of this thesis, but for an authoritative 
discussion of current debates, their shortcomings and proposals for new directions, see Barocas et al. 2013. 
Through 39 ‘provocations’, the authors provide a catalogue of critical questions and theses about 
algorithms. They also offer a useful ordering of approaches, distinguishing between those who see 
algorithms merely as a “technology”, as “form of decision-making”, “epistemology onto itself”, “form of 
rationality”, “general mode of social ordering”, and as “sociotechnical process” (ibid. 2013: 2).  
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algorithms, which self-improve and change over time, emancipating themselves from the 
original code that conceived them (Lewis 2014; Ailon et al. 2011). The spread of 
algorithms then stands for a new type of reasoning at odds with conventional forms of 
knowledge that people are familiar with, where “the algorithmic rules of rationality 
replaced the self-critical judgments of reason” (Daston 2013: para. 1).  
 The Physicality of Algorithms 
Algorithms, in all their possible definitions, depend on a vast range of physical factors to 
be in place, orchestrated and optimised. Server rooms provide storage, computing power 
and electricity. Depending on its purpose, a server also needs to be connected to other 
servers within and across different data centres, as well to further networked components 
such as the trading desk at a bank, or data management platforms used by advertising 
agencies. Speed is a foundational logic of technologically advanced societies (Virilo 
1986; 2005). In a growing number of industries, the speed with which signals are 
transferred and processed across these networks is paramount to outwit competitors. 
Competitive advantages to buying a stock or securing a winning bid for an advertising 
impression are articulated in milliseconds (Aldridge 2013). Under these circumstances, 
data centres have coined the concept of ‘co-location’. As Lewis (2014) highlights, this 
denotes a mechanism of ordering where frequently interacting algorithms are placed in 
the same data centre, and even in a particular order within a data centre to further cut 
transaction time. Algorithms, therefore, are embedded in a spatial configuration 
expressed in new forms of centrality and periphery that emerge through 
telecommunication networks (Sassen 2005). Decisions about which routes on these 
networks algorithms chose to interact with each other are themselves influenced by 
algorithmic calculations. For instance, the succession in which a financial trading 
algorithm contacts stock market exchanges for pricing information is itself determined by 
a specialised algorithm (Lewis 2014). Algorithms then are networked and interact with 
each other (e.g. Hayles 2006). Physical factors affect this process. The particular 
configuration of these physical factors co-determine how self-improving algorithms 
evolve, which algorithm succeeds over another, which algorithms interact with each 
other, and ultimately what outcomes are generated. 
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 The Epistemology of Big Data 
Algorithms depend on data as a raw material that fuels their performative decisions, 
influencing how they evolve, act and which inferences they make. Only a decade ago, 
when the volume of data feeding into algorithms was comparably scarce, the complexity 
of an algorithm was its main competitive advantage. Today, data is available in 
abundance. Google’s chief economist, Hal Varian, estimates that “[b]etween the dawn of 
civilisation and 2003, we only created five exabytes of information; now we’re creating 
that amount in two days” (as cited in Kitchin 2014: xv), and a range of studies observe a 
rapid growth in the volume of data generated and analysed (e.g. Hilbert & López 2011; 
Gantz & Reinsel 2011). Amidst this data deluge, simpler algorithms paired with a higher 
volume of source data are making more accurate inferences than complex algorithms that 
have to rely on relatively poor data material (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013). For 
instance, as Morozov (2015) argues, the contemporary market power of Google depends 
less on the sophistication of its algorithms, as it does on having access to, and hedging 
large sources of proprietary data that its algorithms can draw on.  
The notion of data itself has witnessed surging attention recent years, as epitomised by 
the term ‘big data’. Originally coined in the 1990s to denote management and analysis of 
large-scale datasets (Diebold 2012), by the late 2000s, it had become a buzzword across 
academia, industry, government and the media, often associated with hyperbolic claims 
of revolutionary changes and regarded as a fix-all for world problems from health to 
traffic congestion (e.g. Anderson 2008). A common framework to describe big data has 
come to be known as the 3Vs: data is at once large in volume, high in velocity as it is 
being created and analysed near real-time, and diverse in variety, containing various 
sources of data and types of data from structured to unstructured (e.g. Zikopoulos et al. 
2012). As Kitchin (2013) demonstrates in a wider overview, further attempts have been 
made to refine these characteristics. These attempts include the idea that datasets are 
exhaustive (n=all), that big data dispenses of the sample altogether, or that it relies on 
unprecedented sample sizes.  
Data have always involved categorisation. Suicide, a sociological interest since 
Durkheim, offers a perspective to illustrate this. In his analysis on the rise of modern 
statistics, Hacking (1990) posits that suicide was among the first human behaviours 
regularly counted. Alongside crime and other acts considered wrongdoings, or amoral, 
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these data started to fill up official tables of deviancy in the nineteenth century. Out of 
such tables, distributions and averages informed what was considered normal. Moral 
statistics were later extended by other variables to sort people more widely. However, 
these categories did not just depict people to those who sought to analyse them, but also 
described people to themselves: 
“One can ask: who had more effect on class consciousness, Marx or the authors 
of the official reports which created the classifications in which people came to 
recognise themselves?” (Hacking 1990: 3) 
Data and classification thus are a modern way of generating reality, or as Hacking calls 
it elsewhere with a nod to Foucault, a ‘historical ontology’, that is a historically specific 
way of constituting people as “objects of knowledge, [as] subjects acting on others [and 
as] moral agents” (Foucault 1984, as cited in Hacking 2002: 2). 
Beyond the 3Vs, big data stands for a new rationale of classification. Big data weaves 
together data as a raw material with a particular logic of inference that is governed by 
algorithms (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013). Knowledge Discovery in Data (KDD) 
is a common approach to handling large datasets. Here, algorithms sift through data sets 
to discover “emergent relationships among attributes” (Nissenbaum 2009: 44). Cheap 
storage and processing power in abundance have removed economic barriers that have 
previously required to structure and limit data set exploration. These limitations coincided 
with epistemological principles suited to draw inferences from such data, most notably 
the formulation of hypotheses and the principle of causality. Big data changes this by 
shifting focus from the cause of phenomena to the mere evidence of their occurrence. 
This causes a historical rupture in the epistemological foundation of societies. Furthering 
Daston's claim about algorithmic rules of rationality, this means that: 
“[…] society will need to shed some of its obsession for causality in exchange for 
simple correlations: not knowing why but only what. This overturns centuries of 
established practices and challenges our most basic understanding of how to make 
decisions and comprehend reality.” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013: 18) 
While classifications through data have always shaped lived reality in modern societies, 
the process of arriving at these classifications could be queried and understood in 
principle by human agents. Established modern categories like class, or those in the media 
business denominating audience segments from ‘housewife’ to ‘millennial’, are 
accessible to those who fall into them. People know about these classifications, their 
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names and the socio-economic characteristics they signify. People can also anticipate 
which category they would fall in and shape their self-perception in either agreement or 
disagreement. They can position themselves towards those data and categories that seek 
to describe them. The logic of inference that underlies big data renders this impossible. 
Categories are emergent, unstable, classifications are buried within the computational 
calculations, do not have a name, and may not be intelligible by an outsider. As boyd and 
Crawford (2012) remind us, the volume of data also does not make it infallible and instead 
carries inherent biases and limitations rooted in unreliable source data and its 
misinterpretation. Gitelman (2013) stresses that the notion of ‘raw data’ in itself does not 
exist, and that the construction of any data corpus already entails values and judgements, 
which are themselves increasingly informed by computation. In light of such issues, Lash 
argues that power “enters into us and constitutes us from the inside” (2007: 61), instead 
of being imposed on us through an external label. Lash uses a uni-directional expression 
of power that does not accommodate the possibility of agency. However, stripping aside 
these dystopian tendencies, his statement nevertheless underscores the fundamental shift 
of the dynamics in self-understanding brought about by the mechanisms of generating 
and enacting social classifications in the context of big data. 
 Human-Machine Complicity 
Considering the range of data sources implied in the processes of calculation and 
inference further widens the scope to consider another computational characteristic. In a 
surveillance context, Lyon (2001) has highlighted the porosity of distinct data sources as 
‘leaky containers’ and the notion of ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000) 
underscores a connective imperative of data for surveillance purposes. Amidst these data 
sources are those people under surveillance themselves, whose demographic, location, 
behavioural, attitudinal or other data are considered as raw material through which 
outcomes are generated. This does not just include automatic tracking data and 
dataveillance, but also social data that consumers intentionally produce themselves 
through tagging, liking and sharing of media content in particular on social platforms, 
which in turn influence selection, curation and personalisation mechanisms on which 
these platforms modulate further interactions between users (Alaimo & Kallinikos 2016). 
In these ways, through their everyday practices, the subjects of surveillance are – often 
unwillingly – complicit in the computational principles that govern them.  
  
63 
In contrast to claims that algorithms are “totally isolated from all social and cultural 
factors whatever” (Slezak 1989: 563), this means that people are constituent parts of 
computational practices. These social and cultural factors also extend to the production 
side of coders, programmers and other software architects in the widest sense. Algorithms 
are not neutral (Halavais 2009), and similar to the modern ways of classifying and 
standardising that Bowker & Starr (2000) have described, algorithms prefer and 
emphasise some attributes over others. Preference selections are part of the performative 
nature of algorithms, and in particular machine-learning algorithms may generate the 
underlying criteria autonomously. Yet those who write algorithms themselves also 
encode moral judgements, lay-sociological and lay-psychological assumptions, 
behavioural research and many other factors. For instance, the proverb ‘opposites attract’ 
has been translated into the matchmaking criteria of dating websites (Ayres 2008), and 
Alaimo (2014) has shown empirically how online companies select particular design 
infrastructures and assumptions of personal relevance for consumers that are encoded into 
their platforms. A fourth computational characteristic then is about the willing or 
unwilling complicity of consumers and professional experts with machines to create and 
sustain powers of computation. 
3.1.2. The Lived Experience of Computation 
I have now characterised a computational logic through four characteristics. While my 
broader aim is to understand the lived experience of a computed world, this emphasis on 
computation per se was a necessary precondition. It illustrates the particular rationale 
through which computation acts on the world and thereby delineates it as an interlocutor 
for human agents. This establishes a basis for developing the communication problem of 
computed sociality.  
Although a computational logic emerges as a distinct set of characteristics, there is no 
Manichean dualism between computers and human agents. As the notion of complicity 
has illustrated, people’s acts themselves feed into the computational logic. In light of both 
the complexity as well as the modularity of the characteristics above, people are not 
addressing a monolithic interlocutor when they seek to act towards a computational logic. 
They encounter a configuration composed both of machine and human elements. As this 
research is principally concerned with the lived experience of surveillance, it must remain 
open to how ordinary people recognise a computational logic. People's perceptions of 
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what and whom they act towards may differ from the theoretical notion of a 
computational logic that I have proposed. This neither diminishes the concept, nor the 
value of people's experience. Rather, the overlaps and discrepancies between the 
characteristics that make up a computational logic and how it is represented in the domain 
of lived experience is a productive field of empirical analysis later in this study that helps 
to understand opportunities and limitations of agency in practice.  
A theory of agency cannot pre-empt an empirical analysis, but it must provide a suitable 
framework. To do this, in a next step, I embed the idea of a computational logic into the 
domain of lived experience. It is here that people encounter computation and need to 
reconcile their own ways of making sense of the world with its logic. At this intersection, 
the communication problem inherent in computed sociality becomes apparent. I develop 
such a perspective in three arguments below. Taking stock of current debates, I diagnose 
(1) the absence of a suitable analytical language that can accommodate the lived 
experience of a computed world. I then proceed to highlight (2) the role of interface and 
infrastructure as sites of constructing meaning, and conclude with (3) the role of visibility 
in structuring the communication problem. 
 Obstacles to an Analytical Language 
Despite their prominence in documenting the changes brought onto the world by 
computation, emerging accounts about big data, algorithms, code or other concepts 
provide little guidance for a framework that connects the computational logic to lived 
experience as they are largely preoccupied with defining and delineating these 
phenomena. I illustrate this through the example of algorithms. Notable exceptions to the 
conventional focus are those accounts which seek to order existing debates, such as the 
proposition to compartmentalise the study of algorithms between disciplines, including 
“a sociological approach that studies algorithms as the product of interactions among 
programmers and designers” (Barocas et al. 2013: 3). Yet this implies that a sociology of 
interaction should look at the production end of algorithms, facilitating a conceptual 
understanding of algorithms themselves, and not of their lived experience. In a related 
effort, Gillespie proposes criteria to narrow attention from algorithms at large to ‘public 
relevance algorithms’, which he understands as those algorithms that affect human 
discourse and knowledge in mediated interactions (Gillespie 2014). One dimension of 
public relevance algorithms is ‘entanglement with practice’, or  
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“how users reshape their practices to suit the algorithms they depend on, and how 
they can turn algorithms into terrains for political contest, sometimes even to 
interrogate the politics of the algorithm itself” (Gillespie 2014: 168).  
Gillespie’s interest lies in how such practices can help characterise algorithms and the 
internet platforms on which they operate, or, referencing his terminology, how algorithms 
are entangled with practice rather than how practice is entangled with algorithms. 
Considerations of the situated experience are left undeveloped here, even in those 
accounts which pledge for a concerted, structured curriculum for embedding algorithms 
in a social science context.  
 Computed Sociality as Interface and Infrastructure 
A more productive perspective can be found in concepts that by its very nature stand for 
a connection. For instance, the notion of ‘fabric’ reflects observations that computation 
is pervasive and suggests that it is interwoven with lived experience. Amin and Thrift 
(2002) claim that software is now part of the material fabric of everyday life, and Burrows 
sees code and software as making up the ‘social and urban fabric’ (Burrows 2009). Yet 
neither of these authors specify what they mean by fabric, and the term is not embedded 
in a wider theoretical discourse. A related term is 'infrastructure'. Previously, I have 
referenced Thrift's (2005) statement that algorithms are performative, but he more 
specifically speaks of a performative infrastructure. Containing the word ‘structure’, the 
notion of infrastructure13 provides a first link between computational principles and the 
notion of agency. Structure and agency form a conceptual dualism in social theory where 
agency manifests itself directed towards, and taking place within structure.14 Debates 
around information and communication technologies (ICT) as infrastructure support the 
idea of performativity by considering them to be malleable (Furlong 2010), in contrast to 
conventional infrastructures like wires or cables which do not change what they provide 
through their very operation (Parks 2012). Like the notion of fabric, the idea of 
infrastructure extends the computational logic into socio-economic life. However, in 
contrast to the idea of fabric, infrastructure already connects to the notion of 
performativity, and is embedded in a richer theoretical history which allows us to link it 
to the relationship between structure and agency in a wider sense.  
                                                
13 For a discussion of ‘infrastructure’ and its various connotations in a social science context, see e.g. 
Bowker et al. 2010; Graham & Marvin 2001; Edwards et al. 2007. 
14 For a survey of the structure-agency debate, see for instance Ritzer 2010. 
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At first glance, infrastructure prioritises the computational logic over lived experience. 
However, infrastructure is not a standalone concept. Software studies and computer 
sciences distinguish between the front-end and the back-end of software (Manovich 
2013). The front-end is available for users to see and to make inputs. The back-end is 
where those operations take place that are removed from user access, but from which 
outcomes are relayed to the front-end. Infrastructure is part of a similar dichotomy, with 
the notion of interface as its opposite. Infrastructure stands for the back-end, where reality 
is mediated and constructed, before it enters the lived experience. Conversely, 
representing the front-end, the interface is emblematic for the realm in which most media-
related practices take place. Galloway (2012) even frames the interface as the most 
emblematic manifestation of digital culture per se. The interface is the screen of a digital 
device that serves as a window into mediated experience. At the same time, the interface 
is a means of translation which connects a computational logic with a human way of 
experiencing the world. This division is echoed in how media and technology companies 
consider themselves as engineers of consumer experience. For instance, in an article about 
Facebook, German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung used the photo 
of a wallpaper in the company’s office, demonstrating that at least implicitly, the logic of 
interface and infrastructure is part of Facebook’s self-perception. This wallpaper 
symbolically depicts the user interface of Facebook. But on one end, the interface is lifted 
like the corner of a curtain to reveal an intricate arrangement of cogwheels surrounded by 
depictions of people going about various activities – a view into the underlying 
infrastructure.  
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Figure 1: Facebook Office Wallpaper 
 
Source: Glassdoor15 
The combination of interface and infrastructure enables an extended reading of computed 
sociality. Under this perspective, computed sociality encompasses the processes of 
computation, its calculated outcomes, and the human experience of these outcomes. This 
specifies the domain of agency in a computed world. The interface through which human 
agents experience computation constitutes a site at which they are able to construct 
meaning. Agency can then be understood as situated acts around the interface against an 
underlying infrastructure. Those acts themselves fall into the empirical domain. However, 
a theory of agency needs to explore the possibilities, modalities and constraints of agency 
within the setting of interface and infrastructure. This requires an understanding of how 
acts on the interface can relate to the computational logic that is enacted from within the 
infrastructure. I argue that conflicts in relating the experience on the interface to the 
infrastructure and vice versa ultimately constitute the communication problem of 
computed sociality. In the next section, I show this through the concept of visibility. 
 The Invisibility of Computational Logic 
The notion of visibility is an integral part of infrastructure debates: “[i]nfrastructure 
typically exists in the background, it is invisible and it is frequently taken for granted” 
                                                
15 I have received permission from Glassdoor to publish this material, sourced at: 
https://media.glassdoor.com/l/0f/a7/13/ef/3.jpg 
  
68 
(Bowker et al. 2010: 98), as these authors emphasise in reference to Star & Ruhleder 
(1996). The notion of visibility also has direct implications for agency. Brighenti (2007) 
proposes that visibility is composed of the overlapping domains of “aesthetics [as] 
relations of perception [and] politics [as] relations of power” (ibid. 2007: 324). He 
continues to suggest that such power is intertwined with agency: “Everything I see is, at 
least potentially, within the reach of the I can. What is not seen is not thematised as an 
object in the domain of action” (ibid. 2007: 328, original emphasis). Agency then depends 
on perceiving the object or subject towards which it is directed, before specific acts can 
be performed. 
Applying the notion of visibility in the context of infrastructure to include modes of 
perception outside the human senses, and to make explicit the relations of power that 
emerge through them, offers a framework for theorising agency in the context of 
computation. In the following, I understand visibility as a metaphor for power and 
perception more widely, that extends beyond human sight to include all possible means 
of understanding the world through the human senses, and conversely through a 
computational logic. Visibility then is about sensors, whether biological, cultural, or 
technological, paired with modes of understanding and acting. In this section, I relate the 
notion of visibility to the dichotomy of interface and infrastructure and sketch out how 
this structures the possibilities and modalities of agency in a computed world. 
At its I/O developer conference in 2013, Google elevated the notion of invisibility to a 
precept that should guide the development of new projects. The company proposed to 
“get computers out of the way” (“Hello Larry!” 2013: no pagination; Page 2013: no 
pagination), in other words removing the awareness that mediation occurs from the 
mediated experience itself. Invisibility then emerges as a desirable state for a system’s 
end-users: “[g]ood, usable systems disappear almost by definition. The easier they are to 
use, the harder they are to see” (Bowker & Star 1999: 33). Parks suggests that each 
“infrastructure can be differentially positioned on a continuum of visibility and 
invisibility depending on its material composition, scale, design, location and purpose” 
(Parks 2012: 66), ranging from television towers conceived as architectural icons and 
landmarks, to satellite stations or data centres that are barred from access and often 
located in remote areas or protected by high security measures. Yet most infrastructures 
are visible in principle - they can be dug out, uncovered, and queried. Similarly, 
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algorithms are embedded in a language of perception, having been described as ‘unseen’, 
‘concealed’, or ‘unnoticed’ (Beer 2009), or as sinking into the uncontested background 
of everyday life (Thrift & French 2005). However, such descriptions do not reveal just in 
what way a computational logic is invisible, and in how far this invisibility differs from 
other infrastructures. Understanding the specific factors that constitute the invisibility of 
a computational logic informs how, if at all, this invisibility can be overcome, and 
ultimately how agency is possible. The concept of visibility then provides a framework 
for understanding how (media) infrastructures that are sunk into the background may 
come to the centre of people’s lived experience. 
In contrast to other infrastructures, a computational logic cannot simply be revealed. 
While physical objects like server rooms remain part of the computational logic, they 
have ceased to be signifiers for its operation. Visibility has become disconnected from 
ways of knowing the world.16 Already more than two decades ago, Michel Serres 
observed that  
“[t]he informational world takes the place of the observed world [where] things 
known because they are seen cede their place to an exchange of codes [with the 
consequence that] sight looks blankly upon a world from which information has 
already fled.” (Serres 1989: 45-47) 
A computational logic stands at odds with the cultural specifics and biophysical 
universals of perception and understanding. Hayles has implicitly alluded to this in her 
concept of a ‘cognisphere’, where she argues that while cognitive flows take place in a 
complex web between humans and machines, most of these flows are outside human 
grasp:  
“[m]ost of the communication will be automated between intelligent devices. 
Humans will intervene only in a tiny fraction of that flow of communication. Most 
of it will go on unsensed and really unknown by humans.” (Hayles interviewed in 
Gane et al. 2007: 350) 
                                                
16 I argue that the metaphor of a ‘black box’ (e.g. Pasquale 2015) is not able to advance the debate in this 
regard. In order to frame invisibility, it paradoxically uses a visible container, the box itself. As a side effect, 
the computational logic is treated as if it indeed resided within a contained entity. The ‘black box’ then 
does not problematise the notion of visibility. It instead falls back on an object that is within the sensory 
realms of human experience to explain that which escapes this experience. The confinement, or boxing, 
also stands at odds with the pervasiveness of computational principles in socio-economic life, which Hayles 
describes as “the movement of computation out of the box and into the environment” (Hayles in Gane et 
al. 2007: 349). 
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These characteristics foreclose the ability of human agents to intervene in the 
computational rendition of reality - they live in a world where there are perpetually being 
looked at by computers which count, analyse, infer and categorise, but they cannot look 
back. These radical changes in the conditions under which knowledge about the world is 
produced constitute the communication problem of computed sociality. This problem 
manifests itself not in the sense of misunderstandings, or issues of translation, but in the 
categorical inability for human agents to relate to the computational logic as an 
interlocutor. Computers monopolise the means of perception that make reality, and 
thereby its interpretation. This radical shift in control over knowledge of the world and 
its production presents a historically unprecedented obstacle to human agency17 and 
underscores its urgency and political nature. Brighenti states that if visibility exerts 
power, this converts places which manufacture visibility into sites of political struggle: 
"Visibility curdles into representations. In the absence of dissonant messages, 
representations tend to settle down and stabilise themselves. That is why the issue 
of access to the places of visibility is a central political question. To access these 
places is the precondition for having a voice in the production of representations.” 
(Brighenti 2007: 333) 
When places of visibility are monopolised by a computational logic, the struggle for 
representation gains a new quality. Querying representations is obstructed by the 
incompatibility of human modes of perception and understanding with the logic of 
computation. As a precondition, agency then needs to embark on a restoration of visibility 
to overcome the communication problem inherent in computed sociality. It needs to find 
a modus operandi that renders visible the principles behind the production of 
representation and the monopoly of interpretation.  
3.2. Theorising Agency in Computed Sociality 
Some writers have started to see a problem of agency posed by a computed world. Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier (2013) propose specialist auditors that mediate between public 
interest and corporate algorithms. Hayles (2005) argues for a critical code literacy to 
restore agency, and others diagnose a dichotomy of Program or Be Programmed 
(Rushkoff 2011), urging human agents to “break through the glass ceiling of the smooth 
                                                
17 I use the term ‘unprecedented’ to denote the historically new type of obstacle and make no judgement 
about the difficulty of acting towards a dominant structure. Particular socio-historical configurations, such 
as racial exclusion, have rendered people powerless in much more immediate and material ways. See for 
instance Gilroy 1993. 
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interfaces and start programming” (Lovink in Lynn 2010: para. ‘What role can an artist 
have’). But such programmatic calls to action do not consider the lived experience of 
computation, and how agency emerges through it. I will now explore how social theory 
has already dealt with agency, and how it offers a more comprehensive framework. As 
my argument so far proceeded, as concepts and problems solidified, the traditional 
contours of social theory re-emerged. The discussion of interface and infrastructure, as 
well as the tension between human agents and a computational logic, recall the debate in 
social theory over the primacy of social structure versus individual autonomy in shaping 
human behaviour.  
While most social theory, largely a twentieth-century undertaking, could not anticipate 
the rise of computation as a constituent part of social structure,18 this does not hamper its 
relevance. Computed sociality may be a contemporary phenomenon, but the broader 
underlying questions it addresses – structure, agency, power, participation – remain 
relevant. Nevertheless, the changing coordinates of the social world brought about by 
computation foreclose a straightforward application, and we must consider concepts 
specific to today’s computed world beyond established social theory to revisit and update 
existing frameworks. Sociology provides a more suitable canvas for this undertaking than 
other disciplines because it remains conceptually open and theoretically flexible to 
accommodate these new realities in a non-prescriptive way. It enables researchers to go 
beyond disciplinary boundaries and redraw its scope without causing a paradigmatic 
crisis. Hans Joas succinctly stated:  
“[…] that the original wealth of problems has persisted in this discipline to a 
greater extent than in others, where they have been lost from the outset owing to 
a greater degree of abstraction. Commentators often bemoan sociology's lack of a 
firm paradigm. Yet the positive side to this absence is that it allows certain losses 
of abstraction to remain visible which, for example, are simply ignored by the 
model of a rational economic subject adopted in economic theory or by 
psychology's notion that the organism merely reacts to outside stimuli.” (Joas 
1996: 4)  
                                                
18 Despite its central role in the social sciences, ‘structure’ is an elusive term without a consensual 
definition. For an overview and critique, see Sewell (1992; 2005). I follow Sewell’s suggestion that in 
contrast to mainstream structural functionalism, ‘structure’ does not only constrain (e.g. Cheal 2005), but 
also enable, and that it is a process, not static. Sewell is influenced by Giddens’s theory of structuration and 
Bourdieu’s habitus. While I chose a different theoretical framework, it shares Sewell’s dialectical ideas of 
structure and his criticism of structural functionalism.  
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To ensure this strength unfolds, delineating a theoretical understanding of agency in the 
context of pervasive computation also demands to narrow the choice of social theory 
itself. It requires a framework that does not radically prioritise either structure or agency 
and instead incorporates their potential tension as a productive theoretical feature. This is 
particularly important for this research because it seeks to explore the very possibility of 
agency, and not deny or advocate it a priori.  
3.2.1. Computed Sociality and the Social Construction of Reality 
Berger and Luckmann offer such an approach. When their book The Social Construction 
of Reality appeared in 1966, it was the first publication to feature ‘social construction’ in 
its title, inaugurating the term into mainstream sociological parlance. It was released at a 
time when the extreme ends of the structure and agency antagonism were being laid out. 
A decade and a half earlier, Parsons had for the first time fully outlined his theory of 
structural functionalism in The Social System ([1951] 2012) and Blumer ([1969] 1992) 
was formulating his anti-structural approach to sociology. Between those two poles, 
Berger and Luckmann offer a theoretical framework that seeks to reconcile structure and 
agency through a dialectical relationship. In the context of computed sociality, its 
particular merit lies in its ability to bridge macro and micro sociology, as I demonstrate 
below. 
The structuralist ideas which Berger and Luckmann draw on can accommodate the 
pervasiveness of computation and the invisibility of infrastructure as external to human 
grasp, yet also as constitutive of social life. Structuralist ideas also provide a connection 
to the traditional discourse of surveillance theory. At the same time, Berger and 
Luckmann incorporate the interactionist ideas of Mead – and by proxy reflect those of 
Goffman. Berger and Luckmann see society as a consequence of interactions and 
emphasise the idea of communication for social order. This provides an analytical 
framework for how human agents are co-constitutive of social order, and how they can 
relate to, and query the structure they are embedded in through the sensory, cognitive and 
epistemological means they possess. An interactionist perspective also allows us to 
consider the idea of ‘interface’ as the site of both human-to-human and human-to-
machine interaction. Lastly, although Berger and Luckmann could not foresee the future 
relevance of computation for social theory, their choice of concepts echoes the language 
I have used so far. Social order for Berger and Luckmann is a reality of lived experience, 
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and the notion of reality provides a terminological link to the discourse on computed 
sociality. It is echoed by Kallinikos’ phrase of ‘the computational rendition of reality’ and 
also reflected in Crary’s claim that technologies create  
“[p]roducts” are hardly just devices or physical apparatuses, but various services 
and interconnections that quickly become the dominant or exclusive ontological 
templates of one’s social reality.” (Crary 2014: 40) 
For Berger and Luckmann, the primary means through which this reality is generated and 
maintained is intersubjective knowledge. The question of knowledge then provides a 
conceptual link to the tension between visibility and invisibility, which is defined as a 
struggle for knowledge about the world.  
Berger and Luckmann’s language and concepts at times are bulky and not self-evident, 
such as their particular interpretation of ‘institutions’ and especially their idea of 
‘objective reality’. But through these concepts, they offer a distinct approach to 
sociological analysis. I will outline their core concepts in greater detail below. 
3.2.2. Berger and Luckmann: Main Concepts 
The fundamental premise in Berger and Luckmann’s theory is that human agents are the 
authors of society: 
“[…] social order is a human product. Or, more precisely, an ongoing human 
production. […] Both in its genesis (social order is the result of past human 
activity) and its existence in any instant of time (social order exists only and 
insofar as human activity continues to produce it) it is a human product.” (Berger 
& Luckmann [1966] 1991: 52) 
Yet this ongoing production takes place in ordered world of experience, or reality, that 
already exists before a specific human agent enters the world. Indeed, in answering how 
society is possible, Berger and Luckmann revert to a structural argument, drawing on 
Karl Marx’s dictum that social existence determines individual consciousness. In contrast 
to Marx, they do not mean this in an economic sense, but simply in the sense that human 
agents exist under objective circumstances which determine how they make sense of the 
world and which provide the backbone for the production of social order.  
Society is a human product in the sense that human agents express themselves through 
their activities in a process called ‘externalisation’. The products of their activities, if 
repeated and habitualised, eventually attain an independent character from those who 
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created them and stand for themselves in a process labelled ‘objectification’. Berger and 
Luckmann use a broad definition of ‘objective', encompassing any product of human 
activity. Yet human agents are also a social product in that these objects reflect back on 
them in a process called ‘internalization’: “[t]he objectified relations that human beings 
have created constitute frames of human activity, which in turn affect the human beings 
who created them” (Repstad & Furseth 2013: 58). Externalisation, objectification and 
internalisation constitute a dialectical, ongoing process. 
Berger and Luckmann’s book carries the subtitle A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge and they are particularly concerned with the role of knowledge in creating 
and maintaining social order. This knowledge is the intersubjectively shared knowledge 
about society that everyone possesses. Far from the expert knowledge for instance 
associated with specific professions, it is a common-sense knowledge that guides 
everyday conduct (‘knowledge of everyday life’): 
“I live in the common-sense world of everyday life equipped with specific bodies 
of knowledge. What is more, I know that others share at least part of this 
knowledge, and they know that I know this. My interaction with others in 
everyday life is, therefore, constantly affected by our common participation in the 
available social stock of knowledge.” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991: 56) 
The knowledge of everyday life is considered as self-evident until further notice. It is not 
challenged or queried “until a problem arises that cannot be solved in terms of it” (Berger 
& Luckmann [1966] 1991: 58). Such shared, consensual knowledge forms the structure 
of meaning without which human society would not be possible. Berger and Luckmann 
ask how this socially developed, distributed and preserved knowledge congeals into an 
unchallenged, taken-for-granted reality – in other words how knowledge becomes 
institutionalised. Their answer appears straightforward: the perpetual acceptance and 
reproduction of knowledge through the acts of human agents creates lasting social order. 
This is expression of the dialectics of externalisation, objectification and internalisation. 
Yet the underlying process is more complex.  
When human agents express themselves through their activities, repeated acts solidify 
into a model which can be reproduced with less effort in the future. Acts and 
corresponding situations become habitualised and are converted into a type. 
Institutionalisation takes place when habitualised activities are reciprocally typified by 
different agents. This way they become abstracted from specific human agents into 
  
75 
generalised roles and expectations. Acts and situations can now be anticipated by 
different members of society. The process of institutionalisation concludes when 
emerging institutions are handed over to third parties (e.g. a new generation) which have 
not participated in their initial construction. Knowledge about the right conduct in 
everyday life congeals into what Berger and Luckmann call ‘objective reality’, a social 
world that appears set in stone, unsurmountable and partly inexplicable. The man-made 
origin of institutions wanes and they become reified as a non-human facticity as if they 
were a natural phenomenon. Objective reality serves as the unscrutinised canvas on which 
social life is acted out. 
In contrast to Durkheim, who explains order via the concept of institutions, Berger and 
Luckmann stress the dynamic notion of institutionalisation, which are acts of perpetual 
confirmations of objective reality. So while the concept of objective reality hampers the 
autonomy of human agency, the need for reconfirmation adds this agency back in. 
Objective reality needs to be maintained. The most important medium through which this 
process takes place is language, which supplies human agents with knowledge about 
society and is the medium through which this knowledge is applied. Continuous 
interaction with others through language creates a sediment of knowledge that cements 
the taken-for-granted-ness of society. What emerges is a ‘recipe knowledge’ that serves 
as a guide or script that human agents rely on and which they know others also do.  
Alongside the continuous production of social order, its legitimacy must be further 
ensured through mechanisms of ‘universe maintenance'. These range from folk-wisdoms 
to more elaborate theories of legitimation expressed for instance in legal directives and 
religious prescriptions. Together, they form symbolic universes of meaning. When these 
symbolic universes of meaning fail, the taken-for-granted character of society erodes, and 
objective reality loses its status as a self-evident order. For Berger and Luckmann, the 
term ‘dissonances' denotes the tension between objective reality and the world of 
individual experience, or subjective reality. Dissonances occur when there is a rupture 
between objectification and its internalisation. For social order to be maintained, limiting 
those dissonances is essential. Dissonances also permit a critical perspective on objective 
reality, its reform or replacement. 
Problems of social order then emerge when common-sense knowledge is under siege. 
This happens when not all members of society share the same experiences, a threat that 
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society always faces with new generations coming along, or when counter-realities, 
produced for instance in subcultures or expert circles, stand in conflict with objective 
reality and leap into the common-sense experience of everyday life: 
“[R]ebellions on part of laymen (as form of social organization) may lead to 
emergence of rival definitions of reality and, eventually, to the appearance of new 
experts in charge of the new definitions. […] Incipient counter-definitions of 
reality and identity are present as soon as any such individuals congregate in 
socially durable groups. This triggers a process of change that will introduce a 
more complex distribution of knowledge. A counter-reality may now begin to be 
objectivated in the marginal group of the unsuccessfully socialized.” (Berger & 
Luckmann [1966] 1991: 136, 185) 
As societies get more complex and functionally differentiated, this threat grows. In the 
later twentieth century, Berger and Luckmann see the emergence of a society "in which 
discrepant worlds are generally available on a market basis” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 
1991: 192). Writing in the 1960s, the authors treat this scenario as an outlook and do not 
further investigate such discrepant worlds. Recognising the transformative potential 
stemming from a conflict between subjective experiences and objective reality as reified 
common-sense knowledge, they call for further research:  
“The historical and empirical application of sociology of knowledge must take 
special note of social circumstances that favor de-reification [DK: of objective 
reality].” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991: 109) 
I argue that the implication of pervasive computation in social structure has created a 
situation which further consolidates objective reality as inexplicable, yet also provides 
distinct opportunities for de-reification, and claiming back agency this way. This situation 
provides the basis for applying Berger and Luckmann’s framework to understanding 
agency in the context of computation, and I will outline it below.  
3.2.3. Revisiting Berger and Luckmann in the Context of Computed 
Sociality 
Despite the theoretical and conceptual fit of Berger and Luckmann's approach with key 
themes that I have explored thus far, applying their framework requires some 
modifications. Berger and Luckmann's main case study was religion, and they did not 
take into account the role of technology in modern societies, let alone the notion of 
computation. Below I outline the limitations of a literal use of their framework and 
propose a reinterpretation of core concepts. I will mainly draw on ideas from Lash’s new 
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media ontology, glitch theory and Goffman’s notion of interaction. I draw on Lash despite 
differences in approach. Lash focusses on hegemonic and post-hegemonic notions of 
power. He pursues an understanding of power as largely uni-directional, that is dominant 
and all-encompassing (Lash 2007). Such an emphasis on this particular understanding of 
power leaves little room for the systematic contemplation of agency. Yet his analysis of 
algorithmic forms of power contains a commentary on how (impossible) human agency 
should look like vis-à-vis computation, which I turn on its head by incorporating it into 
an actual framework of agency. 
The fact that computers do not just mediate, but constitute social life (Burrows 2009) 
challenges Berger and Luckmann’s assumption of society as an exclusively human 
product. Pervasive computation does not negate the man-made character of society. But 
it adds another type of agent that is involved in the creation and maintenance of social 
order. Just like human agents, today, a computational logic is involved across the entire 
dialectical process of externalisation, objectification, and internalisation. While I will 
explore this empirically later throughout this work, the example of online purchase 
recommendations illustrates this in a simplified way.  
Human agents externalise their activity (e.g. Amazon movie purchases) in the form of 
mediated interaction with a computer database. A computational logic then aggregates 
similar activities across different human agents and develops a comprehensive model of 
product preferences. This is the stage of objectification in which the computational logic 
manufactures how members of society relate to each other and perceive themselves by 
means of their consumption patterns. The engineered outcome is then relayed back to 
human agents and internalised in the form of suggestions such as ‘other people who liked 
this product also liked that one', or ‘you may also be interested in this offering’. By proxy 
of a computational logic, human agents now have an intersubjective understanding of 
preferences that has been constructed by computers. The criteria by which this happens 
are removed from human scrutiny, yet the outputs are relayed as a given reality on the 
computer screen. Computers have created a reality that appears as set in stone, given and 
trusted, yet somehow inexplicable. Unlike in Berger and Luckmann’s original theory, it, 
therefore, does not take a new generation, or the factor time more generally, for reality to 
obtain an objective character. Rather, the willing or unwilling handover of institutions 
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from human agents to computers creates a new form of facticity that lets reality appear 
as objective.  
Computational processes are also complicit in a latent takeover of an existing objective 
reality that is already set in stone. As computers have become pervasive, they seep into 
existing institutions that already make up objective reality and alter its premises without 
human agents recognising this transformation. Although Lash’s (2007) understanding of 
power as dominant and all-encompassing itself may not be helpful for conceptualising 
agency, the shift in the nature of power that he outlines opens a new perspective on the 
struggle that human agents encounter. Lash speaks of a power binary that distinguishes 
between hegemonic and post-hegemonic forms of power. Hegemonic power is expressed 
in a concerted ideology and imposed as a coherent narrative from outside onto the 
modalities of everyday life. In contrast, a computational logic19 constitutes post-
hegemonic power that spreads from within everyday life and is not discernible as a 
coherent force (Lash 2007). What human agents believe to be reality and what actually 
constitutes the reality they participate in becomes increasingly discrepant. Human agents 
may possess a sedimented everyday knowledge and act according to this knowledge. But 
as Berger and Luckmann have highlighted, objective reality is dynamic and needs to be 
maintained. When computers mediate the application of this knowledge in interaction 
between human agents, the performative nature of these computers alters reality in the 
process. This computational intervention is not necessarily recognised by human agents 
and instead perceived as a regular adjustment of common-sense knowledge, making it an 
expression of computational power.  
In this new constellation, the nature of social interaction changes. Berger and Luckmann 
based their model on the ideal type of face-to-face communication derived from 
Goffman’s concept of interaction ritual ([1967] 2003) and did not consider mediated 
communication. Drawing on Berger and Luckmann, Hepp (2013) emphasises that 
mediated communication also underpins the production and maintenance of common-
sense knowledge. He highlights that changes in media and their everyday appropriation 
through human practices affect how reality is constructed.20 Today, computation 
modulates mediated interaction and co-shapes the social consensus reached between 
                                                
19 Lash (2007) uses the term ‘algorithms’. 
20 See in particular pages 38, 46, 58 and 59 in Hepp (2013). 
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human agents. In this context, as computers become engaged in the construction of 
reality, they also emerge as a new type of social interlocutor for human agents. Arguably, 
computers are not members of society.21 But because they co-shape society, Berger and 
Luckmann’s framework suggests that from an interactionist perspective, they have to be 
treated as social interlocutors in the process of producing social order alongside, and in 
conjunction with human agents.  
In this new framework of interaction, human agents are robbed of the primary means to 
develop and maintain common-sense knowledge – human language does not reach the 
language of a computational logic. In Berger and Luckmann’s theory, this scenario would 
put objective reality under siege because at least in part it could not be maintained. Yet 
paradoxically, a computational logic is backed by a human-made mechanism of universe 
maintenance which at least today prevents this. This mechanism is the utopian promise 
of salvation attached to technology by a Silicon Valley narrative as technology as a silver 
bullet and fix-all for social problems, epitomised by the proverb ‘there is an app for that’. 
Morozov (2013a; 2013b) has called this narrative ‘solutionism’. The term denotes: 
“[...] an intellectual pathology that recognizes problems as problems based on just 
one criterion: whether they are “solvable” with a nice and clean technological 
solution at our disposal. [...] The ideology of solutionism is thus essential to 
helping Silicon Valley maintain its image. The technology press — along with the 
meme-hustlers at the TED conference — are only happy to play up any solutionist 
undertakings. 'Africa? There’s an app for that,’ reads a real (!) headline on the 
Web site of the British edition of Wired.” (Morozov 2013a) 
Under this reading, the lack of available language for human agents to compete on equal 
terms with computers for the production and maintenance of knowledge leads to a 
transformation of the nature of common-sense knowledge itself. The conventional 
modalities of common-sense knowledge that Berger and Luckmann describe are 
complemented by a consensus that ‘technology knows best’, an idea that echoes Turkle’s 
(2011) observation in a different context about people’s heightened expectations towards 
technology. Common-sense knowledge becomes detached from specific issues of social 
order and transforms into the meta-knowledge that other members of society also buy 
into the accuracy and superiority of computational solutions.  
                                                
21 However, the film Her provides a compelling utopia in which an artificial intelligence that was purchased 
as a software product develops a personality and is seen as part of the social world by the protagonist.  
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Reformulating the social construction of reality in this way would paint a bleak picture 
for the potential of agency. However, I argue that two concepts in Berger and Luckmann’s 
theory, (1) dissonances and (2) mechanisms of universe maintenance, open a new 
perspective once they are revised.  
 Glitches as Dissonances 
Berger and Luckmann maintain a vague understanding of the term dissonances. They do 
not dwell on the term and rather focus on the social groups that may spark dissonances. I 
argue that computed sociality comes with a specific type of dissonance – the glitch - that 
helps understand the possibility of agency. Glitches are unanticipated and unpredictable 
irregularities in how a computational system behaves. They can arise from the normal 
working conditions of a software, such as pixelated images during a situation of low 
bandwidth, but usually are “perceivable malfunctions of a system” (Goriunova & Shulgin 
2008: 111) resulting from error in software syntax, logic or incomputable exceptions 
when unsuitable data is decoded in the way a computational logic deems proper. Yet 
glitches are not failures in the sense of a full computational shutdown: “Stated differently, 
it is a given program’s failure to fully fail upon encountering bad data […]” (Manon & 
Temkin 2011: para. 3, original emphasis). In that the computational system does not fail 
but embody the glitch, it momentarily becomes representational in an unintended way, 
reconfiguring the relationship between a digital interface and its underlying processes: 
“A glitch is a mess that is a moment, a possibility to glance at software’s inner 
structure, whether it is a mechanism of data compression or HTML code. 
Although a glitch does not reveal the true functionality of the computer, it shows 
the ghostly conventionality of the forms by which digital spaces are organized.” 
(Goriunova & Shulgin 2008:114) 
A glitch thus means that the categorical invisibility of infrastructure collapses, at least 
partially. A glitch does not reveal the entirety of a computational logic but discloses 
fragments of its character at a moment in time. The computational logic, or a tangible 
reference towards it, is spilt out onto the interface and into the realm of human experience. 
Glitches then are artefacts of mediation. Mediating between interface and infrastructure, 
they produce a site through which meaning can be created. Through glitches, the 
otherwise invisible computational logic enters the domain of people’s experience, helping 
them to articulate the world they live in. Couldry and Hepp (2013) have proposed a 
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definitional difference between mediation and mediatisation that sheds further light on 
such glitches: 
“While ‘mediation’ refers to the process of communication in general - that is, 
how communication has to be understood as involving the ongoing mediation of 
meaning construction, ‘mediatization’ is a category designed to describe change. 
It then becomes possible to link both concepts in the following way: mediatization 
reflects how the overall consequences of multiple processes of mediation have 
changed with the emergence of different kinds of media.” (Couldry & Hepp 2013: 
198) 
In this sense, glitches more specifically are a form of mediatisation because they alter the 
communicative landscape of mediation. They convert the computational logic into media 
and transform the means by which the construction of reality takes place. However, due 
to their temporal and unstable nature, glitches do not transform a computational logic in 
a binary model from ‘unmediated’ to perpetually ‘mediated’. Instead, they are ‘pop-up’ 
mediatisations that occur and vanish interchangeably and unexpectedly. People’s 
acknowledgement of their existence, and past experiences of glitches, however, induce a 
wider socio-cultural change in the construction of reality, irrespective of whether a glitch 
is present or absent at a given moment in time. Such modes of mediatisation in glitches 
may not be fully registered in broader Cultures of Mediatization (Hepp 2013), but they 
reflect deeper processes of mediatisation nonetheless. 
Glitch theory is a discourse mainly located in new media and computer art which focuses 
on the aesthetics of glitches as digital artefacts (Barker 2011). A sociological reading of 
the term provides a connection between the sociology of knowledge and the interactionist 
tradition of agency. In Berger and Luckmann’s language, when the underlying logic of 
infrastructure suddenly becomes visible on the computer screen, human agents encounter 
a situation in which their own, subjective reality encounters the principles of computed, 
objective reality. Such encounters can either verify common-sense knowledge or reveal 
a clash of counter-realities. A glitch represents a potential instance of de-reification that 
Berger and Luckmann stress as theoretically and empirically important for understanding 
social order. Usually, human agents are removed from a computational logic as a category 
of agent that is involved in the production of social order. A computational logic is an 
unknown, invisible interlocutor with whom human agents struggle to establish a social 
situation in Goffman’s ([1959] 1990) sense. A glitch creates a social situation in which a 
computational logic enters the sphere of human sensory and cognitive experience. As a 
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glitch occurs, the computational logic declares itself and becomes an available 
interlocutor. Language, human agents’ primary means of developing, maintaining and 
challenging everyday knowledge is temporarily restored, and human agents encounter a 
face of their interlocutor which helps them establish a situation that creates the basis for 
a range of different acts.  
 Reflexivity as Universe Maintenance 
As types of societies change, so does the relationship between objective and subjective 
reality. Berger and Luckmann acknowledge this in their statement that I referenced earlier 
about contemporary societies which offer an abundant choice of discrepant realities, 
requiring constant readjustment between what is objective, and individual, subjective 
experience. A few decades later, in a different debate, the notion of discrepant realities 
surfaced again. Perpetual discrepancies of what is real convert the paradigm of certitude, 
a characteristic of rational, modern bureaucratic societies, into a question mark. Beck 
(1992) has expressed this in the concept of ‘risk society’, where all truths are temporary 
(Giddens 1990), that is until their unanticipated consequences nullify them.22 Modernity 
has become reflexive: it problematises itself and its own rational logic; criticism and 
adaptability to changing certainties become features of society (Beck et al. 2001; Beck 
1992). Lash (2005; 2007) has embedded the notion of reflexivity into a discussion of 
algorithms through the concept of ‘rules’. He identifies three types of rules – constitutive, 
regulative and generative. Both constitutive and regulative rules are institutionalised, 
codified and policed by human agents (e.g. religion, law). The rise of computation stands 
for a new set of generative rules that are formed by and expressed through software and 
algorithms without human agents encountering them, or being able to rewrite them. While 
generative rules themselves are virtual, they generate actuals in the domain of lived 
experience (Lash 2007). Generative rules are the ultimate expressions of reflexivity as 
they perpetually adapt to changing constellations, reinventing themselves in the process. 
The association of generative rules with the idea of reflexivity makes Lash's perspective 
                                                
22 For a more detailed discussion of ‘risk’, its use in theories of modernity and its relationship with 
surveillance, see chapter two. For participants’ empirical experience of risk, see Chapter Five.  
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on agency relevant to my argument.23 For Lash, human agency needs to mirror the 
modalities of generative rules:  
“As social norms, i.e. regulative rules, weaken, we must increasingly become, in 
Ulrich Beck’s sense, reflexive. We must become as if algorithmic. We must find 
our own rules and use them generatively. That is we must give the rule to 
ourselves. We are less rule followers than rule finders. Kant gave us two types of 
judgement: determinate judgement in which the rule is given to us, and reflective 
(reflexive) judgement in which we must find the rule.” (Lash 2005: last para.) 
Clearly, human agents cannot become computers in the way they think and act, and 
Lash’s is careful enough to add an ‘as if’ to his statement, suggesting approximation 
rather than convergence. As pro-active rule finders, the task of agency then is to 
perpetually query and unearth the hidden logic of computers. This is echoed by 
Goffman’s interaction theory. Goffman has proposed that each interaction takes place in 
a social situation which must be defined before such interaction can take place. This 
entails a clear conception of one’s interlocutor (Goffman [1959] 1990). Generative 
reflexivity then is a means for human agents to frame their computational interlocutor. 
Within Berger and Luckmann’s framework, there are two ways in which this can be 
enacted.  
Firstly, reflexivity expands the possibility of agency through glitches. The concept of 
glitches suggests that they are evoked through internal processes within a computational 
logic and thus reveal themselves haphazardly, in an unplanned manner. While glitches 
may enable agency, in a conventional reading of the concept, human agents would need 
to wait for glitches to occur. Glitches then stand for a reactive conception of agency which 
can only take place once the computational logic affords it. Yet the idea of reflexivity 
offers a way to imagine glitches as tactically provoked. If human agents act reflexively 
in the sense of perpetually updating the relationship to their environment, acts that can 
trigger glitches become an expression of Lash’s idea of human agents as rule finders. Acts 
on an interface usually have a specific, often utilitarian purpose (e.g. purchasing a book 
at Amazon, arranging a bank transfer). If human agents combine those acts with rogue 
entries, or monitor their own acts and compare them against return visits to a given 
interface, human agents can themselves provoke glitches. Acting in a computed world 
                                                
23 Based on Lash’s preoccupation with power, I read his statement below as intended as an unattainable 
imperative in the abstract, rather than a hands-on instruction. However, I see practical applicability through 
connecting it to Goffman’s and Berger and Luckmann’s frameworks. 
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then implies combining everyday acts on the interface with querying the computational 
logic at the same time in a reflexive manner. These queries are contemporary expressions 
of establishing a social situation in Goffman’s sense and framing a computational 
interlocutor.  
Secondly, the idea of reflexivity allows us to reimagine Berger and Luckmann’s concept 
of universe maintenance. Acts of universe maintenance are social acts that take place in 
interaction with others. Shared myths, legends and stories about reality and its institutions 
are principal mechanisms of universe maintenance. In the societies that Berger and 
Luckmann describe, especially in the context of religion as their major case study, such 
narratives remain relatively stable over time. I argue that in contemporary reflexive 
modernity, mechanisms of universe maintenance become themselves generative. Social 
stability is not generated by the permanence of these narratives, but through the 
knowledge that they will continue to constantly change and adapt in order to offer new 
perspectives on how a computational logic operates. Universe maintenance then is less 
about perpetuating a specific set of institutions, but about maintaining a stream of 
information about the modulations of a computational logic, which in turn allows human 
agents to adjust their behaviour (e.g. privacy settings on social networking sites, opt-out 
from online advertising). Glitches can form the basis for such universe maintenance in 
that they are shared and distributed by human agents as folk tales across society, only to 
be expanded by or supplanted by narratives about other glitches. They are joined by 
interventions from artists, algorithmists, or other translators, whose folk tales enter the 
repertoire of everyday knowledge of the world.  
A theoretical understanding of agency in light of the communication problem of 
computed sociality, which I have outlined above, can only determine how agency is 
possible in principle. It cannot capture the actual modalities and acts performed on this 
canvas of possibility. As Jonathan Crary highlights “[…] agency itself is a mutable and 
historically determined notion” (Crary 2014: 82). The manifestations of agency in the 
context of computed sociality, therefore, differs from sociological conceptions of agency 
in context of the classical struggles the discipline has long documented, such as class, 
race, or gender. How exactly human agents navigate the social situations that glitches and 
modes of universe maintenance create, and whether human agents need to wait for a glitch 
to happen ipso facto, or can actually produce it, remains an empirical question which I 
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will document in the following chapters. At the same time, the framework of agency that 
I have offered remains confined to the communication problem of computed sociality, 
and is not a general theory of agency, or a critical meta-review of the concept of agency 
as such (e.g. Emirbayer & Mische 1998).  
3.3. Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have proposed an approach to understanding agency in the context of 
the computational rendition of reality (Kallinikos 2009). I have set out by arguing that 
existing terms to frame the computational mechanisms that undergird society today do 
not take into account the lived experience of computation and by themselves do not offer 
a perspective on agency. Drawing on the notion of computed sociality and the social 
construction of reality, I have specified the focus of a theory of agency as interrogating 
the conditions of knowledge in a computed world. I have developed my argument in two 
sections.  
A first section framed agency as a communication problem for human agents vis-à-vis 
computational interlocutors. Reviewing a range of terms, from algorithms, big data to 
code and software, I have isolated four characteristics which jointly form a computational 
logic. I have then embedded this computational logic in a framework of lived experience, 
which allowed to juxtapose computational and human modes of making sense of the 
world. I have argued that the problem of agency in a computed sociality needs to be 
framed through the tension between interface and infrastructure. Human activity takes 
place on the level of the interface, whereas computational principles act on the level of 
infrastructure. The dualism of interface and infrastructure is itself expression of a further 
dichotomy expressed through visibility and invisibility. I have suggested that the 
infrastructure of computation is categorically invisible for human agents. My 
interpretation of visibility is not contingent on the human eye and sensory perception but 
applies more widely to the cultural specifics and biophysical universals of making sense 
of the world. A communication problem then arises through a categorical incompatibility 
between computational and human modes of constructing reality. Agency requires a 
restoration of visibility to reclaim the conditions under which knowledge of the social 
world is produced. 
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In a second step, I have applied the communication problem of computed sociality to a 
broader framework of social theory. I have argued that the paradigmatic flexibility of 
sociology permits updating and going beyond existing social theory to incorporate 
computation as a social force while retaining its analytical potential. Berger and 
Luckmann’s Social Construction of Reality has provided a theoretical scaffold for this 
task. While the authors could not anticipate the rise of computation as a central feature of 
society, their basic framework overlaps with central themes in the conceptual language 
of computation that I had previously outlined. I have updated Berger and Luckmann’s 
framework by introducing a computational logic as an additional type of agent that co-
produces reality alongside human agents. I have then documented in how far this changes 
the idea of intersubjective common-sense knowledge and the structure of objective 
reality. The basis for my reinterpretation was Berger and Luckmann’s outlook on the 
theoretical and empirical need to take into account ruptures between objective and 
subjective reality as modernity evolves. This required moving the concept of dissonances 
from the margin of their theory to centre stage, and specifying the term through the 
concept of glitches. I have proposed that computational glitches lead to a collapse of the 
hitherto insurmountable barriers between interface and infrastructure. Glitches permit 
human agents to approach a computational logic through their own sensory and cognitive 
means, creating a site for the production of meaning. While this brings computation into 
the realms of human experience, additionally, the internalisation of generative rules and 
reflexivity provides a basis for agency which brings human agents closer to computation 
by emulating its principles.  
I have concluded that a theory of agency can only be a theory of the conditions of 
knowledge under which agency is possible. It cannot identify the actual modalities of 
agency in lived experience. This would be prescriptive and defy the idea of agency as 
such. The manifestations of agency remain an empirical question, which I will analyse in 
the remainder of this work. More widely, this chapter has provided evidence that the 
diagnosis of computed sociality does not relegate the understanding of society to the 
explanatory frameworks of computer sciences, related disciplines and to practitioners 
who read and write computer code. Instead, the paradigmatic flexibility of sociology and 
its conceptual repertoire enables social scientists to analyse present and future societies 
in the context of computation.   
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 Chapter Four: Methodology 
This chapter outlines the research approach adopted in this thesis, the underlying rationale 
for selecting it and the steps taken to assemble it. I follow Josselson and Lieblich (2003) 
in understanding this approach as a ‘plan of inquiry' instead of a ‘method’ in order to 
reflexively develop an approach specific to the research problem at hand, rather than to 
overemphasise procedural conventions. As this chapter documents through a discussion 
of ‘digital methods’, this research takes place in a changing epistemological environment 
and lacks precedents that allow reliance on a fixed, consensual set of procedures. Through 
a plan of inquiry, I discuss how the reflexive application and modification of existing 
research tools, including those outside sociological conventions, can be combined to 
facilitate an empirical understanding of everyday life in the context of surveillance and 
computation. Aimed at the in-depth understanding of everyday life from the perspective 
of research subjects themselves, the empirical approach is rooted in a qualitative 
paradigm. The research strives to understand how people make sense of surveillance in 
computed sociality, how they perceive themselves as active agents vis-à-vis a 
computational logic, how they act towards this logic, how their interaction with 
computational agents unfolds, and what this means for their relationship with 
computational surveillance. These concerns reflect the theoretical framework at the 
intersection between a sociology of knowledge and a sociology of agency developed 
earlier in this thesis and place the empirical analysis in the tradition of ethnomethodology 
and interpretative sociology, which focus on the meaning-making of subjects in and of 
their worlds. This translates into the following research questions:  
• What is the role of online surveillance in everyday life?  
• How do people develop knowledge about the computational mechanisms behind 
online surveillance?  
• What practices do people employ to act towards such forms of surveillance, and 
what are their intentions? 
The research design operationalises these questions in a multi-step process. It sets out 
with a content analysis of news reports on surveillance, followed by active interviews and 
in the last step a combination of think-aloud protocols, participant observations and live 
interviews. Forty participants were recruited through a combination of snowball, quota, 
and maximum-variation sampling. After a broader discussion of methodology and 
research precedents that define the coordinates for the plan of inquiry, the chapter 
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explains the specific research design, sampling and generalisability of findings, before 
looking at research ethics and concluding with a reflection on the researcher’s experiences 
during fieldwork.  
4.1. Doing Sociology in a Digital Age 
Everyday life is increasingly mediated through, taking place in, and constituted by digital 
technologies (Burrows 2009). This is a core premise for the theoretical framework of this 
thesis and motivates its empirical questions. It also has implications for the choice of 
method. If the purpose of method is access to ‘the social’ (Savage & Burrows 2007), or 
knowledge of the lives of people and their relations through a “social science apparatus” 
(Ruppert et al. 2013: 23), a systematic transformation of how life is experienced requires 
scrutinising existing sociological practice. Warning of a Coming Crisis of Empirical 
Sociology, Savage and Burrows (2007) see the portfolio of established sociological 
research methods as dated. Elsewhere, they argue that  
“[s]ociologists […] are losing whatever jurisdiction we once had over the study of 
the ‘social’ as the generation, mobilization and analysis of social data become 
ubiquitous. [C]onfronted with these circumstances, sociologists needed to rethink 
their methodological practices in radically innovative ways, unfettered by some 
of the deeply rooted domain assumptions in our discipline that were so central to 
our methodological success in the 1960s and 1970s but which no longer pertain 
in the early years of the 21st century.” (ibid. 2009: 763-4) 
The authors’ concerns are particularly pertinent for this research because they are 
informed by Thrift’s (2005) notion of ‘knowing capitalism’, a macro-social diagnosis that 
knowledge about people increasingly is derived from the pervasive monitoring and 
surveillance fuelled by commercial interests. The struggle to make sense of a world 
governed by computation and surveillance, which the main theoretical and empirical 
theme of this thesis, then also affects sociologists in their work. Data about people is 
increasingly located in proprietary platforms such as Facebook, where mediated life takes 
place,24 and the company has set up its own team of social scientists (Zhou 2014). Lupton 
(2015) highlights that as sociologists compete with an increasing range of commercial 
researchers and organisations as experts on the social, they face growing lag in the 
analysis of the digital domain, lacking tools, computational skills and access to digital 
                                                
24 As of November 2015, Facebook had 1.5 billion monthly active users (Facebook 2015). 
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data.25 Also, they are confronted with an epistemological challenge as research from such 
competing domains frequently draws on big data as a logic of inquiry that stands at odds 
with established sociological ways of investigating the world (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier 2013). Even if social scientists take advantage of a growing array of free digital 
analytics tools to counter the proliferation of new authorities on the social world, these 
are usually not designed for social analysis and limited in their applicability (Manovich 
2012). Taken together, these issues affect sociologists’ ability of “developing, funding 
and conducting sociological research” (McKie & Ryan 2012: 2), as well as to lend 
authority to their findings. While Savage and Burrows focus on surveys and in-depth 
interviews and predominantly provide examples from the domain of quantitative research 
(ibid. 2007; ibid. 2009; Savage 2013), these challenges also apply to other modes of 
inquiry. Such modes include ethnography, where the complex relationships between 
online and offline worlds, and the distribution of internet use across devices, platforms 
and tools, challenges the classic notion of the field site (Miller 2011).  
4.1.1. Averting the Crisis: Digital Methods 
Under the label of ‘virtual methods’, early attempts to update social research methods for 
digitally mediated environments mostly seek to migrate existing methods into the digital 
domain (Hine 2005). In contrast, the paradigm of ‘digital methods’ argues for digitally 
native approaches that “consider the Internet as a source of data, method, and technique” 
(Rogers 2013: 27). A growing range of such approaches is proliferating.26 Rogers (2013) 
himself emphasises the study of hyperlinks, date stamps, algorithms, geo-IP location 
technology, historical website archives, search results and other digital artefacts. Latour 
et al. (2012) suggest to take advantage of the data generated through human interactions 
with digital technologies. Arguing that conventional methods represent a ‘dead 
sociology’ (Back 2012) that in its entrenched research practices fails to appreciate the 
rapid change in the constitution of contemporary society brought about by digital 
technologies, Back and Puwar (2012) articulate a manifesto for a ‘live sociology’. The 
term has multiple connotations and is more a composite of directions than an instructive 
toolset. Abstracting from the eleven points in which the authors develop the concept, it 
firstly can be understood in juxtaposition with dead sociology as a set of methods that is 
                                                
25 However, as Manovich (2012) demonstrates through the example of telecommunications firm Sprint, 
commercial organisations do not possess a monolithic power of interpretation as datasets and rules of access 
are fragmented across the organisation, creating hierarchies within and between companies. 
26 For a comprehensive overview, see Lupton 2015. 
  
90 
contemporary and hence ‘alive’. It secondly recognises the fluidity of data and includes 
approaches to capture them in real-time, including web scraping. Yet most profoundly, 
live sociology stands for the liveliness of methods expressed through curiosity and 
flexibility, as the authors demonstrate through an analogy with Baudelaire’s figure of the 
flâneur: 
“[w]e need to take our research tools and devices for a walk, [prompting] 
unexpected relationalities with the environment, the body and the senses. 
Presented with strange encounters, alternative ways of categorizing and knowing 
the world emerge. [W]e as researchers become exposed to openness and the 
liveliness of the events we try to get close to.” (Back and Puwar 2012: 10) 
Such fluidity is also a theme in Pink’s (2009) digital anthropology. Instead of changing 
the tools for data-gathering and modes of analysis, she reconsiders the field site. Her 
concept of ‘ethnographic place’ flexibly combines places, objects and people both online 
and offline. It acknowledges that sites are neither static in time, nor that they can be 
defined exclusively through material or other criteria. The ethnographic place then 
becomes a dynamic collection of sites and signals that stand in flexible relations and 
multiple constellations with each other. Debates on rethinking method in a digital context 
more broadly extend to the humanities (Berry 2011; Gardiner 2015). For instance, Moretti 
(2013) proposes ‘distant reading’, a way of studying literature that does not involve the 
close reading of texts by scholars, but big data analysis of content to uncover grammatical 
structures, vocabulary, thematic and dramaturgical patterns. 
These examples suggest a diverse set of efforts to rethink the methodological toolbox not 
just of sociology, but of the wider social sciences and humanities. They also portray an 
emerging landscape of inquiry that is based on exploration rather than consensus around 
a fixed canonical portfolio of methods. There is evidence that this new landscape by its 
very nature will remain unstable in order to accommodate the fluidity and complexity of 
the phenomena under study. In a deliberately provocative book, Beer (2014) argues for a 
‘punk sociology’ that permanently challenges the status quo. It includes “relativism, 
openness, and eclecticism” (ibid. 2014: 34) in the development of knowledge, embraces 
new and unconventional approaches of narration that include unpolished outputs beyond 
academic texts, and applies a do-it-yourself ethos to finding sociological problems and 
approaches that draw on inspiration from outside disciplines. A common trait in 
rethinking methods then is the idea of an ‘assemblage’ (Savage 2013), a notion that 
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already informed surveillance theory to develop situated approaches that combine often 
seemingly incompatible perspectives (Haggerty & Ericson 2000). While the choice of 
method should always be contingent on the research questions at hand (Silverman 2006), 
digital methods stand for the combination of data from different sources, disciplines and 
epistemologies to create new approaches to understanding social life, such as 
assemblages between conventional ethnography and data from digital sensors 
(MacKenzie & McNally 2013; Lupton 2015).  
Some aspects of digital methods are not new and instead evolutions of earlier 
observations. Pre-dating this debate by more than 20 years, Williams, Rice, and Rogers 
already emphasised that  
“although we consider possible research methods for new media as mainly 
extensions of existing methods, we propose that the new media researcher should 
consider alternative methods, or even multiple methods, and to attempt a 
triangulation of methods.” (Williams, Rice & Rogers 1988: 15) 
Generally, the rise of digital methods can be understood as a critical response to 
entrenched ways through which sociologists have sought to understand the world. Yet 
digital methods are not a silver bullet and themselves must remain open to critique. In 
particular, the use of big data in social analysis creates new concerns and limitations. 
Large volumes of data do not mean that data is representative, and their inherent bias can 
be difficult to spot (boyd & Crawford 2012), troubling established processes of asserting 
validity in particular if previously untested approaches are used:  
“[…] researchers should be aware that the most easily available measure may not 
be the most valid one, and they should discuss to what degree its validity 
converges with that of established instruments.” (Mahrt & Scharkow 2013: 27) 
Problems of access then can also distort results in that easily accessible datasets are 
prioritised over those which are more difficult to obtain. Even without such constraints, 
interactions between people and technology create vast amounts of data. Researchers 
need to make decisions about inclusion and exclusion of data that reliably represents an 
issue under study, creating a new form of sampling bias under a “veneer of scientificity” 
(Bruns 2013: section 2, para. 1). Furthermore, applying a ‘technological fix’ to a 
sociological crisis can alter the sociological agenda, inadvertently favouring a 
quantitative paradigm over interpretative understanding (Gooding 2013). Despite the 
explanatory power ascribed to its volume and logic of inference, critics consider big data 
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inward-looking as it neglects the socio-cultural, economic, historical and political context 
it is embedded in, leading to a reductionist perspective devoid of wider sociological 
imagination (Uprichard 2012; 2013). If sociology seeks to draw on technological systems 
for the collection of data, or considers those systems themselves as data objects, it 
therefore needs to incorporate wider theoretical debates such as the politics of algorithms 
(Barocas et al. 2013) in its thinking on method. Such reflection extends to ethical 
considerations about access to and ownership of data, privacy intrusions and consent, 
where sociologists are held to other standards of accountability than commercial actors 
(Mahrt & Scharkow 2013; Boase 2013; Lupton 2015). 
The ideas of punk sociology and assemblage of methods can mitigate some of these 
critical issues due to their openness to both big data and qualitative approaches. Yet the 
fluidity of the empirical landscape, the dynamic nature of digital objects and the need for 
creative combinations of tools also entails a lack of conventions through which to 
legitimise a particular choice of method, placing greater emphasis on the documentation 
and justification of a selected approach. Some argue that the term ‘method’ itself can be 
misleading because it focuses on procedure, rather than on how to consider the underlying 
questions. Josselson and Lieblich (2003) prefer to speak of a ‘plan of inquiry’, a phrase 
that reflects the ‘punk’, unstandardised and problem-centric nature of approach. I adopt 
their suggestion in my empirical approach.  
4.1.2. Applying the Digital Methods Paradigm 
For this thesis, the emergence of digital methods begs the question whether researching 
phenomena in the digital domain prescribes ‘digitally native’ methods as outlined above, 
and whether the demarcation between digital methods and apparently ‘dead’ sociology is 
actually clear-cut. My objective is to provide an understanding of everyday life under 
conditions of computational surveillance. While I take into account issues of algorithms, 
big data and related concepts, they are not instructive for my approach. I focus on the 
lived experience of human agents from their own perspective(s), and their subjective 
sense-making of and in such a society. My emphasis reflects the longstanding remit of 
qualitative sociology “to document the world from the point of view of the people 
studied” (Hammersley 1992: 165), allowing me to draw on its established set of tools. 
This study therefore does not need to consider big data approaches to sociology or 
attempts to decode or reverse-engineer computational artefacts directly. Yet other aspects 
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of the digital methods debate provide valuable guidance. Firstly, mapping the field of 
human experience in a networked, messy and fluid environment requires an approach 
analogous to reworking the ethnographic place and cannot rely on established 
conventions of field site. A static approach to field sites would privilege the site over the 
lived experience and force manifestations of agency in a too narrow context. Secondly, 
an assemblage of methods that incorporates approaches outside of sociology in order to 
establish deeper access to people’s experience in a digital environment can supplement 
conventional qualitative research methods. This includes using the internet as a source of 
data itself through aspects of a live sociology, provided that such data not only reflects 
people’s experience but is itself part of their experience. Lastly, ethical considerations 
brought forward in the context of digital methods are particularly relevant to this thesis 
because they ask whether research on surveillance can legitimate methods based on 
monitoring and surveillance themselves, and whether such methods can be replaced by 
less controversial approaches that yield a comparable depth and breadth of insight.  
My plan of inquiry is focussed on people’s experience, rather than technology as such. 
This makes my research less exposed to the limitations of current empirical sociology 
discussed in the context of digital methods. Yet I incorporate numerous intersections 
between human experience and technological artefacts and translate them into tools of 
inquiry in order to supplement existing methods. 
4.2. Research Precedents 
The lack of systematic empirical research into the lived experience of surveillance means 
that research precedents which this study can draw on are scarce (Ball & Haggerty 2005). 
These limitations are exacerbated by the fact that while surveillance studies themselves 
are a multidisciplinary field of study, empirical work on surveillance tends to draw on the 
mono-disciplinary methodological paradigms of its constituting disciplines, such as 
human geography or the sociology of crime. Such studies often are too narrow to inform 
this research, which draws on a multitude of debates and disciplines in its theoretical 
constitution. Nevertheless, supplementing the broader meta-discussion around digital 
methods, a review of existing studies in the domain of surveillance helps to develop the 
coordinates for my plan of inquiry, both by incorporating ideas, and by circumventing the 
limitations of existing studies.  
  
94 
4.2.1. Agency in Surveillance Studies: Two Perspectives 
A notable account is Walby’s (2005) institutional ethnography that explores the role of 
human agency in surveillance. Yet his definition of agency differs from how the term is 
understood in this thesis. Walby locates agency within the context of surveillance 
institutions to understand for instance how CCTV operators conduct surveillance. Such 
an approach sheds light on the production and maintenance of surveillance systems. In 
the context of a computed society, his method could contribute to how professional agents 
such as programmers are complicit in a computational logic. However, the everyday 
experience of living with surveillance, which is the focus of this thesis, does not take 
place within the spatially bound settings of a CCTV control room but within a distributed 
environment composed of physical and virtual sites that may differ between study 
participants. Walby himself acknowledges that his approach only provides a partial 
perspective of agency by neglecting the experience of those under surveillance. It 
however highlights the benefits of combining multiple methods, between in-depth 
interviews and participant observation in understanding the experience of surveillance. 
Walby proposes that in-depth interviews should be complemented by a discussion 
between researcher and CCTV control room operator which uses their observed actions 
as a basis. Walby considers the practices of doing surveillance as a form of text. He then 
queries surveillance operators on these texts that he has recorded.  
A perspective of the everyday experience of those under surveillance outside of the 
CCTV control room is provided by Toon (2000). He studied how youth gangs cope with 
and evade the sight of CCTV cameras in a UK town centre is an exception. Toon 
operationalises de Certeau’s notion of tactics (1984) using a combination of observation 
and in-depth interviews to document and interpret the practices of youths in hiding from 
surveillance. Toon’s approach is useful for this thesis because it highlights the importance 
to explore the relationship between human agents and CCTV cameras as interlocutors in 
managing visibility towards surveillance. However, his approach cannot be translated 
into this study. Just as in the case of surveillance operators, ducking and diving from 
CCTV takes place in a confined space. The a priori focus on resistance also neglects how 
the complex tension between complicity and objection to surveillance in a digital 
environment is enacted. While the study establishes CCTV cameras as an interlocutor, 
Toon only looks at the cameras themselves as material objects. He does not consider what 
takes place behind the CCTV cameras and thus does not need to consider how to 
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operationalise the relationship between study participants and the abstract notion of 
computation.  
4.2.2. Agency in a Digitally Mediated Environment 
Empirical material on the subjective experience of digitally mediated surveillance is 
limited. Andrejevic is one of the few authors who have investigated everyday life on the 
internet in a context of pervasive surveillance (Andrejevic 2005). However, Andrejevic 
does not reveal his research methods, limiting the ability to build on his empirical work. 
He also only looks at peer-to-peer surveillance as specific manifestations of surveillance, 
which does not offer guidance on how to operationalise the relationship between human 
agents and computation. Andrejevic focusses on social networking sites (SNS) and does 
not consider how the fluid nature of digital experience may merit a reconceptualisation 
of field sites.  
Extending the search for research precedents to the area of privacy shows that this 
compartmentalisation into distinct sites is prevalent in both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to digitally mediated communication, which prioritise SNS (Barnes 2006; 
Albrechtslund 2008; boyd & Ellison 2007). This focus has merits as users often encounter 
privacy issues on SNS. However, it also stands at odds with the dispersed and networked 
nature of digital surveillance across different ‘leaky’ contexts (Turow 2011; Lyon 2007; 
Nissenbaum 2009). Zimmer (2008) has documented the interplay between search engines 
and SNS to expand their surveillance capabilities, but empirical designs have not paid 
sufficient attention to this dynamic. The compartmentalisation of surveillance into 
distinct digital contexts simplifies research logistics because it narrows scope and 
provides justification for the selection of field sites.  
Yet studies on surveillance and SNS provide useful references for a research design. In 
his study on modes of resistance towards surveillance, Sanchez (2009) conducts a content 
analysis of Facebook user comments in reaction to a change in Facebook privacy policy. 
He provides an example of using the internet as a resource in the digital methods 
paradigm (Rogers 2013). Similarly, Livingstone’s (2008) work on teenagers and privacy 
on SNS is of methodical merit. Arguing for a multi-method approach, Livingstone 
combines participant observation and open-ended face-to-face interviews with teenagers 
in front of their computers while they are using SNS. This has two benefits. Firstly, 
although Livingstone focusses on SNS, adopting a modified version of this interview 
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setting would allow a researcher to let the research subjects themselves define the sites of 
lived experiences while they are online, instead of imposing it through an a priori 
decision. Secondly, the combination of participating in lived experience in front of the 
computer as well as its interrogation facilitates a depth of understanding that conventional 
in-depth interviews or observation alone could not provide. Livingstone’s approach can 
be considered an example of live sociology introduced above (Back & Puwar 2012).  
Outside of the explicit context of surveillance, Bucher (forthcoming 2017) most recently 
conducted interviews and Twitter exchanges with 25 internet users about the Facebook 
algorithm to understand how people make sense of algorithms and whether awareness of 
such algorithms affects their use of SNS. While I could not consider her contribution in 
my methodology and research design (Bucher publishes long after my fieldwork was 
completed), her study underscores that it is possible to routinely speak with ordinary 
people about complex and abstract matters like algorithms. This echoes my own 
fieldwork experience in the context of this thesis and helps opening up the perspective of 
human agents in a computed world to further empirical research.  
4.2.3. Implications of Research Precedents 
An analysis of research precedents has shown that there is no established template that 
this study can rely on. Surveillance studies have produced little empirical research on 
agency towards surveillance, and those studies that are available are both limited in scope 
and preoccupied with CCTV surveillance. Studies on agency towards surveillance in a 
digitally mediated environment are equally scarce, and an extended sourcing of literature 
around online privacy shows a preoccupation with SNS. Yet a review of existing research 
nevertheless supplements the insights gained from a discussion of digital methods. This 
review supports the value of a triangulation of methods and the importance of a dynamic 
conception of field sites. It also emphasises the importance to operationalise the 
relationship between participants and technological artefacts of surveillance, and offers 
guidance on how to combine interviews and participant observation in a live sociology in 
order to tap deeper into the lived experience of research subjects.  
4.3. Research Design 
The research design is informed by the debates around digital methods, techniques 
inspired by research precedents discussed, and general considerations of qualitative 
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research. This translates into a three-tier research design which I discuss in this section. 
In a first step, ‘sensitising concepts’ are developed through an analysis of news reports 
and internet user comments on surveillance in order to generate an interview guide for 
the successive tier and to make explicit potential issues of researcher bias. A second step, 
the ‘horizontal dimension’, consists of active interviews with participants in order to 
document the breadth of their engagement with issues of surveillance and how they 
generally assemble and construct knowledge about computed sociality and surveillance. 
This is complemented by a third research phase, the ‘vertical dimension’ that follows 
participants to field-sites which they have determined themselves. This vertical 
dimension is itself divided into several parts and consists of a succession and combination 
of think-aloud protocols, participant observation and live interviews accompanying 
people’s online practices to more deeply explore specific contexts of experience. The 
different components of the vertical dimension tap into different modes of cognition 
between affect and reflexivity. The below chart summarises the research design, which 
will be explained in further detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 2: Graphical Illustration of Research Design 
 
4.3.1. Sensitising Concepts 
As surveillance is designed into an ever wider array of social domains, it has become 
subject of pervasive public debate. This situation both enables and constrains a research 
design. It indicates that far from a niche subject limited to the biographical experience of 
few, surveillance is part of wider everyday experience. Talking to participants about 
surveillance therefore does not appear arbitrary, overly abstract or technical, but relates 
to how they experience the world. However, surveillance is also networked by its very 
nature and defies closed containers (Lyon 2007). In contrast to a compartmentalised 
approach to surveillance, this study seeks to incorporate this expanse of surveillance in 
its design. Yet while it is committed to emphatic understanding, enabling participants to 
set the agenda and speak from their own perspective without intrusion of external 
concepts and a priori structure, the vastness of surveillance requires basic signposts in 
order to ensure that the conversation is relevant. All interviews are collaborative 
achievements between researcher and research subject (Silverman 2006). Putting 
signposts in place with the intention to enable, rather than constrain or influence 
participants, further supports their own voice. Such signposts can take the form of probing 
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questions, or comparing a participant’s perspective with views on surveillance purported 
in the media. At the same time, signposts support the self-awareness and reflexivity of 
the researcher. In this study, the researcher is not an outside observer in a different culture. 
I am myself embedded in the same macro-social context as my research subjects and 
experience surveillance in the news, encounter it on Facebook and in other contexts. 
Using signposts in the form of an interview guide, and entering fieldwork with a list of 
concepts derived from news media and other sources allows me to keep track of sources 
that may have influenced my own perception and to navigate those concepts carefully 
without subconsciously imposing them on the participant.  
In order to address these issues, this research develops what I call ‘sensitising concepts’ 
prior to engaging with participants. These are key themes about surveillance and 
computation from news media, user commentaries and on SNS. Their aim is to generate 
signposts for conservation to enable participants, and provide stimuli yet checks for the 
researcher. These concepts were developed from empirical reality rather than from the 
theory underpinning this research because, as I have demonstrated, theory has neglected 
the subjective experience of computational surveillance. The rapid expansion of 
computational surveillance also outpaces the ability of theory to keep up, and to even 
provide a comprehensive inventory of contexts and manifestations of surveillance. In the 
anticipation that participants will draw analogies and make reference to current events 
when narrating their experience of surveillance, this research wanted to ensure that it is 
aware of such contexts.27 Developing these concepts from empirical reality also hinted at 
a wide range of attitudes to surveillance that go beyond the binary of resistance and 
complicity that existing studies have focussed on. 
Between November 2009 and April 2010, a content analysis of user-comments on 
Facebook and online news articles about surveillance in Germany and the UK was 
conducted.28 Although user comments are not a widespread source of data in sociological 
analysis, their use has a precedent in Sanchez’s (2009) study on resistance to surveillance. 
In this thesis, user comments on SNS were derived from Facebook discussion groups on 
Facebook’s plans to change privacy settings on the social network. Using qualitative data 
analysis software NVivo, key issues emerging across news sites and SNS were collected 
                                                
27 This proved particularly insightful in light of the deployment of Google Street View and the government’s 
spy software (Bundestrojaner) in Germany. 
28 Online versions of Der Spiegel, Sueddeutsche, Bild, The Guardian and The Sun were analyzed. 
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and grouped into larger concepts. The collected comments have not been attributed to 
individual people and research participants were not recruited from commentators.  
Drawing on online user comments comes with caveats. In addition to ethical 
considerations about using SNS data, which I address later in a separate section, online 
comments in news are not linked to contextual information about the author. For instance, 
assessing whether a comment has been made by an expert with a particular affinity to 
issues of data protection (e.g. working in computing, government) or by a lay actor is not 
possible. Also, the choice of contexts for gathering sensitising concepts (particular 
newspaper websites and Facebook) may foreground some, and neglect other issues about 
surveillance. Sensitising concepts may be closely aligned to the particular audience 
demographics of such newspapers, the tone and topic of articles as well as structural and 
user demographics of a specific SNS. For these reasons, this research only uses sensitising 
concepts as signposts. Yet as these signposts are non-prescriptive, their shortcomings are 
also productive. They allow an understanding of in how far participants’ priorities overlap 
with and depart from the agenda set by the public debate.  
4.3.2. Horizontal Dimension 
The horizontal dimension consists of in-depth face-to-face interviews with research 
subjects guided by the previously developed sensitising concepts. These concepts have 
been used to initiate a conversation and successively, as interviews progressed, as checks 
and balances and to manoeuvre the interview towards the participant’s subjective 
experience against the canvas of representations of surveillance in the broader socio-
cultural environment. The juxtaposition of public representations of surveillance with 
individual experience helps understand how participants’ experiences may be congruous 
with, or differ from these representations. It also facilitates an understanding of how 
representations of surveillance come to bear on participants and in how far they contribute 
to constructing those representations.  
This stage of research is called horizontal because it seeks to capture participants’ breadth 
of engagement with surveillance across their entire realm of experience instead of 
compartmentalising it into specific pre-defined containers. This horizontal approach 
starts without a broader conception of field site. Interviews took place in education 
buildings, cafes, sports and other leisure facilities, and in people’s homes. These spatial 
environments were chosen for participants’ convenience and to create a hospitable, open 
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atmosphere that they felt at ease with. In contrast to ethnographic work that incorporates 
physical space in studying internet practices (Miller 2011; Pink 2009; Burrell 2009), the 
location of interviews was not instructive for the understanding of everyday experience. 
However, a core tenet of this study’s research design is that the horizontal dimension 
allows to identify specific contexts of heighted importance for participants. The emphases 
made by participants in the horizontal dimension were later used to define the field sites 
for the next stage of the research, the vertical dimension.  
The interviews in the horizontal dimension were designed as ‘active interviews’, which 
go against the convention of keeping involvement of the interviewer to a minimum and 
to regard the interview merely as a means to neutrally extract information from 
respondents (Holstein & Gubrium 2004). Instead, the active interview deems the 
interaction between interviewer and respondent as a resource itself that sheds light on the 
procedures of knowledge production: 
“Conceiving of the interview as active means attending more to the ways in which 
knowledge is assembled than is usually the case in traditional approaches. In other 
words, understanding how the meaning-making process unfolds in the interview 
is as critical as apprehending what is substantively asked and conveyed.” 
(Holstein & Gubrium 2004: 142, original emphasis) 
An active interview is not a particular type of interview. Rather, it is a paradigm that 
recognises that all interviews implicitly are active and turns this into a productive feature. 
Such an approach to interviewing pays attention to the social construction of knowledge 
which underpins the theoretical framework of this thesis. Conversational in style, it has a 
storyline that unfolds through the relationship between interviewer and interviewee. As 
an ‘interpersonal drama’, it does not just convey information but is an interpretative frame 
in which meaningful reality is assembled through interaction (Holstein & Gubrium 1994). 
The notion of drama highlights that the interview is a scripted situation, and supported by 
basic coordination such as an interview guide, the roles of interviewer and the 
interviewee. Yet although scripted, the interview situation is not rigid. Seeking to bring 
out the subjects behind the roles of interviewer and interviewee, it commands flexibility. 
While the interviewee as a subject is the focus of the research, the subjectivity of the 
interviewer provides personal stimuli and resources from their own experience that relate 
to the interviewee and elicit answers (Holstein & Gubrium 2004). In contrast to other 
interview types, which seek to limit the interview situation to neutral and impersonal 
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stimuli, this personal approach recognises that an interview is a collaborative effort 
(Garfinkel [1967] 1984; Hammersley & Atkinson 2007; Silverman 2006) and that 
knowledge is not a “preformed, purely informational commodity” Holstein & Gubrium 
2004: 155) that would be tainted if the interviewer was anything but passive.  
4.3.3. Vertical Dimension 
While the horizontal dimension focusses on the entire domain of subjective experience, 
the vertical dimension foregrounds particular contexts. These are contexts in which 
research subjects encounter particularly deep and complex configurations of surveillance 
and computation, and in which parts of the meaning-making of these phenomena takes 
place. As I highlighted above, these contexts were developed individually for each 
participant through the emphases they made during the horizontal dimension. In practice, 
these usually were SNS such as Facebook or the German StudiVZ, as well as music 
networks such as last.fm. After a basic analysis of each interview in the horizontal 
dimension, I selected two of those contexts for each participant to purse in the vertical 
part of the research. In the vertical dimension, field sites acquire a performative quality 
in that they both enable and shape research outcomes.  
As I outline below, research in the vertical dimension combines observation and live 
interviewing. This involves both digital sites – the contexts selected – as well as physical 
sites in that the research took place in front of participants’ computer screens demanding 
a co-presence of researcher and participant. Fieldwork in the vertical dimension was 
conducted in separate sessions from the horizontal dimension in order to avoid fatigue 
effects among participants. As the vertical dimension requires extra instructions for 
participants, subjects’ attention span may not be sufficient to yield satisfactory results if 
conducted in the same session. Also, the vertical dimension requires that participants 
encounter previously unknown information, which required asking them to not log into 
SNS or other online sites for 48 hours prior to the research. The vertical dimension itself 
is split into three sub-sections, which I introduce below.  
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 The Think-Aloud Method 
The vertical dimension begins with a think-aloud interview. The think-aloud method 
(TAM)29 emerged out of wider techniques of protocol analysis developed by Herbert and 
Ericsson (1984) and has its root in cognitive psychology (Lewis 1982; Charters 2003). 
The name is self-explanatory: research subjects are requested to think out loud as they go 
about a specific, pre-set task. In the context of the present research, this entails mentioning 
what one sees on the screen, where one clicks and what goes through one’s mind as one 
performs the task. Prior to the TAM, participants were asked not to use SNS or other 
contexts selected for the vertical dimension. This step was necessary to ensure that 
enough new information had accumulated that justified navigating these sites for a 
sufficiently long time and to ensure that a portfolio of practices that is as wide as possible 
is represented in the TAM. During the vertical data-gathering session, respondents were 
then asked to access these sites and go about the activities they would usually engage in.  
The intention to develop such a research method goes back to groundwork conducted by 
Ericsson and Simon (1980) who highlight the importance of introspective research 
techniques. They distinguish between working memory (WM), in which reasoning – the 
practice of making sense – takes place simultaneously with the performed act, and long-
term memory (LTM), in which fragments of WM are kept, but in altered form and not 
necessarily in a form that can be verbalised (Charters 2003). The TAM intends to give 
researchers access to participants’ WM, whereas interviews predominantly tap into LTM, 
where a reasoning process has already taken place and experiences and practices appear 
reflexively in a cognitively and socially processed form, frequently adjusted to fit wider 
values, norms. Tapping into WM is crucial for understanding experiences with 
surveillance because it allows access to the minute detail of practices which respondents 
might not be able to recall retrospectively as they happen in an intuitive and affectual 
manner, and may not be actualised in LTM. It sheds additional light on the process of 
construction of knowledge and meaning-making which even an active interview that 
stands in a social constructionist paradigm could not entirely capture.  
Although the TAM emerged in an experiential, quantitative setting, it is not merely an 
artificially designed research method impinging on everyday conduct. In fact, Herbert 
                                                
29 I use the abbreviation ‘TAM’ when I refer to the method as such, and use the term ‘think-aloud interview’ 
when I refer to the specific interviews that I conducted on the basis of this method.  
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and Ericsson (1984) highlight that the TAM builds on thinking out loud as a naturally 
occurring process. People think out loud themselves in everyday situations, such as 
through a shopping list, or mumbling ‘what did I want to do next’ to oneself. Crucially, 
the researcher does not interfere in the think-aloud process, does not pose any questions 
and just listens. Yet despite the fact that thinking out loud occurs naturally, doing so on 
request for a sustained period of time may be an unusual situation for respondents. In 
order to prepare participants for this task, each think-aloud interview began with a 
preparatory task, where participants accessed a news website of their choice and said out 
loud what went through their mind for two minutes as they navigated the site. During the 
actual think-aloud interview, which took between five and fifteen minutes for each 
context, the only cues I gave as researcher were encouraging reminders to continue 
thinking out loud and not to fall into silence. 
While it originates within the framework of quantitative, experimental research, the TAM 
has been increasingly used in the context of predominantly qualitative empirical 
investigations. Since the late nineteen-eighties, researchers from a variety of academic 
fields, such as education, psychology, second language research and human-computer 
interaction, have pointed out the potential of the TAM for qualitative research paradigms. 
Starting out from a recognition of the relevance of individual differences between 
participants in think-aloud studies, Rankin (1988) proposes to consider every participant 
performing a think-aloud protocol as a self-contained case study. Charters (2003) argues 
that qualitative think-aloud research unfolds its strengths particularly well in contexts 
where the goals are description and explanation, instead of a focus on cause and effect. 
Therefore, thinking-aloud can be regarded as an adequate approach for answering 
research questions that cannot be based on an identification of all the important variables 
of complex situations ahead of time and which imply a need for understanding the 
meaning-making of respondents (Vaino-Larsson 1990; Crellin 1990). Integrating the 
TAM into the plan of inquiry for this thesis reflects Beer’s (2009) call to look outside 
established disciplinary paradigms to research digitally mediated life.  
As the TAM intends to tap into a stream of consciousness, researchers commonly 
advocate to let participants focus exclusively on what they are actually doing (level two 
verbalisation), and not to provide reasons for their actions, or reflect on them (level three 
verbalisation) as it would disrupt this stream of consciousness (Herbert & Ericsson 1984). 
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This research follows this strand of thought and introduces reflexive methods to 
compliment such a TAM in additional stages of the vertical dimension.  
 Retrospective Probing and Live Interview 
Instruction manuals for the TAM highlight that participants’ verbalisation skills vary 
considerably, which affects quality and length of the protocols (van Someren et al. 1994). 
Four pilot studies in the context of this research project have confirmed this. One 
participant did not articulate his thoughts and merely documented on which buttons he 
was clicking. Pilots also revealed that think-aloud protocols vary in length, depending on 
how active participants are on SNS, and how information-rich other contexts relevant for 
them are. Whereas the TAM allows deeper understanding of subjective experience within 
a specific context, there may be further practices that participants engage in, but which 
simply did not occur during the limited time frame of the think-aloud protocol. Last but 
not least, additional understanding of subjective experience can be gained by letting 
respondents elaborate reflexively on the issues brought up in the TAM, as well as by 
taking advantage of the co-presence in front of a computer. Implementing an attitude to 
methods as put forward in the digital methods debate – whether as ‘punk’ or as an 
‘assemblage’, allows to consider the TAM not merely as a method itself, but as a source 
for collateral approaches that build on the foundations it has created, whether it is a 
particular type of data, or a setting. In order to counteract limitations of a TAM and 
expand on the empirical opportunities it provides, the research design was revised after 
the pilot study to follow a modular approach within the vertical dimension.  
A TAM without interaction between participant and researcher was complemented by a 
second module of retrospective probing. In a fifteen-minute break after the think-aloud 
protocol, I generated questions from my notes of the TAM session and asked participants 
to elaborate on the issues they mentioned while they had been talking out loud. This 
introduced a reflexive dimension to the spontaneous, unfiltered data of the TAM without 
altering it. Allowing participants to reflect on the TAM both clarified issues not 
comprehensible without context, and permitted them to branch out into domains of 
experience they had not previously actualised, but which were stimulated by the TAM. 
Probing the TAM data also revealed that some participants were surprised by their own 
affectual acts and subsequently tried to negotiate what their ‘true’ perspective was. 
Instead of tarnishing or polluting previously collected data, combing a TAM with a 
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reflexive approach takes into account that participants are not merely rational actors 
(Slovic 1999; Loewenstein et al. 2001), but act in a complex configuration of affectual, 
emotional self-management (Sennett 1998) and rational reflexivity (Giddens 1990).  
A third module, following directly after the retrospective probing, consists of a live, 
action-based interview that is not directly associated with the statements made in the 
think-aloud interview, but takes advantage of the field site – a digital context reflecting 
the participants’ deep engagement with issues of surveillance in front of their computers. 
It resembles the approach employed by Livingstone (2008) in researching children’s use 
of SNS which combined conversation and action, and the idea of live sociology proposed 
by Back and Puwar (2012). I joined participants in front of their computers, where they 
navigated to the sites of the TAM. Equipped with visual cues as to what is happening on 
the screen, I asked participants to demonstrate what they usually do in this particular 
online setting, how and why. Recalling the TAM and reflexive probing, without 
prompting, many participants took the opportunity to illustrate the points they had 
previously made by means of example. For instance, some participants showed me a 
friends’ Facebook post that warned about surveillance, or accessed their privacy settings 
to document how they protected themselves against surveillance. Others demonstrated 
the false trials they manufactured with fake information to fool advertising algorithms.  
The three modules in the vertical dimension differ in two ways. Firstly, they reflect a 
different degree of interaction between participant and researcher as they move from a 
more rigid, closed approach (TAM) to a more open and discursive approach. Secondly, 
the modules vary regarding degrees of reflexivity and verbalisation. The think-aloud 
protocol is concerned with what is happening presently and focusses on affect rather than 
reflexion (level two verbalisation). The retrospective probing still refers to what has just 
happened, but introduces a reflexive dimension (level three verbalisation). Whereas the 
TAM only requests participants to tap into working memory, the retrospective probing 
also encompasses long-term memory. The live, action-based interview finally invites 
reflexion on general issues, inferred from both present and past user experience. 
4.4. Sampling 
Sampling techniques can be separated into probabilistic and non-probabilistic 
approaches. Probability sampling is based on random selection methods involving 
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procedures which ensure that each case in the universe under study has fixed and 
determinate – often equal – probabilities of being drawn for the sample. These include 
simple random, stratified random, multi-stage cluster and other sampling techniques. 
Probabilistic sampling is generally preoccupied with numerical measurements and used 
in studies that intend to make statistical inferences to large-scale populations (Bryman 
2008). In non-probability sampling, the chances of a case being selected cannot be 
calculated, and the underlying motivations for assembling a sample are different. 
Non-probability sampling is predominantly used in small-scale studies which investigate 
complex social phenomena where the research questions demand a deep interrogation, 
and which emphasise the explorative analysis of social patterns within its context over an 
abstracted statistical representation (Schutt 2014; Yin 2014). Non-probabilistic sampling 
encompasses several techniques, including convenience or accidental sampling (based on 
ease of access), snowball sampling (a participant referring another), quota sampling 
(reflecting proportional attributes of the population in the sample), theoretical sampling 
(the sample seeks to develop or test a theory), maximum-variation sampling (inclusion of 
different ends of a social spectrum to enhance diversity), and others with varying 
terminology. Sometimes purposive sampling is considered as a particular method in 
opposition to accidental sampling, but it is also used as a generic term for non-
probabilistic sampling (Berg 2006; Schutt 2014; Silverman 2006).  
This research design draws on non-probabilistic sampling because it is well-suited for 
qualitative approaches concerned with in-depth understanding (Ritchie et al. 2014). The 
design follows a combination of snowball, quota, and maximum-variation sampling.  
Participants were recruited in the UK and in Germany. At the time of data collection, both 
countries were engaged in different public debates about surveillance. In Germany, 
Google Street View had launched to public outrage, the federal government had 
distributed a spy software, and newspapers were revealing new practices of mobile phone 
tracking. In the UK, a debate had formed around the intrusion of CCTV cameras in public 
space.30 These countries also have different national histories of surveillance. In addition 
to the Third Reich, until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the secret police (Stasi) in East 
                                                
30 See Chapter One. 
  
108 
Germany was present in nearly all aspects of public and private life (De La Motte & 
Green 2015).  
As a native German living in the UK, I wanted to take into account these national debates 
and socio-historical configurations. Far from embarking on a systematic analysis of 
national differences, I intended to take advantage of these histories to tap into a wider 
array of attitudes, experiences and practices towards surveillance. I also wanted to explore 
in how far these national issues affect people’s understanding of computational 
surveillance, which is itself a global phenomenon where Facebook, Google, other 
interfaces and computational logics transcend national boundaries.  
Fieldwork took place in 2010-201131 in London as well as Aachen and Erfurt, two 
German cities of about 200,000 inhabitants. As my place of residence, London offered a 
convenient setting for participant recruitment. I grew up in Aachen, so could draw on a 
range of sites that I had access to for recruiting and interviewing people. My local 
infrastructure also allowed me to spend enough time physically in Aachen to conduct 
fieldwork. The same rationale applies to Erfurt, where I used to attend university. But 
while Aachen is located in the very West of Germany, Erfurt is part of the former GDR 
and secret police past. I wanted to incorporate these fragmented national histories of 
surveillance between East and West in my German fieldwork and understand how they 
inform people’s narratives.  
In order to recruit participants, I posted flyers in universities, in public sports and leisure 
facilities and on supermarket notice boards (Erfurt) that called for participation. I also 
approached people directly in universities and sports and leisure facilities. I chose this 
combination of contexts to ensure a broader participation from varied social backgrounds, 
education and occupation profiles outside of the domain of university students that I had 
easiest access to. In order to enable an understanding of how issues of surveillance are 
navigated within the same social group, I asked participants to recommend people they 
knew. Lastly, I added two quotas to establish a 50% split between male and female of 
participants, and a 50% split between participants in Germany and the UK. In total, 40 
participants were recruited for this study, and the desired gender split was achieved 
                                                
31 Two participants were interviewed in 2011. In the case of one additional participant, the vertical 
dimension was carried out in 2011 after a longer  period of non-response following the initial interview in 
2010.  
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overall, as well as both in the German and UK subsamples. While university students are 
accustomed to participation in research studies, with a regular influx of requests similar 
to mine accompanying them through their university life, the same cannot be said for 
people who do not set foot in a university building on a daily basis. Lack of familiarity 
with such studies and lack of affinity with the underlying intentions (someone writing a 
thesis) may have resulted in a higher barrier for participation. I have therefore offered an 
incentive of €30 (£25 in the UK) for participation in this study, which I included in the 
calls for participants. This incentive was paid to all participants. 
I limited participants to the age group of 18 to 29 years. The term ‘digital natives’, used 
to denote the generation born after 1980 into a world already saturated by digital 
technology (Prensky 2001; Palfrey & Grasser 2008), has been criticised for ignoring 
social nuances in technology literacy (Helsper & Eynon 2010) and equating generational 
criteria with expertise and mastery (Selwyn 2009). Yet in order to ensure a wider variety 
of computational practices, I wanted to focus on younger internet users. The most current 
internet usage report by the Pew Research Center at the time of research design suggested 
that this young generation still stands out in terms of frequency of internet use and the 
variety of online practices they engage in (Jones & Fox 2009), offering a richer canvas 
for studying surveillance across online contexts. For ethical reasons, I did not include 
minors.  
Furthermore, participants with various degrees of education were recruited, as well as 
participants still in education and those already in the professional workforce. The overall 
composition was skewed towards university students, representing 18 of the 40 
participants in total. The other participants were distributed across a range of professions 
(e.g. legal secretary, artist), and included a homemaker, an apprentice and a person 
looking for employment.32 
  
                                                
32 See Appendix B for more information on participants’ demographics.  
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Figure 3: Age Distribution of Participants 
 
The choice to include residents from both the UK and Germany was stimulated by 
differences in press coverage of surveillance in those two countries that I discovered 
during the coding of the sensitising concepts in NVivo. Privacy scandals, such as data 
leaks and hackers’ intrusions into SNS, or changes in Facebook’s privacy policy, featured 
prominently in the German press. Frank Schirrmacher, the late editor-in-chief of 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, in 2009 initiated a wider discussion on the future of 
personal data, artificial intelligence and surveillance, which was echoed in multiple other 
media outlets. Between 1 October 2009 and 31 January 2010 alone, German online news 
portal Spiegel published 60 articles related to surveillance on the internet. 
In the UK on the other hand, media coverage on surveillance-related phenomena was less 
intense. Publications such as The Sun hardly reported on these issues; a recent murder 
case, where the perpetrator tracked down the victim via Facebook and a convict on the 
run taunting the police through Facebook were the exceptions. In Germany, Bild, a tabloid 
newspaper, instead offered instructions how to protect one’s data, such as step-by-step 
guides to prevent public access to user profiles as a recurring theme. The Guardian 
demonstrated greater frequency in coverage of issues related to online surveillance, but 
lacked the emotional tone of German media. Between November 2009 and January 2010 
The Guardian featured 22 articles (including blog posts) on online surveillance, less than 
half the quantity recorded at Der Spiegel.  
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Comparing Germany with the UK does not require to consider them as two bounded 
entities, as boyd highlights in a more general argument: 
“In a networked society, we cannot take for granted the idea that culture is about 
collocated peoples. It is not a question of mobility but of access to a hypertextual 
world. Geography can no longer be the defining framework of culture; people are 
part of many cultures including those defined by tastes, worldview, language, 
religion, social networks, practices, etc.” (boyd 2008: 27) 
Introducing a comparative dimension between Germany and the UK into this study helps 
understand in how far individual practices of surveillance reflect wider national public 
discourse and in how far they resemble each other based for instance on a cross-nationally 
shared social platform like Facebook as a translocal community. Instead of making 
generalisations about differences between how the British and German publics live with 
surveillance, to which a non-representative, small sample could not provide a valid 
answer, a comparative dimension therefore serves as an analytical tool to uncover the 
wider social context in which practices towards surveillance take place.  
4.5. Generalisation of Findings 
Patton (2015) emphasises that the choice for qualitative method does not prescribe sample 
sizes, that the information-richness of cases is more important than sample size and that 
sample size is contingent on the specific research questions. In this study, the sample size 
of n = 40 is based on the notion of ‘theoretical saturation’ (Yin 2014), a principle 
originally coined in the context of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967), where I 
stopped recruiting additional participants when themes and concepts had solidified and 
no new information was obtained during fieldwork.  
The nature of sampling (non-probability) and the volume of cases affect the question of 
generalisability of findings. Quantitative research uses statistical generalisation in order 
to apply findings in the sample to the universe under study, where statistical procedures 
ensure the representativeness of results. Some qualitative researchers are exclusively 
concerned with the particular cases in their study and do not intend to make empirical or 
theoretical generalisations at all (Stake 1994). Yet such a view has been criticised as 
limiting the potential and impact of qualitative research (Mason 2002; Silverman 2006). 
Over-emphasising the need for statistical principles narrows, and simplifies the 
discussion about generalisation. Large-scale statistical surveys rely on averages and are 
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farther removed from individual cases than in-depth, qualitative work, eliminating 
nuances and converting real people into abstractions (Flyvbjerg 2004). 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994) stress that differences between quantitative and 
qualitative research are merely stylistic. They provide a taxonomy of similarities and state 
that both have inference as their objective, either descriptive or explanatory, based on 
public procedures that are codified, transparent and open to scrutiny. Acocording to the 
authors, this leads to uncertain conclusions as inference is an imperfect process for 
reflecting the real world, and that inference is based on a set of rules.33 While qualitative 
studies are not representative in statistical parameters, other logics of generalisation exist. 
Instead of statistical generalisation, the idea of analytical generalisation links empirical 
findings to a theoretical framework (Yin 2014), and Bryman (1988) similarly suggests 
that cases should be generalised towards theoretical propositions instead of populations. 
It is in this sense that I generalise findings from this study in order to shed light onto 
micro- and macro-sociological trends in society. 
4.6. Design Limitations 
The research design was developed in 2009 and fieldwork took place mainly in 2010. 
Modes of media consumption are rapidly changing. In particular, the proliferation of 
mobile devices has transformed how people’s lives are digitally connected and ‘always 
on’ (Turkle 2011; Frith 2015). This research design has not considered this mobile 
transformation. The vertical dimension was entirely conducted using desktop and laptop 
computers, and the interview guide for the horizontal dimension did not emphasise the 
experience of surveillance and computation in the context mobile devices. Participants 
did not systematically bring up smartphones, or consider them as important in their 
subjective experience. At the time of writing, Facebook (2015) has more monthly active 
users on mobile devices than on desktop, Apple has launched the Apple Watch and arm 
wrist fitness trackers such as Fitbit have propelled self-tracking from a niche movement 
to a mainstream practice. The diffusion of technology and the emergent practices that 
surround it affect the reproducibility of this research design. While the overall design 
remains relevant and applicable, the interview guide needs to be updated and the selection 
of field sites revised. Preparations for the TAM also need to consider that asking 
                                                
33 I am paraphrasing their taxonomy here in abbreviated form. For a more detailed account of this argument, 
see in particular pages 8-9 in King, Keohane and Verba (1994). 
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participants to abstain from social media for 48 hours may not only be undesirable given 
the practical relevance of SNS in their daily lives and social expectations surrounding 
SNS use, it may also be unfeasible due to the push notifications many SNS sent to users’ 
smartphones.  
4.7. Ethics 
‘Who is watching the watchers?’ This old adage from Roman philosopher Juvenal 
underpins Norris and Armstrong’s (1999) seminal study on CCTV control rooms. It found 
that CCTV operators largely act in a realm devoid of any checks and balances. As 
experiences of fieldwork in surveillance studies became more readily available, 
researchers of surveillance have started to apply this question to their own practice. 
Reflecting on their research on urban police surveillance, Kemple and Huey (2005) 
illustrate that the researcher can easily become a subject of surveillance by virtue of the 
police, and also be perceived by research subjects as an agent of surveillance. Researching 
online surveillance is a far-cry from the often physically dangerous conditions under 
which Kemple and Huey have carried out their work. Yet the demands for heightened 
researcher reflexivity persist, in particular towards research subjects, and how modes of 
inquiry, such as participant observation, can be set apart, both in terms of actual and 
perceived practice, from modes of monitoring or ‘snooping’ on research subjects that 
would blur the distinction between researching, and doing surveillance.  
This issue gains additional urgency at the intersection of the theme of study (surveillance) 
with the research tool and venue (internet). The digital methods debate has highlighted 
that surveillance itself is the primary mode of gathering insight on digital consumers by 
commercial agents, which academic researchers reject on ethical grounds. At the same 
time, surveillance-driven commercial activities compete with academic research for 
interpretative sovereignty over the social, creating pressure on academics to innovate 
(Lupton 2015). Doing academic research on surveillance on and within the digital domain 
then requires a sound ethical framework that negotiates possibility and practice of 
methods. It also needs to pay attention to how participants perceive role and objective of 
the researcher. Whereas Kemple and Huey had been mistaken for undercover police 
agents, researchers on digital surveillance need to avoid being seen as a ‘stalker’, ‘creep’ 
or other stereotypical role popularised through the rise of peer-to-peer surveillance and 
the normalisation of ‘snooping’. (Andrejevic 2005). Risking such labelling is not merely 
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prohibitive on ethical grounds; it also constitutes a source of systematic bias leading 
potentially to non-response, falsified answers, or social desirability effects.  
4.7.1. Ethics in Internet Research 
Most research today is affected in some way by the internet, either as a field of study, as 
a means to derive insight, or as a site of inquiry. Originally rooted in the broader field of 
computer and information ethics (Moor 1985; King 1996), a growing array of disciplines 
are confronted with ethical questions for conducting internet-related research. As 
Buchanan & Zimmer (2015) highlight, these range from researchers’ obligations to 
protect the privacy of research subjects and distinctions between public and private space, 
over confidentiality and anonymity, to consent, protection of minors and the ethics of 
covert research and intentional deception as means of obtaining information.34 
The proliferation of SNS has amplified the urgency of such questions, for instance 
whether the terms and conditions that users have agreed to on Facebook are a sufficient 
basis for consent, causing a debate between legality and ethics (Gilbert 2009). In 
particular, the use of digital methods, such as harvesting data through large-scale scraping 
via APIs or other means has brought differences between commercial and academic 
research to the fore (Glickman et al. 2012; Lupton 2015). More recently, the rise of cloud 
computing and researchers’ attempts to draw on cloud functionalities to assist in research 
services such as participant recruitment, data analysis and storage, as well as researcher 
collaboration, has amplified existing ethical concerns around privacy and ensuring 
confidentiality. The case of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which is a crowdsourcing 
marketplace that uses low-wage labourers to perform simple tasks, has added questions 
around the exploitation of labour and acknowledgement of authorship in the research 
process. (Scholz 2008; Aytes 2013).  
Beyond recommendations by individual researchers in a methods debate or gained from 
a reflexive approach towards their own projects, various disciplines and their ethics 
boards have formulated codes of conduct to guide researchers through those questions 
(Buchanan & Zimmer 2015). Yet systematic literature on ethics in the context of 
surveillance and its intersection with the digital domain is absent. Below, I outline the 
                                                
34 I limit my discussion to introductory remarks with the aim to illustrate the relevance of ethical issues in 
this project and do not claim comprehensiveness. For an exhaustive overview on the history of debates, 
their various strands and a detailed documentation of ethical concerns, see Buchanan & Zimmer (2015).  
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specific ethical considerations I have taken in preparation, execution and analysis of the 
empirical part of this thesis.  
4.7.2. Ethics in this Study 
In interacting with participants before, during and after the research, I adhered to standard 
ethical principles such as being open about the purpose of the research, protecting 
anonymity of participants, treating personal information confidentially, and obtaining 
signed consent. In order to avoid being considered a ‘creep’ or a ‘stalker’, I clearly 
stressed the intentions of my research. The active interview, in which I shared personal 
experiences about being monitored, helped create rapport. All participants were 
anonymised and equipped with aliases, to which I refer in the empirical analysis when I 
discuss or quote participants.  
A particular ethical issue emerged when participants showed me their Facebook, StudiVZ 
or other SNS profiles and newsfeeds in the vertical dimension. Here, I obtained a glance 
at their friends’ profiles without knowledge and consent by these friends. I was concerned 
that this may undermine the idea of privacy as contextual integrity (Nissenbaum 2009), 
which suggests that people release personally identifiable information in a context they 
deem as clearly demarcated, making me an unwarranted outsider and trespasser on the 
boundaries between public and private realm. I needed to consider the ethics of 
implicating third parties into the research process. This issue also occurred in constructing 
the sensitising concepts, where I gathered data from Facebook discussion groups, posted 
by people in a non-anonymised way.  
In its conference on ethics in researching SNS, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Publizistik 
und Kommunikationswissenschaft (DGPuK) in February 2009 presented two criteria for 
determining informed consent. The first criterion refers to the interest of inquiry. It 
suggests distinguishing whether the research focuses on individual actions or artefacts, or 
whether the role of the individual as a subject or an author occupies a focal position. The 
second criterion refers to an informed judgement by the researcher regarding the degree 
of privacy that can be assumed for the context where the information was obtained. In 
case of prioritizing the role of an author over that of a subject, and if a low degree of 
privacy can be assumed, informed consent is not needed (Schmidt 2009).  
  
116 
According to these criteria, drawing on user comments in Facebook discussion groups is 
ethically unproblematic. My sole interest was to gain non-person-specific, aggregated 
data, which individuals have published as authors. These texts are created in user groups 
and on discussion boards, open for anyone to join and marked by Facebook as ‘public’. 
Yet the situation is more complicated regarding the information I could glean from my 
participants’ online contacts, which often are not public. I chose to incorporate these 
accounts into my data collection based on the following rationale. Again I was not 
interested in the subjects behind these accounts. I considered their texts as contributions 
to better understand a given participant as a research subject. The notion of self on SNS 
is interdependent and networked, as the term SNS itself suggests, where multiple people 
are co-constitutive of the online appearances of a given subject. I thus was merely 
interested in the context these other authors provide in shaping the everyday experience 
of my participant, who often talked about friends while showing me to them. I also made 
sure to never encourage participants to show me the SNS profile of a third person, and 
made it entirely contingent on their voluntary initiative. References to other people often 
occurred while participants were discussing their own newsfeed, where they had liked or 
shared these contributions, embedding them in a different context of recipients already.  
The distinction in research design between a horizontal and vertical dimension is also 
informed by ethical considerations. Following Rogers’ (2013) call to consider the internet 
itself as a source of data, I initially intended to complement the horizontal dimension 
through mining participants’ web browsing histories, and to use the resulting data to help 
establish the field sites for the vertical dimension. Yet this would have had connotations 
of surveillance because mining web histories emulates practices employed in targeted 
advertising through the placement of cookies. While such an approach might be part of 
the suggested digital methods portfolio (Back & Puwar 2012), it clashes with the 
particular ethical requirements of researching surveillance. Such an approach could not 
only have undermined participant trust. It might also have elicited social desirability 
effects by avoiding controversial websites that are otherwise part of participants’ routine 
repertoire. Had I proposed to mine web histories that already existed prior to the research, 
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participants would have had to grant consent retrospectively, potentially inconveniencing 
them.35  
4.8. The Practice of Inquiry: A Research Diary 
When I set out to commence fieldwork, I began a diary that recorded my notes of each 
day, storing remarks on interactions with participants that ranged from recruitment to data 
collection and debrief. Unlike a field diary in the ethnographic sense which primarily 
fixes participant observations on paper after a day in the field (Hammersley & Atkinson 
2007), I conceived it as a personal diary that stood outside of the immediate research 
design and recorded my thoughts during the process, what I was learning as a research 
practitioner and how this could be used to advance the ongoing fieldwork. I saw it as a 
means to keep myself reflexive and self-critical while being in the field. It also helped 
develop strategies for building rapport with participants, which is an integral requirement 
for conducting active interviews that explore subjectivity in dialogue. Below I document 
extracts from this diary to provide more colour on the practice of inquiry, not just its plan.  
4.8.1. Participant Recruitment 
I recruited Anna, my first participant, on campus in Erfurt after directly approaching her 
with a flyer that outlined my research project. She immediately agreed to take part. It was 
generally straightforward to find students as cooperative as Anna, both in the UK and in 
Germany, and several participants said they regularly take part in such projects. 
Approaching students directly worked best, followed by message boards at German 
universities, which had lesser appeal to potential participants in the UK.  
Despite the €30 reward offered, my flyers at supermarket message boards only added two 
additional participants. Flyers in sport clubs, from gyms to swimming facilities, did not 
provide any results. It was more time-consuming to find interested participants in sports 
facilities and I needed to take a proactive approach, spending more time explaining the 
study and the context before people agreed.  
After all interviews with a given participant were completed, I asked whether they could 
recommend other people for the study. This was particularly useful for recruiting further 
                                                
35 The use of web histories to establish field sites has another drawback not connected to ethical issues. It 
would have equated the frequency of website visits with relevant subjective experience. If used for field 
site selection, web histories should be evaluated by participants first.  
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people outside the university context. The interview process, in particular through its 
active, conversational style, had overcome barriers, and I found even those participants 
who were initially hesitant to agree ending up proposing further research subjects that I 
could contact. At universities in Erfurt and Aachen, some participants told me that they 
had jointly signed up to the study with a friend already, and had been discussing the study 
before they took part. What began as an attempt to recruit additional participants turned 
into evidence that talk about surveillance is a naturalised social activity.  
4.8.2. Rapport and Active Interviewing 
The prominence of surveillance in public discourse reveals little about the degree of 
intimacy that people associate with their own surveillance encounters. Apart from my 
personal experience, I did not know how willing participants would be to talk about living 
with surveillance, how much they would open up and how we both would deal with 
potentially awkward moments of serendipitous privacy intrusion. When would I cross a 
line, how much should I reveal about myself in an active interview, should it be quid-pro-
quo, or all-in? I was an outsider, not part of participants’ social circle yet expected them 
to talk about personal aspects of their life on the internet, while many of them regularly 
deleted their web browsing history to prevent others from glancing onto their online data. 
While I was roughly the same age as the older participants, I was conscious about my role 
as the researcher, who could solicit an openness under the auspices of research, which in 
particular younger participants may not have granted in everyday social situations. As a 
male researcher, I also was alert about issues that might arise from gender relations, for 
instance private photos of female participants on SNS and how I should avoid giving off 
wrong impressions as a ‘lurker’ or ‘creep’.36 
Yet I discovered quickly that my concerns did not reflect research practice. Already the 
trial interviews suggested that the personal experience of surveillance is interpersonally 
narrated and shared. Throughout the fieldwork, participants pro-actively discussed their 
life with surveillance, sharing anecdotes, walking me through their privacy settings or 
eagerly trying to find an old Facebook post to illustrate a point. For many, encounters 
with surveillance, and even snooping on friends in acts of peer-to-peer surveillance, are 
                                                
36 These concerns convinced me to let participants take the lead during the live interview in the vertical 
dimension, I did not encourage them to access any photos and told participants prior to the session 
emphasised that they did not need to show what they did not want to.  
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topics of everyday conversation. I was entering into a dialogue that many participants 
were at least in part already having with others. The idea of active interviewing helped 
establish a lateral relationship that was characterised by working on the common cause 
of making sense of the reality of surveillance. Participants did not primarily perceive me 
as a gendered subject or an older researcher, but as a like-minded interlocutor.  
4.8.3. The Vocabulary of Computation 
The obstacles in conducting fieldwork were different from those that I had anticipated. 
While entering and sustaining a conversation about surveillance occurred naturally, 
participants struggled to verbalise their encounters with the logic of computation. The 
implication of computation in surveillance was not lost on them. On the contrary, it played 
a pivotal role in their conversation about surveillance with friends. But they did not have 
a technical vocabulary including terms like ‘algorithms’, ‘big data’ or ‘code’ readily 
available and instead relied on metaphors and circumscriptions that varied between 
participants and their specific social context. The interview situation demanded a degree 
of reflexivity from them that is largely absent in everyday interaction with friends, leading 
to a more abstract mode of conversation. I realised that I could not introduce technical 
terms and instead had to iteratively find out how participants described computational 
issues before carefully adapting to these ways of talking myself. Initially, I considered 
the search for vocabulary as a limitation of research design, but on recalling the social 
constructionist perspective that underpinned my approach, I decided to turn the struggle 
to actualise computational agents, both conceptually and linguistically, into a feature of 
analysis itself. Themes of computation featured more prominently in the vertical 
dimension, where both the TAM and the successive interview gave participants visual 
aids to illustrate their points by example.  
4.8.4. Closing the Conversation 
I had assumed that fieldwork would end with a simple debrief after the vertical dimension. 
But for some participants, talking about surveillance did not have immediate closure. I 
received two friend requests on Facebook from participants. I accepted because warding 
off participants after the fieldwork might have signalled that rapport had been 
disingenuous and betrayed participants’ openness. During a live interview, another 
participant showed me a video explainer about surveillance on SNS that she had posted 
to her Facebook timeline that was followed by an exchange of comments between her 
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and several friends. I showed particular interest in this video because it documented how 
surveillance is not a solitary experience, and negotiated socially. The participant noticed 
my interest. She offered to take a screenshot. I accepted because it was self-initiated. I 
later used that image in the write-up of empirical material with blackened names.  
After we had completed the vertical dimension, three other participants asked me ‘how 
they did’. I had previously stressed that there are no right or wrong answers. One 
participant still considered the interview as a test and wanted to understand whether I 
thought that he was coping well with surveillance. Two others wanted to understand 
whether their responses were ‘normal’, how others had answered, and what tactics that 
other people commonly employed to hide from surveillance. These questions struck me 
because they underscored both the uncertainty in dealing with surveillance and the need 
for social orientation in evaluating one’s own approach. In all cases I gave vague and 
encouraging answers that did not compromise others. Yet these questions also reminded 
me that talking about surveillance with people can attach demands of research subjects to 
the researcher who is expected to consult and provide guidance.  
4.9. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the plan of inquiry pursued in this project. It has placed the 
approach taken into the broader context of digital methods and research precedents before 
formulating the specific research design. This design is a three-tier process, consisting of 
(1) a sensitising dimension which gathers concept for an interview guide, (2) a horizontal 
dimension focussing on the breadth of people’s encounters with surveillance through an 
active interview and (3) a vertical dimension that explored the in-depth experience of 
surveillance in narrower field sites. The vertical dimension is itself split into three 
components, the think-aloud method (TAM), a reflexive interview on the TAM and a live 
interview that combined participant observation with probing questions. As a qualitative 
study, this research intends to make generalisations and I have documented the 
epistemology behind those generalisations. Researching surveillance in the digital 
domain poses particular ethical challenges, which have affected the research design and 
the conscious exclusion of some digital methods. The research practice itself was iterative 
and required adjustment over time to elicit meaningful responses on complex and abstract 
issues of computation. The rapport built with participants and the combination of research 
tools in the vertical dimension have facilitated the construction of meaning.   
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 Chapter Five: The Normalisation of Surveillance 
in a Landscape of Risk 
The term ‘surveillance’ is generally uncontroversial in the academic literature (Lyon 
2002) and has gained additional facets as it proliferated from the enclosures of total 
institutions in a Foucauldian paradigm to nearly all aspects of everyday life. However, as 
this study seeks to explore surveillance as a manifestation of computation from the 
perspective of ordinary people, it cannot superimpose a theoretical understanding of 
surveillance onto its lived experience. In fact, problematising the concept of surveillance 
and reconstituting it empirically from the ground up is a prerequisite for a more 
substantial analysis of how people engage with and act towards it. An analysis that 
explores people’s understanding of and attitudes towards surveillance is able to identify 
the basic parameters that inform people’s experience, locating areas of focus and defining 
a framework for narrating their lives under conditions of pervasive surveillance. This 
chapter takes on this task. It provides an introduction to the empirical analysis of 
surveillance that later chapters build and expand on.  
This chapter draws on a series of theoretical concepts developed in the literature. 
Primarily, these concepts refer to the discussion in Chapter Two and its inquiry into the 
definition and nature of contemporary surveillance. Its point of departure builds on the 
diagnosis that surveillance is pervasive and part of everyday life (Lyon 2007). This 
diagnosis is supplemented by three theoretical paradigms established in the literature 
review. Firstly, it draws on my hypothesis advanced in the first theoretical chapter that 
existing approaches to the lived experience are too narrow and that an empirical approach 
to surveillance instead requires to de-centre the notion of surveillance. Secondly, it makes 
reference to the notion of computational surveillance. Thirdly, it embeds the experience 
of surveillance in a framework of risk as advanced by Beck (1992). Here, risk is 
understood as the uncertainty about consequences of today’s acts for the immediate and 
distant future, and whether they will manifest themselves as threats or benefits (Nassehi 
1997).  
Within this framework, the chapter references additional theoretical concepts. In the first 
part, it draws on Deleuze’s (1992) notion of societies of control as expression of the 
colonisation of the minute details of life through surveillance. Yet it only incorporates a 
Deleuzean perspective as a reference point to map people’s own conceptualisations, and 
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not as an analytical paradigm. In a similar vein, it references Foucault’s concept of the 
panopticon merely to illustrate people’s narrow associations with the term surveillance, 
and how their understanding of surveillance does not extend from Foucault’s disciplinary 
societies to societies of control. To illustrate how surveillance enters people's lived 
experience more widely, the chapter incorporates the relationship between information 
and surveillance (Kiousis 2002), debates around privacy on SNS (boyd 2008), data 
doubles (Haggerty & Ericson 2003) and peer-to-peer surveillance (Andrejevic 2005; 
2007; Koskela 2003). Lastly, it makes a first reference to Berger and Luckmann ([1966] 
1991) through their notion of the normalisation of experience. This concept stands for the 
unquestioned integration of a phenomenon – surveillance in this case – into everyday life 
as a mundane fact. However, it is the next chapters and their focus on agency that will 
draw more extensively on Berger and Luckmann. 
In a first step, this chapter interrogates people's definitions of surveillance, how 
surveillance-related phenomena are embedded in their lives and how these phenomena 
inform participants' perceptions of surveillance. It concludes that surveillance is part of 
much wider practices and encounters which participants frame in other terms than 
surveillance. In a second and final step, this chapter locates experiences of surveillance 
in a framework of risk. It highlights the distinct role of computational surveillance in 
defining this sense of risk and connects surveillance to the broader theme of computation. 
5.1. The Dissolution of Surveillance  
This section argues that surveillance as lived experience can be understood through its 
erosion. It proposes that the expansion of surveillance into nearly all domains of life 
normalises surveillance-related phenomena as mundane facts and integrates them in a 
wider context of experience, leading to the dissolution of surveillance as a distinct 
concept.37 In a first step, this section explores people’s own definitions of the term 
surveillance vis-a-vis academic conceptualisations. It then continues to identify three 
phenomena through which the conceptual erosion of surveillance can be understood. 
These phenomena are the notion of a ‘data deal', the adaptation of data doubles, and peer-
                                                
37 The dissolution of surveillance is distinct from the suggestion that a computational logic is invisible, 
which I introduced in the theoretical discussion and which will inform later empirical analysis. The 
dissolution of surveillance denotes the erosion of surveillance as a term and concept through which people 
frame phenomena of watching, monitoring and data collection in a computational context. The invisibility 
of computation instead refers to people’s inability to query and make sense of computational factors that 
impinge on them.  
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to-peer surveillance. Together, they show that the conceptual dissolution of surveillance 
paradoxically is evidence for how deeply embedded it is in everyday life.  
5.1.1. The Limits of Surveillance 
Enrico knows that he is being monitored on the internet. However, the 28-year-old history 
student struggles to articulate how he should frame this experience: 
[5, 01] “Well on the internet you are not really surveilled, well surveillance is more like the Stasi 
and the state and so on. Hmmm, well, yes, but it depends – how do I best describe this, 
well, it is not that distinct. Now the state, there I would feel surveilled, but on the internet, 
in general terms?” [DK: translation from German] 
Enrico is not a Luddite. On the contrary, he is aware that his personal data on the internet 
is perpetually collected and analysed. We spoke extensively about his privacy concerns 
regarding Google Street View, and that data traces he leaves online can be misused. But 
Enrico is reluctant to equate being online with being under surveillance. For him, 
surveillance is associated with the government, and not the economic agents that 
systematically follow his traces on the internet. Nevertheless, he is confused. Enrico 
acknowledges that being online does carry traits of what he calls ‘surveillance’ and 
struggles to draw boundaries between different forms of being watched. His attempt to 
further explain himself sheds light on the characteristics he associates with surveillance: 
[5, 02] “Surveillance I’d say is exaggerated, that there is data being collected yes, but it is not 
that someone is chasing you personally and wants to get you.” [DK: translation from 
German] 
My first participant, Anna from Erfurt, has a similar view. When I asked the 20-year-old 
teaching student whether she felt under surveillance on the internet, she was quick to 
correct my question:  
[5, 03] “Not really surveillance, I would not say that. That there’s someone sitting from the 
government and following you…or surveilling you, but of course, my data is always 
sucked in, and some company is spying on me what I clicked on.” [DK: translation from 
German] 
For Anna and Enrico, being under surveillance is an intimate act that involves a direct 
relationship between those conducting surveillance and the person under surveillance. 
They see it as a practice of deliberate intrusion into their personal sphere that is based on 
a specific interest in them as individuals. Surveillance is a directed, isolated effort set up 
by the state specifically to get under their skin. The everyday experience of being 
monitored on the internet, while acknowledged by both, does not fit this concept.  
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Dave, who is a fitness trainer at a gym in Erfurt, but about to take a job at a multinational 
firm in Munich as a marketing associate, agrees with the personal nature of surveillance 
and the state as its protagonist. However, he thinks that the state also carries out 
surveillance on the internet. Dave mentions the Bundestrojaner, a piece of code installed 
by federal institutions in Germany to monitor web users, which had caused a stir in the 
public debate a few months before we met: 
[5, 04] “Now it’s about these Bundestrojaner [DK: federal surveillance software]. Things that 
search certain things without you noticing it. Someone from the BKA [DK: Federal 
Criminal Police Office] could surveil you, the danger is there. I’m generally opposed to 
that. Although you invite this yourself with these Facebook things, also Google. It would’ve 
been a dream for the Stasi back then. They gathered information for months and installed 
bugging devices and wiretapped conversations – which the government now can do with 
just one click.” [DK: translation from German] 
Dave finds that the internet enables surveillance on an unprecedented level, facilitated by 
the proliferation of online companies like Facebook. Yet while such companies illustrate 
the potential of surveillance, he does not actually feel under surveillance by them. Instead, 
he places the data troves assembled by such companies in the context of what the state 
could do with it. Dave knows that companies spy on him and feels transparent and 
exposed, which leaves him with a feeling of unease and powerlessness. Surveillance, 
however, is a much narrower concept for him that is associated with criminal behaviour:  
[5, 05] “Of course you are totally transparent on the internet, but I would only feel under 
surveillance if I had done something wrong, illegal and so on, if I was a criminal. Well not 
that I don’t feel uncomfortable, this data collection stuff is pretty ‘scary’, but surveillance 
that is police and criminal and so on, so somehow different.” [DK: translation from 
German] 
Josephine, who is a hairdresser in Erfurt and attends a course in textile design, also 
extends the idea of surveillance to the internet. However, she struggles to grasp when and 
how surveillance exactly occurs. Surveillance on the internet does not fit into the narrow 
categories of spy narratives and government surveillance, but it remains an ambiguous 
idea that Josephine cannot untangle from other practices of monitoring. She feels that her 
experience online is related to surveillance, but different at the same time: 
[5, 06] “I do feel under surveillance, but I think when it comes to surveillance you think about 
Stasi, ‘The Lives of Others’ or like in the movies, and on the internet, how shall I say, that 
is somehow more general, you don’t really know how the data is being used, like why am 
I under surveillance and why are my data being collected, that is not always surveillance 
like at Amazon, that would be too crass, but you can never tell for sure.” [DK: translation 
from German] 
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Her statement makes explicit a broader theme across participants’ narratives. 
Paradoxically, the omnipresence of data collection and the spread of monitoring, their 
undifferentiated application and unclear purpose erode connotations of surveillance. 
Some participants echo this by narrowing down the definition of surveillance to exclude 
this ambiguity, whereas, for others, surveillance itself becomes ambiguous.  
For German participants, these attempts to frame surveillance are embedded in a national 
historical context informed by the Stasi secret police in the former GDR and the wider 
totalitarian experience of the 20th century. While this particular collective memory is 
absent from people I spoke to in the UK, they approach the notion of surveillance in a 
similar manner. Their framework generally emerges from a different, more recent, 
collective experience – the proliferation of CCTV in urban spaces. For instance, Mike, 
who works as a graphic designer, highlights: 
[5, 07] “It's one thing to have piece of software on my computer and over time it is doing things 
and transmitting information. I think, if anything, I tend to not feel under surveillance 
because surveillance is something that...it precedes the internet. In my mind, it's like a 
camera on the wall, a photographer on the street. It's an offline thing to me […] Like I walk 
on the streets, and there is CCTV everywhere, and you read how people get an ASBO 
when they smoke pot, there have been stories of people from an estate here in the area.” 
Across Germany and the UK, the notion of surveillance does not capture people’s lived 
experiences of being monitored online. In people’s associations surveillance appears as 
an archaic term that denotes those practices of monitoring and controlling which are 
imposed from the outside, by traditional agents like the government, onto people. 
Surveillance is separated into distinct acts, bound in space and time. It refers to intrusions 
into individual lives with specific purposes in the physical world. Participants’ narrow 
conceptualisations of the term surveillance and uncertainty about its applicability stand 
at odds with the progressive conceptual expansion of the term in academic literature away 
from the confinement – theoretically and literally – of Bentham’s original panopticon 
(Foucault 1979). Various reinterpretations of the panopticon and alternative concepts 
(e.g. Elmer 2003; Haggerty & Ericson 2000) intend to open frameworks of surveillance 
for a digital age. It is, however, precisely some of the defining characteristics of the 
Benthamian prison design, a physical space with a personified observer, that inform and 
constrain participants’ understanding of the term surveillance. Instead, they use a 
different language to capture surveillance-related phenomena, from ‘spying’, ‘snooping’ 
to ‘watching’ and ‘monitoring’. In contrast to participants’ narrow use of the term 
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‘surveillance’ itself, those other terms are employed far less restrictively. In fact, the 
indiscriminate and interchangeable application of terms suggests that they do not relate 
to firmly developed, distinct concepts but to phenomena in flux which participants 
struggle to demarcate. Interrogating participants’ language of surveillance is not merely 
semantics. It creates the foundation for a deeper understanding of how forms of pervasive 
monitoring on the internet are embedded in people’s lives. In the next three sections, I 
document how monitoring practices more widely complicate the experience of 
surveillance and how they are complicit in its ambiguity. In doing so, I will continue to 
use the term surveillance, but merely as an analytical category whose boundaries are 
eroding and which problematises itself. My choice also has practical reasons - alternative 
terms are not established and abandoning the term surveillance would result in a bulkier 
language, while academic concepts that can aid the analysis still refer to surveillance as 
an overarching category.  
5.1.2. An Implicit Deal 
Lars, a 26-year-old politics student in Erfurt and former police officer, uses music-
streaming website last.fm to discover new songs. The fact that last.fm monitors his music 
consumption to generate its recommendations leaves him unimpressed, and he actively 
dismisses potential negative connotations: 
[5, 08] “That’s the way it is, I don’t really think about it, ‘oh yet another data monster, surveillance’ 
and stuff, it is just clear that you have to share your data if you want to get those 
recommendations.” [DK: translation from German] 
Lars does not separate between using last.fm, and making his data available. Both are 
intertwined and in his mind, jointly constitute participation in last.fm. He uses a language 
of economic exchange that frames monitoring on last.fm as a transaction between 
personal data and personal return. This transaction is based on an unquestioned agreement 
with ‘how things work’, an implicit set of rules. For him, this is in no way extraordinary, 
but a mundane fact that he does not challenge. The last.fm example is particular in that 
Lars knowingly and voluntarily submits his data to the music website. However, similar 
patterns referring to the co-constitutive nature of everyday online practices and personal 
data are widespread. Mark, a 25-year-old office clerk from London, sometimes is 
surprised himself how he has accepted online monitoring as an unquestioned part of being 
online: 
  
127 
[5, 09] “You have to log in all the time today, so you leave your email and stuff at least, and then 
they collect data about what you do everywhere. Yeah, you think about it and the longer 
you do you think whoa, like 20 years ago people would think this is crazy, but I guess 
here we are, and we don't know any different so no one’s totally outraged.” 
Dave is similarly unimpressed. He has no illusions that whatever he does online is 
somehow, somewhere, being recorded. We sat together in front of his computer, and he 
navigated to his most-used websites; Facebook, German social networking site StudiVZ, 
Amazon, and a discussion forum for car enthusiasts: 
[5, 10] “I just log in, and I do that automatically without thinking much about it. If you don't pay, 
you're the product, right? That's how you say it. That's pretty obvious to everybody.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Dave uses a proverb to capture a fact about online life and surveillance. He had first heard 
it from friends. A while ago, they had talked about a Facebook privacy scare. The media 
had reported how Facebook used people’s data beyond the Facebook website, and a 
commentator used this proverb. For Dave and his friends, it made explicit a shared 
knowledge that they had already intuitively lived by.  
Like Dave, participants are aware that business models and functionalities of online 
offerings depend on their data. Participating in life on the internet, therefore, requires a 
degree of complicity, or as one female student from Aachen called it: 
[5, 11] “[…] a pact. You know what you’re getting into. I don’t read the small print, but if there is 
small print in the first place, you know anyways ‘your data may be used, blah blah blah’.” 
[DK: translation from German] 
The notion of such a deal is recurring throughout participants’ answers, independent of 
their level of knowledge about surveillance and technical expertise. But it manifests itself 
differently between people. Some, like in the examples above, abstract from their 
experience and reflect on the role of being monitored. Others just mention it in passing 
and do not pause to reflect, or highlight this idea explicitly, suggesting how mundane and 
unspectacular it appears to them. For instance, Luise, who lives in a flat share in Erfurt 
with other students from her university, walked me through her most-used websites, 
logging in, logging off, clicking through a plethora of buttons and entering search terms. 
She uses the internet mainly to research issues relating to her studies, to do online 
banking, book holidays and other administrative tasks. She does not browse much, and 
the majority of her internet activities involves inputting information. Only when I asked 
her what she thinks happens with her inputs, she matter-of-factly stated: 
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[5, 12] “For me, the internet is like a tool, I use it for all the everyday stuff. And it is logical that I 
also have to feed the internet with my information.” [DK: translation from German] 
Yet the everyday complicity between providing personal data and participating in online 
life is not just confined to a technical or economic dimension. It is also engrained in social 
expectations. Dennis, a 26-year-old geophysics student from Germany illustrates this in 
the context of Couchsurfing, a social network that connects backpacking travellers with 
hosts that offer a sleeping place for a small, or even no fee. Travellers need to be 
personally accepted by hosts. Dennis again uses a language of transaction, in which 
submitting his personal data to Couchsurfing plays a central role: 
[5, 13] “You can say that's the deal you have to strike, so you have to reveal something, for 
instance, that's the thing at Couchsurfing. You have to tell a lot about you so that people 
are interested in the first place, and people want to host you. And you can't just write fake 
stuff; you have to be trusted as a serious person and no as a looney. And of course, that 
data can be extracted. Well, I don't know if it really happens, but yes.” [DK: translation 
from German] 
Dennis is unable to restrict his profile to a pre-approved list of trusted people, both by 
design of Couchsurfing and by individual intention. In order to find a lodging place, he 
needs to communicate trust towards an undifferentiated set of strangers and reconcile his 
presentation of self with the risk of being monitored. While he does not believe that other 
people on Couchsurfing would spy on him, he is aware that providing his data to create 
social trust makes him vulnerable to being monitored by online companies, and to his 
data being harvested.  
Dennis’ story is an example for the inevitability of monitoring that surfaces in other many 
accounts, such as Lars’s. While Lars can decide himself whether he wants to be monitored 
by last.fm, participants often highlight that everyday conduct online just has to take place 
within the parameters of such deals. Consider Frank, whom I met in Dave’s gym. Frank 
works as a clerk for the city’s public transport company. He highlights that his only 
chance to avoid being monitoring would be to become a Luddite: 
[5, 14] “Yes I would say you have to live with the fact that someone is gathering data, there is no 
other way. In particular, because for me, I cannot be without internet because many 
important things go via the internet [...] Yes you are, or at least in my case, I am dependent 
on it [DK: the internet] because otherwise, it would be too complicated to keep in touch 
with some people, and that data is being collected and that I don't know who or when, 
that's part of it.” [DK: translation from German] 
Yet neither Frank nor any other participant is outraged, or surprised by the implication of 
personal data in online practices. Tim, a 26-year-old anthropology student from London, 
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compares his acceptance of monitoring to his dad’s approach of coming to terms with it. 
It sheds light on the basic paradigm of being online that participants, all below 30, 
consider themselves in: 
[5, 15] “My dad, he really reads all the t's and c's. He sometimes prints them out; it is ridiculous. 
And then it takes him hours to register anywhere. I mean come on, we all know that they 
collect our data and it is not any different [inaudible]. So why read it all the time? I mean, 
I’ve not done it once. Ok, my dad, he's old." 
Tim thinks that his dad fundamentally misunderstands the nature of being online because 
he sees being monitored as a deviation from the norm. Conversely, Tim and other 
participants have normalised monitoring as a default state. In their narratives, they do not 
separate descriptions of using the internet from diagnoses of being monitored. Kiousis 
(2002) has argued that information and surveillance are inseparable, bound together by a 
mutually constitutive feedback loop. This argument is not merely theoretical, but already 
part of people’s lived experience.  
The normalisation of monitoring does not mean that people embrace it unchallenged. 
Their accounts, like in the examples above, include references to privacy, or expressions 
that on closer reflection, pervasive monitoring can be ‘scary’. Accepting being watched 
as default is not a general expression of attitudes towards surveillance, or even a 
resignation to its powers, but merely an acknowledgement of the basic framework in 
which lived experience takes place. As I will show in later chapters, many participants 
employ tactics to circumvent and foil attempts of surveillance or seek to modulate this 
default through their acts in other ways. 
5.1.3. Data Doubles 
The idea of surveillance as a distinct phenomenon is further challenged through 
participants' approaches to their personal data more widely. Social networking sites 
(SNS) are a key domain in which such considerations take place. During the think-aloud 
interviews, many participants showed me their social media presence. They walked me 
through their privacy settings and explained how they design their profiles. Consider law 
student Luise, who takes great care in choosing how to represent herself on Facebook. 
She changes her profile picture regularly depending on her mood and has a rotating stock 
of about ten images that she chooses from. Her face cannot be clearly identified in these 
photos. Either they are shot from a distance, or she takes other measures to obscure her 
face. On one photo, her hair is combed forward to cover her face, and another photo 
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zooms in on her left eye, cutting out the rest of the face. She only posts sporadically on 
the newsfeed in order to avoid coming across as a spammer, and does not simply ‘like' 
every post she finds interesting, but only posts about what she calls ‘serious' issues, such 
as politics, gender equality, global warming. Such practices of impression management 
on SNS between self-exposure and privacy are commonly understood and have for 
instance been documented by danah boyd (2008) in the context of American teens. For 
Luise, they are routine, everyday acts of managing life on SNS. Yet they are joined by a 
very different set of practices which are just as mundane for Luise. These practices shed 
light on the deep-seated role of personal data in people’s everyday considerations. When 
Luise walked me through her settings, she paused her cursor on the field containing her 
demographic data: 
[5, 16] “I only enter my name and where I am from and my email address, that should be enough 
for people who want to find me. I don’t share more, so no hobbies or whatever else is 
being asked for.” [DK: translation from German] 
Luise tries to strike a balance between allowing others to find her on the one hand and 
preventing Facebook from knowing more than necessary about her on the other. In this 
process, she thinks about Facebook not merely as a canvas on which she constructs her 
online identity through photos, biographical information and curated posts, but as a 
database that she is part of. Luise takes into account her role in this database with the 
same ease and attention as arranging her profile pictures. Being online for Luise naturally 
entails considering one’s representation through data. Although she sees herself as an 
average user, thinking about data is not an alien concept reserved to the domain of 
professionals or particularly advanced users, but a routine part of the fabric of life. Other 
participants are even more explicit about their implication in data. Showing me her 
LinkedIn profile, Christina explained: 
[5, 17] “[…] if someone searches for me…I don’t want to give away too much, but I want people 
to find me, so I think what information LinkedIn will pick up when someone enters my 
name.” 
Christina sees herself as part of a database. This affects how she presents herself on 
LinkedIn. While Christina is concerned about privacy, feeding the LinkedIn database with 
sufficient data for others to identify her has priority. Christina considers LinkedIn as a 
tool to make new professional connections, and as a business journalist she needs to 
ensure that she is adequately represented through her data when others query the database. 
When the 26-year-old added her name, job title and other information to LinkedIn, she 
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knew that she was creating two profiles at the same time. One profile is visible on her 
personal LinkedIn page, intended for visitors to read. The second LinkedIn profile is its 
data equivalent. But Christina does not think about them as separate but as two 
dimensions of one phenomenon. 
Such acts are not confined to the creation and maintenance of online profiles and occur 
across participants' activity on SNS. Sarah, a linguistics student, remembers when she 
was prompted by a friend on Facebook to install Farmville, a computer game that resides 
within Facebook and connects to her account. Before Sarah installs a tool such as 
Farmville, she automatically thinks about implications for her data: 
[5, 18] “And then there is also this tick box at the games. Many have Farmville. And if I install 
that, I also first think about whether it is getting some of my data and then I double-check 
in settings. So like what there is now from my data, how that’s being protected.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Her language offers a broader perspective on how people relate to their personal data. 
Sarah speaks of a ‘data set’. Instead of dispersed data points, she sees her data as an 
aggregate entity. A similar conception is implied in Luise’s and Christina’s attempts to 
be discovered in a database. All three narratives suggest that participants see themselves 
as having a ‘data double’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2003) online that serves as digital 
equivalent, or at least approximation of their selves. While no participant claimed that 
such digital imprint either reflected their ‘true self', or that it should aspire to, people take 
the existence of at least rudimentary digital bodies for granted and incorporate them into 
their understanding of everyday life online. Concepts like ‘data double', ‘dividual' and 
‘data individual' are being used in academic literature with primarily negative 
connotations, denoting the assemblage of digital reconstructions of people for purposes 
of analysis, control and surveillance. Despite people's existing concerns about privacy 
and being monitored, the notion of data doubles is not just connected to such worries, or 
even constituted by them. Much more widely, data doubles are a category of self-
expression and self-perception that underpins everyday life online. 
The incorporation of data doubles into everyday practices also extends to practices of 
imagining other people, as Jack's story shows. The urban planner from London wanted to 
find his old friends from elementary school on Facebook. But instead of entering the 
names of people he recalled directly, he opted for a different approach: 
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[5, 19] “I think, well I am not sure, but Facebook can tell who your mates were back in school. 
So I put it [DK: name of school] in my profile and got some recommendations, and there 
were even people I did not think of.” 
Jack used Facebook as a database not to find specific people, but to assemble people 
based on the data conveyed through his search query. While Jack like many participants 
is concerned that online companies collect personal data and monitor him, he does not 
relate his own search query to Facebook as an agent of surveillance.  
Data doubles as digital equivalents of people are not just analytical categories that 
diagnose macro-sociological trends, but have found their way into people’s lived 
experience. As such, people’s attention to personal data on the internet is well 
documented, for instance through teen’s practices of curating their social networking 
profiles (boyd 2008), or attitudes to online privacy (Fuchs 2013). But beyond these tropes, 
people relate to, engage with, and communicate through their data doubles themselves, 
revealing much wider issues about the mundanity of living with online surveillance.  
5.1.4. Watchers and Watched 
Participants generally associate surveillance with a clear distinction between ‘watchers’, 
who conduct surveillance, and ‘watched’, who are exposed to it. Surveillance appears to 
them as a linear process within the binary of the state or CCTV on one side, and people 
under their gaze on the other. This dualism continues to exist in people’s wider 
conceptions of monitoring on the internet, which they often frame in other terms than 
surveillance, and which incorporates online companies as watchers. Yet participants’ 
narratives discussed so far already hint at a sometimes more complex configuration of 
watchers and watched. For instance, talking about his Couchsurfing experience, Dennis 
indicated the role of another type of agent in the monitoring process – people like himself. 
This is echoed in stories about data doubles. Participants engineer their data doubles both 
to be found by others, and to search for others as well. Online destinations such as SNS, 
in addition to gathering and analysing data themselves, become intermediaries for new 
configurations of watching and being watched between people. However, the examples 
introduced so far are only marginal expressions of the wider phenomenon of peer-to-peer 
surveillance. This section explores how peer-to-peer surveillance manifests itself, and 
how it contributes to the dissolution of surveillance as a distinct category in everyday life.  
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When I asked Martin who he thinks is interested in his personal data, the sales manager 
from London immediately produced a long list. Alongside his employer and online 
companies, he mentioned friends and their peers: 
[5, 20] “Of course, Google and such, my colleagues, friends of friends, my friends, actually 
everyone. When I post something, I get like ‘Oh, have you done this and that’, and I am 
like ‘Well, it also wouldn’t have interested you if I had just met you on the street’. I think 
everyone is generally interested.” 
Martin’s friends are not powerful corporations or government agents that exercise any 
form of top-down power over him. They are internet users just like him, not particularly 
technically advanced, neither trained in surveillance tactics and data science, nor with 
access to specialist online tools. Despite this lateral relationship, he mentions them in the 
same vein as hierarchical forms of surveillance. This is not an expression of the 
magnitude of his concern, and Martin later added that he is more worried about companies 
spying on him than his friends snooping around on his social media profile. Yet his 
statement shows that other ordinary people join more established, top-down agents of 
surveillance as just another group of watchers that participants encounter.  
Being monitored by friends is not a rare occurrence, but a systematic component of being 
online that is embedded in an overarching framework of other surveillance experiences. 
The immediacy of reactions from friends on his Facebook posts remind Martin that 
someone, somewhere, is always watching, and other participants acknowledge the 
perpetual gaze as well. This is echoed by Amanda. I met her while I was pinning my calls 
for participation at a university message board in London, where she was posting flyers 
for her badminton society. The finance student admits to being addicted to her 
smartphone. One of her most-used apps is the location-based service Foursquare. She 
opens the app on her phone to virtually ‘check in’ to places she visits in the physical 
world, like cafes, airports and her university, earning online points and badges for each 
time she shares her location. Foursquare for her is a way to share her whereabouts with 
friends and sees it as a fun way to compete with others for badges earned at regular places. 
Amanda has been at her local coffee shop so often that she received the ‘major' badge. 
But like other SNS, Foursquare is not all carefree:  
[5, 21] “If you have shady ex-boyfriends or shady best friends or frenemies or whatever they 
want to call them, you should definitely be cautious online and with your movements. And 
I mean everyone has them, sometimes you just don’t know yet [laughs]. That's the 
question that all of these new features, these location-based features bring into play, you 
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know. Like Foursquare, you check in you're here, so they know you're not home. Or if you 
have a stalker boyfriend, he knows where you are.” 
Unlike Amanda, who voluntarily uses FourSquare, Christina, the business journalist, 
reported how she became exposed to peer-to-peer surveillance on Facebook without 
actually having a Facebook account. She felt compelled to join Facebook in order to 
intervene in peer-to-peer surveillance taking place at his expense:  
[5, 22] “The whole reason that I joined was Facebook was to try and control. Because when it 
came about and went big some years ago, I was told that people saw pictures of me, and 
they talked about it on Facebook. They knew about my life, and things that I did not even 
know and they talked about it on Facebook. And there was this creeping idea that there 
were all these pictures of me, and I did not even know what they are.” 
Participants recognise that exposure to peer-to-peer surveillance is inevitable and just as 
much a part of being online as leaving data traces. In particular, SNS produce unintended 
consequences which allow people to track others’ conversations and whereabouts. Legal 
secretary Joanna from London, even suggests that the prospect of peer-to-peer 
surveillance is baked into the appeal of SNS and an important motivation for people to 
join in the first place: 
[5, 23] “Everyone’s doing it, right? I mean that’s why most of us log in to Facebook all the time, 
to see what’s new and to snoop around a little. Maybe some people don’t notice, but to 
be honest, you gotta be really naïve if you don't see this, I think it is why everyone is on 
Facebook, it’s the perfect spy tool.” 
The 26-year-old’s statement shows that peer-to-peer surveillance is not just a nuisance or 
potential threat, but also a source of entertainment. It is through narratives of surveillance 
as entertainment that participants frame their own complicity in peer-to-peer surveillance. 
Participants find themselves in a dual role of being watched, and taking the role of 
watchers themselves. Karen enjoys snooping on her friends. Although other participants 
admit to spying on love interests or other specific people, the dental hygienist from 
London is not plotting a scheme against a particular person, or systematically following 
someone. Instead, she highlights more widely how surveillance as entertainment is 
familiar and often uncontested to participants:  
[5, 24] “Now Facebook is so like, it shows you any activity that anyone does. So you don't have 
to do any stalking yourself to kind of be updated on what anyone does. And if you want 
to know more, you can still snoop around on their profiles and yes I admit, can I say that, 
I am not a creep, but it is kinda fun.” 
Karen did not make an active to choice to participate in peer-to-peer surveillance. Her 
complicity just happened by means of using Facebook and its technological affordances. 
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For many, using these affordances and engaging in at least the casual monitoring of others 
is socially expected by those who are being watched. Apart from an intrusion, the 
deliberate submission to being watched is an integral part of everyday monitoring 
between peers. Franzi, a 24-year-old physiotherapist from Aachen highlights:  
[5, 25] “There are these expectations. That I like or comment on a photo and that I do that quickly. 
If I now, and someone did that to me once, if I only like a photo after a year or so and 
comment, that's weird, and then I'd say that person is creeping on me. But apart from 
that, it is kind of expected that you follow the lives of other people. What is Kerstin doing, 
so a friend of mine? I always have to keep an eye on that. Otherwise, she is upset." [DK: 
translation from German] 
Peer-to-peer surveillance is embedded in a system of complex social norms that determine 
when monitoring is acceptable and even desired, and when it is frowned upon. It is not a 
monolithic phenomenon but contains many nuances which determine what is unwanted 
surveillance, and what is accepted monitoring. The act of watching itself is present across 
these forms of peer-to-peer surveillance, but its interpretation changes. 
All these examples show that peer-to-peer surveillance is a complex phenomenon. Yet 
despite differences, at large, peer-to-peer surveillance erodes the binary relationship 
between online consumers on the one hand and specialist agents of surveillance on the 
other. Surveillance moves from a hierarchical to a lateral relationship and modalities of 
being watched and watching alternate and overlap. Participants live in a surveillance-
saturated world where mutual monitoring is part of popular culture that they actively 
participate in and which is normatively coded. Through peer-to-peer surveillance, various 
forms of monitoring become part of daily encounters and interactions with other people, 
contributing to the normalisation of surveillance as a fact of life.  
Participants are not adamant to differences between peer-to-peer surveillance and forms 
of surveillance conducted by other types agents. The often frivolous and playful nature 
of peer-to-peer surveillance for people has very different consequences than in particular 
computational forms of monitoring, which people struggle to grasp in their processes and 
intentions, as the next chapters will show in more detail. However, as in particular 
Martin’s example has shown, participants still experience peer-to-peer surveillance as 
part of a wider universe of experience composed of different forms of surveillance. 
Embedding peer-to-peer surveillance in this broader framework also shapes people’s 
relationship to surveillance at large. Peer-to-peer surveillance not only stands for the 
familiarity and mundanity of being watched by other people. It also problematises 
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people’s relationship to other forms of surveillance. Franzi feels uneasy about being 
tracked on the internet by large corporations, but she is not sure whether she is entitled to 
feel that way given that she spies on her friends: 
[5, 26] “Can I really be upset about this if spy on other people myself? That’s a contradiction 
somehow.” [DK: translation from German] 
Franzi does not equate peer-to-peer surveillance to corporate tracking but nevertheless 
puts the two in a relationship. Living in a world of pervasive monitoring, she struggles to 
separate between permissible forms of surveillance and legitimate reactions to it. The 
omnipresence of monitoring makes it difficult for her to take a moral stance on 
surveillance, evaporating possible dissent.  
As the above discussion has shown, peer-to-peer surveillance contributes to the 
normalisation of surveillance in multiple ways. It adds a lateral form of monitoring to a 
traditionally hierarchical relationship and creates a sense of familiarity with those who 
watch. It further embeds surveillance into everyday experience, establishes it as a 
potentially desirable, entertaining phenomenon that is surrounded by a set of social norms 
and expectations. Lastly, it erodes the boundaries between watchers and watched, turning 
participants into agents of surveillance themselves. Taken together, these factors 
normalise the lived experience of surveillance and complicate the assessment and 
judgement of other surveillance phenomena.  
5.1.5. Synthesis: Between Omnipresence and Dissolution 
As surveillance becomes ubiquitous, it ceases to be a distinct phenomenon. The 
proliferation of data, the incorporation of data doubles as meaningful categories in lived 
experience and the rise of peer-to-peer surveillance expand people’s exposure to and 
implication in various strands of surveillance in the broadest sense. Surveillance becomes 
normalised as an integral part of everyday life that is enmeshed with and indistinguishable 
from other practices, and that has multiple connotations. Deleuze (1992) has claimed that 
in societies of control, surveillance leaves the contained environments of disciplinary 
institutions and becomes ubiquitous. Two decades later, participants' narratives confirm 
this diagnosis. They also suggest that surveillance as a concept blurs and dissolves in the 
context of its perpetual expansion. While people’s definitions of surveillance as they 
perceive the term vary between Germany and the UK, participants in both countries share 
similar experiences of the normalisation of the phenomenon ‘surveillance’ as it is 
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conceptually understood in academic literature. In the domain of online life, being 
monitored, calculated and controlled is neither an outside act, nor an intrusion into an 
idea of life that is ideally free from such interventions, but a constituent part of it. This 
changes how people perceive surveillance, define and relate to it. 
5.2. A New Landscape of Risk 
Surveillance in the widest sense is a mundane and routine phenomenon deeply 
intertwined with and often indistinguishable from other everyday practices. However, 
although people accept the general existence of surveillance as an unchallenged fact, they 
do not stoically succumb to it, are apathetic towards it or engage with surveillance in an 
un-reflexive manner. The previous analysis already contained a broad range of statements 
from participants about their concerns and useful or entertaining associations with 
surveillance. This section documents how such attitudes are embedded in experiences of 
risk. Framing surveillance as risk establishes a framework through which people’s 
relationship towards surveillance can be understood. In a first step, this section highlights 
that computational surveillance takes a particular role in the experience of risk. It then 
outlines participants' conflicting perceptions of surveillance and how their inability to 
resolve these contradictions fuels a narrative of risk. The last step illustrates that 
surveillance risks are associated with broader questions around agency and computation.  
5.2.1. The Risky Nature of Computational Surveillance 
Evelyn from Erfurt has gotten used to being monitored online and thinking of surveillance 
sparks a sense of indifference. At the same time, she is concerned: 
[5, 27] “You are being spied upon everywhere on the internet these days, I really got used to it, 
it is just like that. And I don't think ‘shit, that's crazy' but just take it in. Still, I'd say that I 
am somehow afraid.” [DK: translation from German] 
Accepting surveillance as a mundane part of everyday life and yet having a sense of fear 
are not conflicting attitudes for the 20-year-old psychology student. Her fear is abstract 
and diffuse, not concrete.  
[5, 28] “Fear, in general, that things can happen with my data, that I…I can't describe what could 
really happen, that it somehow has negative consequences somehow at some point.” 
[DK: translation from German] 
Evelyn’s fear can be understood as a sense of risk following Beck (1992) that surveillance 
sparks unintended consequences which cannot be anticipated in the present. This feeling 
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of risk is widespread among participants. Ann-Kathrin, who is a fellow student in 
Evelyn's course in Erfurt, highlights:  
[5, 29] “You gotta see the big picture behind it. With Google, I don't have Googlemail, it is said 
that they store data. And then this car, err, Street View. You have to see this together; it 
is all Google and the data, that's all connected. And if Google wants to abuse that, they 
have the perfect basis, because all data is there. And I am afraid of that, also that I don't 
have any form of control and what could happen.” [DK: translation from German] 
Ann-Kathrin acknowledges the complexity of online surveillance and its networked 
character. However, appreciating this complexity also prevents her from assessing a 
specific threat and possible outcomes of surveillance in the first place. Katy, who lives in 
Kent but studies in London to become a translator, agrees. For her, acknowledging the 
complexity of online surveillance is not the basis for understanding it, but the beginning 
of recognising the inability to assess it: 
[5, 30] “That companies are spying on you… it is in the news so I did a bit of reading. But the 
more you want to understand what’s going on, the less you really get it. At least that’s 
what I think sometimes.” 
For many participants, the notion of such risk is unevenly distributed and particularly 
pertinent in the context of online surveillance conducted by commercial computational 
agents. In part, this attitude relates back to the narrow conceptualisation of surveillance 
in their own terminology. Evelyn adds: 
[5, 31] “The state, you kinda know what they want to do with the data and since I am not a 
criminal I am not afraid.” [DK: translation from German] 
Ian, a 25-year-old charity worker in London, adds a similar view towards peer-to-peer 
surveillance. Its intentions and possible outcomes are straightforward, and Ian can grasp 
them in their entirety: 
[5, 32] “I'd say when my friends are spying on me, that's kind of, well if you are honest with them 
and hide what you don't want them to see, it is not dangerous really. And that's different 
when you look at all these data collection companies, you can think ah ok, they may want 
this for their advertising but you can't be sure what they do with your data, and maybe 
they sell it on, it is completely in the dark.” 
Although surveillance is a pervasive phenomenon that in all its different iterations 
contributes to the normalisation of monitoring, attitudes towards surveillance are complex 
and embedded in a nuanced assessment of risk. Such assessments are structured based on 
possible consequences of surveillance, not its actual depth of intrusion. In the context of 
computational surveillance, participants struggle to spell out what these consequences 
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might be, how and when they might manifest themselves and what steps to take to avert 
them, establishing a hierarchy of risk.  
5.2.2. Risk as Contradictions 
Despite people’s concerns, they do not just consider computational surveillance as a 
potential threat. Participants’ narratives about the normalisation of surveillance have 
already indicated a more complex set of attitudes, where surveillance has utilitarian or 
even entertaining dimensions. Yet the notion of risk also includes the struggle to 
determine whether a phenomenon will have negative consequences at all, and how to 
balance such future consequences against present benefits (Nassehi 1997). In this vein, 
participants struggle to ascribe a fixed set of attitudes to surveillance. For instance, the 
inevitable ‘deal' they strike when online also has positive connotations as Paula, a 
homemaker and part-time yoga instructor from Aachen highlights: 
[5, 33] “They always show you what you’ve bought, what else could interest you, what other 
customers have… that’s always pretty amazing. They definitely analyse your clicking 
behaviour, your purchasing behaviour and somehow offer you things so adequately. […] 
Well, I always like when it says ‘customers who have bought this article have also…'. 
Sometimes that's quite interesting; you somehow find something that you wouldn’t have 
thought of yourself.” [DK: translation from German] 
Paula does not want to miss these recommendations. But she also thinks that Amazon has 
a dark side. This dark side remains vague for her and is based on speculation. Paula 
struggled to answer my question how she stands towards surveillance. Instead, she 
recognised me as an expert, who could help her build an assessment of the diffuse sense 
of risk that she experiences: 
[5, 34] “It can of course happen that they continue to analyse my data and if they get hacked, 
that this can be used in some way against me. That’s always a double-edged sword and 
if you ask me now how I stand towards it… hmm…honestly, I don’t have the skills to 
assess that. How dangerous is this really? I have often wondered; could you tell me?” 
[DK: translation from German] 
While Paula is wondering about hypothetical consequences of being monitored, Bashir, 
a medicine student from London, reported a specific incident that made him consider the 
role of surveillance in a particular situation: 
[5, 35] “A while ago I got this new debit card, and I went out to buy groceries. And I still remember, 
I got this frozen pizza. A few days later I got an email from this online supermarket, and 
there was a promotion of a new frozen pizza. The thing is, I never really buy frozen pizza, 
just this one time because it was exam week and I could not be bothered to cook a proper 
meal. So I was like – does my bank sell on my information? I mean, what are the odds 
really? That was just too convenient. But then I can’t imagine banks are allowed to pass 
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on this information, so I calmed myself down. But yeah, I still don’t know for sure to be 
honest when I think about it.” 
Like Bashir and Paula, for many participants assessing the risk of living with surveillance 
is an unfinished exercise that they struggle to conclude. Andre, aged 29, works in a car 
body shop in Aachen. Although he generally prefers the ‘real world’ as he calls it, to the 
internet, during the evenings, he can frequently be found tinkering with his PC or finding 
car parts on auction websites. The adverts on these car sites originally made him think 
about being monitored, and now he cannot quite resolve what stance to take: 
[5, 36] “This is always like hot and cold. Am I being spied on or not? You don't know, and it 
always is a fourth and back. But you don't get closer to the truth and in one moment I 
don't care, and then again I'm paranoid. With all these internet companies that analyse 
you, you just don't where you're at." [DK: translation from German] 
These narratives illustrate that attitudes towards surveillance are not straightforward and 
embedded in a web of changing assumptions, experiences and assessments. The risk of 
living with surveillance does not manifest itself as a specific threat but through the 
intransparency of intentions and modulations of computational agents.  
5.2.3. The Computational Halo of Risk 
When I met Stuart, who works as a loans advisor at a bank in Piccadilly, he was not 
concerned about exposing his personal data on the internet. He regularly encounters news 
reports that warn about data collection and some of his friends go to great lengths fine-
tuning privacy settings. But Stuart does not see any risks to exposing himself: 
[5, 37] “Risks? I can't think of any risks. Like the only risky thing I do is I go to my bank's website. 
And I think banks should have this stuff figured out and protect my data, so I am not really 
afraid, so I don’t really think about that when I’m online like doing my stuff…that someone 
can do…what someone can do with my data. And I mean what’s so important, and why 
would someone be interested in me? I am not that important, like there are thousands, 
millions, whatever. So there is nothing particularly interesting that I would imagine…I 
could not imagine, that it is that there is anything interesting to find out about me.” 
Stuart, who is aged 26, joins a small group of participants who shrug off an otherwise 
pervasive need for data protection that surfaces in other narratives. Stuart thinks his data 
traces are ordinary and that he does not stand out, allowing him to disappear in plain sight. 
He also alludes to an argument often purported by defenders of mass-surveillance that 
those who have ‘nothing to hide’ also do not need to fear surveillance (Solove 2011). 
Even if he was monitored, Stuart cannot imagine that his information would generate any 
interest or spark any consequences for him.  
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Annegret recently started her apprenticeship to become an optician in Erfurt. She 
highlights: 
[5, 38] “I don’t have anything to hide, why should I be worried? We’re all naked anyways and 
then it does not make sense to hide, it is just not contemporary anymore.” [DK: translation 
from German] 
Annegret, who is 19 years old, believes that she has long lost any privacy to 
computational surveillance and that whatever measure she takes, it cannot be restored. 
Annegret has stopped worrying about exposing herself and has accepted that she lives in 
an age where privacy is non-existent. Both Stuart and Annegret embrace a post-privacy 
paradigm to their everyday lives online. But although they appear to dismiss any 
surveillance risks, they are not as indifferent to surveillance as their statements suggest. 
Annegret regularly uses Amazon to order books and relies on its recommendation feature 
to discover new products. But one purchase seems to have confused Amazon’s 
recommendation algorithm and rendered it useless to her: 
[5, 39] “You always get these recommendations on Amazon ‘you could also like this' and so 
forth, and I always think oh damn, if I could somehow influence this, because the 
recommendations are all wrong, well I once bought a book, and this was a one-off for my 
sister and now I suddenly don't get any decent recommendations anymore. I always found 
that a real cool feature and it was really handy but what I get now, how can I turn that 
off?” [DK: translation from German] 
Amazon’s recommendations are based on monitoring Annegret’s browsing and 
purchasing habits. Instead of objecting to this data being collected, like some other 
participants do, Annegret embraces it and has come to rely on Amazon’s calculations. But 
a single act, her purchase, suddenly disconnected Amazon’s conclusions from her actual 
preferences. Annegret does not know what went wrong. She does not know whether her 
purchase, Amazon’s conclusions, or a combination of both had been behind the loss of 
relevant recommendations. She does not have any insight into the computational logic 
behind Amazon and, at the time that we spoke, had been unable to revert to a state where 
Amazon’s recommendations were of the same value to her as before.  
Stuart encountered a similar incident right during our interview. When he logged into his 
Facebook profile following our think-aloud session, he saw his ex-girlfriend showing up 
as a recommended friend next to his newsfeed. He sighed: 
[5, 40] “Here, not again, this always happens, she's my ex, and we unfriended each other a long 
time ago, and I thought I blocked her, but she always shows up. It is so annoying, fucking 
Facebook. I really don’t want to see her, and Facebook just keeps recommending her. To 
  
142 
be honest, that completely ruins my day when that happens. And it gets worse when my 
friends who are still friends with her like her stuff and it appears in my feed.” 
Stuart and his ex-girlfriend did not break up on good terms. They unfriended each other 
on Facebook and eager not to be reminded of the past, Stuart blocked her in his settings. 
But although he exhausted all technical means to the best of his knowledge, Facebook 
neither acted on his explicit inputs on the user interface, nor did it infer that Stuart did not 
want to see how his friends interacted with a person he had unfriended. Stuart felt 
powerless, unable to communicate his intentions to Facebook and uncertain when he 
would be exposed to unwanted memories of the past again. His Facebook experience had 
slipped from his control, and it mattered to him.  
Both Stuart and Annegret claim not to care whether they are being monitored and have 
given up on the concept of privacy. A conventional understanding of surveillance would 
suggest that both participants do not share others’ experiences of risk stemming from 
online monitoring. Yet taking a wider view on surveillance as it sinks into the everyday 
reveals a more complex picture, where risks of surveillance return to Stuart and Annegret 
in the guise of other encounters. Stuart and Annegret problematise situations that entail, 
or are based on being monitored. These situations do not fit into a traditional rhetoric of 
either resisting surveillance or submitting to it. They are not even framed specifically as 
surveillance encounters and instead appear as problems arising from the unintended 
consequences of computational logics. Stuart’s and Annegret’s stories highlight that 
rejections of surveillance risks only extend to an insular understanding of surveillance as 
a distinct phenomenon. Widening the analytical prism on surveillance shows that 
consequences of being monitored are much more far-reaching. Stuart and Annegret worry 
about their sovereignty as individual agents in a computational world and face the risks 
of exposure to unwanted experiences.  
5.2.4. Synthesis: A Landscape of Risk 
Living with surveillance is embedded in a landscape of risk. People attach different 
measures of risk to various forms of surveillance, and computational surveillance stands 
out as participants struggle to grasp its intentions and consequences. Attitudes to 
surveillance are not straightforward and alternate between threat and more positive 
connotations. These often are not grand claims about surveillance, but situated statements 
that refer to specific online practices in which surveillance plays a part. At the same time, 
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as surveillance erodes as a distinct concept, implications of surveillance can be found in 
experiences that are not surveillance-centric. Paradoxically, it is those statements which 
refute the notion of surveillance as risk that most explicitly hint at the implication of 
surveillance and computation in creating a much wider experience of risk.  
5.3. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter created a foundation for exploring how people relate to computational 
surveillance, the core theme of this thesis and the analytical focus of the next three 
chapters. It set out by problematising the notion of surveillance itself. Theoretical 
approaches note a pervasive spread of surveillance in contemporary societies of control. 
This is echoed by empirical analyses that document people’s attitudes and acts towards 
surveillance, for instance in the context of CCTV (Toon 2000) or online privacy (boyd 
2008). Yet such approaches assume that surveillance enters people’s lived experience 
within conceptually defined boundaries as separate and distinct phenomena. This chapter 
has shown that a much wider perspective is necessary to understand how surveillance is 
embedded in people’s everyday experience, and that doing so requires to de-centre 
surveillance research. In a first step, this chapter has shown that people’s narrow 
definition of surveillance itself is related to the omnipresence of surveillance in everyday 
online practices. Paradoxically, as people perpetually encounter and engage with 
surveillance, the concept of surveillance erodes and sinks into their wider lived 
experience. Surveillance becomes a mundane fact that has become normalised and 
entangled beyond recognition with other practices. In a second step, this chapter has 
shown that the normalisation of surveillance does not imply indifference. In particular, 
people struggle to assess the benefits and threats emerging from computational 
surveillance, leading to fluctuating attitudes and conflicting assessments of surveillance 
that are always temporary, until further notice. Living with surveillance takes place in an 
environment of risk. These risks often do not relate to surveillance as such, but to the 
computational context which it is part of. Together, the two constituent parts of this 
chapter illustrate that an empirical analysis of the lived experience of surveillance 
requires, and cannot be separated from an understanding of wider online practices and 
how people relate to computational agents. The following chapters build on this 
conclusion.  
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 Chapter Six: Experiencing the Fleeting 
Conditions of Knowledge 
I had just occupied an office on the sixth floor of a 1960s high-rise building on the 
university campus in Erfurt, Germany. It was the time of the football World Cup, and 
Germany was to play Ghana tonight. Looking out of the office window, I glanced over a 
park where stagehands were busy erecting a large screen on a metal scaffold, as well as 
setting up drink and sausage stands for the night’s live broadcasting event. The ground 
was covered in cables, amplifiers, electrical switches, a test image illuminated the screen, 
speakers were being wired, sound checks performed. Against the green nature, this 
technology hub looked strangely out of place, isolated, starkly naked, its contours 
pronounced in juxtaposition. From up here in my temporary office, the entire event’s 
infrastructure was laid bare. It was visible and comprehensible. Each cable, each wire, 
was placed in a grid, bundled together, lines running in parallels. Their routes could be 
traced from beginning to end, input to output. From the electrical generator to the LED 
screen, each object’s single purposes could be inferred, their joined orchestration could 
be grasped.  
The arrangement I looked down on, where the screen and its infrastructure are visible in 
unison, represents a particular way of perceiving and understanding the world. It also 
stands for a theme I was going to explore in my tower office with local students, just as 
with other participants before. I wanted to speak with them about screens and their 
surrounding infrastructure. But my interest did not lie in tangible objects like cables and 
wires. Instead, I intended to explore their relationship to the infrastructure of computation 
that orchestrates online surveillance. The theoretical framework of this thesis has hinted 
at the complexities of this relationship and problematised the difficulties of grasping 
computation. To recall the basic argument: I have proposed that computational principles, 
which jointly from a computational logic, stand at odds with human modes of making 
sense of the world. However, such a logic increasing shapes the social world and how 
people perceive it, what Kallinikos (2009) has called the computational rendition of 
reality. This computational logic constitutes an infrastructure. Parks (2012) suggested that 
infrastructure exists on a spectrum of visibility and invisibility and I argued that a 
computational logic is categorically invisible. Drawing on Brighenti (2007), I framed 
visibility both as a domain of perception and of power that facilitates understanding and 
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agency. I concluded that in dealing with computation, people are confined to its 
representation of the interface on the screen, and lack the ability to query its underlying 
infrastructure that contains its logic.  
This chapter takes an empirical perspective on this problem. It investigates how people 
in everyday life experience the relationship between their ability to make sense of the 
world and the computational logic it is governed by. On this basis, it explores how, if at 
all, people are able to construct knowledge about computational surveillance. It then 
continues to discuss how this stock of knowledge and modes of generating it influence 
people’s self-perception as capable agents. In order to tackle these questions, the chapter 
draws on the catalogue of theoretical concepts that I introduced earlier. Specifically, it 
leans on those concepts in Chapter Three that I used to illustrate the crisis of perception 
and understanding in the context of computation. In this introduction, I briefly take stock 
of these concepts.  
I already referenced the idea of a computational logic, the concepts of interface and 
infrastructure, as well as the notion of visibility above in justifying this chapter’s 
approach. Additionally, the chapter makes reference to Lash’s (2007) concept of 
generative rules. Lash argues that algorithms – what I more widely call a computational 
logic – operate on the basis of rules. Unlike constitutive and regulative rules which are 
historically conveyed through ideologies and consensus of human agents, generative rules 
operate from the inside of algorithms themselves. They are hidden from view and not 
represented through intersubjectively comprehensible codices. I use Lash’s concept to 
shed light on people’s self-understanding of agents in the context of these rules. A further 
concept I reference is that of Hayles’ (2007) cognisphere. Hayles suggests that people are 
increasingly embedded in cognitive systems of global, interconnected data flows. 
Largely, these flows are characterised by data exchanges between machines. In this 
cognisphere, comprised of both human and machine cognition, humans can only grasp 
fragments of the much wider exchanges taking place between machines (Hayles 2007). I 
set the idea of the cognisphere in relation to Marks’ (2006) concept of unfolding in order 
to describe the modulations of the cognisphere that people experience. Marks argues that 
all code – another shorthand for the computational logic – is usually enfolded, hidden 
from view in an endless virtual domain. Unfolding denotes the process by which specific 
images reach people out of the pool of enfolded information. Lastly, this chapter 
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introduces a complimentary concept in order to bridge empirical reality and theoretical 
framework. To shed light on people’s practices in the context of interface and 
infrastructure and the corresponding idea of visibility, I reference the notion of 
exosomatic organs. Coined by Innis (1984), the concept denotes artefacts, such as camera, 
telephone, microscope, or binoculars that reside outside of the human body, but which 
can be appropriated to augment human sensory abilities and mediate between them and 
the outside world.  
The overarching theme of this chapter is the construction of knowledge. It is situated in 
the wider framework of this thesis that incorporates Berger and Luckmann’s ([1966] 
1991) notion of the social construction of reality, Kallinikos’ (2009) computational 
rendition of reality and the associated concept of computed sociality (Kallinikos & 
Tempini 2014). The succeeding chapters will make more explicit references to Berger 
and Luckmann, including the social aspect of constructing knowledge and issues of 
resolving glitches between objective and subjective reality. This chapter’s main emphasis 
is neither the social dimension of the construction of knowledge nor the agency towards 
computational surveillance that comes from it. Rather, it is an exploration of the 
conditions under which knowledge takes place, and the possibilities and limits which 
these conditions afford. The chapter's emphasis, therefore, reflects the positioning of the 
theoretical concepts it uses within the wider theoretical framework, which prepare for the 
later theoretical introduction of Berger and Luckmann. Just as concepts of infrastructure, 
interface and visibility constituted groundwork in the theoretical framework that resulted 
in my adaptation of Berger and Luckmann's theory, this chapter provides groundwork for 
the next two empirical chapters which lean more strongly on Berger and Luckmann’s 
concepts. However, as the chapter is interested in the conditions of knowledge, it makes 
repeated references to Kallinikos and Tempini. The computational rendition of reality 
highlights the problem of knowledge, and the notion of computed sociality delineates the 
particular social configuration in which people’s encounters and experiences take place. 
While the idea of a computational logic and associated concepts are well suited to 
illuminate the empirical material discussed below, these references help to sharpen the 
argument in light of the overall thesis outline and simplify the narrative connection 
between the themes discussed here and the next chapters that draw more heavily on 
Berger and Luckmann.  
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This chapter is divided into three sections. It begins by discussing how people experience 
and define what I call ‘conditions of possibility’. These are the limits and affordances 
presented by the categorical invisibility of the computational logic and its generative 
modus operandi. The next two sections deal with how people construct knowledge about 
surveillance on the basis of these conditions of possibility. The first of these sections 
explores how people try to circumvent the need for knowledge by drawing on 
technological tools that act as outsourced agents on their behalf. The last section looks at 
unfolding events, or how computational surveillance appears to people against all odds. 
It documents people’s lived experience of unfolding as well as their attempts to 
reconstitute their role as agents in control over the conditions of knowledge through acts 
that provoke unfolding events on their own accord. The empirical material discussed in 
this chapter reflects all participants. Although only a selection of them is referenced in 
my narrative, the patterns analysed in this chapter are applicable to the entire pool of 
participants. I include dissonant voices from single participants whenever a phenomenon 
was not consensual or more nuance required.  
6.1. Conditions of Possibility 
Constructing knowledge about online surveillance first and foremost is not a set of 
practices or a process, but a problem. The principal agents of online surveillance are 
computers that operate through algorithms, code, big data and related concepts – what I 
have previously called a computational logic. When I spoke with participants about how 
much they knew about surveillance and their ways of figuring out its presence and 
workings, conversations often shifted to how little they knew, and the obstacles in their 
way to understand surveillance. People wanted to emphasise the conditions under which 
they make sense of a computed world and saw these conditions as justifications and 
explainers for their understanding of surveillance. These conditions also featured 
implicitly in their accounts when they reflect on themselves and on idealised ways of 
coming to terms with surveillance. I call them conditions of possibility because they 
structure any further approaches to surveillance. I introduce them in this section and 
distinguish between a rational and reflexive logic of computation on the one hand, and its 
mode of appearing to participants, or visibility, on the other.  
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6.1.1. Becoming Like Machines 
Andre from the car body shop, whom I introduced in the preceding chapter, does not 
come across as a particularly frightful character. Speaking in a firm voice, serene and 
mellow, he appears confident when talking about surveillance on the internet. While he 
is aware of risks associated with surveillance, he does not seem scared or overly 
uncomfortable about the prospect of being monitored. Yet he suggests that being online 
requires constant vigilance:  
[6, 01] “In theory, you always have to walk on eggshells.” [DK: translation from German] 
Andre’s statement implies a particular state of consciousness characterised by heightened 
awareness, diligence, self-questioning, and constant re-assessment of situations. Such 
paradigms of watchfulness are recurring themes in participants’ narratives. For instance, 
Mark highlights: 
[6, 02] “When it comes to Facebook or Google spying on you or all the other online companies, 
you can’t afford to be sloppy. You should always keep your eyes open ideally.” 
Yet while similar analyses are pervasive, participants also acknowledge that such 
imperatives are unattainable as qualifications such as ‘in theory’ or ‘ideally’ illustrate. 
Andre expanded on this when he talked about a file-sharing service that he uses to 
download movies and music: 
[6, 03] “I would really say that I am a realist. It is not possible to keep all these things in mind. 
You cannot put together scenarios, play through a game of ‘what happens if’, before you 
do anything on the internet. So even when I download a movie or so, I certainly know that 
people have received cease-and-desist orders because someone had monitored their 
online traffic. And then I sometimes do think, umm, now you have to be careful, or you do 
need to be more careful, but not all the time – that is virtually impossible.” [DK: translation 
from German] 
In his eyes, constant vigilance requires anticipating, imagining and thinking through what 
he calls ‘what-if-scenarios’, a constellation of potentialities that connect individual online 
behaviour with surveillance-related consequences. But Andre feels that he cannot live up 
to the principles he sets out himself. Similarly, Mark struggles to provide a blueprint for 
watching out for surveillance:  
[6, 04] “I can’t really tell you the best way. It’s not that I say this and that, that’s what you have to 
do to, you have to be open for everything that could happen. It could be anywhere really, 
I mean you cannot see that it’s actually happening and where and when. I guess, and you 
probably just have to have a sense of it and try to be careful whatever you.” 
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Both Andre and Mark are among those participants who want to protect themselves from 
the gaze of surveillance. But discrepancies between an envisioned approach to 
surveillance and actual practice extend across different attitudes to being monitored. 
Several participants are not concerned about surveillance, and others have given up on 
figuring out where and how surveillance operates altogether. They nevertheless engage 
in similar rhetoric about vigilance. For instance, Katy, a student from London is carefree 
with her personal data, sharing it to receive better online recommendations and useful 
advertising. Still, she hopes that she could understand the principles by which a 
computational logic operates in order to better engineer her exposure. Vigilance for her 
is not a means for protecting herself from surveillance, but a precondition for engaging 
with surveillance in a way that is beneficial for her. Others, like Linda, who just finished 
her maths degree and moved to London, claim that they ‘don't care anymore' about 
surveillance because there is nothing they can do about it. Yet as conversations 
progressed, such participants emphasised that their attitude towards surveillance stems 
from a systematic lack of access to its logic. Martin is stuck in the middle. He worries 
about surveillance but has adopted a laissez-faire attitude: 
[6, 05] “Uhm, if I thought about it constantly, I’d probably not be able to sleep anymore. […] I try 
and don’t think about it with every click I make. I’d go crazy.”  
At first, I understood his statement as an expression of worry, where he bracketed the 
concerns about pervasive surveillance from his consciousness in order to eliminate 
ongoing, nagging fears about the consequences of being monitored. But as our 
conversation progressed, he helped me see his statement in a different light. Martin 
alluded to the dimensions of time and complexity and not to the issue of fear. He meant 
that trying to figure out how surveillance works would be so time-consuming that he 
would not be able to fit it in a day, and that probing into the mechanisms of surveillance 
would exceed his cognitive abilities, leading him to ‘go crazy’ if he attempted to decipher 
it.  
These very different narratives illustrate that at its most basic, the idea of vigilance is not 
principally related to personal protection from surveillance, but to the issue of generating 
knowledge about surveillance. Independent of personal attitudes to surveillance, the 
struggle to constantly monitor one’s web activities in relation to surveillance alludes to 
categorical differences between human and computational agents. These differences 
structure awareness of the occurrence of surveillance and knowledge about its shape, 
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modalities and intentions. They become explicit in accounts that construct an us-versus-
them rhetoric in which participants create a dualism between man and machine. Linda 
highlights:  
[6, 06] “Google and all the others, it’s like they have computers, unlimited resources, I mean it’s 
different. You are now being faced by machines, and you got to behave like a machine 
ideally if you want to fight back. Like machines don't tire, and they are faster." 
This juxtaposition between human and computational attributes occurs time and again. 
Andre recognises that his personal attributes of being in the world and making sense of it 
are not compatible with how computational agents operate: 
[07] “I can't think as fast as a computer, and I can only be at one place at a time, but we are 
surrounded by computers everywhere – how should I as a person know how computers 
work, it is not that simple to figure out.” [DK: translation from German] 
Andre makes a distinction between his bodily presence and the networked nature of 
computation. He also hints at obstacles of figuring out how computation operates, an issue 
that other participants formulate more explicitly. Some lament that they are not coders or 
programmers, and thus position themselves as lay agents who are exposed to coming to 
terms with a phenomenon that requires expert skills. Others do not dwell on expert and 
lay distinctions, but emphasise the inaccessibility of a computational logic at large. 
Constanza, who is an Italian-born artist based in London, says:  
[6, 08] “Like how shall I figure out how an algorithm works and all that data that is being sucked 
in how that is processed, I guess nobody knows really, it’s all a black box. I know that 
they are using my data, but I don’t know which data and what they make of it, like how 
they read it, and you hear stories sometimes how that is not always correct. I guess that’s 
the issue, where shall I start and what can I really do even if I wanted to?” 
These stories stand for participants’ profound awareness that they are embedded in a 
computed world which produces knowledge about them, but which is not accessible as 
an object of knowledge in the same way. Both Andre and Constanza try to justify 
themselves through rhetorical questions as if they needed confirmation and self-assurance 
from others that they really could not do more. In particular those like Constanza who 
consider themselves proficient in their use of computers, are aware of latest software and 
effortlessly use terms like ‘algorithms’, feel a sense of shame that they have hit a glass 
ceiling, and have to capitulate to the logic of computation. Being vigilant is firmly 
connected with this sense of shame. It is an expression of the need to adopt to the modus 
operandi of computation itself in order to systematically establish it as an object of 
knowledge. To recall, Lash (2007) has argued that computation operates on the basis of 
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generative rules. These are hidden rules inaccessible to human agents characterised by 
self-questioning, self-learning, rule-finding and constant reassessment - they are 
perpetually reflexive. According to Lash, dealing with computation in everyday life 
requires people to adopt the same paradigms that underpin generative rules. Participants’ 
narratives show that his argument meets a world in which people have already formulated 
a maxim of calculative rationality and reflexivity to echo the modalities of computation. 
But people know that being calculative, rational and perpetually reflexive is an 
unattainable task. People know that in order to understand computational surveillance, 
they have to think more like computers, but face the limits of their minds and bodies that 
prevent a closer, systematic approximation.  
6.1.2. Out of Sight, Out of Mind 
When I met James, who works as a barista, our conversation kept coming back to a single 
topic. James experienced a sense of blindness that he could not let go of. Surveillance 
was a threat to him, and he was more concerned about CCTV than internet surveillance. 
Yet at the same time he found it easier to live with the bigger evil - CCTV surveillance - 
because he could see the cameras. They communicated their physical presence, allowing 
him to assess the situation he was in. His experience of internet surveillance was different. 
I struggled to get answers to my questions, such as where he was being monitored, and 
how he thought his data was being used. James replied with slight variations of a one 
sentence statement, from ‘I don’t know, I can’t see how it works’ to ‘You just don’t see 
it, so how should you ever know.’ James felt that he could not answer my questions in 
more detail because without his human senses being able to both perceive and understand 
surveillance, everything was speculation. Online surveillance for him was confined to the 
back of his mind as a lingering, unspecific and ambient awareness:  
[6, 09] “I think nowadays it’s in the back of your head most of the time. Not like in a panicky way 
where you end up worrying all the time: It is more, I would say it is a general sense that 
it’s there. […] But you can’t see it so you don’t really think about it.”  
It was only when I broached the subject of Amazon that James opened up. Participants I 
had spoken to previously had repeatedly referenced Amazon as an example of online 
surveillance. James concurred:  
[6, 10] “Oh yes, Amazon. It is an exception, the recommendations you get, that is obvious, and 
also how it follows you around on the internet, the Amazon ads you get when you have 
looked at a DVD or something. Yeah so this is different from what I said before – am I 
contradicting myself? I mean, there you have it right there. But it is one of those rare 
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moments where you go ah ok. Like as I said before, you can see how you are being 
traced, but that’s an exception.” 
James's story stands out through his persistence of not speaking about what he cannot see. 
But it also vividly illustrates, in a single account, a common relationship between 
visibility and knowledge of surveillance among participants. They consider visibility as 
both a mode of perception and understanding, whose scarcity in a world of computation 
is complicating and limiting knowledge of surveillance. While James was initially 
confused how to accommodate Amazon into his narrative, his story also stands exemplary 
for how people’s encounters with surveillance are structured between a default of 
invisibility and particular instances of visibility.  
Giddens’ (1991) distinction between ‘discursive’ and ‘practical’ consciousness illustrates 
this further. Practical consciousness is a background modality that accompanies everyday 
life unobtrusively, just like James’s statement that online surveillance is ‘in the back of 
your head most of the time’. Implicit and taken for granted, it is free from interfering with 
or disrupting everyday acts. Yet once surveillance becomes visible, like in the Amazon 
case, it turns into directed, focal attention where participants problematise and negotiate 
their own position to surveillance and generate specific insights into its workings. To stay 
with the Amazon example, here is how Luise from Germany narrates her experience with 
surveillance that suddenly became visible:  
[6, 11] “Some recommendations, I always think whoa crazy, all the things they know about me, 
and then they can conclude so many things, that is quite heavy. And you always realise 
it again in these situations.” [DK: translation from German] 
For Luise, Amazon is not covert about its surveillance practices. Instead, the online 
retailer lays them out in front of her every time she visits the Amazon website. Its purchase 
recommendations are a continuous reminder for Luise, both that her every click on the 
website is being monitored and how – through an analysis of her consumption and 
clicking habits.  
Participants identify a set of contexts where surveillance appears time and again. 
Alongside Amazon, they repeatedly reference the advertising industry, which people 
think reveals its own logic of surveillance. For instance, another participant from London, 
22-year-old Adam, said: 
[6, 12] “Like, I wanted to buy a pair of sneakers, and suddenly there were sneaker ads wherever 
I went. So I thought ‘here we go again’, someone has been spying on me. It’s kind of in 
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your face, actually – ‘hey look, I know you wanted to buy these sneakers, so I will follow 
you pester you until you get them’. It’s not very subtle, to be honest.” 
But these contexts are far and few between. As Adam’s phrase ‘here we go again’ 
insinuates, revelations of surveillance through advertising or Amazon are mundane and 
routine. They reoccur in the ever-same contexts, but participants provide few stories of 
such systematic revelations in other environments. This also means that visible instances 
of surveillance often reconfirm, rather than foster additional knowledge because, after a 
while, they do not shed light on new ways in which surveillance works. Luise followed 
up on her remarks about Amazon: 
[6, 13] “Well, I am not sure I can say how much I really know about surveillance. I mean, there 
is the Amazon case that we talked about, but what do I know apart from that? And yes I 
know that Amazon targets me, and that is crass, but if you have seen it 100 times you 
don’t really feel shocked anymore I would say.” [DK: translation from German] 
At large, the domain of online surveillance then remains invisible like James has 
emphasised. Participants consider knowledge of computational surveillance as 
intertwined with their ability to perceive computational agents with their human senses. 
For instance, after I had finished a think aloud protocol with Luise, she opened her web 
browser to show me her privacy settings. Immediately, a website which she had selected 
as her default page, opened. I asked her whether she was being monitored right now:  
[6, 14] “Whether I am being monitored right now or now? No idea. Well, I don't see that sort of 
thing, but that does not say anything at all because it could be there nevertheless. But to 
reflect on it concretely is difficult because there is no evidence.” [DK: translation from 
German] 
The lack of visual anchors affects participants’ construction of knowledge about 
computational surveillance. Its pervasive invisibility even goes so far that people struggle 
to find a language to describe computational agents. Previously, I introduced Italian artist 
Constanza who confidently speaks of ‘algorithms’ and ‘data’. But other participants fail 
to find suitable vocabulary. They pause to find the right terms, stop and restart their 
sentences, use their hands and gestures in attempts to capture and express computational 
agents. My interview with Luise did not seem to progress well when I asked her to 
describe how surveillance works. She tried to come up with an answer, but paused several 
times, before finally replying: 
[6, 15] “Well yes I also don’t know how to describe surveillance on the internet really now that 
you are asking. A lot of what’s happening, it’s not really noticeable. You feel kind of 
excluded and don’t really know how to express it. You could be surveilled right now, but 
also not. And you don't know by whom because as I said it is not visible. They always say 
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you are being watched, and that probably is also true. But where and how exactly, that is 
not clear most of the time. On Facebook, you know that you are being watched in general, 
and Mark Zuckerberg is always criticised in the media because of that. But you don't know 
the specifics. You are as I said somehow powerless.” [DK: translation from German] 
The systematic invisibility of computational surveillance then not only curtails people's 
amount of knowledge but also affects the process of constructing knowledge itself by 
limiting ways to think about and express computational principles in language.  
6.1.3. Synthesis: A Default of Improbability 
The above discussions have illustrated that people are faced with two dichotomies which 
structure their construction of knowledge about computational surveillance. The first of 
these dichotomies is expressed in a clash between a human and a computational logic. A 
computational logic is underpinned by generative rules, which are rational and reflexive. 
But people struggle to systematically adopt a rational and reflexive paradigm in their 
everyday life to keep up with those generative rules. The second dichotomy is that of 
visibility and invisibility. Computational surveillance lacks phenomenal anchor points 
that transport it into the realm of human experience. For participants, the ability to see 
stands metaphorically for access to the world through their human senses. They relate 
their sensory experience to the ability to frame, define and understand computational 
surveillance. Together, these dichotomies define conditions of possibility in which 
constructing knowledge about surveillance takes place. For analytical reasons, I presented 
those dichotomies as separate points. But they are also interconnected. Generative rules 
are hidden from view. This means that the invisibility of computational surveillance 
forecloses a better understanding of the specific rational and reflexive modus operandi of 
computation. While people acknowledge and experience the computational rendition of 
reality (Kallinikos 2009), it then coincides with the experience of improbability of access 
to its underlying modes of making sense of and structuring the social world.  
These dichotomies do not claim to describe exhaustively how people construct 
knowledge about computational surveillance. The remainder of this chapter will add 
further observations, and I will present a social perspective in the next chapter. Instead, 
these dichotomies represent much broader groundwork. As conditions of possibility, they 
form a baseline, a default that stands in the way of constructing knowledge of 
computational surveillance. Either explicitly or implicitly, all other attempts of 
constructing knowledge are positioned towards overcoming the limits imposed on 
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participants through the rational and reflexive nature of computation, and its invisibility. 
This extends from knowledge to practice. In the last empirical chapter, I will discuss how 
people act towards computational surveillance in order to negotiate how they are being 
computed, where the conditions of possibility outlined here further will inform an 
interactional framework based on Goffman (1971). 
6.2. The Technological Promise 
Generating knowledge about surveillance is riddled with complex obstacles. This section 
discusses how people try to overcome the conditions of possibility that constrain their 
access and understanding of computational surveillance. It is the first of two sections 
which take on this perspective. Here, I look at the technological fixes that people employ 
in lieu of their own abilities. The next section addresses ways through which people try 
to reconstruct the ability to generate knowledge about computational agents through their 
own human logic.  
6.2.1. Exosomatic Organs 
Karen struggles to stay on top of surveillance on Facebook, be it in the form of a third-
party application like Farmville scraping her data, Facebook monitoring her clicks and 
‘likes’, or friends turning into unwanted spectators. Yet she does not dismiss Facebook 
as a mere data collection machine, where membership is a Faustian bargain of social 
connection traded for personal information that leaves her trapped in a surveillance web. 
As much as Facebook is a source of surveillance, Karen also draws on it to manage the 
gaze of computational agents that surround her. During our interview, Karen clicked on 
her Facebook privacy settings and pointed her finger at the computer screen:  
[6, 16] “I have ticked the boxes, here, here, and here so I don't have watch out all the time, and 
Facebook does it for me, like what data about me Farmville and all the other apps can 
get. You have to tick the boxes because you obviously need to change the default 
settings. Maybe I check again when Facebook has changed. But I really don’t need to 
think about it all the time, and that's pretty good." 
Karen knows that Facebook continues to monitor and gather data about her no matter 
which privacy settings she applies. Instead, she rather uses privacy settings to stay on top 
of those surveillance threats that can be influenced. Karen applies a visual metaphor, 
‘watching out’, to a software interface. She delegates a task to for which she would 
otherwise need both her eyes and a particular cognitive state of heightened attention.  
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Conceptually speaking, Facebook’s privacy settings turn into an exosomatic organ, an 
artificial sense (Innis 1984). Usually, exosomatic organs are prostheses that augment and 
expand the range of human senses. They enhance already existing human abilities such 
as seeing or hearing. But participants’ use of software settings and tools also operate 
entirely in lieu of human senses. Further to Karen’s story, Enrico suggests:  
[6, 17] “I don't know what Facebook does with my data. Well, on the newsfeed and such, but not 
how that is shared and what is happening in the background. Yes, you do feel powerless 
because you just cannot watch out, because you do not see these things. But privacy 
settings are good because they control that in the background. There you still have the 
feeling that you can influence things.” [DK: translation from German] 
Enrico acknowledges a divide between interface and infrastructure that determines his 
grasp of surveillance. He is limited to the interface of the screen, where information is 
displayed in a form that he can cognitively process and understand. The interface provides 
some clues about how surveillance works. Changes in personalisation, such as in the 
newsfeed, allow Enrico to spot some modulations of surveillance. These are visual 
references to the underlying surveillance logic. But at the same time, the expressions on 
the interface signal the existence of a much deeper world of surveillance on the level of 
infrastructure that he cannot stay on top of. Privacy settings as exosomatic organs 
establish a connection to this hidden layer. But Enrico also makes clear that this 
connection is not immediate. His access to the realm of intangible surveillance is only by 
proxy. Once set up and configured, privacy settings operate independently and without 
his further contribution. While they stay vigilant on his behalf, they do not relay the world 
of surveillance directly back to him so that he can watch out for himself.  
Exosomatic organs extend beyond privacy settings. Evelyn uses a program that prevents 
data to be collected for targeted advertising:  
[6, 18] “I do have an ad blocker running, TrackMeNot, there you don’t have to constantly think 
“uuuh, what is happening now with my data now that I am on website XY?” [DK: 
translation from German] 
The program, TrackMeNot, is vigilant on Evelyn’ behalf, no matter whether she accesses 
a news website or is surfing on a social network. In this sense, it goes beyond the scope 
of Facebook privacy settings. But it is limited at the same time – it only replaces her own 
grasp on surveillance with regards to targeted advertising. Other instances of surveillance 
are not considered. Compared to this, James, a technophile, has opted for a more radical 
approach:  
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[6, 19] “I have like anti-virus, anti-phishing, ad block, and also some other tools, like against 
cookies. I mean it’s amazing the stuff you can get for free. So as I said, I kinda have my 
filters running all the time so I don’t have to look out for nasty stuff all the time.” 
Without technological support, James suspects he would have to be on guard 
permanently. But exosomatic organs take over this task on his behalf. He has constructed 
a system of exosomatic organs spanning across as many internet activities and addressing 
as many surveillance intrusions as possible. James’s assemblage is an extreme example 
that is not widespread among participants. However, it encapsulates the vast array of 
exosomatic organs, be it one or the other, that participants rely on beyond mere privacy 
settings. 
The notion of exosomatic organs illustrates how participants are trying come to terms 
with the invisible nature of surveillance and the dilemma of perfect vigilance. As they 
cannot systematically convert invisible surveillance into their sphere of perception and 
understanding, participants draw on software to keep track of surveillance around them. 
Participants automate vigilance of surveillance by translating it from a human into a 
machine task. Freed from the limitations of human abilities, this delegated watchfulness 
also becomes a continuous watchfulness. Software never sleeps and operates 
autonomously without further contribution by participants.  
6.2.2. Seeing Through Software 
People’s use of exosomatic organs sparks wider questions around the relationship 
between computation, the visible world and ultimately the production of knowledge. 
Considering that exosomatic organs operate autonomously in a realm that is inaccessible 
to human senses, it begs the question how they structure people’s relationship to this 
invisible world, and whether they help at all in making surveillance appear to participants 
directly.  
Bashir, a medicine student, is sceptical about the ability to grasp surveillance on the 
internet. Although he uses privacy settings from Facebook to web browsers, it remains 
‘all pretty unclear’. For him, human agents are barred from understanding a 
computational logic:  
[6, 20] “It’s all technology, so your only chance is to respond with technology because as an 
average person, you just don’t get this stuff at all […] I kinda know, or hope at least that 
it works, um… that the privacy settings work, and that's that. What's really going on, I 
don't know.” 
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This statement sheds further light on Bashir’s relationship towards the use of software. 
As surveillance takes place in the domain of technology, so too does it have to be 
approached in and through technology. Exosomatic organs remain confined to the 
technological arena and do not cast open a door into the world of computation. Access to 
the domain of computation, remains foreclosed.  
A term frequently used by participants in this context is the notion of an imaginary ‘wall’. 
For instance, when Dennis from Germany walked me through his Facebook privacy 
settings, he concluded:  
[6, 21] “So, I select something there, tick the boxes and that’s that. What is happening exactly – 
no clue. That’s like a wall to be honest.” [DK: translation from German] 
Dennis never sees, hears or otherwise perceives how the software tools he uses engage 
with surveillance. For him, a divide between interface and infrastructure cannot be 
overcome. The world of human experience stops on the interface.  
Most participants either directly or indirectly affirm the experience of a wall between 
human experience on the interface, and underlying processes on the infrastructure level. 
Browser settings and other tools may display certain categories of threats, but they do not 
shed light on the actual workings of surveillance. When Stuart talked about his privacy 
settings, he was unable to tell more about what they actually do:  
[6, 22] “I can’t really see from this what these settings actually do. And to be honest, they also 
don’t really tell you much. More privacy is better I guess, so I selected everything and 
clicked no, no, no. Here, here and here.” 
For Stuart, there is not much to infer about the way surveillance operates from the choices 
that software settings present. They allude to the powerful world of computation 
underneath the interface, but interfaces themselves remain vague and do not offer a 
feedback loop. What happens in the realm of infrastructure remains hidden from view. 
Instead of being able to ‘see’ with the help of exosomatic organs, they act as substitutes 
for participants’ human senses and do not open the world of computation to human 
experience. This has further implications for the production of knowledge about 
surveillance. As privacy settings and other software tools operate in the background, 
participants do not consider them as a source of knowledge about surveillance. Instead, 
attention shifts to exosomatic organs as objects of knowledge themselves. Asked if he 
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knows more about how surveillance works by using privacy settings and ad blockers, 
Martin says: 
[6, 23] “Well not really. I think today you can rather know which tools you have to use. It is like 
with Google and Wikipedia I think. They always say, you only need to know where to find 
things, you do not have to know about ityourself. The tools I use, I don’t expect that.”  
Martin’s statement is epitomised by the proverb ‘there is an app for that’, or what 
Morozov (2013a) has called ‘solutionism’. The phrase hints at a virtualisation of 
competencies through technology. In contrast to for instance print books finding a digital 
equivalent in eBooks, where the human ability to read is still necessary, a virtualisation 
of competencies means that any task-related knowledge, skill and expertise now resides 
in technology itself. Human agents are merely required to know how to find the right 
technological fix. Privacy settings and other exosomatic organs represent such a 
virtualisation of skills.  
6.2.3. Doubts of Delegation 
Despite the use of technological tools, participants have not abandoned efforts to generate 
knowledge about computational agents themselves. Consider again Karen’s statement, 
which I referenced in the previous section:  
[as 6, 16] “I have ticked the boxes, here, here, and here so I don't have watch out all the 
time, and Facebook does it for me. I mean, you have to tick the boxes because 
you obviously need to change the default settings because you have to know 
what you want. Maybe I check again when Facebook has changed, but I really 
don't need to think about it all the time, and that's pretty good I guess.” 
A close reading suggests that she shifts her attention to a meta-level, reviewing the 
privacy settings time and again. These review instances are not arbitrary, but follow 
changes in Facebook’s privacy policy which Karen keeps track of. Like Karen, many 
participants have doubts over uncritically delegating vigilance to software tools. Evelyn, 
who uses ad blockers to watch out for her, underscores that the technologies she uses 
cannot replace her personal reflection on surveillance:  
[6, 24] “Yes, I know very well that an ad blocker cannot solve everything and for instance, on 
Facebook, it also does not work at all and with Farmville, which everyone seems to be 
playing now, this is also accessing my data and cannot be blocked. […] You cannot lean 
back and say ‘now I don't have to bother with this anymore’.” [DK: translation from 
German] 
Such concerns are joined by critical voices about the clarity with which software is able 
to ‘see’. Josephine, the textile design student, highlights:  
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[6, 25]  “It is kinds of perverse to be honest. Facebook is spying on you but also gives the tools 
to protect your data. But it is clear that those tools are not as good as Facebook’s 
capability to spy on you.” [DK: translation from German] 
While many believe that they can only systematically keep tabs on surveillance through 
the use of software, this reliance on a computational entity sits uneasily with participants. 
As conversations about such tools progressed, many were worried that their tools are 
themselves opaque and inaccessible to human scrutiny. For instance, Bashir does not trust 
all software that claims to protect him:  
[6, 26]  “Like when it is Norton, it is a brand; you trust it. But privacy settings on Facebook it more 
like a placebo and now there is a ton of software out there that maybe you read about or 
that a friend has recommended or that is pre-installed, but then you sometimes wonder if 
it’s not a bit dodgy, like when you use it that it spies on you also, there are these stories 
about that, but how to you verify that? It is better if you keep your eyes open as well.” 
Others are concerned about differences in power between software that monitors 
surveillance on their behalf, and the computational agents that monitor them. James 
initially seemed proud when he presented his elaborate system of technological sensors. 
But his faith in technology started to bear fissures and cracks as our conversation 
progressed.  
[6, 27] “[…] as I said probably everyone collects your data. Everyone does it. But I mean Google 
and Facebook they have the smartest programmers so really what your freeware can do 
is probably not on the same level. And then, […] you are fucked anyways.” 
Enthusiasm and deflated feelings about software often coincide. During their biographies 
of coming to terms with online surveillance, people realise that technological fixes cannot 
replace the need for knowledge of their own. Attitudes to software tools also are unstable, 
changing between connotations of a fix-all solution to critical tones within a single 
conversation, pointing towards a troubled and conflicted relationship. Available tools are 
too narrow and distrusted, and participants see them as inferior to the surveillance 
technologies that online giants like Google and Facebook deploy. Participants’ binary 
distinction between a human logic on one side and a computational logic on the other 
then gains an additional dimension. Technologies are not created equal. Far from a 
monolithic category, people see a hierarchy of computational logics. Power does not 
merely reside in computation per se, but in the technology of the others - the surveillors. 
Classic connotations of power between watchers and watched therefore are reproduced 
on top of a binary between human and computational powers.  
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6.2.4. Synthesis: A Broken Promise  
In a computed world, where the ability to understand surveillance is constrained, people 
draw on technological tools in a bid to ‘fix’ the relationship between their human abilities 
to make sense of the world and its computational co-constitution. Relying on such tools 
is a first indication that people recognise the erosion of common-sense knowledge and 
experience the emergence of ‘discrepant worlds’ (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991) 
through computation. Resorting to technological fixes highlights that given the 
inaccessibility of these discrepant worlds, people strive to move the intersubjective 
negotiation of common-sense into those worlds by proxy. But these technologies do not 
systematically open up the world of computation to participants, resulting in a situation 
where the need for knowledge about surveillance is merely outsourced. Paradoxically, as 
people draw on technological tools to pitch computation acting on their behalf against 
computation that represents surveillance, they realise the limits of technological 
solutionism and become aware that their own, human logic remains a vital component in 
constructing knowledge about computational surveillance. This resurgence of the human 
senses is the theme of the next section. 
6.3. Appearances of Computation 
Beyond outsourcing knowledge of surveillance to technology, participants themselves 
also attempt to reconstruct their own ability to understand computational surveillance. 
This section documents how surveillance that is usually hidden from view reappears on 
the interface of the screen and becomes open to human understanding. It draws on Marks’ 
(2010) concept of ‘unfolding’ to illustrate this. The section begins by documenting how 
people experience unfolding events that they are confronted with serendipitously and 
proceeds to show how people provoke unfolding events themselves. 
6.3.1. Unfolding Events 
Mike from London usually spends his lunch breaks at work watching videos of funny 
mishaps on YouTube. Sometimes, these videos have been flagged as offensive by other 
users, which means that Mike cannot watch them without logging to YouTube with his 
user account. Some time ago, Mike had just clicked on an age-restricted video like so 
many times before, as he was suddenly diverted to a webpage that prompted him to 
connect his YouTube and Gmail user accounts. He was bewildered. Reflecting on this 
incidents, Mike said:  
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[6, 28] “And there was YouTube, and Gmail and an arrow between them […] That was so 
obvious that they did that to get into my Gmail, because you know I am there with my real 
name and all the people that I am in touch with over email, it’s also their real names…but 
that's got nothing to do with YouTube and Google? I mean I am gonna watch that video, 
and that worked before so that's what I don't…I mean why do they need to know who I 
am? So it's so obvious that that's really fishy. They kind of lure you into that because they 
think, ok you are gonna really want to watch that video, creepy.” 
Mike did not know that Gmail and YouTube both belonged to Google, which had decided 
to merge its user account across different web properties. His everyday experience was 
unexpectedly disrupted when a previously unknown configuration of surveillance 
unravelled in front of his eyes. The workings of surveillance became tangible through an 
image containing the logos of both Google and YouTube, connected by the shape of an 
arrow between them. Lyon (2007) uses the term ‘leaky containers’ to describe what Mike 
witnessed: the merging of formerly distinct databases containing personal information. 
Whereas this usually happens by re-routing flows of data, ungraspable by the human 
senses and confined to the expert knowledge of technicians, marketers or policymakers 
involved, Mike encountered a visual representation. He did not have to conduct any 
research on surveillance, probe into any inconsistencies or contradictions he encountered 
during his internet use or exhibit a particularly heightened vigilance towards surveillance 
in order to detect it. Instead, the computational logic behind surveillance revealed itself 
in its intentions through an image. For Mike, this was sufficient to deduce the underlying 
motivation: a computational agent wanted to acquire his consent for merging and 
exploiting his personal data.  
Mike is not alone. Many German participants are avid readers of online newspaper 
bild.de. During the time of my interviews, the newspaper introduced a feature that allows 
users to comment on news articles using their Facebook account. A plug-in on the website 
at the bottom of each article displays how many people have already shared it and 
contains a timeline that imports Facebook recommendations and comments, including 
names and profile pictures. When people add their comments to the news article, it would 
also automatically be recorded on their Facebook. For participants like Andre, this was a 
new manifestation of surveillance:  
[6, 29] “[…] and I thought, cool, that’s nice. You can post the article directly on Facebook and 
don’t need to write a new comment first. But wow, then I saw that it can be seen 
everywhere and that anyone reading Bild knows it then. Then I thought ‘wow’, that’s pretty 
intense, maybe I shouldn’t do it then.” [DK: translation from German] 
  
163 
Both Mike and Andre could make inferences about the workings of surveillance through 
a visual representation of a computational logic. In both cases, surveillance required the 
complicity of human agents to operate and revealed its motivations in this process. 
Hidden on the level of infrastructure, surveillance is usually enfolded. By creating an 
image of itself, it unfolded into the domain of human experience. As Marks (2010) has 
shown, unfolding can either be triggered by human agents, or through the interior logic 
of computation. In these examples, unfolding was driven by the computational logic 
itself.  
Such unfolding incidents are different from participants’ routine encounters with 
Amazon’s recommendation engines and other mundane appearances of surveillance, as 
one participant summarises:  
[6, 30] “Yeah it’s difficult to really figure out how it all works. I mean yes, Amazon and stuff and 
also maybe the whole targeted ads thing, you kinda know, and it does not surprise you. 
Like you see it and its 'ah ok, here we go again'. You know it and you just expect it. But 
then sometimes you figure out that you are being tracked in a way that you did not think 
of, and that is really eye-opening then.” 
Routine encounters with surveillance already are part of people’s repertoire of knowledge 
and reconfirm their understanding of computational surveillance. While people may see 
surveillance as a risk, routine encounters provide certainty that they still know, at least in 
part, how surveillance operates. In contrast, unfolding events create uncertainty because 
they remind people how little they know, and how vast and complex the web of 
surveillance is. The next section explores the unease that unfolding events create in more 
detail.  
6.3.2. Unfolding Events and Uncertainty 
Unfolding events unexpectedly foreground issues of surveillance into consciousness. 
Whereas routine encounters with surveillance such as Amazon recommendations are part 
of a stable experiential horizon that lacks news value, unfolding events unveil previously 
unknown instances, aspects, or processes of computational surveillance. Rebecca’s 
experience, who also observed the integration between newspaper Bild and Facebook, 
stands for the feeling of surprise and shock that participants regularly report. The student 
who had moved to Erfurt earlier in the year, said: 
[6, 31] “My jaw dropped. Really crass. You don’t suspect a thing and then bang – you realise 
you are being monitored, everything is controlled and maybe has been all the time…and 
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you had zero idea and suddenly realise ‘this is how it works’. I do not have the technical 
know-how, but just like this, it is eye-opening, I’d say.” [DK: translation from German] 
Similarly, when Anna from Erfurt reflected on the same incident, she highlighted a sense 
of disillusionment: 
[6, 32] “The facade has collapsed so to speak.” [DK: translation from German] 
Both Rebecca and Anna were unprepared. They did not expect an ordinary situation to 
turn into an encounter with surveillance. Based on attitudes, beliefs and everyday 
practices, they had a set of fixed, sedimented expectations associated with the Bild 
website. I call these ‘contextual expectations’. Surveillance was not part of them. Through 
an unfolding event, their contextual expectations collapsed as reality suddenly emerged 
as more layered and complex than they had assumed.  
Participants struggle to deal with these revisions of reality, as Ian from London expresses: 
[6, 33] “[…] actually, sometimes you run into a situation where you think, fuck, I did not see that 
coming. And that kinda fucks you up a bit. Like especially where you don't expect it. I 
mean, that some dodgy site tracks you, ok, but when I then went to the Guardian, I saw 
they had the same ads. So I was, ‘oh come on', I thought that well, a more, how to say, 
‘quality' newspaper does not do that. But that's it nowadays; I guess they all need money 
probably, so you cannot expect any higher principles. But still…it’s not the same, like I 
am not sure if this sounds stupid, but I was disappointed in a way.” 
Ian’s account reflects a deep sense of uncertainty. In his interview, he portrayed himself 
as computer literate and proficiently spoke about surveillance risks. But he admits that 
his own confidence is undermined when surveillance emerges in unanticipated ways and 
contexts, exposing the fallibility of individual assumptions and calling into question 
personal judgement. James, whom I introduced earlier, adds to this sense of betrayed 
expectations. He feels like living in  
[6, 34] “[…] a constant beta” 
where certainties about how surveillance operates are only temporal, incomplete and 
fallible. Martin adds to this. As unfolding incidents occur time and again, he feels that his 
confidence in his own knowledge is being undermined. He cannot trust himself:  
[6, 35] “I have come to think that I know quite a lot and that I can see the dangers pretty well. 
But once in a while, there is a moment where you realise ok now I realised this. But this 
also means that I knew less than I thought.” 
These accounts echo a language of risk society and late modernity. They erode fragile 
certainties and transform knowledge about computational surveillance into a reality ‘until 
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further notice’ (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991) that can change, or entirely collapse at any 
time.  
6.3.3. Unfolding New Understanding 
Despite the uncertainty generated by unfolding events, participants welcome them as rare, 
direct connections between human senses and the world of computation. Time and again, 
participants highlight how unfolding events foster knowledge about surveillance that is 
otherwise not available. Paula was another German participant who noticed the use of a 
Facebook plugin on a newspaper website and remarked: 
[6, 36] “You see directly where you are at, you realise how they really implement it. It is just much 
more concrete than the usual waffle that you are being tracked on the internet.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Unfolding events convert an abstract awareness about surveillance into a direct, tangible 
experience.  
Often, surveillance reveals itself through these unfolding events in ways that could not be 
anticipated. Ann-Kathrin remarks: 
[6, 37] “As in the case of the Bild story, you always learn something. I mean, I could not have 
figured out how this works, as a normal person. And that it happens in the first place. You 
need to see it with your own eyes. In that sense – yes, I would say really not good what’s 
happening there and also shocking, but then again also good because you then know, 
what is going on there and probably also elsewhere. In that sense, I learned something 
again.” [DK: translation from German] 
Ann-Kathrin, who references the same incident as Paula, highlights the value of 
individual, direct experience of surveillance as a source of knowledge. Her language 
illustrates that a divide between ‘normal' people or lay actors, and those agents 
responsible for surveillance, is suspended through unfolding events. She adopts a visual 
language that references the importance of human senses in perceiving and understanding 
surveillance, and specifically her personal experience through her own human senses. 
This emphasises the personal experience as a source of knowledge of surveillance in the 
context of exosomatic organs, but also towards explainers stemming from public 
discourse. Her statement also reflects the contradictory nature of unfolding events 
characterised by the dual process of knowledge erosion and knowledge accumulation.  
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Also Mike found merits in the shock that Gmail and YouTube were jointly spying on him. 
Following his story, we talked about the personal consequences he drew from that 
particular incident:  
[6, 38] “It was a complete surprise really. But then I thought, it is not so bad really. Um, I mean, 
they would have sold my data anyways probably, so I guess I was lucky in a way that 
they made it so obvious you know. It was right there for everyone to see what they are up 
to. You didn’t need read about it somewhere, like ‘Facebook scandal’, or this is in the 
news also. It was right there when I logged on.” 
In our conversations, many participants acknowledged that talk about surveillance is part 
of public discourse, but feel that they learn more about how surveillance operates when 
they experience it directly. Although Paula, Ann-Kathrin and Mike are critical of 
surveillance, they favour actually experiencing the process of surveillance over it going 
on unnoticed. Since they cannot escape surveillance, feeling its gaze is preferable to an 
abstract paranoia. Such a view on surveillance is very different from surveillance 
portrayed for instance in Foucault’s panopticon where the process itself constrains and 
limits people through coercion. Here, being under the gaze itself, not just its 
consequences, is a negative experience. In post-disciplinary, computational surveillance, 
the very absence of experienced exposure obstructs knowledge about surveillance and 
contributes to its negative perception.  
6.3.4. Limits of Unfolding  
Knowledge gained through unfolding events is bittersweet. It does not happen on 
participants’ own terms but is dictated by the pattern of unfolding itself. Like others, 
Simona has experienced instances of unfolding. Simona is a 26-year-old business analyst 
based in London, who recounted how she participated in a wine tasting event that her 
company was hosting for clients. As part of the event, participants were supposed to guess 
the price of the wines tasted. Simona wanted to cheat a little:  
[6, 39] “So I googled it. Just type in the name of the bottle and a couple websites came up. But 
when I clicked it, there was this popup, or like block from Vodafone. You don't have 
access; please call this and this number to verify your age.” 
For Simona the conclusion was apparent – Vodafone was tracking her entire mobile web 
traffic. The company’s monitoring was sophisticated enough to determine that Simona 
was on an alcohol-related website. Probed about whether she thinks this event helped her 
to be more proficient about surveillance risks, Simona resumed: 
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[6, 40] “So yeah, this is how I figured out I was being tracked all along probably. But to answer 
your question, do I think I know more about this stuff now? Well, not really. I mean I just 
happened to be in a situation where I was looking for wine. I’m not a wine drinker 
generally, so the chances...the chances, like the likelihood, I mean I normally would never 
have found out!” 
Ann-Kathrin, who merits the knowledge gained through the Bild incident, is also worried 
that she is dependent on the forces of surveillance unveiling themselves. After she had 
discussed how she stumbled across the Bild incident, we talked about whether she finds 
such moments useful in learning more about surveillance in her daily life:  
[6, 41] “I would also say, it is difficult to influence what will be uncovered and how. And if it will 
be uncovered at all. In that sense, I would not rely on it.” [DK: translation from German] 
Unfolding incidents are neither finite nor structured, but piecemeal and haphazard. They 
are inserted serendipitously in participants’ experience of everyday life and do not form 
part of a linear trajectory towards a more comprehensive understanding of surveillance. 
Which instances, or in which contexts surveillance is unfolded, remains outside people’s 
control at the mercy of computation itself. While unfolding events show that human 
agents can obtain access to the interior logic of computation in principle, they are merely 
scraps of evidence.  
Unfolding incidents also have to be recognised as such. During the fieldwork for this 
study, eight participants did not broach the issue of unfolding at all. During my fieldwork 
in Germany, after the interview was formally concluded, some participants were keen to 
hear what others had said to compare their own experiences and assessments about living 
with surveillance. I asked two participants, which had not mentioned unfolding events, 
whether they had heard about the Bild and Facebook integration that so many others had 
referenced. Both declined although they were both Facebook users and readers of the 
online newspaper in question. I have argued above that unfolding events are commonly 
initiated through the interior logic of computation. But they only occur when the overspill 
of computational surveillance into specific human experience actually takes place. 
Unfolding is an interactive process that requires people to recognise, decode and interpret 
them. Knowledge about surveillance fostered through unfolding events hence does not 
systematically suspend a power differential between human and computational agents. Its 
logic of appearance – driven by computation - reaffirms a hierarchy of power in agenda 
setting between computational surveillance and human agents. As the ability to recognise 
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unfolding incidents varies between participants, they also create a hierarchy of power 
between different human agents.  
6.3.5. Engineering Unfolding  
The unfolding events described so far were chance encounters: unsystematic, 
unpredictable, and triggered by the logic of computation instead of human agents. 
Although unfolding events temporarily suspend divides between interface and 
infrastructure, their haphazard nature limits participants’ ability to actively construct 
knowledge about computational surveillance. In this section, I demonstrate participants’ 
attempts to reverse the dynamics of unfolding by making computational surveillance 
appear on their own terms.  
Richard, a 24-year-old financial advisor from London, considers himself ‘a bit of a geek’. 
In his passion for technology, he does not see his web browser as a static interface through 
which he accesses the internet, but as a tool that can be customised. For Richard, this 
applies particularly to Mozilla Firefox, his browser of choice. Richard is an avid user of 
plug-ins, sets of software components that add functionality to the browser. For him, plug-
ins are a remedy for the daily nuisances of pop-up windows, surreptitious advertising and 
pervasive surveillance. During his interview, we had just completed a think-aloud 
protocol, Richard left the LinkedIn website on which he was dwelling and introduced 
Ghostery, his most cherished plug-in. He explained how Ghostery blocks a website from 
sending information about him to advertising companies. With a few clicks, Richard 
showed me what Ghostery was capable of: Whenever he accessed a new website, a pop-
up window appeared, listing all those companies which are extracting his personal 
information from a particular website. Richard describes his discovery of Ghostery as 
revelatory: 
[6, 42] “At first I was really excited because I could see what was really going on. I mean there 
is a lot in the news and the whole privacy debate that is going on now but to be honest…I 
don't know. I kinda felt I only really got it with Ghostery. The news just go on about this, 
but here i’s this company, this company, and you have the entire list. That's brilliant really. 
I didn't, umm don't necessarily know them, and I guess they are pretty much unknown to 
anyone. So I googled them, and they have websites and everything, like normal 
companies. I guess once you know about them, they are pretty open about what they do.” 
Richard’s use of Ghostery is a practice of discovery in which exosomatic organs and 
unfolding conflate. In its basic function of keeping companies at bay, Ghostery substitutes 
for the human senses like exosomatic organs discussed previously. However, Richard 
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does not merely delegate vigilance to technological tools that act on his own behalf. He 
also uses Ghostery to systematically trigger unfolding events.  
For Richard, Ghostery reveals computational surveillance in three ways. Firstly, it 
confirms and expands his awareness of the fact that websites send user information on to 
other parties. Thereby, it makes the data flows of the advertising and data-mining 
industries tangible. Secondly, it lists the names of institutional, computational actors 
previously hidden from access, giving anonymous computational agents that act on him 
a face. Lastly, the unfolding through Ghostery allows Richard to continue unmasking 
surveillance himself. Richard showed particular enthusiasm that with the help of 
Ghostery, he had discovered the websites of some of the companies behind online 
surveillance. He felt as if he was entering a hidden world: 
[6, 43] “It was pretty freaky. Like not Google and the kind of companies you know, but unknown 
companies really. All neat websites and you could see that what they are doing was data 
mining, and they had charts where they showed like what people prefer to shop and stuff. 
I was really like woah.” 
However, while his use of Ghostery enabled Richard to take control of the process of 
unfolding, after an initial period of discovery and excitement, he disabled it: 
[6, 44] “Seeing this pop-up all the time about who tracks you…it was just getting boring after a 
while. It was always the same companies and I kind of thought; I don't really gain anything 
from this. Like, don't get me wrong, I really think we all should learn more…know more 
about this whole privacy thing and how it works, but it was just getting annoying and not 
leading anywhere. So I just have it [DK: Ghostery] running in the background nowadays.” 
After a while, Ghostery was not leading to new discoveries, its ability to generate 
unfolding of surveillance had stalled. New discoveries had become mundane, and 
Ghostery did not allow him to further his knowledge about surveillance beyond its own 
technological affordances. Similarly, Josephine from Erfurt has Norton, an Anti-Virus 
software, installed on her computer. Her dad advised her to do so. This software acts like 
an exosomatic organ, keeping spyware at bay. But it also features a pop-up window that 
notifies Josephine whenever surveillance takes place, allowing her a glimpse into the 
mechanisms of computation. However, Josephine admitted that she intended to deactivate 
the pop-up window: after a while, it did not yield any meaningful insight and was just 
bothering her.  
Software tools offer participants a systematic, albeit limited way of taking the unfolding 
of surveillance into their own hands. But they are not the only way. Everyday practice of 
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being online is interspersed with moments in which people try to tease out the logic of 
computation to the interface of their screen. Enrico sometimes stops catching up with his 
friends' lives on Facebook and directs his focus to Facebook itself in order to explore how 
it works. He clicks ‘like’ on random posts, repeatedly accesses a friend’s profile and 
watches what happens. A few days later, he finds the results of his clicks: 
recommendations that link back to the posts he liked or a friend's profile he repeatedly 
accessed now featuring more prominently in his newsfeed than usual. 
[6, 45] “Mostly at night, like when I have nothing else to do, I just mess about a bit. It’s just, I got 
this feeling how Facebook works and want to test it.” [DK: translation from German] 
Targeted clicks on the interface allow Enrico to infer how Facebook computes his inputs. 
While he admits that his approach is ‘not perfect’, acknowledging the complexity of 
computation, it casts a window into an otherwise alien world on his own initiative. 
Occasionally, he reads about changes to Facebook’s newsfeed and adjustments to its 
algorithm. Enrico struggled to explain what algorithms really are when I asked him, but 
he knows that they change how Facebook orders his experience. While he does not follow 
a rigid regime of immediately testing each change he that reads about, he uses these 
instances as opportunities to repeat his ‘test’. They give him a sense of comfort. As he 
told me, to date, none of these apparent changes had altered the fundamental way that 
Facebook organises his experience – he still feels in touch with at least the basic premises 
that underpin Facebook’s logic.  
Similar attempts feature in other participants’ stories. Usually, people decide to probe into 
a computational logic based on a news story, or an unfolding incident that they previously 
encountered. For instance, Ann-Kathrin noticed that Google shows advertising next to its 
search results that do not relate to the particular search term she had just entered. She 
suspected that Google was getting information from her activities on other websites and 
wanted to put the search engine to the test. She surfed the web and after a while, returned 
to Google, entered a search term and monitored which ads came up. This way, she 
confirmed her suspicion that Google had been tracking her all along, not merely on its 
own website. Ann-Kathrin used a set of calculated acts to expose at least a part of 
Google’s modus operandi. Yet such investigative practices often are not standalone 
quests to further knowledge about surveillance. They are embedded in a more complex 
interactional relationship between human and computational actors. Specifically, they are 
a prerequisite for participants’ practices of acting towards surveillance to influence 
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computational inferences about them. In these instances, participants take matters of 
unfolding into their own hands. Unfolding is part of establishing a social situation in 
Goffman’s sense which allows participants’ to define their interlocutors and anticipate 
their courses of action. The last empirical chapter in this thesis is dedicated to the structure 
of interaction and will shed light on this wider role of unfolding incidents in greater detail.  
6.3.6. Synthesis: A Landscape of Unfolding  
Unfolding events stand for the unlikely appearance of a computational logic in the domain 
of human experience on the interface of the screen. Conceptually, they are modulations 
in the cognisphere that Hayles (2006) has described, where human agents only have 
access to a fraction of the cognitive systems expressed through computational data flows. 
Participants encounter a range of different unfolding events, either triggered by the logic 
of computation or generated by themselves through software or targeted acts that tease 
out the computational logic. Unfolding events are ambiguous in their consequences. 
While they help to advance knowledge about computational surveillance, they also 
shatter established certainties and cause participants to revisit the status quo of their 
knowledge about the social world. Against the available conditions of possibility set by 
the ever-rational and reflexive nature of computation and its pervasive invisibility, 
people’s attempts to understand computational agents can be considered as restorative 
acts. These are acts that seek to repair the ability to generate knowledge about 
computational surveillance and the social world it affects against all odds. In Berger and 
Luckmann’s ([1966] 1991) parlance, through unfolding events, participants uncover 
discrepant worlds that are separate from the world of common-sense that is shared 
between human agents. These discrepant worlds become – at least in part and for a 
moment in time – tangible and open to scrutiny. Bringing together Berger and 
Luckmann’s concepts with the notion of computed sociality (Kallinikos & Tempini 2014) 
and Alaimo’s (2014) work on the reassembling of consumers shows empirically that 
through such unfolding events participants are presented with a reality that they may have 
been complicit in creating, for instance through ‘likes’ on SNS or Amazon purchases, but 
which they were not aware had congealed into institutionalised social facts. Such acts of 
unfolding are not an end in itself. As narratives about engineering unfolding have 
demonstrated, knowledge about surveillance is a precondition for the ability to 
renegotiate meaning within computed sociality. Knowledge about computational agents 
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through restorative acts thus are embedded in, and enable wider relations between human 
and computational agents.  
6.4. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter had two objectives. In a first step, it documented the general conditions under 
which the construction of knowledge about computational surveillance takes place. It 
then secondly explored specific modes of generating knowledge under these conditions.  
Living in a computed world coincides with the loss of acquiring systematic understanding 
about it. People realise that a computational logic constructs meaning, also on the basis 
of their acts, but outside of their symbolic universe. This changes the foundations for the 
social construction of reality that Berger and Luckmann ([1966] 1991) have articulated. 
It also demonstrates that the computational rendition of reality (Kallinikos 2009) is not 
an abstract concept, but that at least its existence is part of the experiential world. In 
everyday experience, people get reminded that the rules and mechanisms by which 
computation operates differ from their own ways and abilities of making sense of the 
world. Awareness about the computational rendition of reality also permits people to 
make inferences about it. They portray computational agents as rational and reflexive and 
impose the same principles upon themselves in order to keep up with computational 
occurrences and ways of working. At the same time, computation operates in an invisible 
domain, and people connect the ability to perceive a phenomenon through their human 
senses with the ability to understand it. These factors impinge on people’s self-
understanding as agents in control of the world around them. They demonstrate a divide 
between their inherent perceptual, cognitive and analytical capabilities on the one hand 
and the requirements of navigating a computed world on the other. This environment 
constitutes a default of conditions of possibility that problematises knowledge about 
computational surveillance, and against which further attempts to foster understanding 
are positioned.  
Within these conditions of possibility, several modes of generating knowledge about 
surveillance nevertheless emerge. Feeling resigned about the lack of access to a 
computational logic, people outsource the need for knowledge to software tools. These 
tools do not enable them to perceive and understand surveillance, but operate 
autonomously in lieu of people themselves, eliminating the need for knowing about 
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surveillance. Yet serendipitously, computation surfaces by virtue of its own logic in 
unfolding events, where it lays bare aspects of its modus operandi on the interface of the 
screen. In order to reclaim control, people also look at ways to provoke, and tease out a 
computational logic – either through software or through manual interventions. Unfolding 
events are restorative acts that overcome the otherwise limited conditions of possibility. 
By restoring the ability to understand surveillance, people build a foundation for much a 
much wider set of relations with computational agents.  
The themes discussed in this chapter have shown that knowledge about computational 
surveillance is fluid. In a general environment of metaphorical darkness, the contours and 
shadows of computational surveillance emerge every now and then, revealing a glimpse 
into its logic, confirming or dismantling existing knowledge in every new instance. 
Living in a computed world, people are in a perpetual state of coming to consciousness, 
where a succession of unfolding events reveals more information, momentarily 
sharpening people's senses, without changing the general feeling of being inadequate, 
lagging behind, chasing ephemeral computational agents. The next two chapters further 
elaborate on the themes established here. They document how participants amongst their 
peers collaboratively develop everyday practices that transcend the limits of unfolding 
experiences, and how they directly interact with computational agents to negotiate 
consensual interpretations of reality.  
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 Chapter Seven: Collaborative Inquiries and the 
Troubled Nature of Common Sense  
A pessimistic reading of the previous chapter may encourage a dystopian view of people 
in a computed world as lone agents deprived of systematic opportunities to reveal 
instances of computational surveillance, to obtain knowledge about its workings, 
purposes and consequences. Yet this chapter documents that people’s encounters stand in 
a wider context that complicate and expand their relationship towards computational 
surveillance. People’s experiences of such surveillance are firmly embedded in public 
interaction and routine part of the social construction of knowledge through which people 
intersubjectively make sense of the world. The chapter builds on and extends the narrative 
developed in the previous chapter. So far, this narrative has explored the limits and 
affordances of knowledge in a computed world – its conditions of possibility – and how 
people deal with these conditions. In order to carve out the basic conditions of knowledge 
construction, it conceptualised people as lone, individual agents. This had analytical 
reasons: people encounter computational surveillance on their screen, often in solitude, 
and it is their individual data that is being computed. The previous chapter focussed on 
the direct encounter with computational surveillance as it happens in a prototypical setting 
in front of the computer screen, in order to combine the immediate experience of 
computation with the domain of knowledge. The following analysis in this chapter adds 
a wider social context.  
Drawing on Berger and Luckmann’s ([1966] 1991) social construction of reality, this 
chapter argues that a collective inquiry into the workings of computational surveillance 
is already taking place. At the centre of the chapter are the concepts of objective reality 
and intersubjectivity. To reiterate, objective reality in Berger and Luckmann’s sense 
stands for the undisputed conditions under which people live. It is the taken-for-granted 
world that appears set in stone, and natural. Society is a man-made product and thus 
always constructed. But the constructed character wanes over time as institutions solidify 
and become abstracted from the forces that created them. In the previous theoretical 
discussion in Chapter Three, I have reformulated Berger and Luckmann’s framework. 
Specifically, I have argued that the rise of computation as a social force means that social 
order is not merely a human product, but co-constituted by computational forces, which 
operate in and through objective reality. People possess a common-sense knowledge 
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about the world, but this knowledge is increasingly under siege due to the obstacles in 
understanding computation. Based on this reformulation, this chapter explores how 
people construct and reconstruct common-sense knowledge about the computational 
aspects of objective reality. For Berger and Luckmann, common-sense knowledge is 
intersubjective because it is shared between and mutually constituted by people. This 
chapter hence places particular emphasis on the complexities of the intersubjective 
understanding of computational surveillance. By documenting the collective inquiry into 
computation through my reformulation of Berger and Luckmann, I extend the notion of 
computed sociality (Kallinikos & Tempini 2014). While sociality is rendered by 
computation, this chapter shows that parallel processes of social construction between 
human agents not only remain relevant, but change in light of computational dynamics. 
It also highlights that reflection on computation is a manifestation and integral part of 
computed sociality itself.  
Throughout the chapter, I will make references to more detailed concepts from Berger 
and Luckmann’s catalogue to illustrate how such common-sense knowledge operates in 
practice, and how its modalities differ from the pre-computational world that Berger and 
Luckmann have described. Instead of outlining these concepts at the outset of the chapter, 
I will introduce them progressively in my argument in order to closer embed them into 
the empirical experience narrated by participants. I will also return to concepts that I have 
introduced to augment and extend Berger and Luckmann’s theory, such as the notion of 
mediatisation (Hepp 2013). 
The chapter sets out by delineating a number of communicative arenas in which 
participants jointly probe into computational surveillance – news media, social 
networking sites (SNS) and face-to-face interaction. These arenas introduce the basic 
patterns of the social construction of knowledge. The next section problematises the 
construction of knowledge within these arenas. It outlines that common-sense knowledge 
about computational surveillance is inherently unstable, fragmented and does not 
translate into a coherent picture of reality, leading people to deploy tactics of querying 
and imagining a social consensus in which they feel safe to participate. The final section 
explores how people intersubjectively maintain knowledge about computational 
surveillance despite its instability, and how they create a sense of social coherence that 
nurtures and solidifies their view of computational reality.  
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7.1. Talking about Computational Surveillance 
In Meckel’s book Next (2011), the protagonist is a personified algorithm who lets the 
reader in on its personal view of the world and how it continuously enmeshes people into 
an algorithmic web of dependency. The algorithm narrates the story from the inside, a 
perspective that human agents struggle to obtain. Meckel chose a science-fiction format 
over an academic publication in order to reach a non-expert audience, arguing that the 
social consequences of computation are largely absent from the public agenda (Meckel, 
interviewed in Geyer & Haas 2011). Meckel’s personified algorithm joins a growing body 
of popular literature devoted to uncovering the hidden mechanics of computation, such 
as The Filter Bubble (Pariser 2011) or Super Crunchers (Ayres 2007), whose promise to 
reveal what is usually invisible is already conveyed in their respective subtitles; What the 
Internet Is Hiding From You and How Anything Can Be Predicted. Surveillance has more 
widely long been a theme in popular culture (Lyon 2007), and Mathiesen (1997) proposes 
that analysing popular appearances of surveillance are a rough proxy to public 
knowledge. But the social thematisation of surveillance is much more widespread and, 
far from top-down, includes lateral interaction between people. This section outlines three 
communicative arenas in which the social construction of computational surveillance 
takes place: news media, social networking sites (SNS) and face-to-face interaction. I 
understand communicative arenas as conceptually delineated and generalisable domains 
in which participants are exposed to talk about surveillance, or routinely probe into 
surveillance through interaction with others. My interest is not in these arenas per se. 
Rather, by describing them through several of Berger and Luckmann’s concepts, they 
help outline a basic structure of social knowledge construction about surveillance. 
7.1.1. Surveillance in the News 
Although Sarah, a 21-year-old German linguistics student, struggles to grasp surveillance, 
she is surrounded by its representations. Every day, she checks the news online and 
occasionally watches the 8 o’clock news. Mentions of surveillance are nearly as 
commonplace as political affairs, stock prices or sports results. Exposure to debating 
surveillance is not a choice but a necessary consequence of engaging, even passively, in 
the wider public sphere: 
[7, 01] “You read about it sort of every day now, in the media. There’s always, like recently with 
StudiVZ, there’s always a data scandal where someone stole some data. You kinda can’t 
escape it these days.” [DK: translation from German] 
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This abundance of information about surveillance is widely echoed by participants. Their 
stories usually open with expressions such as ‘every day’, or ‘nearly every time I check 
the news’ to underscore the frequency of media reports about surveillance. As if words 
were not enough to capture this omnipresence, Stefan, who attends university in a 
different city than Sarah, puts it onomatopoetically.  
[7, 02] “It is really like bang bang bang nowadays, like a bombardment. There is always 
something.” [DK: translation from German] 
Such media reports are not just reminders of the presence of surveillance or an inventory 
of its forms. Frequently, they offer interpretations and explanations of the inner workings 
of surveillance. Annegret, who studies with Sarah, recounts how the way Google operates 
is being unravelled in news media explainers: 
[7, 03] “This one time, Google was in the news and it was mentioned again that they collect user 
data, and how that works if you have entered your information, how they store it and how 
it is used for advertising, although this is not the first time I had heard about it.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Consider also Dave again, the fitness coach from Erfurt. When we met at the gym’s bar, 
our conversation quickly steered towards Google Street View. Dave seemed to be 
intrigued by the thought of Google launching the service in Germany imminently and 
admitted that he followed the news closely. He pulled out his smartphone and while we 
talked, tried to search for new articles on Google Street View as if to underscore his 
excitement. Still, he admitted, many questions about Street View remained unanswered. 
Which cities were to be photographed next? What about his hometown, Erfurt? And how 
could people blur their private residences on Google once they had been photographed? 
The media offered Dave a glimpse into how Google operates:  
[7, 04] “So recently I watched NDR and there was a documentary on about dangers on the 
internet, including Google Street View and pixelated houses. What was really good was 
that you then knew, I see, this is how it all works, this and this person has the data and 
they are being used in this way. […] This was not just about when Street View launches, 
but about background information, what as a normal guy, I would not necessarily know 
yet.” [DK: translation from German] 
Dave experienced an instance of unfolding driven by public discourse. The media 
provided him with ‘behind the scenes’ access to surveillance and shed light on its 
otherwise imperceptible processes and aims.  
Unfolding events demand a high cognitive effort for individual actors to be identified as 
such and for drawing appropriate conclusions. On the rare instances that they happen, 
  
178 
participants are left at their own device to discover and contextualise them. In contrast, 
the media provide a constant stream of facts about surveillance, converting unlikely into 
more common encounters. These instances of social unfolding take over the labour of 
discovery and offer ready-made interpretations of surveillance. Participants’ personal and 
immediate experiences with surveillance are thus contextualised in a wider, more 
systematic body of knowledge that is socially constructed. Another participant, Lars from 
Germany, concludes: 
[7, 05] “[…] I also think it’s cool, I wouldn’t be able to find out all of this by myself, what is going 
on there. In that sense it is really helpful actually. I check Spiegel and they write about 
what Facebook does with my data. Actually, if I think about it, most of the stuff I know 
about Facebook is not from the terms of use or so. That is so woolly and one does not 
read it. And it is pretty technical. So a large part I know is from the media, because it is 
such a huge topic nowadays.” [DK: translation from German] 
This topicality in the media that Lars describes is not confined to introspections into the 
workings of surveillance and templates for interpretation. Dave highlights: 
[7, 06] “When I am on Bild or Spiegel.de, then you see an article or at least an advice box every 
couple of days, such as ‚Top 10 tricks to protect your profile’, ‚How to protect yourself’, 
and also on TV sometimes. Well I pretty much know all these tricks by now, but there 
could always be something new. I do tend to click in the end.” [DK: translation from 
German] 
Social unfolding events are joined by recommendations on how to act towards 
surveillance. While Dave just mentions what can be done, other participants put the 
media’s advice to practice. When I met with Stefan, a biology student, I noticed pop-up 
windows and warnings that came up every time he loaded a new website. Stefan has a 
series of privacy tools installed on his computer, regularly clears his browser cache and 
revisits his Facebook privacy settings time and again. These are all suggestions he 
discovered in the media:  
[7, 07] “They really hammer it in, also the media, you always get some kind of advice. And after 
a while, you know the rules […] you know what you are supposed to do.” [DK: translation 
from German] 
Stefan has internalised so-called ‘recipe knowledge’, defined as “pragmatic competence 
in routine performances” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991: 56). These are shorthands 
for thinking about and acting towards surveillance which are produced and disseminated 
through the media. Stefan embraces these shorthands without much second thought. Just 
like everyday life is filled with manners, conventions and rules from the arrangement of 
cutlery at the dinner table over stopping at a red traffic light to following a netiquette in 
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online chat rooms, so does Stefan provide evidence that dealing with surveillance is 
normatively coded.  
The media also open a social context about surveillance to participants. Frank stresses: 
[7, 08] “Through this [DK: the media], you can see how the others see it and how you should see 
it yourself.” [DK: translation from German] 
For Frank, social unfolding directly connects to his personal encounters with surveillance. 
In his personal encounters, alone in front of his screen, Frank tried to interpret them and 
connect the dots. But his reasoning stood unverified. Through media stories on 
surveillance, Frank can infer what those around him know about surveillance. They allow 
him to assume a social consensus on how surveillance works and adjust his own 
interpretation. In his mind, what the media say about surveillance is socially endorsed. 
Once a fact has been published, a news report has been aired, he considers it as 
intersubjective consensus. While other participants do not accept media reports 
uncritically, such reports nevertheless serve as indicators for a potential social consensus 
against which participants assess their own experience. The media then convey modalities 
for thinking about and acting towards surveillance. Often, these are not suggestions for 
optional consideration, but express ‘how things really are’ and ‘how it’s done’. Books, 
like Meckel’s personified algorithm, do not feature in participants’ accounts. Instead, the 
media help shape people's knowledge about surveillance through a stream of news, small 
stories and revelations within the flow of everyday life. 
7.1.2. Probing Surveillance in Social Media 
Social networking sites (SNS) are considered amongst the most fervent collectors of 
personal information by participants, yet they also offer a forum for exchange and inquiry 
about surveillance. The social construction of knowledge on these sites is complex, and 
the following section distinguishes several modes through which participants engage in 
this communicative arena.  
 Collaborative Practices and Activism 
Throughout their interviews, participants make reference to Facebook and StudiVZ as 
contexts where they discuss surveillance. In order to conceptually delineate SNS as a 
communicative arena versus the media, the experience of Luise from Germany provides 
a starting point. Her experience summarises core features of SNS as a communicative 
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arena that may otherwise only be grasped by looking at several examples in conjunction. 
At the same time, the formal group setting in which Luise’s experience takes place is 
atypical for participants’ experiences. Her example cautions against misconstruing 
surveillance talk in SNS as an expression of organised activism.  
A while ago, Luise had joined a Facebook user group protesting against a looming change 
in Facebook’s privacy policy:  
[7, 09] “I think people were like ‘yes, Facebook is selling your data’, ‘attention, fight back!’, ‘sign 
here and do this and do that because your data is being sold and don’t play along 
anymore’ and stuff. And over time, more and more stuff came together; one person said 
something and another one added something else.” [DK: translation from German] 
Luise witnessed a gradual process of constructing knowledge about Facebook through 
the input of many other Facebook users. Disparate hypotheses, ideas, suggestions and 
comments amassed and ultimately congealed into social consensus knowledge. Step by 
step, through input from various peers, her understanding of how surveillance operates 
extended and solidified:  
[7, 10] “It was actually really cool. You could really see how this was growing because everyone 
knew something and posted links and some were really knowledgeable and after a while 
it all came together. And as I said, everything on Facebook!” [DK: translation from 
German] 
Luise’s example highlights a fundamental characteristic of how knowledge about 
surveillance is constructed in the context of SNS, and this it differs from other mediatised 
debates. As an editorial environment, the media unveil processes, establish facts and offer 
interpretations of surveillance in a top-down way. Surveillance has already been analysed 
and contextualised. How others think about what the media say, whether they accept it as 
fact, or whether they have read or watched a news report about surveillance at all, is left 
for participants to speculate. In contrast, on SNS, knowledge of surveillance is peer-
produced through collaborative practices (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991). It also is 
contingent on outcome – as Luise highlights, it was ‘growing’ over time.38 
But as much as Luise’s example allows grasping focal characteristics of constructing 
knowledge of surveillance within SNS, it also prompts investigating its organisational 
                                                
38 This is not to say that media representations of computational surveillance, such as news articles, are 
ignored in the social construction of knowledge. In examples that will follow, links to news articles and 
other media artefacts that are shared on social networks often initiate a process of debate and inquiry into 
surveillance. However, these form part of a wider intersubjective process of discovery, discussion and 
inquiry that is driven by respondents and their peers.  
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form. The group she had joined was an institutionalised environment comprising of 
strangers that systematically inquired into surveillance. The group pursued a clear aim: it 
was protesting against Facebook’s policy changes. Reports of such groups are widespread 
among German participants. But while nearly all of them have observed one of their 
Facebook or StudiVZ friends ‘like’ such a group, UK participants did not mention them 
at all. Anna from Erfurt spots a trend in her newsfeed: 
[7, 11] “There are tons of these groups. In general, I think that people talk about privacy and 
surveillance a lot on Facebook. At least you get the impression because, well I have the 
impression that lately many have liked such groups, like ‘Facebook, return our data’ and 
stuff.” [DK: translation from German] 
Yet participants’ practices of constructing knowledge are not expressions of media 
activism. Numerous scholars have highlighted, discussed or contended the role of SNS 
as platforms for political mobilisation and activism, for instance in light of the Arab 
Spring or the US elections. (Morozov 2011). Others have dismissed SNS as a breeding 
ground for superficial, dead-end activism. Indeed, Luise’s behaviour could be considered 
‘slacktivism’; the ease with which people can associate in non-committal groups, or as 
‘clicktivism’; a fire-and-forget approach to activism where involvement in an issue begins 
and ends with a mouse click (Karpf 2010). Although participants find themselves in an 
everyday struggle with surveillance, they neither share a unified political stance towards 
surveillance nor are their acts - alone or in conjunction with others - decidedly political. 
There is no explicit, common political project for which they convene and cooperate, such 
as an “anti-corporate cyber-libertarian agenda” (Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010: 23). 
 Legitimising Inquiry 
While most participants do not engage with such groups beyond a click or acknowledging 
their pervasive existence, these are neither cases of superficial activism, nor are they 
trivial. They form part of a wider setting, an atmosphere of inquiry, that legitimises SNS 
as an arena in which the workings of surveillance are queried. For instance, Anna finds 
talking about surveillance with her friends ‘a bit geeky’ and Paula considers it ‘a bit too 
technical’. When Paula and I met for an interview over coffee, it was the first time that 
she was discussing this topic in the offline world. Yet on SNS, it is a different story. Paula 
says: 
[7, 12] “Well it [DK: surveillance] is a topic that is being discussed more frequently. I don't know; 
maybe I would not post anything about like cars or something niche. But this [DK: 
surveillance] works. Yes, it is a topic, and you always see stuff about it on Facebook for 
  
182 
instance if someone likes a post about the new privacy rules or so, this is why I would 
say: yes, you can talk about it.” [DK: translation from German] 
Facebook groups also document interaction between people on surveillance. The volume 
of posts and the number of members are clearly visible to anyone who visits the group 
page, assuring participants that talking about surveillance is a common activity. Yet, 
figuring out how surveillance exactly works usually does not take place in the confines 
of a formal group and associated ‘likes’, but elsewhere on SNS. Evidence can be found 
in participants’ newsfeeds and profile pages. For instance, when Tim invited me to have 
a look at his Facebook newsfeed, one of his friends had previously posted a link to an 
article that explained how Facebook was ‘stealing’ users’ personal data: 
[7, 13] “I guess he wants to tell us not to be too carefree - yeah, it’s good to know these things 
nowadays, people sometimes post stuff like this. It is pretty… when you compare it with 
the other crap that people are posting, I don’t know like so hung-over from last night… I 
rather read something like this because it actually is important in a way.” 
For Tim, this post was not unusual. He immediately contextualised and identified it as 
belonging to a wider, recurring theme of reminders and revelations of surveillance that 
pervade his newsfeed. Tim did not choose to inquire into how surveillance works at this 
particular moment in time. Although he finds the issue of surveillance important, he does 
not have a structured interest in probing into surveillance with a regular pattern. In his 
everyday life, inroads into the workings of surveillance emerge spontaneously as new 
artefacts on this Facebook newsfeed. These are not rare instances, random posts by 
cognoscenti users, who are ‘in the know’ about surveillance, but a recurring, familiar 
sight on the newsfeed by a diverse range of peers. Also Constanza, the Italian artist living 
in the UK, remembered that someone had shared an article on Facebook’s privacy settings 
not long ago. Eager to show me, she started scrolling through her newsfeed:  
[7, 14] “People post stuff about Facebook on… um…well…Facebook, it is funny really. So this 
is Rob, and he was the guy who posted this link a while ago, um let's see, is it still there? 
Yeah, Facebook does this and that and they don't let you control your data. That's 
basically what it says. There is always someone who shares something about that, so 
yeah, stuff like this regularly is in my newsfeed.” 
Like Constanza, participants regularly stumble across discussions about surveillance on 
their newsfeeds, making their presence as mundane as encountering a friend’s pictures 
from a recent holiday.  
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 Meaningful Reciprocity 
In the examples so far, participants have observed how others inquire into surveillance. 
Yet, they also take an active role, be it by responding to what others have posted, or by 
initiating a conversation about surveillance. Dave, the gym instructor, had previously 
posted a news article about Google Street View on his Facebook. He had added a 
comment, claiming there was ‘no escape’ from surveillance. Similarly, a few weeks 
before we had conducted our interview, James, the barista from London whom I have 
already introduced in the previous chapter, had commented on a friend’s Facebook post. 
His friend had shared a news article on data leaks. James excavated this post again during 
our interview: 
[7, 15] “He wrote this here [DK: participant points towards friends’ post] and I just said like I am 
being careful about what I share anyways.” 
Consider also Josephine again, the hairdresser and textile design student. She says about 
herself that she is ‘more or less average in terms of computer skills’. In her newsfeed, she 
had posted a video entitled ‘What facebook knows about you’.  
Figure 4: ‘What facebook knows about you’ Video 
 
Source: Screenshot from participant’s Facebook account. 
Josephine played the clip to me. It sheds light on Facebook’s data collection practices, 
visualises flows of personal data and explains what happen to all the collected user data. 
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Diagrams, lines, nodes and other symbols create a visual representation of the 
computational logic. Josephine chose to introduce her post with the statement ‘meine rede 
[sic]’, loosely translated as ‘as I keep telling you’. The video reflects what she had always 
suspected, but could not validate or express adequately.  
It is worthwhile dwelling a little longer on Josephine’s story because it allows exploring 
the intersubjective process of figuring out how surveillance works in greater detail. By 
posting the video on Facebook, Josephine did not just make others aware of surveillance. 
She also validated her interpretation of surveillance through her peers’ approval. Indeed, 
when she showed me the video, her post had already received several ‘likes’. These ‘likes’ 
helped establish, or at least make explicit an intersubjective consensus. Josephine now 
had tangible evidence that her friends shared her views on how Facebook operates, and 
that her post was worthwhile and relevant: 
[7, 16] “Well I mean, it is nothing special really, I did not make the video myself, it is more like 
‘yes, confirmation that the message is correct maybe, cool video’, something like that.” 
[DK: translation from German] 
Such feedback are acts of ‘meaningful reciprocity’ (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991) 
that consolidate knowledge between people. These acts may take other forms, such as a 
written comment below a post, an anecdote or a link with supporting evidence. For 
instance, Bashir had recently commented on a friend’s post. He navigated to his newsfeed 
to show me. His friend had issued a warning that Facebook had changed its terms of use, 
allegedly giving it extended rights for commercially exploiting users’ data. A discussion 
among friends ensued on how to counteract this. Bashir scrolled down to show me his 
response: 
[7, 17] “Ok here, I basically just said that all you can do basically is to delete your account, and 
then here this guy replied and posted a link to this article – shall I click on it now [DK: 
participant opened the link in a new browser window] and that explains it point by point 
basically.” 
Like Josephine and Bashir, participants are engaged in an intersubjective process to 
establish their own common-sense logic of surveillance. This reflects Berger and 
Luckmann’s claim that the logic of how an institution operates “[…] does not reside in 
institutions and their external functionalities, but in the way these are treated in reflection 
about them” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991:82).  
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SNS are an arena in which such reflections take place, where participants are routinely 
engaged in a collaborative process of constructing knowledge about surveillance. 
Generally, this process is unstructured: facts about how surveillance works appear 
surreptitiously, are produced ad hoc and in passing. Spontaneous discussions emerge out 
of posts, likes and links. They are fragmented and do not connect into a coherent whole - 
just as participants feel that their surveillance knowledge is perpetually incomplete, as the 
last chapter established, the interface of SNS does its part. It organises information into a 
linear stream, such as most prominently realised in technologies like Facebook or Twitter 
newsfeeds. In a continuous progression of new posts and likes, revelations about 
surveillance are embedded in a stream of fleeting moments, appearing and disappearing 
in the newsfeed, rather than archived and consolidated. Writing about privacy threats, 
Marichal (2012) sees an ‘architecture of disclosure’ built into Facebook that encourages 
users to reveal and disseminate information about themselves. But conversely, 
participants have created an architecture of inquiry on SNS. Through creative practices, 
be it sharing links, liking posts or commenting on what others have revealed on SNS, they 
use the technological affordances of SNS to probe into how surveillance works.  
7.1.3. Face-to-Face Interaction 
Surveillance on the internet is not virtual. Its consequences impact people’s material lives 
– both online and offline, as notions of ‘social sorting’ (Lyon 2003) and examples of 
offline repercussions based on online data (Meyer-Schönberger 2009) illustrate. But 
similarly, probing into surveillance is not just mediated by screens but a theme in face-
to-face interaction.  
Rebecca is a student in Erfurt, Germany. She is from a small town in Thuringia and 
commutes back home from university every weekend. Her boyfriend still lives there. 
When I interviewed Rebecca about surveillance encounters, she recalled a particular 
moment: 
[7, 18] “Facebook is also found via Google, as far as I know, and that is a bit scary. So my 
boyfriend googled himself and then there was immediately his photo and his name and 
... we thought it was a bit weird, so then we talked about it for a bit, about the whole data 
collection thing.” [DK: translation from German] 
Rebecca and her boyfriend both had existing ideas of their own about how Facebook 
profiles and Google search intersect. But they were confined to their subjective 
experience. United in front of the computer, they jointly encountered an unfolding 
  
186 
moment that foregrounded their ideas. The couple then thematised their previously 
isolated thoughts and in conversation probed deeper into how Google works. Yet in many 
cases, a specific, shared screen experience is not even involved. Christina, the business 
journalist from London I introduced in a previous chapter, mentioned how computational 
surveillance regularly turns centre stage in booze-fuelled nights out with friends: 
[7, 19] “Facebook is just a normal thing, you talk about it…like when you have nothing else to 
say, well not that it is boring as such, I mean more in a way that everyone has a say. You 
are with your mates, someone is really pissed or what whatever and jokes about 
Facebook, like ‘don’t put this on Facebook’, and then everyone weighs in and it turns into 
this whole discussion on privacy.” 
In Christina’s example, participants discuss their personal encounters and opinions with 
surveillance in an entirely different social setting. The friends share a joint implicit 
understanding about surveillance, as Christina’s remark to not ‘put this on Facebook’ 
shows. Conversations can get more technical than this, as James, whose is an avid user 
of the privacy tool Ghostery, explains. At a party, he encouraged his friends to give it a 
try: 
[7, 20] “We talked about the whole privacy thing. And then I said, here I use this tool, it’s really 
cool, check it out.” 
Like on SNS, participants do not gather face-to-face in a concerted effort to unmask and 
decode surveillance. Face-to-face conversations about how surveillance works are void 
of a political imperative or an a priori agenda. They happen serendipitously, interwoven 
in the flow of conversation that is part of everyday life. Just like in the case of SNS 
discussed before, these conversations are also acts of meaningful reciprocity. Face-to-
face conversations help participants to solidify their perceptions, hypotheses and worries 
about surveillance in an intersubjective consensus. 
7.1.4. Synthesis: the Conceptual Grid of Knowledge Production 
The social construction of knowledge about surveillance takes place in three 
communicative arenas; news media, SNS and everyday face-to-face interaction. These 
arenas are characterised by a number of focal concepts which have emerged in the 
analysis above. These concepts describe the basic structure of participants’ social 
construction of knowledge about surveillance. The media present shorthand knowledge 
for ‘how surveillance really works’ and ’how things are done’. On SNS and in face-to-
face interaction, participants probe into surveillance through collaborative practices. 
Knowledge of the workings of surveillance is contingent on an intersubjective consensus, 
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which is largely implicit in media representations and explicit in talking about 
surveillance with peers in the context of SNS or face-to-face interaction. Such consensus 
is often developed through acts of meaningful reciprocity. The role of these 
communicative arenas is indicative of emerging ‘cultures of mediatization’ (Hepp 2013) 
in which human agents’ experience and meaning-making of computational surveillance 
is embedded. Hepp highlights that  
“[…] it makes sense to treat media cultures as cultures of meditization. By this I 
mean that media cultures are cultures whose primary meaning resources are 
mediated through technical communications media, and which are ‘moulded’ by 
these processes in specifically different ways” (Hepp 2013: 70, original 
emphasis). 
Computation moulds people’ resources of meaning-making and generates meaning itself, 
as Chapter Three and Chapter Six have shown. However, recognising the agential forces 
of computation, people also construct meaning in reference to computation across all 
three communicative arenas I have outlined. They additionally use communication media 
(news media, SNS) as means to engage in processes of meaning-making in relation to 
these very media environments. The next section illustrates the practices associated with 
meaning-making in more detail and contextualises them through Berger and Luckmann’s 
concepts. 
7.2. The Troubled Common-Sense Reality of Surveillance 
Communicative arenas help people to construct and to reconstruct the reality of 
surveillance through common-sense knowledge. Usually, the common-sense world is 
stable and unproblematic. As Berger and Luckmann attest, “the world of everyday life 
proclaims itself” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991: 37) and challenges to these 
proclamations need to be deliberative acts. In principle, subjective experiences or external 
brokers of ideas, be they groups or individuals, can suggest “counter-definitions of 
reality” (ibid. [1966] 1991: 186). Yet, the authors concentrate on the successful 
construction of reality. The instability features as exceptional situations of crisis (Berger 
& Luckmann [1966] 1991) and as an outlook onto an increasingly complex world “in 
which discrepant worlds are generally available on a market basis” (ibid. [1966] 1991: 
192). As the following section will show, the case of surveillance is different. Situations 
of crisis are not scarce, but constitutive of the social construction of surveillance reality. 
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It is riddled with contradictions and beset with struggle, making a stable and all-
encompassing common-sense reality an unlikely state of affairs.  
7.2.1. The Thickness of Reality and its Experience as Construction 
When talking about the omnipresence of surveillance in the media today, some 
participants get reminiscent. Bemused and amazed, they pause and express their own 
bewilderment that figuring out how surveillance works has become part of their everyday 
life. Franzi, the physiotherapist form Aachen, says: 
[7, 21] “Wow, if I talk about this now, actually…well, two years ago or so, you did not hear much 
about it. It has gotten really crazy over time.” [DK: translation from German] 
Whereas Franzi is surprised by the proliferation of surveillance knowledge, others find it 
peculiar that a subject like surveillance has entered public discussion the first place. 
Stefan alludes to the ‘geeky’ nature of the subject, that already others highlighted. 
[7, 22] “Actually, the topic is pretty particular. Well, I don’t know, it is not rocket science, but pretty 
geeky nonetheless. Well, if it wasn’t for everyone being online nowadays, the internet is 
everyday now. I do not know how to say it. Well, it is really a pretty extreme subject, 
because it is so particular. Well I would rather think it is for computer freaks, but it is a 
topic for everyone still.” [DK: translation from German] 
Yet the pervasiveness of public debate does not mean that the knowledge about 
surveillance is finite or static, and therefore solid. Whereas reality ‘thickens’ over time 
(Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991), the reality of surveillance is far from reaching a 
solidified state. The reality of surveillance is emergent and fragmented. Josephine calls it 
a puzzle: 
[7, 23] “It is like a puzzle, because you have to piece everything together. Someone makes a 
post here, then here, and then you read something somewhere else. I think you have to 
piece it together over time, it comes more and more together and then you know more 
easily what the others think and how it works.” [DK: translation from German] 
The reality of surveillance has to be assembled, as Josephine’s ‘puzzle’ metaphor 
illustrates. Other participants use different terms, but their conclusions are similar. Lars 
reflected on how his knowledge of surveillance and its workings came about: 
[7, 24] “You just have to figure it out from the fact. You know the facts I’d say, from the media 
and stuff.” [DK: translation from German] 
This notion of assemblage inherent in participants’ accounts has wider implications. It 
suggests that reality does not appear as self-evident. Fundamentally, this lends a new 
meaning to the idea of a social construction of reality. Usually, people do not consider 
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their own reality as constructed. The construction of reality is an analytical concept 
employed by sociologists. But Josephine’s example changes this conceptual scope. The 
common-sense world of surveillance is perceived both as ‘real’, as well as constructed. 
The experience of construction is an intrinsic feature of the reality of surveillance. In 
particular, this is apparent in SNS as a communicative arena. Here, the construction of 
reality creates data about itself: on their newsfeed, in posts and comments, participants 
are witnesses of their own and their peers’ labour of construction. Alongside a given 
consensus about surveillance, they see its conceptual scaffold. This does not make it less 
‘real’. Yet, this scaffold is a reminder of the incompleteness and the fluid, rather than 
thick state of the reality of surveillance.  
In part, this assemblage in not a mere construction of reality, but a reconstruction. During 
my interviews, I learned time and again that participants position what they know about 
the workings of surveillance against a reference point: the world of surveillance from the 
inside perspective of computation. To use Berger and Luckmann’s term, the reality of 
computation is a “finite enclave of meaning” (ibid. [1966] 1991: 39). It denotes a socially 
segregated reality that has its own logic and principles. It makes sense in itself and for 
itself, yet is insulated from people’s experience. Participants believe that the unobscured 
truth about how surveillance operates is located within the logic of computation. 
Josephine’s metaphor of the ‘puzzle’ already alluded to an external reality outside the 
common-sense world: what she knows has to be pieced together into a whole which 
already exists elsewhere. Other participants are even more explicit. Lars, the former 
police officer I introduced earlier, sees Google and Facebook as ‘Datenkraken’, or data 
leeches. He thinks that these companies have plotted a surveillance architecture that no 
one else oversees. Figuring out how surveillance works means trying to leap into their 
world:  
[7, 25] “As far as I know by now, you somehow have to get closer to Facebook. Because only 
they now how everything works. And I think this is what people somehow try. Like that 
you reconstruct, try to comprehend.” [DK: translation from German] 
People’s common-sense world of surveillance is not self-referential, but also an 
approximation to computation as an enclave of meaning. Participants seek to ‘tear down 
the walls’ and integrate this world of computation into their common-sense world. 
Computed sociality (Kallinikos & Tempini 2014) then is not merely a new configuration 
of sociality that is rendered in the computational domain. Computational mechanisms of 
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meaning-making are joined by people’s efforts to consciously relate to them beyond being 
mere ‘dividuals’ in their calculation and to bring together enclaves of meaning into a 
common understanding. Yet, as much as participants try to reconstruct what goes on 
behind the scenes, their own reality always remains different. Apart from the lack of 
access to computation, their efforts to reconstruct reality do not take place in a void, but 
within the context of their own biographical and social experiences.  
7.2.2. Manoeuvring Communicative Arenas 
Although participants think that a public discourse around surveillance helps them 
understand how surveillance operates, they feel that assembling specific facts, piecing 
together bits and fragments, finding out what common-sense is, are tasks left to 
themselves. Common-sense reality is always surrounded by finite enclaves of meaning to 
which everyday life relates, yet is removed from, such as the legal system, medicine, or 
flying an airplane. The more differentiated a society, the more acute the development of 
segregated provinces of meaning becomes. However, there are no institutionalised 
experts which mediate between the world of computation as an enclave of meaning and 
the everyday, lived experience of surveillance. There is no doctor, no pilot, no lawyer 
who claims responsibility for a body of knowledge and offers interpretation to outsiders: 
‘fasten your seatbelts’, ‘you can sue them’, ‘you will be fine tomorrow’. This section 
documents how participants order the revelations of surveillance which they encounter 
across different communicative arenas and how common-sense knowledge consolidates 
without public-facing expert systems. I illustrate this in two sections which document 
how people reconcile competing interpretations of surveillance, and how they imagine a 
social consensus. 
 Competition of Interpretation 
Communicative arenas entail a competition of interpretation. ‘How it’s done’, or ‘how it 
works’ is not always clear-cut. Stuart recalls a situation when a privacy scare was making 
the rounds on Facebook. One morning, he logged into the site and saw his entire newsfeed 
crowded with the ever-same status update posted by numerous friends: 
[7, 26] “Everyone was like ‘I hereby declare’…and then they basically went to say that they don’t 
give Facebook the permission to use their data.” 
Stuart could not recall what exactly sparked this mass-reaction, but he very well 
remembered what went through his mind when he saw all these posts. For a moment, he 
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wondered whether he should follow the others, copy and paste this declaration and 
publish it on his newsfeed as well. It seemed to be consensus, at least there was a group 
which vocally suggested it. Stuart was just about to accept it as the ‘thing to do’ when 
one dissident voice put his assumption of common sense on shaky grounds: 
[7, 27] “I’m friends with this guy…and he was basically mocking the whole thing. Like he posted 
something like ‘I hereby declare that I have no fucking clue and am not a lawyer so I don’t 
know anything about privacy rights’. […] I don’t really know him that well. We go to uni 
together. He is just a smart guy, so I thought I can believe what he says. It just did come 
together. He wasn’t really like someone where I thought: ‘oh yeah, I will do whatever this 
guy says’. And to be honest, it sounded quite obvious when he said it.” 
This episode highlights a fundamental problem: the intersubjective experience of 
surveillance is not homogenous, but fractured. It is riddled with dissonances of 
interpretation that hinder people to validate an apparent social consensus. Acts of 
“disconfirmation of reality” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991: 171) are abound. In 
Stuart’s case, this disconfirmation happened right after he stumbled across an apparent 
fact. It gets more complicated when conflicting versions of reality only emerge much 
later, in and another context. For instance, one participant lamented: 
[7, 28] “You think you have understood how it works and that you can never be sure what 
happens with your data. And three weeks later your read that there is a new law and that 
it was all overblown and exaggerated.” [DK: translation from German] 
But Stuart found a way out. His Facebook friend did not just challenge the common-sense 
reality around him, but simultaneously offered a new interpretation. For Stuart, this friend 
spoke from a privileged vantage point. This illustrates that expert and lay knowledge are 
not dichotomous concepts. Giddens has already highlighted that technical knowledge 
filters back and is re-appropriated by lay actors (Giddens 1990: 145). In order to lend 
stability to the contradictory flow of surveillance knowledge, participants draw on tactics 
of ascribing surveillance expertise to selected others. Lars says: 
[7, 29] “Well, after a while it just emerged. This is a buddy of mine, wait, this one, he often posts 
stuff about that and then I think it’s pretty solid what he says. Well, over time I’ve found 
people for that, like this one. Or my brother, he knows a lot about that stuff, too. So I watch 
what they say, and if they say it’s like that, then I trust them. Because, honestly, there’s 
so much stuff that gets posted and also a lot of bullshit, as the day goes on.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Instead of identifying trusted sources, others weed out misinformation. Anna is friends 
with many family members on Facebook. Her aunt notoriously posts advice on protection 
against surveillance, but Anna ignores it: 
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[7, 30] “[...] especially my aunt, she always shares some newspaper articles on privacy and 
Google and stuff like that. But she’s just too old, she doesn’t get it anymore. It’s all very 
trivial. Either you know about it already for a long time anyways, or she also shares 
appeals like ‘this is how you can protect your profile’ and stuff like that. Of course, that’s 
totally naïve. That’s what people do who still play Farmville or share Diddl Mouse [DK: a 
cartoon character] pics. And then you immediately know, well, you know what I mean.” 
[DK: translation from German] 
Alongside those designated experts, nearly all participants highlighted situations where 
they had to make ad-hoc decisions, such as journalist Christina:  
[7, 31] “You just have to make a decision, so I pick whatever sounds most convincing. Like 
someone posts a link and then someone says ‘wrong!’ or something and posts another 
link.” 
But such decisions do not come easy. Karen, the dental hygienist, said that conversations 
about surveillance tend to go in circles, and competing interpretations are often not 
reconciled: 
[7, 32] “Like one guy, he said that Facebook sends you targeted ads. But then I was like ‘how 
can that be’, I mean if I look at the kind of ads that I get, that clearly is not targeted. And 
my friend agreed, - so we were in this discussion and at the end I did not know anymore, 
so yeah, that happens.” 
Figuring out how surveillance works then is systematically entangled with confusion and 
resignation. Participants are faced with competing hypotheses that are temporary, 
refutable and potentially contradictory. Berger and Luckmann claim that the validity of 
one’s knowledge is a fundamental characteristic of everyday life: “validity of my 
knowledge of everyday life is taken for granted by myself and others until further notice, 
that is, until a problem arises that cannot be solved in terms of it” ([1966] 1991: 58). In 
participants’ experience, this validity is inherently unstable. What is true about 
surveillance in one moment can emerge as a misinterpretation in another, and participants 
struggle to break this cycle.  
 Imagining Consensus 
The uncertainties attached to surveillance knowledge also affect how participants interact 
with others. Paula told me how embarrassed she felt after her Facebook post on privacy 
had been dismantled by others: 
[7, 33] “Well yes, because surveillance and privacy are always being such a matter of debate 
and because it’s become so important, I thought, well I thought now you’re going post 
something as well. Then the reactions were pretty stiff – like ‘wrong’ and ‘that’s totally not 
true’ and so on. I don’t always know how they’d know, but well, as I said that wasn’t that 
great.” [DK: translation from German] 
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Even on the day I interviewed her, Paula was still not sure whether her interpretation was 
indeed factually wrong. But the unanticipated opposition made her hesitant to post 
anything at all. Her experience is indicative of a general phenomenon. Participants 
struggle to gauge how much others already know, and wonder how certain they can be 
about what they know themselves. For instance, Ann-Kathrin says:  
[7, 34] “Then I didn’t dare to post such a link. Well, sometimes I just don’t know anymore whether 
I’m up to date or about to out myself as a complete idiot.” [DK: translation from German] 
Whereas some are concerned that their contributions may uncover a lack of knowledge, 
others worry that they may come across as too eager. Linda, the maths graduate, worries 
about the expression she is giving off: 
[7, 35] “I’m often like, I don’t want to come across as a total nerd. Like someone who thinks it’s 
is all ridiculously important. I mean people exist. I, well I wouldn’t say I am an expert, but 
I probably know more than the others here to be honest, because I read a lot and I have 
always been around computers.” 
These concerns are expression of a struggle to identify one’s own relative positioning 
within a collective discourse whose scope and boundaries are not apparent. Although talk 
about surveillance is pervasive, its rules of engagement are unclear. People do not 
participate impulsively in surveillance discussions, but try to assess the social situation to 
which they contribute beforehand. They try to imagine what the consensus about 
surveillance is, and position their own contributions accordingly. For instance, Amanda, 
the finance student I met at the university message board, told me how she had read an 
article about privacy violations on SNS that she wanted to share it with her Facebook 
friends. But she first scrolled through the newsfeed to see whether someone else had 
already posted the same discovery: 
[7, 36] “Well I thought to myself, it wouldn’t want to be someone who reposts stuff and someone 
else has already posted it and I was late and did not notice. But I didn’t find anything, so 
I just posted it.” 
In Germany, Ann-Kathrin was worried that her recent discovery was in fact too simplistic 
to share on StudiVZ, outing herself as a novice. However, she recalled that one of her 
friends had recently made a similar post that received many likes: 
[7, 37] “Well, it was about Google Street View. My friend posted something on Facebook, like 
that these days all these cars are driving around everywhere. I had read something, uhm, 
seen, an article, with a photo of what these cars look like. Then I thought to myself, ‘you’re 
going to post this’. But first I wanted to make sure that, well, that people would be 
interested. So I again checked my friend’s profile, on Facebook, and he got quite a few 
likes there.” [DK: translation from German] 
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Both Amanda and Ann-Kathrin engage in contextualising tactics to position their own 
contributions vis-a-vis a common sense. They construct reference points against which 
they assess what is appropriate to say. As surveillance knowledge is in flux, participants 
cannot fall back on a fixed notion of common sense. What exactly is common sense needs 
to be actualised at a given moment in time. By probing into the workings of computational 
surveillance, participants also probe into the structure of knowledge that surrounds them. 
In consequence, they adjust what they share and alter how they participate in the 
construction of knowledge. Based on incidents like social sanctions on SNS, discussions 
about surveillance are experienced as normative, even if de facto, such norms may not 
exist. The social construction of knowledge about computational surveillance takes places 
in an environment of imagined norms, which contributes to the dissemination of this 
knowledge as such.  
7.2.3. Synthesis: The Hard Work of Common Sense 
Seemingly casual posts on SNS and mundane banter about computational surveillance in 
face-to-face interaction are hard work. While people generate common-sense knowledge 
about computational surveillance in interaction with each other, it does not translate into 
a universal, comprehensive common-sense reality. People experience isolated instances 
of common sense. The body of knowledge remains fragmented and does not translate into 
an overarching, comprehensive consensus. It also is a common-sense until further notice 
that is unstable and prone to crisis. While knowledge thickens over time, confirmations 
of common-sense and disconfirmations coincide.  
In contrast to other domains of everyday life, computational surveillance is not a finite 
body of knowledge where people can assess their level of understanding against a 
reference point. They constantly need to evaluate, assess and infer how socially shared 
acts that reveal computational meaning-making relate to the common-sense of others. 
Reconciling competing interpretations and imagining a social consensus are prerequisite 
acts for people that co-determine the development and dissemination of common-sense 
knowledge. These practices and problems further extend the notion of computed sociality 
in that they show how the computational rendition of reality (Kallinikos 2009) itself 
coincides with reconfigured modes and possibilities of social construction for human 
agents. Computed sociality therefore does not merely take place in and through 
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computation, but also manifests itself in broader social practices outside the 
computational domain that stand in relation to it.  
7.3. Consensus-Maintenance 
Although the reality of computational surveillance is emergent, far from ‘thick’ and 
ultimately unlikely to congeal into a stable and coherent whole, instances of 
intersubjective common sense between human agents are attainable. This section explores 
how people maintain and solidify common-sense knowledge to avert crises and 
disconfirmations of reality to which living in computed sociality is prone, as I have shown 
above. It provides an answer by embedding people’s narratives into a reinterpretation of 
what Berger and Luckmann call “conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance” 
([1966] 1991: 123). This slightly unwieldy term refers to mechanisms by which common-
sense reality is legitimated, and how subjective experiences are attuned with collective 
knowledge.39 Within these parameters, this section explores two types of mechanisms; 
the de-reification of computation, and folk tales of surveillance. These mechanisms 
ultimately demonstrate how in context of reconfigured modes and possibilities of social 
construction, human agents rely on collaborative practices to ascribe interpretations to 
computation. They provide evidence that in computed sociality, human agents are not just 
reactive to the parameters, frameworks and problems of consensus that computation 
imposes on them, but proactively stabilise a social consensus.  
7.3.1. The De-Reification of Computation 
Surveillance is an octopus, at least in Germany. During one of my interviews, a 
participant mentioned how a newspaper article discussing Google featured the illustration 
of an octopus, alluding to the concept of ‘Datenkrake’, a popular German expression that 
likens systems and institutions that collect personal data on the internet to an octopus 
spreading its tentacles. Although such visual representations of surveillance are scarce, 
participants do not imagine surveillance purely as abstract. Sarah had read an article about 
a privacy breach on StudiVZ in the news:  
                                                
39 This term is unusual, even for Berger and Luckmann, who have a penchant for bulky terms. Its 
machinistic connotation either appears at odds with the very human process of social construction, or 
implies that Berger and Luckmann consider universe maintenance as uncontroversial and thus occuring in 
an automatic fashion like a machine. There is evidence for the latter. As I highlighted in Chapter Three, 
Berger and Luckmann assume stablility as a social default at their time of writing and consider dissonances 
between competing enclaves of meaning as exceptional events.  
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[7, 38] “[…] this time a hacker had written a software and it tapped hundreds or thousands of 
user’s data. StudiVZ was powerless before that, they said. And that I find pretty serious, 
that they couldn’t protect the data – I mean they are professionals, all engineers and IT 
guys, they earn their money with that kind of stuff and there should be some software 
protection or something like that. But then one of them got interviewed and he said that it 
wasn’t their fault.” [DK: translation from German] 
Sarah does not talk about StudiVZ as an abstract entity, but conceives it in terms of 
individual agents, technicians and IT professionals. She ascribes complex computational 
characteristics to personified human agents. Ann-Kathrin’s view of computational 
surveillance is related:  
[7, 39] “Yeah, I’ve read that a couple of times now, that somehow a journalist logged in via 
StudiVZ and then observed a person for several weeks, printed photos and could prove 
for a long period of time what that person was doing every day, who they met, and that’s 
pretty scary. In reality it’s not people who do that stuff but robots or something like that. 
But that’s what they wanted to show: that SudiVZ is doing it like that by design, and that 
was pretty scary, as I said.” [DK: translation from German] 
Ann-Kathrin remembers that reporters have simulated the processes of computational 
surveillance with human agents as embodied placeholders. She extends this template in 
her own vocabulary. Somewhat clumsily, she refers to ‘robots’ doing the data aggregation 
and extraction work that has been simulated by journalists, subsuming computational 
processes into material bodies.  
Some participants go a step further and identify specific individuals as main agents behind 
computation. Evelyn noticed a heated discussion about Facebook’s use of personal data 
on the social network itself: 
[7, 40] “[…] things were posted, like …’this and that… that’s how it looks like’ […]. Then I also 
see how this, what’s his name again… Mark Knopf … or whatever… the Facebook guy 
… is being discussed and then you see all that and then you’re going to check your 
settings.” [DK: translation from German] 
Although Evelyn cannot recall his name and nearly confuses him with musician Mark 
Knopfler, she projects the institutional complex of Facebook on its founder Mark 
Zuckerberg. The role of Zuckerberg as personal culprit or mastermind of surveillance 
appears time and again. Tim from London was very vocal about companies like Google 
and Facebook making money from users’ data. He spoke vividly about a looming change 
in Facebook privacy settings, just like others. But he put an emphasis on the persona of 
Mark Zuckerberg:  
[7, 41] “[…] in the comments, there are always these jokes about Mark Zuckerberg [DK: on 
Facebook]. And also I saw someone post this cartoon where Mark Zuckerberg was 
photoshopped like Uncle Sam and it said ‘I want your data’ or something.” 
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Based on what I learned from Evelyn and Tim, in my later interviews, I specifically asked 
whether participants ever encountered the name Mark Zuckerberg in their Facebook 
newsfeeds or talked about him as a person. For instance, Henning, who is 22 years old 
and just moved to Aachen to study Engineering, said: 
[7, 42] “I once did it myself. Well, as a joke, but still, it’s true. ‘Zuckerberg you turd’ and stuff like 
that. […] Well, because of all the data leaks and whatever other things there are, there 
are always these scandals coming up.” [DK: translation from German] 
In all these instances, people converted abstract, unknown computation into material 
entities that they can conceptually grasp and relate to. These tactics modify how Berger 
and Luckmann consider common-sense reality. For them, it emerges through reification. 
The term denotes the “[…] apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, 
non-human and possibly supra-human” (Berger & Luckmann [1966] 1991: 106).  
By making institutions or phenomena appear not man-made, they become adamant and 
set in stone. In many accounts that have been discussed so far, participants see the world 
of computation as exactly that - a non-human facticity that is impenetrable: 
“The reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world. It is experienced by 
man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he has no control rather 
than as the opus proprium of his own productive activity.” (Berger & Luckmann 
[1966] 1991: 106, original emphasis) 
By attributing computation to material bodies, participants engage in acts of de-
reification. The reified world of computation is locked away in another enclave of 
meaning that people lack access to. Through de-reification, people re-integrate this 
removed enclave of meaning into the common-sense reality of the everyday. While 
Berger and Luckmann do not expand on the notion of de-reification,40 Sewell’s (2005) 
analysis how contemporary life is increasingly subject to ‘de-reification’ provides a 
clearer context for participants’ acts. He sees de-reification as claiming back control over 
the production of meaning by making previously immutable and incontestable realities 
mouldable and open for negotiation. In participants’ own narratives, this means that if 
Zuckerberg is deemed a surveillor rather than Facebook’s algorithms, the world of 
surveillance suddenly becomes man-made again and thereby enters people’s domain of 
understanding. In this context, the notion of control that Berger and Luckmann speak of 
                                                
40 However, Berger and Luckmann realise the importance of analysing de-reification for future research: 
“The historical and empirical application of the sociology of knowledge must take special note of social 
circumstances that favour de-reification [...]” ([1966] 1991: 109). 
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means that an interpretation on the level of human cognition becomes possible again. It 
also sparks a sense of comradery. Lars summarises quite bluntly how a common, 
personally identifiable villain creates a basic social consensus. 
[7, 43] “Well, they are all bashing this Zuckerberg guy. That’s also stupid, but… Anyway I think 
that everybody thinks he’s fishy. This means you will get a lot of ‘likes’. I mean if you post 
something about him.” [DK: translation from German] 
Acts of de-reification then create a foundation through which collaborative practices of 
figuring out how surveillance works can be easier sustained.  
7.3.2. Pigs and Folk Tales 
All other fieldwork had long been wrapped up when one day, I got an email from Adam. 
I had initially met him nearly six months ago for an interview, after which he had just 
disappeared. Whether I still wanted to do ‘that second interview’, he asked. We met at 
my home in London. Adam, an art student, had brought his laptop. After the think aloud 
protocol, we took a look at his Facebook account to further explore the issues we had 
been talking about. In his first interview, Adam had attested that there was a lot of talk 
about surveillance in his newsfeed and he was eager to show me this time. After a few 
clicks, he brought up an image that featured two cartoon pigs with speech bubbles over 
their heads: ‘Isn’t it great’, one pig is depicted saying, ‘we have nothing to pay for the 
barn’. The second pig is seen replying ‘Yeah! And even the food is free’. This dialogue 
is supplemented with the following subtitle: ‘Facebook and you. If you are not paying for 
it, you’re not the customer. You’re the product being sold’. The post had been shared by 
one of Adam’s friends a few days prior to our interview, but it had originated elsewhere. 
Adam’s friend merely added to its distribution by making it available to his circle of 
friends. When Adam and I revisited the post, it had garnered a lot more activity since 
Adam’s first encounter. We counted 235 ‘likes’, it had been shared 142 times and 
continued to receive comments by other Facebook users. Adam permitted me to make a 
screenshot, which I show below.  
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Figure 5: ‘Facebook And You’ Cartoon 
 
Source: Screenshot from participant’s Facebook account. 
He commented on the cartoon as follows:  
[7, 44] “The pigs, I mean that’s really brilliant. It’s exactly what we have been talking about, I 
mean what I was gonna say. I guess it’s obvious, but it’s good to see someone say it, like 
you are reminded, especially if it’s this funny. And I mean everyone agrees.” 
The cartoon did not reveal anything that Adam did not already know about surveillance. 
The facts it presented were banal. Yet, a closer look at Adam’s statement suggests that 
the cartoon nevertheless plays a critical role in the construction of reality. The cartoon 
foregrounded a well-known fact about surveillance in Adam’s consciousness and 
reaffirmed it. As others supported the claim in the cartoon, Adam felt that what he knows 
is shared by others and accepted as common sense. Indeed, in the Facebook comments, 
people were chiming in. They affirmed the cartoon’s claim and cracked jokes about their 
personal data being sold. What were little more than two pigs and a speech bubble can be 
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understood as an affirmatory token that ascertains reality as intersubjectively shared. The 
likes, shares and comments are practices of acknowledgement which performatively 
consolidate a consensus.  
It took the cartoon on Adam’s newsfeed and the flow of comments and shares below it 
for me to realise that apparently banal facts that had emerged in my previous interviews 
were more than they seemed. For instance, in Franzi’s circle of friends, a conversation in 
the pub or at a party can easily gravitate towards Facebook and related questions. She 
does not always agree with her friends: 
[7, 45] “Well, we do fight, well, fighting is too much… let's say we don't always all agree. I for 
example don't have a problem with my pics being found online, but my friend, she's super 
extreme and has blocked everything, even for her own friends. She thinks… well, that 
Google and others won't get her data that way, because they can also search Facebook 
– completely paranoid! Well I do like her, but… but I always say you've got to decide for 
yourself. No matter where you go, you're always the commodity. Nothing is for free, you 
always give something in return, be it money or data. Well, and everyone pretty much 
agrees to that, even my girlfriend. But everyone chooses to deal with it differently.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Franzi uses a very similar phrase to the one in the cartoon, describing personal data as a 
commodity. She sees it as a means of reconciliation in a disagreement with her friend. 
The phrase is a lowest common denominator, a fact about surveillance that everyone can 
agree on. If common-sense reality is falling apart or threatened to disintegrate when 
different subjective narratives about surveillance clash, affirmatory tokens ensure that a 
basic common ground is maintained. Disagreements are converted into questions about 
details, not fundamentals.  
The message behind the pig cartoon surfaces time and again in various other stories. 
Participants routinely employ such affirmatory tokens to stabilise common-sense 
interpretations of surveillance. These tokens belong to the realm of mythology, which 
Berger and Luckmann identify as an important means of maintaining common-sense 
reality. This is particularly relevant to the context of surveillance, because mythology is 
“[…] close to the naïve level, in that, although there are specialists in the mythological 
tradition, their knowledge is not far removed from what is generally known” (Berger & 
Luckmann [1966] 1991: 128).  
In the fragile reality of surveillance, there is no canonical mythology to draw on. Yet 
people craft and reproduce specific stories about surveillance which serve as affirmatory 
tokens. I call them folk tales in order to maintain a theoretical link to Berger and 
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Luckmann, but to differentiate them from common mythology as religious and containing 
a large corpus of interconnected narratives. The following two examples from Frank and 
Stefan illustrate how these folk tales are manufactured through people’s own experience.  
For instance, sometimes unfolding events, where surveillance is revealed, obtain a larger 
audience and are converted into socially shared narratives. Frank’s story is particularly 
telling:  
[7, 46] “You pretty much constantly hear these stories – hacked profile, and ‘people watch out, 
hands off the games, I got a virus’ or stuff like that. As I said, time and again you hear 
about it when you talk to people, that it happened to someone or that you know someone 
who it happened to.” [DK: translation from German] 
Such folk tales are woven into the fabric of everyday life and perpetually reconfirmed. 
Stefan felt awkward broaching the issue, but eventually found the courage: 
[7, 47] “Can I say that? That’s a bit embarrassing maybe. Uhmmmm, in my shared flat. Well 
when somebody closes the door [DK: to his own room] then we always say: ‘Always 
remember to log out of Facebook first!’ Because… well, it’s a guys’ house, if you know 
what I mean.” [DK: translation from German] 
This recurring joke between flatmates is part of an everyday household situation and 
reproduced through face-to-face interaction. Stefan and his flatmates have attached the 
theme of surveillance to an inferred behaviour that happens behind closed doors. Here, 
they believe, Facebook collects (potentially compromising) data about its users even if 
they are not on the Facebook website itself. Such banter between friends is an affirmatory 
token of surveillance reality. By attaching it to a mundane everyday situation, Stefan and 
his flatmates reconfirm a common feature about surveillance without having to engage in 
a conversation about surveillance specifically – the confirmation of common sense reality 
happens in passing.  
Several male participants and one female, both from the UK and Germany, and from 
different cities within Germany, made a very similar reference to adult content and 
surveillance. For instance, Josephine highlights that she has heard a story about an 
embarrassing mishap a number of times already: 
[7, 48] “Sometimes you hear, well, that probably was in the news once, there was this guy who 
was logged in at Facebook and then visited a porn site and apparently clicked something 
wrong – super awkward – then it was on his profile! Such-and-such likes porn – how 
embarrassing!” [DK: translation from German] 
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Whereas some affirmatory tokens, such as sharing a cartoon on Facebook, are calculated 
and rational acts, others like Stefan’s story are affectual and embedded in everyday 
themes of conversation. Without people taking specifically about surveillance, these 
tokens inadvertently stabilise the common-sense reality of surveillance and ensure that 
the intersubjective construction of reality becomes possible by providing people with a 
common ground. Affirmatory tokens are collective practices but not agential by 
themselves. While they are not direct acts towards surveillance, the narratives they 
convey remind people of the need to act towards surveillance and provide templates for 
doing so. 
7.3.3. Synthesis: Reality Checks and Social Grooming 
In an environment where common-sense knowledge is unstable and does not congeal into 
an overarching reality, people employ tactics to maintain and solidify common 
understanding of surveillance. Affirmatory tokens, and folk tales as elaborate narratives 
of such tokens, are mechanisms of consensus-maintenance that provide people with 
reality checks that allow them to gauge whether their knowledge of surveillance is 
congruent with that of others. They also serve as a form of social grooming, implicitly 
indicating to each other that one believes in a common set of assumptions. These are both 
consequences and prerequisites for the construction of knowledge. Affirmatory tokens 
emerge out of what is known about surveillance and communicate to people that 
achieving a common-sense understanding is possible. Such mechanisms of consensus-
maintenance do not overturn computational meaning-making and do not represent an 
infallible truth. Indeed, the intersubjective consensus about how computation operates 
may be technically flawed, or reductionist. People do not become experts that muscle in 
on a computational modulation of the world through such mechanisms. Instead, such 
mechanisms socialise the experience of living with computation and provide templates 
for interpretation. The intersubjective interpretation of computation then is part of 
computed sociality itself. 
7.4. Chapter Conclusion 
In his essay on the complicity of anthropological fieldwork, Marcus considers changing 
boundaries and relationships between ethnographers and their subjects. Through 
collaboration between agents, what Marcus defines as “’co-operation’ in dialogue” 
(Marcus 1997: 93), new avenues of insight become possible. This chapter has shown that 
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Marcus’ notion of collaboration is not confined to the production of knowledge between 
a professional researcher and research subject. Extending it to participants of this study 
resonates with Garfinkel’s definition of ethnomethodology as: “[…] the actual methods 
whereby members of a society, doing sociology, lay or professional, make the social 
structures of everyday activities observable” (Garfinkel [1967] 1984: 75). As lay actors, 
participants conduct ‘fieldwork’ of their own in cooperation with other non-experts to 
foster, disseminate and consolidate knowledge about computational surveillance. They 
do, in a sense, echo Geertz famous anthropological rallying cry to “[…] hawk the 
anomalous, peddle the strange” (Geertz 2000: 64), by probing into a world of alien 
algorithms and corporations like Facebook and Google.  
The notion of collaboration stretches across the themes discussed in this chapter. In the 
communicative arenas of SNS and face-to-face interaction, participants piece together 
how surveillance works. And even though news media, as another communicative arena, 
offer ready-made, top-down interpretations of surveillance, their integration into 
common-sense reality does not take place without collaborative effort: what the media 
say about surveillance is replicated, queried, questioned or confirmed in Facebook posts, 
casual face-to-face conversations and folk tales through emerging cultures of 
mediatisation (Hepp 2013). 
This chapter has shown that such collaboration is not a linear trajectory to an all-
encompassing, uncontroversial common-sense reality of surveillance. There is no 
‘Heilsversprechen’ (Riesebrodt 2007), a promise of salvation, at the end of a collaborative 
enterprise where surveillance stands demasked, decoded, and ultimately understood in its 
operations, motivations, and consequences. Although the common-sense reality of 
surveillance thickens over time, it does not solidify. In a sense, it is asymptotical: although 
instances of surveillance knowledge expand over time, a comprehensive reality seems 
impossible to reach. In another sense, it is dialectical: common-sense knowledge and its 
dissolution coincide. 
Building and deconstructing a reality of computational surveillance in dialogue is a 
collaborative effort. This includes the foundations upon which such knowledge can be 
constructed in the first place. Amidst the fragility of computational reality, people 
collaboratively reconfirm the foundations that make intersubjective common-sense 
possible in the first place. Through affirmatory tokens, people reproduce truisms about 
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how computational surveillance works. As a lowest common denominator, these 
affirmatory tokens ensure that forming an intersubjective consensus remains possible in 
the light of competing interpretations.  
Collaboration between lay actors does not mean that people can systematically challenge 
the reality of computation and gain access to its enclave of meaning. Yet, the notion of 
collaboration underscores that dealing with computational surveillance is not an 
individual and ultimately lonesome affair. The previous chapter, particularly through the 
notion of unfolding events, has shown how deeply and personally the world of 
computation impinges on people as individual agents. This chapter has added that 
querying, contextualising and narrating such encounters is a set of social practices woven 
into the fabric of everyday life and expression of the computed sociality that Kallinikos 
and Tempini (2014) have outlined. In combination with concepts from Berger and 
Luckmann, this empirical analysis has expanded the notion of computed sociality and 
demonstrated that it includes not just the computational modulation of reality, but also 
practices of knowledge production by human agents in reference to computation that are 
enacted outside the computational domain itself. In other words, whereas Bucher (2012c) 
highlights how computation ‘makes sense’, I have documented empirically how people 
make sense of computational surveillance that makes sense about them in a collaborative 
process of social construction. The chapter has shown that a computational logic does not 
monopolise meaning despite its constitutive role in the social world. Hepp (2013) has 
criticised traditional notions of a ‘media logic’ and drawn on Berger and Luckmann to 
show that ascribed meaning and interpretation by human agents towards what the media 
and hence computation ‘do’ recognises them as subjects and helps understand their role 
in the production of meaning. The collaborative practices I have shown in this chapter 
underscore this and highlight people's role as active agents in the context of computed 
sociality.  
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 Chapter Eight: Negotiating Clashes of Reality 
With Unknown Interlocutors 
This chapter explores participants’ capacity to act towards computational surveillance in 
relation to their own understanding of reality and explores its motivations, modalities, 
consequences and limits. It constitutes the concluding empirical chapter in this thesis and 
is based on the groundwork which the preceding empirical analyses have provided. The 
first empirical chapter (Chapter Five) facilitated an understanding of people’s complex 
attitudes and experiences of surveillance between care and control, necessity, risk and 
avoidance. Chapter Six and Chapter Seven focussed on the aspect of computation in 
surveillance, in particular how people encounter generally invisible processes of 
computational surveillance in everyday life, and their communicative practices of 
structuring these encounters. One chapter explored this issue from the perspective of 
individual agents, whereas another detailed the collaborative efforts of decoding the 
presence and modus operandi of computational surveillance. While these chapters were 
narratives in their own right, they also were preconditions for understanding the 
possibility and practice of negotiating clashes between people’s own, and the 
computational interpretation of reality. They provided a wider context of the necessity to 
act in this manner, and the complications involved. Agency is a broad term. Following 
the theoretical framework and empirical analysis thus far, this chapter is specifically 
concerned with people’s ability to shape how computational surveillance perceives and 
calculates them. It remains open to incorporate different modes and motivations of 
participants’ acts, from resistance to complicity in co-engineering of their own exposure. 
By proxy of this theme, the chapter incorporates broader questions around the general 
ability to act towards computation and ultimately the role of human agents in a computed 
world, that initially surfaced in Chapter Six around the imperative of reflexivity and 
rationality. Below, I re-introduce the main theoretical concepts which inform this chapter 
and outline its argument. 
At the heart of the chapter are the concepts of visibility, glitches, and reflexivity. To 
recall, in the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Three, I identified these concepts 
as cornerstones for the capacity to act. Firstly, I have used the notion of visibility to denote 
people’s perceptual and cognitive barriers in querying computational surveillance, and to 
understand agency as making visible the illegible and incomprehensive mechanisms that 
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underpin a computational logic. I have also stressed that while human agents struggle to 
render computation visible, computers look back and categorise and calculate them. In 
this chapter, I use the notion of visibility in these two ways, connected by what Goffman 
(1971) calls ‘relations of visibility’. I am focussing on how people make visible 
computational interlocutors with the objective to influence how these interlocutors ‘see’ 
them, and how they mould their appearance accordingly. Secondly, I understand glitches 
as an updated concept emerging from Berger and Luckmann’s ([1966] 1991) notion of 
dissonances. Berger and Luckmann distinguish between two types of reality, or 
explanatory frameworks for how the world operates. Subjective reality refers to the world 
of individual, lived experience. Objective reality has little to do with established notions 
of objectivity as unbiased or infallible and instead refers to the institutionalised, 
naturalised world in which people live and which they take for granted. As objective 
reality is a consequence of the abstraction of human acts over time, subjective and 
objective reality are interconnected. Usually, they are in tune. However, these worlds can 
become misaligned, causing clashes, or dissonances, between subjective experience and 
the institutionalised representation of the world. Objective reality here stands for the 
computed world, which uses inferences about people to create social facts. Glitches occur 
when discrepancies between subjective, human logic and a computational logic reveal 
themselves. They are fissures and cracks in a usually coherent universe of reality. These 
glitches create a need and space for people to act towards computation. Lastly, reflexivity 
is a concept from Lash (2005), who argues that in order to challenge computational 
agents, people must act as if they were like them and hence adopt an ever questioning, 
rational and reflexive logic.  
This chapter embeds these concepts in a symbolic interactionist framework informed by 
Goffman (1971; [1959] 1990; [1967] 2003) in order to understand how human agents set 
up a framework to act towards computation by establishing a social situation, how they 
consider assumptions about computation to characterise their interlocutors, and how 
differences in power determine whether acts are carried out on the front stage, or the back 
stage.41 The notions of interface and infrastructure that further informed the theoretical 
framework also resurface in this context. In this discussion, a further extension of 
Kallinikos and Tempini’s (2014) discussion of computed sociality becomes possible. In 
                                                
41 As I am using ’back stage’ in the sense of Goffman’s concept, I follow his spelling instead of the common 
English language spelling ‘backstage’.  
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Chapter Seven, I have shown that computed sociality also encompasses the construction 
of intersubjective common sense between human agents that is about computation, but 
negotiated outside of computational operations. Here, I demonstrate that people also 
interact with computational agents directly, extending the intersubjective construction of 
meaning from relationships between human agents to human-machine relationships. The 
case study of individual representation, or how computational processes frame people, 
provides a contained field for exploring this communicative constellation. 
The chapter begins by developing a typology of glitches in participants’ lived experience. 
It argues that people strive to overcome those glitches by negotiating their appearance 
vis-à-vis computational agents. Drawing on Goffman, it frames computational agents as 
unknown interlocutors whose unclear shape and motives complicates interaction and 
defines relations of visibility between interactants. Under these conditions, this chapter 
documents three types of acts through which participants negotiate their representation 
by computational interlocutors. Some of these only take place on the interface of the 
screen and disregard deeper engagement with a computational logic, whereas others delve 
deeper into the workings of computation. However, despite this plethora of practices, this 
chapter stresses that people’s act towards computation are riddled with failures and 
omissions. It concludes that participants are far from hyper-rational and ever-reflexive 
agents, and highlights that the realisation of their fallibility gives rise to a redefined sense 
of self-worth and aspirations of character in the context of a computed world.  
8.1. Understanding Glitches 
Pointing to her Facebook newsfeed, Laura, a student in London, complained: 
[8, 01]  It’s always this guy here. I don't even know him that well, but whatever he posts, it always 
pops up. And like here, when I click on my friends' profile here, what she posts, it’s not 
there [DK: in the newsfeed]. So I have to check her profile, I mean if I want to see...stay 
up to date."  
For Laura, it is evident that Facebook curates the activities she gets to see in her newsfeed. 
But Facebook’s filters do not reflect what is important to her. The person who keeps 
reoccurring in her newsfeed is a far-flung acquaintance that she has only met at a few 
parties. Her best friend instead hardly features at all in her newsfeed, a situation that she 
finds unacceptable: 
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[8, 02]  "To be honest, I want to decide for myself how Facebook filters my newsfeed, it's my life 
after all and I should be the one who decides what I get to see, like what my real friends 
are up to and also what friends I get to see, and not Facebook." 
Facebook’s apparent idea of Laura and how she sees herself were out of sync. Laura 
encountered a dissonance between objective reality, or how inferences from her digital 
presence have become institutionalised as a social fact by computers, and her subjective 
experience. This dissonance is a glitch that reveals a flaw in Facebook’s logic. In contrast 
to a software crash or a bug, Laura did not encounter a technical glitch, but a glitch in the 
production of meaning. As computers increasingly constitute the social world, glitches 
also refer to slippages, or mistakes, in how computers understand the world. Just as 
technical glitches often result from human-machine interaction, such as user input that a 
given software cannot cope with, these social glitches are produced in interaction between 
a computational and a human logic. These glitches then are not ‘hard' operational failures, 
but ‘soft' glitches that are constituted by discrepancies in judgement and interpretation. 
Control about what is relevant in her life had been taken from Laura, and there was no 
straightforward way to reclaim it. Yet Laura had no intention of settling with this 
situation. Although a computational logic is usually invisible and curtails the ability to 
act towards it, Laura did not accept simply being at the mercy of flawed inference. 
Instead, she expressed intention to correct the glitch and impose her subjective experience 
onto her objective representation. Such glitches are commonplace, and like Laura, 
participants see themselves as agents who strive to overcome them. While these glitches 
often are highly specific and personal, they can be categorised into three types; (1) naïve 
inferences, (2) normative clashes, and (3) computational superiority over subjective 
experience. Below, I draw on select participants’ narratives to illustrate this typology of 
glitches. 
8.1.1. Naïve Inferences 
Glitches are particularly pertinent in backlashes against the way information on the web 
is personalised. In these cases, a computational logic is perceived by participants as naïve 
and simplistic compared to the complex, multi-faceted and rich subjective experience. I 
illustrate this with the help of Dennis, a student from Germany, and Stuart from London. 
When I joined Dennis in front of his computer, he pointed to his Facebook newsfeed and 
complained: 
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[8, 03]  "Well, how this is selected, always, like this friend, as if it's stuff you have to see and the 
other stuff is being left out – that doesn't make any sense. They select it; well, I mean 
they don't show everything that everybody says, that would be too much with – how many 
do I have – well, 328 friends.” [DK: translation from German] 
Such disagreements are not confined to Facebook. They also occur other SNS, on retail 
sites like Amazon, on music streaming services. Many participants also bemoan the naïve 
inferences which targeted advertising makes about them, such as adverts reappearing for 
a product they have already bought. Instead of resisting being tracked at all, many 
participants suggest that computers should 'listen in' better. Stuart, whom I interviewed 
in his student flat in London says: 
[8, 04] "Sometimes I am on Amazon, and I think - really? Is that what you are recommending 
me? You don't know me at all, do you? Ok, sometimes it is really useful, I have it mostly 
with books. But I bought some DVDs. And the movies Amazon tells me to buy are usually 
pretty shit. So thanks for that. I could pick better movies myself without these 
recommendations. I mean, some websites now ask you whether it was helpful, a 
recommendation. And you can click yes or now, so have your say in a way. Like everyone 
should be able to have a say. So yes, what they think I like, it's just bollocks really." 
The world of computation is opaque to most people. This is reflected in how Laura, 
Dennis and Stuart cope with dissonances. They acknowledge that computational forces 
are at work beneath the interface. But clashes between objective and subjective reality 
entail an asymmetry of power. While a computational logic can transgress into the realm 
of lived experience, participants struggle to systematically dismantle the computational 
logic. Laura, Dennis and Stuart circumvent this asymmetry by choosing a language of 
personal experience over technological concepts. While they are unable to criticise lines 
of code or algorithmic processes, they can challenge computed outcomes directed at 
themselves by proxy of their self-knowledge. By asserting their subjectivity, they convert 
the computational logic into an object of mockery. Other participants have shared similar 
experiences. They show that computation is not necessarily a mystical, or scary 
phenomenon due to its impenetrability. While participants may be upset by the outcomes 
of wrong, simplistic calculations, the fallibility of computation and their ability to call out 
computational flaws equips them with a comfort of power amidst a computed world.  
Arguably, challenging inferences in this way says little about participants’ power of 
agency towards computational forces. Poking fun at hilarious book suggestions on 
Amazon is not a form of code literacy (Hayles 2005). It remains open whether 
computation really works in the way that participants observe through being obviously 
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misrepresented. Nevertheless, these examples underscore that people as lay actors have 
the possibility in principle to dissent from computed outcomes. 
8.1.2. Normative Clashes 
The glitches that Laura, Dennis and Stuart encountered refer to a specific manifestation 
of a computational logic. In their accounts, Facebook's and Amazon's curation 
mechanisms do something rare: they unfold into the realm of human experience where 
they can be grasped. In this state, they seem to stand still and appear limited in scope and 
fixed in time and space. This allows participants to identify a specific disagreement. They 
relate a snapshot of the computational logic to the full richness of their own, subjective 
experience. But there is a much wider, more diffuse sense of disagreement based on 
general suspicion instead of actuality. Participants have a general risk awareness 
associated with surveillance and computation that stretches from the loss of privacy, 
social stigmatisation by peers, disadvantages in future employment, general fears of 
social consequences to inaccurate representation. Attached to those concerns are 
expectations of how computation should interpret their personal data and represent them 
as data subjects. Glitches emerge when these expectations clash with how participants 
believe they are de facto computed. These glitches are situated everywhere and nowhere. 
Participants have a diffuse sense that they exist, but struggle to pinpoint them. James the 
barista highlights: 
[8, 05]  "Everybody is after your data, and if you don't stop using the internet, they will get it. But 
it is not really clear what happens once they got that data and that really worries me like 
what that says about you, and you don't even know that, and it’s going to hit you years 
later.” 
Similarly, Paula from Germany has a general sense of disagreement with computational 
surveillance that like Laura, she intends to overcome: 
[8, 06]  “You can’t really know who has what data about me, I think. Either you adapt and say, 
‘screw it’, or you do something and try to protect yourself, so you’ll be seen as whom you 
want to be seen yourself. Just name, or also address, or some random clicks you have 
made or some bullshit to fake everything.” [DK: translation from German] 
Paula finds it impossible to know exactly how society is computed. Yet she still thinks 
that people can co-shape their computational representation and thereby overcome 
glitches as normative discords between subjective experience and objective reality. This 
can either be through reconciling subjective experience and computational reality by 
explicitly disseminating specific information about oneself to set the agenda of 
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calculation, or to prevent glitches from happening in the first place by starving the 
computational logic of meaningful input.  
8.1.3. Computational Superiority 
In a cafe in Erfurt, Germany, history student Enrico is after something different. 
Balancing his laptop on his knees, he is logged into last.fm, an online recommendation 
service for music. In front of him, he sees the result of a surveillance architecture he has 
helped create. Enrico listens to nearly all of his music on his PC, which boasts a collection 
of thousands of songs. Winamp, the media player he uses to play his mp3 files, is equipped 
with a plug-in which Enrico has deliberately installed. It sends information about 
whichever song he is currently playing to his last.fm account. With a sense of pride Enrico 
showed me that this ‘scrobbler’ had already recorded a history of 8,654 listening events:  
[8, 07]  "So here you can see what I've been listening to. Really amazing. Here you have listed 
all the songs and the top bands. I always like to think of myself as an indie guy; my 
favourite artist is Bon Iver. But the coolest thing is, here I can see from the listening 
statistics that recently I've been listening to Mumford & Sons much more often. So 
actually, that would be my favourite band. That's pretty heavy, you think, ah, yes, last.fm 
knows me better than I do myself somehow. And as I said, here you can see what kind 
of recommendations they give, like similar to Bon Iver, or here, also cool, The National." 
[DK: translation from German] 
When Enrico lets last.fm measure and quantify his everyday music consumption and 
tastes, he engages in 'everyday metering' (Pantzar & Shove 2005), a practice that is 
commonly understood as "collecting, collating and analysing minute data and providing 
feedback on how to better care for one’s self" (Whitson 2013: 167). While Enrico finds 
Amazon's purchase recommendations simplistic, there is nothing naïve about last.fm's 
inferences. They provide Enrico with information about his listening patterns and make 
recommendations he had not thought of himself. Enrico’s case is unlike the other stories 
from participants discussed so far, where purpose and meaning of surveillance were not 
evident. For Enrico, it is entirely clear what data last.fm’s algorithms are processing and 
how they are generating outcomes. Last.fm’s surveillance infrastructure is laid open in 
front of him, from the scrobbler that collects data, its aggregation and analysis on last.fm’s 
servers, to the cross-referencing with data from other users, to ultimately curated list of 
recommendations. Last.fm describes itself as a system and Enrico can validate its 
operation and logic. Computation ceases to be a mysterious force and becomes a trusted 
tool for self-discovery.  
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Enrico’s story is a special case. He does not encounter a glitch where computational 
inferences fail to accurately represent him. On the contrary, in the particular last.fm 
context, the idea of a glitch itself is categorically impossible for Enrico. In his mind, 
last.fm is infallible because it knows his music tastes better than he does. Enrico does not 
want to influence last.fm to better reflect his own subjective experience. On the contrary, 
he feeds last.fm ever more data about himself so that he can adjust his own behaviour. 
Glitches also are not an unintended consequence of exposure to surveillance. Enrico is 
deliberately exposing himself to last.fm. He wants to revise his perception of self as 
proposed by last.fm, and not impose his perception of self on the logic of computation. 
Such self-exposure to computational analysis echoes the concept of ‘quantified self’, 
fuelled by the proliferation of consumer devices such as fitness trackers (Wolf 2010). 
Enrico sees an absolute techno-truth in last.fm and glitches cannot come up because he 
does not take his own, subjective reality for valid faced with the power he ascribes to 
last.fm.  
But Enrico’s perceived gains from last.fm’s computational authority also suggest that 
glitches are not necessarily limited to negative consequences of surveillance and 
computation. For instance, Laura’s criticism of the Facebook newsfeed was neither 
sparked by privacy concerns, nor by another negative sentiment towards surveillance at 
large. Her motivation was much more mundane: addressing a personal inconvenience. 
Laura just wanted to be up-to-date on her friend’s whereabouts. The relationship between 
people and computational surveillance then is not always about grand narratives of 
privacy, intrusion and threat, but much more nuanced.  
8.2. Interacting with Computation 
Noticing glitches usually coincides with the ambition to overcome them. Participants 
consider themselves as interactants who actively negotiate their computational 
representation, either by intervening in the objective reality of computation or by letting 
such objective reality alter their subjective experience. As I have highlighted in the 
introduction to this chapter, this further expands the notion of computed sociality. While 
Kallinikos (2009) has outlined how computational processes render social reality, 
people’s practices of interacting with computation show that reality is also co-rendered 
between human and computational agents. Human agents actively and consciously 
contribute to the construction of reality not just between peers as shown in Chapter Seven, 
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but within the computational domain and in relation to computational agents as well. 
However, their expressed intention to intervene in glitches alone says little about 
participants' actual influence on computation, and about specific practices of intervention. 
In order to explore this, some conceptual groundwork is required which I attempt in this 
section by drawing on frameworks of interaction proposed by Goffman. I illustrate my 
argument with the help of two participants, Laura and Freddy, and only occasionally 
make references to others. This choice is based on practical reasons for the sake of a 
coherent narrative and also to illustrate that patterns of interaction are complex within, 
and not just between participants.  
8.2.1. The Possibility of Interaction 
During our conversation, Laura stressed that Facebook's decision to prominently insert a 
remote acquaintance into her newsfeed was not arbitrary. She remembered how she had 
previously clicked on some of the YouTube videos her acquaintance had been posting. 
Her own actions, that much she knew, must have triggered Facebook's selection 
mechanism. This gave Laura an idea how she could possibly intervene:  
[8, 08]  "For a while, I just clicked on my friend's profile all the time. Like, here [DK: Laura points 
on her friend's profile which is now on her screen], I went to her profile all the time, I mean 
not really to see what's new, just so Facebook knows I go there. And I clicked on tons of 
posts and pictures, and clicked 'like', I mean it was a bit stupid because there was no 
point really because the pics were all quite old and she probably thought 'what the hell', 
why is she liking random pictures all of a sudden." 
Laura had no means to rewrite the newsfeed algorithm, to give it specific instructions, or 
to ask Facebook to change it to a more accurate representation of who she is. Instead, she 
believed to have found an angle to interact with Facebook by connecting the curation of 
her newsfeed to her own behaviour. To influence Facebook, she emulated the behaviour 
which she considered to have led to its assumptions in the first place. By clicking on her 
real friend’s profile, Laura assumed that she would establish a connection with 
Facebook’s logic. She expected Facebook to recognise her clicks as a signal to make her 
real friend more prominent on the newsfeed. Without altering the computational logic as 
such, Laura hoped to teach it. She assumes that the computational logic is already present, 
perpetually analysing her clicks and feeding back curated visual information to her on 
that basis. Laura considers herself as making contact, and as initiating a negotiation. 
Facebook is always already looking at her, but she has to actively change focus to look 
back. When in front of a computer, her attention usually is focussed on what is going on 
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right on the interface of the screen. Now, her attention moves behind the interface of the 
screen and the computational logic becomes her primary interlocutor. Her actions may 
still take place on the screen, but it is not the buttons and photos on which she clicks on 
that matter. These are just acts to reach the computational logic behind it.  
Freddy, a young teacher, wants to intervene in his computational representation more 
widely. He has a diffuse sense of disagreement between his own privacy concerns and 
the data analysis practices by online companies. I sat next to next to Freddy in his flat in 
Germany, which he shares with his girlfriend. Freddy booted up his computer and showed 
me various online profiles, from Facebook and StudiVZ to a discussion forum for metal 
music. Freddy has a strict regime about his account names: 
[8, 09]  "Well, so here on Facebook, that's not my real name. My first name is correct, but the 
rest is fake; and religion, Buddha and stuff and hobbies, that's all bullshit. And here, at 
StudiVZ, one sec… [DK: Freddy logs out of his Facebook account, closes Internet 
Explorer and opens StudiVZ in Firefox] well, here I also have the same first name, but the 
last name isn't completely fake. See, the first letters are correct. And on the metal 
messaging board I have a metal nickname, that has nothing to do with reality." [DK: 
translation from German] 
For each online service, Freddy uses a different username. He also alternates web 
browsers and assigns a different one to each SNS. Several participants pursue similar 
practices, but Freddy is particularly meticulous. When I inquired about his social media 
use after the think-aloud protocol, Freddy did not refer to Internet Explorer or Mozilla 
Firefox. Instead, he calls them the ‘Facebook-Browser’ and the ‘StudiVZ-Browser’. Each 
SNS account is also associated with a distinct email address, although he uses the same 
email address for StudiVZ and the online music forum. Using more addresses would just 
not be practical, he claimed and continued to highlight that neither email address 
contained his real name. As our conversation continued, Freddy moved effortlessly 
between browsers, underscoring the apparent ease by which he keeps the contexts of his 
online activities apart: 
[8, 10] "I don't want to be tracked by everyone everywhere; if I can't completely avoid it, well, like 
this I can at least contain it, and they can't infer so much about my personality, and the 
information is all wrong anyways. So I make extra sure this way because I'm feeding the 
companies that do stuff like this with crap." [DK: translation from German] 
Freddy does not see himself merely subjected to the invisible forces of online 
surveillance, but as an active agent who can at least co-shape and negotiate his online 
representation. Both Laura’s and Freddy’s example show that participants believe that 
they can gain access to a computational logic without coding or other expert skills. Such 
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interactions do not happen in isolation. Laura probed into Facebook in the context of her 
desire to see more of her friend, and Freddy’s interactions are embedded in his wider 
internet use. Both examples also shed light on the dynamics of interaction. Laura's case 
highlights that participants’ see the computational logic as a particular kind of 
interlocutor. Freddy’s defensive acts illustrate that relations of power are part of these 
interactions. 
8.2.2. Unknown Interlocutors 
At its most basic, participants’ interventions in glitches can be understood as practices of 
impression management (Goffman [1959] 1990). Participants want to establish and 
maintain impressions that are congruent with how they intend to be perceived. But this 
impression management faces complications. In a previous chapter, I have highlighted 
that an asymmetry of expressive information between participants and computational 
practices is a key factor behind the perception of surveillance as risk. This asymmetry 
also structures participants’ interaction. A far cry from the 'special mutuality' that 
characterises face-to-face interaction for Goffman, participants struggle to identify their 
interaction partner in the first place. In face-to-face interaction, interactants have the same 
amount of expressive tokens available about each other. Yet while a computational logic 
can analyse the world that participants inhabit, participants themselves struggle to grasp 
their computational interlocutors - are they present at all in a given moment, what is their 
aim, how do they perceive participants, how does the computational logic react to 
participants’ attempts of interaction?  
Participants engage in interactions in darkness. Occasions in which a computational logic 
reveals at least some expressive information and provides communicative feedback are 
scarce. In most cases, participants are left to speculate about their interlocutors. 
‘Discrepant roles’ (Goffman [1959] 1990) become a structural feature of the interaction. 
These discrepancies denote aspects that interactants consciously or unconsciously hide 
from others, be it as a normative feature of their role or by virtue of personal decision. 
For instance, in theatre, performers have access to both frontstage and backstage areas, 
while members of the audience can only see the front stage. This means that some possess 
special information and knowledge about a social situation that is not shared with others. 
Goffman sees discrepant roles as potential threats to an interaction because they can cause 
breaks in its order, or challenge it entirely. In the case of computational interactants, role 
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discrepancies are so prominent that participants are unable to define the social situation 
at hand in the first place. According to Goffman, a social situation is characterised by 
interaction rules. But how to define interaction rules for a social situation in which one 
interactant is conceptually unknown and which may not even have a precedent that 
participants can use as a template? Negotiating glitches are not normatively defined 
situations such as two people meeting for a coffee.  
In the absence of guidelines, participants look to establish interaction rules on their own 
initiative. For instance, when Laura repeatedly clicked on her friend's Facebook profile, 
she did not merely attempt to influence how Facebook perceives her. It also was a 
proposition: 'if I do this, you acknowledge my action and revise what you show me in the 
newsfeed'. Participants also try to glean such rules from their computational interlocutors. 
When participants speculate how a computational logic works, they also hypothesise 
which rules govern them, and how they themselves could communicate within these rules.  
But participants do not know whether their proposed interaction rules are accepted, or 
whether they have correctly inferred their interactants’ logic. In the absence of a feedback 
loop, Laura cannot be sure that clicking on her friend's Facebook profile had any effect: 
[8, 11] "Not sure if it did anything. I think I see her more often now in the newsfeed, so yes. I 
think it must have had an effect. Yes, clearly. But I can't really measure it and also, I think 
I now see everyone more often, so maybe Facebook made some changes as well?" 
Similarly, Freddy intersperses his narrative with qualifying statements, such as 
'hoffentlich [I hope]' and 'eventuell [maybe]'. I hence propose the term ‘unknown 
interlocutors’ for computational agents. These are interlocutors that neither reveal 
themselves, nor provide feedback throughout an interaction about its rules, its trajectory 
and its consequences.  
8.2.3. Relations of Visibility 
These obstacles lead to the question how participants are positioning themselves towards 
unknown interlocutors when they seek to establish an interaction. Goffman’s ([1959] 
1990) notion of ‘protective practices’ provides a starting point. These are practices of 
impression management emerging from perceived differences in power. In an omniscient 
gaze, computational surveillance has already established a connection to human agents. 
But participants still need to creatively find a way to establish a relationship in the first 
place, either at a given moment in time like Laura, perpetually like Freddy, or in a specific 
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context like Enrico. Protective practices thus are launched from a position of inferiority 
and recall de Certeau's (1984) notion of tactics. De Certeau opposed tactics and strategies, 
whereby strategies are linked to structures and institutions of power that define the 
context in which people live. This applies to the realm of objective reality computed by 
institutional agents of surveillance like Google or Facebook. Tactics are responses to 
these strategies by those who are subjugated to them, such as the walker in the city or 
users of online services.  
Yet the notion of tactics alone is too limited to frame participants’ practices. Participants 
differ in the knowledge of tools and practices that can help understand computational 
agents. For instance, Laura relies on her common sense, whereas Freddy draws on 
software. Some participants are also more systematic than others: Freddy has a 
meticulous plan that spans across all his online activities, whereas Laura’s practices are 
focussed on a single situation. Participants are located across a spectrum of practices, 
where some exhibit traits of strategies rather than tactics. This requires a concept that 
recognises but does not confine itself to the dualistic nature and prescriptive politics of 
tactics and strategies.  
The notion of tactics is also too constricted in its motivations. De Certeau sees tactics as 
defensive acts, directed against strategies of power. But for participants, tactics towards 
surveillance are not necessarily about resistance. As Lyon (2007) has posited, 
surveillance is neither inherently good nor bad, and participants’ acts reflect this. Some 
practices are geared towards escaping the gaze of surveillance, such as Freddy's elaborate 
web browsing routines. Other practices aim at enhancing exposure and making sure that 
computational agents can capture as much personal data as possible. Again others are a 
hybrid. While Laura wants to resist Facebook's specific curation of her newsfeed, she is 
not opposed to curation on the Facebook newsfeed per se. Participants' attitudes to 
computational agents escape a binary of good and evil. While this becomes most apparent 
in Laura's example, other practices also are structured by similar tensions. At face value, 
Enrico's voluntary exposure to surveillance may be considered as an endorsement of 
surveillance. Yet for him, matters are more complicated. He chose to open up to 
surveillance because he considers a full dataset about himself less biased than a selective 
one, where the scarcity of data would lead to false conclusions about him. Surveillance 
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remains to have negative connotations for him, and the attempt to fully expose himself is 
a means to mitigate them: 
[8, 12]  “I tell you, before I get wrong recommendations, because they don’t have enough data 
about me and make the wrong conclusions about who I am, I rather tell myself, I let 
everything be recorded 100%. This is all accurate then, because that is 100% me. So I 
prefer 100% instead of 50% or 60% [...].” [DK: translation from German] 
A concept that captures participants’ complex relationship to unknown interlocutors then 
also needs to move beyond a simple dichotomy of resistance and complicity. The notion 
of visibility is able to accommodate these concerns. It remains open to both enhancing or 
reducing exposure to surveillance, as well as to resisting or complying with computation. 
It also encapsulates both the human senses through which people act in the world, and 
the operational mode of computation as ‘seeing without eyes’. The concept of visibility 
echoes participants’ own terminology, who are concerned about ‘being seen’ by 
computational agents. Lastly, the notion of visibility fits into Goffman’s framework of 
interaction, who considers interactions as relations of visibility (Goffman 1971).  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will systematically analyse participants’ relationship to 
unknown interlocutors as relations of visibility. The following sections will map relations 
of visibility on a spectrum that defines where participants address computational agents - 
in the realm of participants’ sensory experience at one end, and in the realm of 
computation at the other. In analogy to the theoretical framework of this thesis, I call 
these endpoints interface and infrastructure. ‘Interface’ denotes practices that take place 
on the front stage in Goffman’s ([1959] 1990) sense. They are enacted and geared towards 
the visible layer of the computer screen with no specific consideration of what is going 
on behind it. ‘Infrastructure’ refers to backstage practices that attempt to lift the curtain 
behind the interface. While they may still be enacted on the interface of the screen, in 
their focus, infrastructure practices leave the realm of human sensory experience behind 
to tap directly into the invisible logic of computation. This spectrum then provides an 
understanding of how far people’s acts extend into the computational domain. It also 
documents the patterning of computed sociality between highly computational and non-
computational aspects of active human involvement.  
For reasons of legibility and clarity, I use the term ‘appearances’ when it comes to 
people’s management of their own representation towards computation. I use the term 
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‘visibility’ to denote practices and mechanism of interrogating interlocutors, both human 
agents interrogating computational agents, and vice versa.  
8.3. Negotiating Appearances 
In order to explore practices on the spectrum of interface and infrastructure, I use three 
broad categories that represent different bands of practice in this spectrum: (1) data 
scarcity, (2) obfuscation, and (3) modification. These bands refer to modulations of 
interface and infrastructure and progressively move from practices on the interface to 
those leaning more towards infrastructure.  
8.3.1. Data Scarcity 
Practices of data scarcity are about limiting the personal footprint on the internet to starve 
computational interlocutors of useful information that they can use to compute human 
agents. They are protective measures to shield subjective experience against being 
translated into the objective reality of computation. These practices come in various 
forms. They range from practices which only take place on the interface, over attempts to 
interact with the infrastructure of computation directly, to measures of using software 
proxies to handle the interaction. 
 Interface Practices 
When I asked Rebecca about the lack of information on her Facebook profile, she 
responded: 
[8, 13] “No data for me is better than wrong data, or like data where you don't know what's 
happening with it. So I rather have as little as possible about me on the internet.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Her presence on Facebook only contains a few travel images, a tightly regulated friend 
list, and lacks information on hobbies, family members, schools or university, and even 
status updates. Like many participants, Rebecca is concerned about leaving traces that 
can be analysed. The only way that the politics student can think of avoiding the grasp of 
surveillance is to reveal as little information as possible:  
[8, 14] “Well, I don't know….as soon as the data is out there on the internet, you can't do anything 
about it anymore. Whom should I call to ask ‘hey, delete this please' […] and then who 
knows what is happening with my data and it goes to Google, or the BKA [DK: Federal 
Criminal Police Office] and will be manipulated, I don't know. And I do not have any picture 
of me, on Facebook at least. On StudiVZ I have a photo album about New York. But this 
does not really bother me because StudiVZ can sell this on to whomever, they will not 
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learn anything about me personally, it is just buildings, Ground Zero and stuff.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
In Rebecca's mind, glitches between her subjective experience and inferences by 
computational agents cannot be corrected, only avoided. Her approach represents a strand 
of practices focussed on data scarcity that is geared at producing as little data as possible 
for computational analysis. Such tactics are commonplace. Sarah, who is Rebecca's 
fellow student from Erfurt, follows a similar approach. She calls it a 'profile diet':  
[8, 15] “Yes, there actually is quite a lot what you cannot see. I am doing a profile diet so to 
speak. My contact details are limited anyways. Yes, what do Apps and Services learn 
about me? I don’t really have any Apps or stuff like that, well I really want to limit what I 
feed Facebook with, that’s the only way for me.” [DK: translation from German] 
Both students feel unable to negotiate their appearances. They lack a hypothesis about 
how computational agents operate and hence are unable to establish a conscious 
interaction. To overcome this interactional barrier, they treat Facebook's computational 
logic as if it was just another Facebook user in flesh and bone. They reduce personal 
information, limit the volume of photos and if they upload photos at all, ensure that they 
are as non-descript and impersonal as possible. This echoes the measures that users take 
to curtail what human interlocutors can discover about them online. Sarah and Rebecca 
try to humanise computational agents and assume that their ability to ‘see’ is impaired in 
the same way as that of human agents. 
Sarah’s and Rebecca’s approaches to Facebook are examples of interface practices. 
Negotiating appearances takes place in a framework that begins and ends on the visual 
layer of the Facebook user interface. It does so in a double sense, which situates their 
practices at the far end of interface practices. Firstly, interactions with algorithms are 
confined to the affordances that the Facebook user interface offers, such as making clicks, 
sharing pictures and other content. The location of interaction is the interface. Secondly, 
Sarah and Rebecca equip their computational interlocutor with the same abilities and 
constraints as human interlocutors. They do not lift the veil of the interface to peek into 
the algorithmic logic. The conceptual framework of interaction then also is located on the 
interface.  
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 Thinking About Infrastructure 
For Mark, data scarcity comes with behavioural constraints. As much as he would like to, 
he simply does not use the 'like' button on Facebook and refrains from commenting on 
friends' posts:  
[8, 16] “Well, it may sound awkward...how do say...I just don't want Facebook to assume that 
when I like a post, I also like that person, and they get recommended as a close friend or 
something that's always popping up. Or that, like, I have over 300 friends, and I also do 
not want Facebook to know my best mates, like the 5 to 10 people I really care about 
because they can track that who I communicate with. So I make a note in my head 'like'. 
And sometimes in the pub, I say: 'nice picture' or something and we talk about it.” 
While Mark compensates for his constrained use of Facebook through face-to-face 
interaction with peers, others do not have such alternatives. In London, Katy told me that 
she avoids certain websites altogether. She would just not be able to control how data on 
her is collected: 
[8, 17] “I mean I do avoid dodgy websites. [...] My friends are on these file sharing sites, but I 
went on their once with my old computer. You really feel with all the pop-ups and the 
general look and feel that they snoop you out. Like this video player wanted to install itself 
and I could somehow not cancel it. So you kinda know that they want to suck your data 
and enter your system when you are on there, so I do not go there at all anymore.” 
Mark and Katy make parts of their online behaviour dependent what they believe goes on 
behind the interface. Like Sarah and Rebecca, they struggle to establish communicative 
access to negotiate how they appear to an unknown interlocutor. But their rationale is 
different. In a basic way, they anticipate and conceptualise unknown interlocutors and 
account for the invisible logic behind the interface in their tactics.  
 Software Proxies 
In the examples so far data scarcity meant that participants limited particular online 
activities. Yet once participants engage more deeply with the infrastructure of 
computation, behavioural limitations are replaced by other approaches to data scarcity. 
Carrying his laptop everywhere he goes, Dave rarely misses a chance of being online. He 
may not have a smartphone, but when he leaves his home in the morning after checking 
the online news over breakfast, he flips shut his laptop, puts it in his bag and heads to 
university or the gym where he works. In the lecture hall, he reopens it and starts it up yet 
again in the library, before finally continuing to work and surf the internet at home. These 
intervals inform Dave's practices of disappearance. When Dave opens his laptop at a new 
location, his first destination is the preferences menu in his web browser: 
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[8, 18] “Well from home I go to the library and start up the laptop and before I go online, I first of 
all delete all cookies, and when I wrap up, so when I go home and start up the computer 
again, then I delete all the cookies from the session in the library. Always remove the 
accumulated waste from before so to speak. Yes why, to start again, a new sheet of 
paper, so that my entire history will not be scanned.” [DK: translation from German] 
Similarly, Amanda clears her browser cache after every browsing session, and she even 
resets her entire browser to default. Every time she shuts down her computer, saved 
passwords and custom configurations are lost again. But re-entering the internet every 
time as an apparently blank slate outweighs these hassles: 
[8, 19] “I don't have any fancy settings, I am a pretty basic user really. I just want to make sure 
all data in Safari is gone so it’s all clean for next time, and nothing spyware style stuff is 
on my computer and does some bad shit, like that. Does that sound weird? I also am a 
clean freak generally so maybe that's also why.” 
Both Dave and Amanda stand for a strand of participants who are convinced that they 
inevitably create data trails. Instead of trying to prevent the impossible, they want to 
remove the footprints that they have involuntarily created. These participants forego 
practices of self-limitation that curtail the range of online activities in favour of practices 
that address the consequences of their behaviour. The spatial and temporal boundaries of 
their internet sessions act as intervals in which they intend to reset their data trail. 
According to their rationale, computational surveillance interprets them with growing 
ease the longer they surf the web, melting away their anonymity until the next cookie 
sweep or browser reset. For them, data scarcity is not a fixed status that can be maintained, 
but a condition that must be continually restored. In contrast to those participants who 
refrain from online activities, these participants directly intervene in the computational 
infrastructure by limiting its ability to calculate them.  
More technologically savvy participants draw on software to maintain a constant level of 
data scarcity through interventions on the infrastructure level. In a previous chapter, I 
already introduced Richard. He uses Ghostery to identify occurrences of surveillance 
through a pop-up window which lists all advertising trackers and other monitoring tools 
on a website and blocks all tracking cookies. Other participants draw on a whole range of 
tools. When I leant over Andre’s computer in his Aachen apartment, he proudly explained 
his setup: 
[8, 20] “Here I have Norton, Ghostery as well, and wait, here is AdBlock. Once I had Avira but I 
now deactivated that because of Norton, which is supposed to be better in the end [...]” 
[DK: translation from German] 
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Andre wanted to take every chance he could to protect his data from being scrutinised. 
Software was the best way to prevent surveillance: 
[8, 21] “By yourself, you can’t do anything. I am not a programmer and even if I was, what Google 
or others do, and you don’t even know those others, that wouldn’t help anyways. I think 
even programmers use such tools.” [DK: translation from German] 
Both Richard and Andre do not consider themselves as technical experts, which they feel 
that limits their ability to act. While some academics might consider Rushkoff’s (2011) 
Program or Be Programmed as polemic, Richard and Andre subscribe to this logic. 
Limited in skills, they still think that they need to intervene on the level of infrastructure. 
Unable to establish a direct interaction with computational agents, they rely on software 
as a proxy. When we sat down to navigate to his favourite websites, a Norton pop-up 
window appeared on Andre’s screen: 
[8, 22] “Yeah, yes, I click yes, or no. So here it's yes, but I might also say no, usually depends 
on trust really. When I don't know, like what the site is... Norton does it, I trust it.” [DK: 
translation from German] 
Andre assumes that the software will act in accordance with his own values. This is 
echoed by Christina who uses AdBlock at work as a magazine journalist: 
[8, 23] “AdBlock, like the name suggests it. It does good things, blocking ads and that’s what I 
want. It is how I feel about ads.” 
In these cases, participants use software as advocates of their subjectivity. They may not 
know exactly how these tools function, but they believe that the software acts on their 
behalf. Participants may not be able to read the logic of computational surveillance, so 
they use software as ‘envoys’ that can relate to otherwise unknown interlocutors and take 
over the task of establishing a social situation. In their minds, these software tools place 
them on an equal footing with a logic they do not understand. Software then is a way to 
overcome discrepant roles between interactants by proxy.  
 Synthesis: Data Scarcity 
As this section has shown, practices of data scarcity can be structured on a spectrum of 
interface and infrastructure. It began with behavioural limitations at the far end of 
interface practices. Further examples moved progressively towards a stronger 
consideration of infrastructure. But there is no simple dualism between interface and 
infrastructure. Interface practices can be further differentiated by considering the location 
of interaction and the participant framework of interaction. Whereas the location of 
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interaction in all examples was the interface, the participant framework of interaction, 
how each participant imagines the interaction, varies. It can exclusively relate to the 
interface, but it can also consider infrastructure. Practices that consider infrastructure are 
marked by a struggle to establish an interactional relationship with computation. 
Participants’ experiences contain a sense of tactical play with unknown interlocutors. 
This tactical play echoes the idea of role discrepancy in two ways. Firstly, hiding from 
computational agents is a token of power for participants. By withholding their data, 
participants strive to become unknown interlocutors themselves. Being unknown can only 
be an incomplete enterprise. Participants realise that they cannot transgress into the world 
of computation, whereas computational agents allow inferences about participants. 
Participants strive to be unknown in the sense of removing individual attributes from 
computational grasp. Secondly, participants seek to overcome role discrepancies through 
the use of software. Tools such as Ghostery and others are proxies through which 
participants gain access to a computational logic, counteracting code with other code. 
Through data scarcity, participants try to overcome discrepant roles by making 
computational agents as weak as they are themselves in understanding their interlocutor. 
In contrast, the use of software is an attempt to equip participants with the same attributes 
of power that they bestow on computational surveillance. In both cases, practices of data 
scarcity then are attempts to change the power balance in interactions towards 
interactional equivalence between human and non-human agents.  
8.3.2. Obfuscation 
During the First World War, the British Admiralty and US Navy were alert about the 
deadly capabilities of German submarines. The clear silhouettes of their ships on the 
horizon presented ideal targets for these submerged hunters. Struggling to protect their 
vessels from enemy view, they adopted an unconventional measure. Instead of painting 
ships in particularly unobtrusive ways, visually strong, highly abstract schemes that were 
often in bold colours and reminded of cubist paintings, were placed on their hulls. 
Concealment was replaced by confusion in what came to be known as ‘dazzle’ 
camouflage. The dazzle pattern broke the regularity of a ship's outline, making it difficult 
for the enemy to determine its type, size, speed and direction. While this pattern could 
already confuse bare eyes, it was specifically designed to disrupt mediated observation 
through optical rangefinders, which determined an object by pairing two half images into 
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a single view. The dazzle patterns impeded the alignment of these two halves.42 In order 
to interact with computational agents, participants engage in practices that resemble these 
wartime tools. Below I outline these modes of obscuring digital traces. 
 Software Hacks 
Lars has a Mozilla browser plug-in that is unlike Ghostery or the other tools discussed so 
far. Instead of shielding his data and blocking cookie intrusions, it produces even more 
data. It constantly emits a stream of arbitrary search terms including, to Lars's 
bemusement, 'Britney Spears'. On the bottom of his browser, I saw a list of terms:  
[8, 24]  "That's so funny, Britney Spears, here it is. Of course, I am not her fan, that's clear. I am 
not a little girl, but that's what you will think. Only data waste, nobody can figure out who 
I really am, because this is mixed with what I really do into some kind of broth and then 
Google probably asks itself what’s going on there. “ [DK: translation from German] 
Lars believes that he can mask his intentions by producing data noise. Akin to a dazzle 
ship camouflage, he hides in the open and uses the additional data to confuse unknown 
interlocutors like Google. Such attempts to perplex computational surveillance are 
common. Luise, who shares a flat with several other students, pretends to be someone 
else on the internet every week. Compared to her flatmates, Luise claims to know fairly 
little about computers. Yet she speaks in a confident tone when she explains how Susanne, 
her flatmate responsible for all internet matters, tampers with their collective internet 
account: 
[8, 25] “Well, Google, they are known for collecting search queries and compile statistics on that 
and so forth, but I can…Even if they know it’s me, via the IP-address... But at home, we 
have configured the IP-address in such a way that it always changes, so they cannot find 
it out ultimately.” [DK: translation from German] 
Susanne has edited the settings on the flat's internet router so that it changes a unique 
identifier, the IP address, on a regular basis, apparently making it impossible for unknown 
interlocutors to build a long-term profile of the flat's internet use. Luise trusts Susanne. 
She neither deletes any cookies nor tries to limit her data footprint. If anything, she feels 
more carefree because she believes that she is not traceable anymore.  
 Fake Clicks 
In a Canary Wharf office, Joanna takes a different approach. Joanna is unhappy in her job 
as a legal secretary and just wants to get through the day. The location of her desk helps. 
                                                
42 See e.g. Behrens (1999) for a history of the dazzle camouflage and the role of artists in conceiving them. 
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It is in an isolated corner, shielding her computer screen from passers-by. Throughout the 
day, she has a Facebook tab open in her browser, and unless there is an urgent task that 
cannot be postponed, she checks the newsfeed, news websites or fashion blogs. Yet 
although she can hide her procrastination from colleagues, she is less sure about the IT 
department. There are rumours that her company scans employees’ internet traffic. While 
Joanna does not know how this scanning process works exactly, she suspects that her 
procrastination could raise a red flag and has developed a way to trick the system: 
[8, 26] “Facebook, when I am there I change tabs, and then I go to Google, and I type in some 
law terms...so I pretend that I'm googling work stuff, like I'm doing research. And then 
Facebook is still open, so I did not go to www.facebook.com again. Or like my fashion 
blogs. So I can just go back there and I guess it won't register.” 
At the other end of London, in a construction planning office, Jack has reserved such an 
approach for what he calls 'emergencies'. Referencing the famous Police song 'Every 
Breath You Take', he expects to be tracked continuously. While he is generally not 
concerned, his attitude changes in some situations:  
[8, 27] “So embarrassing, but ok. One time you know, growing old and all that so I was looking 
at some anti-aging stuff, like on cosmetics websites and stuff. And I am a guy, and my 
colleagues always joke about this, like it’s totally girly. And I was, searching, searching 
so that's basically all I did for a good two hours or so. And I did not want to get those ads 
for that later of course... And there's the whole thing about personal advertising now, and 
then when they come to my desk ask me a question and see the ad.” 
Jack felt trapped in gender stereotypes emerging from his behavioural data. Whether 
surveillance algorithms take him for a woman is of little concern to him. Rather, he 
worries that the consequences of calculation will surface to his co-workers. 27-year-old 
Jack works in an open-plan office and his colleagues frequently stop by for a chat, so any 
advertising would be for everyone to see. His concerns are not related to computation 
itself but arise from human peers who judge him based on computational inferences. To 
avoid being exposed, Jack randomly surfs to websites and arbitrarily clicks on adverts. 
He wants to dilute the analytical weight that an advertising algorithm would place on anti-
aging products. Jack's example illustrates that practices of negotiating appearance extend 
beyond the realm of computation itself, and are intertwined with role maintenance 
towards other human agents.  
 Synthesis: Obfuscation 
Probing into the computational logic is a core aspect of all practices of obfuscation. 
Participants formulate specific hypotheses about computational interlocutors and seek to 
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exert influence on an infrastructural level. This is different from the bulk of data scarcity 
practices, where computational principles largely remain abstract. In data scarcity 
practices, withholding data usually is associated with a feeling of being unable to 
intervene, and participants refrain from attempts of interaction. In contrast, practices of 
obfuscation demonstrate a much more intimate relationship with computation, where 
involved participants recognise and embrace its perceived logic. Participants proactively 
engineer possibilities for interaction. However, practices of obfuscation are also much 
narrower. They refer to specific instances and are not extended to surveillance across 
temporal and spatial contexts.  
The difference between data scarcity and obfuscation becomes even clearer through the 
prism of interface and infrastructure. In the case of data scarcity, practices that consider 
infrastructure are often outsourced to software. But how Ghostery, AdBlock and other 
tools identify and block surveillance is not evident to participants. These tools are black 
boxes, and their use is fuelled by mere hope of success. Participants believe the software 
to be inherently good and to act in their interest. Software also features in attempts to 
obscure traces. But its use differs from tools for data scarcity. Consider Lars’s software 
tool which emits false search terms. Like in Enrico’s case of last.fm, where the 
computational logic explains itself, Lars can see how his software operates. By emitting 
random search terms that are visible in Lars’s browser bar, the software unveils its logic 
of operation. It is a rather simple logic, where the software does in automated form what 
participants can conceptually understand and at least in theory, replicate manually.  
Practices of obfuscation show how participants engage with computational infrastructure 
through their own acts. Prerequisite is a specific hypothesis about the logic that underpins 
unknown interlocutor's. Just as dazzle ship paintings were literally a surface measure 
directed at an underlying technology of interpreting visual information (the rangefinder), 
participants' practices of obscuring information target the computational logic that 
transforms data into information. In both cases, overstimulating the mechanism of 
interpretation shall transform it into a blunt tool by turning it against itself. The dazzle 
ship camouflage was an initially tactical consideration that turned into a minutely planned 
and exercised operation, and itself into a tool of power. As it was employed, it acquired 
more and more strategic, rather than tactical properties. The same is the case with 
participants’ acts of obscuring information. These practices demonstrate a much deeper 
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engagement and reflection over specific instances of computation. They are meticulously 
prepared, and participants can provide sound justifications for their approaches. Whereas 
participants’ acts often are tactical in de Certeau’s sense, practices of obfuscation exhibit 
strategic characteristics. 
8.3.3. Modification 
Relating to unknown interlocutors also forms the basis for another set of tactics. Instead 
of acting on what computers supposedly 'think' in order to render their inferences useless, 
some participants also take advantage of a computational logic in order to construct a 
subjectively more meaningful representation of themselves. These practices of modifying 
appearances take two forms.  
 Teaching Computational Agents 
Let’s recall Laura, who believes to have figured out how Facebook curates her newsfeed. 
While she cannot change how Facebook makes inferences, she thinks that she can change 
the outcome of Facebook's curation by supplying subjectively meaningful information. 
Laura does not want to hide from computational surveillance, but to challenge 'naïve 
inferences'. Like Laura, many participants recognise a clash between the complexity of 
their subjectivity and the apparently simplistic assumptions of computational agents. 
They want to teach computers to capture them as they see themselves.  
In Fateha's eyes, social networks 'sometimes need a bit of help' to understand their users. 
Fateha works in a London advertising agency but wants to change jobs. LinkedIn is her 
main tool, but the automatic recommendations she gets do not met her criteria. She 
receives weekly emails about vacant positions: 
[8, 28] “It was terrible, it was all sales jobs. Horrible jobs. I guess they must think, LinkedIn 
thought I want to be in sales because well, yes I am in sales. But I want to go into design 
and I studied it, and it did not list it here. So it must think because I am in ad sales, I also 
want my next job to be sales. It’s a bit better now, but here - this is another ad agency, 
but this is a pharma company, for sales - I mean that's still totally not what I want.” 
Fateha tried to reconstruct LinkedIn’s logic of inference and concluded that it is overly 
simplistic. In an attempt to enhance its understanding of her preferences, she tweaked her 
profile information, adding keywords such as 'graphic design’ wherever she could:  
[8, 29] “I also, well, that's not true really, well a bit at least. My internship, it was not about design 
really, but I made it sound like a design thing. I hope that LinkedIn have picked that up 
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somehow and yes it’s not true. In case when I get questions, when someone asks me I 
can say what I did, I mean I can always explain it.” 
But she was not certain that her intervention had worked. After all, she could only 
speculate how LinkedIn’s logic operates. In an attempt to increase her chances to trigger 
a behaviour that resonated with her unknown interlocutor, she also sent out LinkedIn 
invitations to strangers who work in graphic design, hoping that at least one of these 
tactics worked.  
Frank in Germany, who I introduced earlier as a clerk for the public transport company, 
had a different problem. Whatever music he listens to is captured by last.fm, where his 
friends can see a list of all his songs. One day, a friend poked fun at him for having 
listened to a German pop song: 
[8, 30] “It was 'Tausendmal berührt' [DK: ‘Touched a thousand times’], you probably know it, 
right? I was really like, shit, what’s going on here, that’s not possible, that can’t be. But 
then it was clear: shit, I was writing [DK: an essay for university] and needed something 
to keep me going. Usually, I don’t listen to folk music at all, more house music, but I 
probably just craved it, I had the song on my computer somehow and well, it just did fit 
and I had it on repeat all the time, it was just an embarrassing tune. An accident so to 
speak and he just discovered it. But crazy, last.fm just uses it, well their results are not 
that accurate then.” [DK: translation from German] 
An embarrassing folk song had put Frank's musical reputation in jeopardy. He did not 
want to be caught dead listening to the song, but last.fm had exposed him. But according 
to Frank, last.fm should have distinguished between his usual songs and this exceptional 
incident. Although Frank had undoubtedly listened to the song, it did not reflect how he 
wanted to be seen. Frank had assumed a more sophisticated logic behind last.fm's 
algorithms, and was disappointed as the site overstated the song's subjective importance. 
Recognising that he had to prevent further embarrassment, Frank put together a playlist 
of his favourite songs and let his music player repeat these tunes for hours at a time over 
several days until he had successfully overwritten last.fm's mention of the embarrassing 
song. 
 Entering the Computational Gaze  
In the examples so far, tinkering with one’s appearance was rooted in an assumption of 
the superiority of subjective experience over computed reality. But just as in the case of 
Enrico, who thought that last.fm knows him better that he does himself, some participants 
intentionally submit to surveillance. Lars has a problem with procrastination and has 
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installed RescueTime, an application that tracks his internet use and provides statistics in 
the form of charts, percentages and minutes spent per website: 
[8, 31]  “This tool allows me to discover things about me that I would not realise otherwise, that 
only becomes clear when it is analysed and presented to me. Sometimes you think you 
are only away from your work for a couple of minutes, but if I look at RescueTime, it tells 
me that it can well have been an hour.” [DK: translation from German] 
The idea that computers know better also determines other practices of appearance. 
Several participants were not concerned about targeted advertising and instead 
voluntarily increased their exposure. Tim made sure that when given the option, he 
preferred to log onto a third party website with his Facebook credentials: 
[8, 32] “I don't care about privacy, actually, it’s better this way. I rather have personalised ads 
that are interesting, than random stuff. [...] What I have on Facebook is all true and I have 
nothing to hide, so if it can help to get better ads and if I can discover new things that are 
recommended to me, so if this is the case, I am happy to give other websites my data as 
well.” 
Submitting oneself fully to the computational gaze is less common than other forms of 
engaging with computational agents. They stand for a particular view of unknown 
interlocutors, where specific hypotheses about how exactly a computational logic 
operates make way to generic assumptions about their infallibility. While other practices 
seek to reduce the gap between discrepant roles and strive for interactional equivalence, 
submission to surveillance is about the very opposite: cultivating the power differential.  
 Synthesis: Computational Interlocutors as Significant Others 
Practices of modification can be best understood by juxtaposing them with the types of 
practices discussed previously. Both data scarcity and obfuscation establish a firm 
boundary between the world of subjective experience and its computational 
representation. This is reflected in the construction of social situations. Speculating about 
the logic and motives of their unknown interlocutors, participants intend to avoid 
meaningful communication through withdrawal and deception, undermining the 
collaborative constitution and development of social situations between interactants as 
much as possible. Participants engage with the world of computation so that computers 
cannot enter their subjective experience. They attempt to decipher the logic of 
computation to outwit and circumvent it. This limits interaction to a struggle for access 
to the self and sovereignty over its interpretation between human interlocutors on the one 
hand, and computational interlocutors on the other.  
  
231 
In contrast, practices of modification performatively modulate computational inferences 
by bringing subjective experience into the computational realm. Of all practices, 
modification is most deeply situated on the level of infrastructure. Instead of avoiding the 
social situation with a computational interlocutor, modification embraces and develops 
it. Participants tinker with calculations so that their interlocutor can get a better grasp of 
them. These processes of tinkering are acts of translation that break a dualism between 
human and computational logics and see them as mutually co-constitutive. Participants 
teach computational interlocutors how to ‘see’ them, and acknowledge their interlocutors’ 
view of themselves as meaningful inputs in constructing their own subjectivity. This 
reflects the basic tenet of symbolic interactionism that the self is not a solitary project and 
always constituted in interaction, as already expressed in Mead’s ([1934] 2015) concepts 
of ‘I’ and ‘me’.  
Yet only in practices of modification, participants accept their interlocutor as co-
constituting the self, and not as misrepresenting it. Goffman (1971) has argued that the 
self is coined by significant others who treat her or him as a being. Re-reading the term 
‘significant others’ in the context of computation reveals a nuance. When human and 
computational logics intersect, participants chose whether they want to accept 
computational interlocutors as significant others, and thereby whether to be influenced 
by them. This does not mean that people can eliminate the consequences of computation 
through the denial of computational interlocutors - people live in a world that is already 
computed, irrespective of their personal preferences. However, it illustrates how 
perceptions of unknown interlocutors as meaningful influence the relationship between 
human and computational logics. Once interlocutors are identified as meaningful, 
participants welcome the influence of a computational logic on their self-perception. For 
instance, Laura was not against being interpreted by Facebook per se and merely wanted 
to be seen in a more nuanced manner. Once she corrected Facebook’s perception of 
herself, she did not mind being under computational scrutiny. In this context, glitches 
appear from a new perspective. They can be reconciled or avoided if the computational 
interlocutor is being perceived as a significant other who makes a meaningful contribution 
to the sense of self. Unlike in cases of data scarcity and obfuscation, glitches then become 
issues that can be resolved through more, not less interaction.  
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8.4. Failures: Re-Inventing Reflexive Agents 
The plethora of practices discussed so far may spark assumptions that participants act 
towards surveillance as hyper-rational, ever-reflexive agents, transfixed on ducking and 
diving from the gaze of computation, calculatingly outplaying surveillance, gaming the 
system, and perpetually engineering their computational exposure. A Goffmanian 
framework may further stimulate such perceptions, as some interpret his portrayal of 
individuals in interaction as overly rational, and manipulative (Petras & Meltzer 2003). 
Indeed, in their acts towards surveillance, people seem to operate in a way that the logic 
of computation had originally foreclosed despite their ambitions. As I discussed in a 
previous chapter, being rational, reflexive and calculative are attributes that people 
ascribe to computational agents. In order to understand how computation operates, they 
feel that they need to adopt a maxim of rationality and reflexivity themselves, but 
ultimately realise that the differences between human and computational logics make this 
unattainable. Computation is pervasive and largely invisible, defining what I have called 
the conditions of possibility that people find themselves in. Yet acts towards surveillance 
are specific instances that are bound in space and purpose, and which involve overcoming 
these conditions by imagining unknown interlocutors. Indeed, participants' acts towards 
surveillance bear traits of rational and reflexive agents.  
However, in this section, I document that participants cannot be reduced to such labels. 
Acts towards computational interlocutors stand within a broader context of participants 
as fallible agents that are complex and contradictory beings between rational and affectual 
tendencies. At the same time, I show that being rational and ever-reflexive is a state that 
participants strive towards in their acts, resurrecting the same principles they struggle to 
apply in the broader context of understanding surveillance. This tension ultimately 
underscores participants’ struggles of participation in computed sociality. 
8.4.1. Failures 
Practices of appearance are riddled with accidents, disappointments and failures. 
Attempts to accumulate knowledge about computational surveillance and endeavours to 
negotiate appearances are also personal histories of regrets. Many realise later that they 
should have behaved differently in a past situation, and that they were not tactical, 
focused, and rational where they now think they should have been. Fateha, who now 
actively manipulates LinkedIn, regretfully looks at her past behaviour:  
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[8, 33] “I was so stupid that when I think now, I am like ‘oh my God’, I probably ruined it for me 
already because I was so stupid.” 
Others struggle with the demands of pervasive awareness. Many participants translate a 
general attitude to surveillance into principles of appearance, or how they want to render 
themselves visible to computational interlocutors. I call these ‘regimes of appearance’. 
Yet applying such a regime in a consistent manner is an entirely different affair. I have 
previously introduced Freddy who meticulously tries to split his online activities across 
different web browsers. This is a calculated attempt to obscure algorithmic inferences. 
But in shock, Freddy once realised how he absent-mindedly surfed from his metal music 
forum to Facebook without having changed browsers: 
[8, 34] “It really was ‘ooooh shit’, ‘fuuuuck’. Once I did not pay attention and all is lost, how could 
I be so stupid. You just don’t think, let’s check Facebook, la la la, no attention to what’s 
happening with the surveillance stuff.” 
Freddy had inadvertently let his mask down. He had invested labour and discipline into 
negotiating his appearance and a brief moment of negligence threatened to nullify all his 
efforts. A wrong mouse-click meant that previously separate online contexts were now 
connected. Ann-Kathrin was less agitated but recalls a similar situation. She had forgotten 
to switch off her laptop one night and inadvertently remained signed in to Facebook and 
Skype:  
[8, 35]  “Well, I would not like to appear as if I hadn’t anything else to do, that I would just be 
glued in front of the screen. Because that’s not the case often, really. For example, 
yesterday I forgot to switch off the laptop and then it was all the time, it was online all the 
time. This is probably also the image that’s being portrayed about me, that’s being 
matched with me. ‘She is online, she is a junkie’, and that goes into some database which 
puts me in a bad light.” [DK: translation from German] 
In Goffman's ([1959] 1990) terms, participants struggle to maintain their communicative 
front towards unknown interlocutors. The roles they try to play require discipline and an 
overarching principle of rationality which can easily get undermined by a quick affectual 
glance on Facebook, a wrong assumption about LinkedIn’s logic, or another negligence. 
Yet no matter how reflexive, controlled and diligent participants are about maintaining 
regimes of appearance, they also realise that interactions with unknown interlocutors 
inevitably involve a third party – other human agents. Previously, I introduced a number 
of participants who tightly control what information is available about them on Facebook. 
But tactics like Sarah’s ‘profile diet’ are difficult to execute on a daily basis. She recounts 
numerous occasions where friends have uploaded and tagged pictures of her that clash 
with her idea of making herself visible to computation. Sometimes, people have even 
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posted personal details on her Facebook wall. She did not want Facebook to ‘see’ her in 
these ways: 
[8, 36] “Come on people, I then think, if someone has no pictures of themselves, you gotta realise 
that you can’t just post like crazy like on your own profile. And this really happened to me, 
like after the skiing vacation, where they tagged me, and then I also had some winter 
holiday ads, I am not sure if that was on Facebook or somewhere else on the internet, 
but it was there. Really, come on.” [DK: translation from German] 
Like Sarah, many participants realise time and again that even as they emulate 
computational approaches, they are not acting as lone agents, but are dependent on others 
who co-constitute their appearance. Suddenly, being impulsive, irrational, or at least not 
calculative, emerge as bad behavioural traits that people see in their peers.  
8.4.2. The Limits of Reflexivity 
Participants have developed ancillary tactics that focus on repairing or preventing the 
failures and mishaps that come with attempts to manage one’s appearance. Once 
participants realise how careless they have been with their personal data in the past, many 
try to erase traces and undo their unwanted exposure. When Freddy realised that he had 
not changed browsers before he accessed Facebook, he did the following: 
[8, 37] “When I realised, I immediately logged out of Facebook and deleted my history, and just 
to be on the safe side, I also restarted my computer and reinstalled Firefox and I hope 
that helped.” [DK: translation from German] 
Others embark on a deletion frenzy when they realise that their past behaviour was 
threatening their current idea of appearance, getting rid of all old accounts and registration 
data. Again others rely on policing their appearance. Tim from London highlights: 
[8, 38] “I’m just monitoring what’s out there, what information exists on me and what Google says 
when I google my name.” 
Sarah applies such policing tactics to her peers on Facebook. When a Facebook alert tells 
her that she has been tagged in a post or a photo, she is quick to undo this: 
[8, 39] “I admit it is annoying because you can’t always be that fast, so that the photo keeps 
being visible. But after I have untagged myself, I cannot be recognised [DK: by 
Facebook’s algorithms] at least.” [DK: translation from German] 
Realising that their appearance to computation is co-dependent on others, some 
participants try to maintain their regime through dialogue. Anna, my first participant, 
observed that their peers took to public discussion after a recent change in Facebook’s 
privacy settings: 
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[8, 40]  “This was, well Facebook changed its terms and conditions and there were also your 
activities, your likes, visible for everyone in the world. And there were discussions then, 
that you could not control that anymore and hackers and others could mine all that data. 
And then some people made some posts to warn about this.” [DK: translation from 
German] 
When we sat in front of my computer, she navigated to her friend’s Facebook page and 
pointed towards a post. Her friend had published a post declaring that she wanted to keep 
her profile private despite recent changes in Facebook’s logic. She urged everyone to 
deactivate an option in their own account settings that made comments available to an 
extended circle of people beyond immediate contacts and asked for confirmation that her 
friends had acknowledged her message and taken action.  
Figure 6: Facebook Post Acknowledging Co-Dependency 
 
Source: Screenshot from participant’s Facebook account 
Such attempts to prevent or fix collapses in regimes of appearance debunk the idea of 
participants as hyper-rational, ever-reflexive agents, and show them as people that 
struggle for control, torn between an imperative of becoming like computers, scrambling 
to prevent their peers from undermining their efforts and fixing their own omissions. But 
these attempts also establish reflexivity and rationality as attributes that underpin people’s 
intentions. When they engage with computational interlocutors, many try to mirror their 
modus operandi as rational, reflexive, planned and calculated. Participants want to act as 
agents who grasp the modalities of computation. This entails being reflexive in the sense 
that participants probe and question their interlocutors and become ‘rule finders’ (Lash 
2007) that spot patterns and regularities, similar to the generative rules that underpin the 
computational logic itself. Yet in contrast to Lash, they do not act ‘as if’ they were 
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algorithms and instead are modelling their behaviour on how they interpret computation 
through their human senses and social experiences.  
Yet conversely, failures of maintaining regimes of appearance can be understood as 
unsuccessful approximations to a computational logic. When such regimes collapse, it 
becomes apparent to participants that they are indeed unable to permanently impose 
principles they see in computational interlocutors onto themselves. Participants know that 
they are not pervasively rational and reflexive, but want to be, and condemn their own 
affectual nature. Their struggle and determination to keep up with the rational and 
reflexive paradigm of computation shows how a computational logic creeps into and 
alters a human logic. It changes how people want to think, how they want to understand 
themselves and engage with the world, defining desirable attributes of character.  
8.5. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter explored participants’ practices towards computational surveillance. After 
previous chapters had documented how human agents encounter and construct 
knowledge about computational surveillance, this chapter focussed on their capacity to 
intervene in and interact with the computational rendition of reality (Kallinikos 2009), 
and how these acts are themselves expression of computed sociality (Kallinikos & 
Tempini 2014). My argument demonstrated the motivations, modalities, consequences, 
and limits of relating to computational interlocutors. It approached agency towards 
computation through the concept of glitches, a reformulation of Berger and Luckmann's 
notion of dissonances. Glitches occur when subjective experience and meaning are 
misaligned with objective reality, expressed through the logic of computation. 
The chapter outlined three types of glitches - naïve inferences, normative clashes and the 
superiority of computational inference. Participants strive to resolve these glitches, and 
through a Goffmanian framework of symbolic interaction, this chapter illustrated how 
participants act on them. Computational interactants are unknown interlocutors whose 
shape, motivations and logic are hard to grasp, challenging participants to establish a 
social situation through which to interact. Computational agents can see and read human 
agents, but such insights are not mutual, leading to skewed relations of visibility in favour 
of computational interlocutors. Engaging in interaction from a disadvantaged position, 
participants apply assumptions, they look and learn and probe in order to tease out their 
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interlocutors’ characteristics. On this basis, they negotiate their appearance, or how their 
subjective experience is reflected and acknowledged in computational principles, through 
three types of practices – data scarcity, obfuscation, and modification. Each of these types 
of practices takes place on a spectrum that signifies the depth of encroachment into the 
computational logic. Interface practices both take place on the screen and only consider 
what is on the screen, whereas infrastructure practices delve into the underbelly of 
computation. Yet participants are not hyper-rational and ever-reflexive agents.  
The chapter concludes that people’s practices are riddled with omissions, misconceptions 
and failures. Participants are torn between their rational, reflexive and their affectual 
selves. Yet they also realise that computational interlocutors are cold, calculating, rational 
and reflexive, and that agency towards them demands such qualities to a grade and with 
a consistency that is unattainable for them. Acting towards computational surveillance 
alters the perception of an ideal self, and rationality and reflexivity emerge as desirable 
attributes for self-optimisation vis-à-vis computational forces.  
These findings stand in a broader context. The practices towards computational 
surveillance discussed here shed further light on the social construction of reality against 
the background computed sociality, the central paradigm of this study. In Chapter Seven, 
I have shown how people intersubjectively construct knowledge about a computational 
world and establish a common-sense reality between them. This chapter has shown that 
the intersubjective constitution of reality does not just take place between people, but also 
between human and computational agents. As people seek to repair the glitches between 
their subjective experience and the computational world, they reconcile different views 
of reality and either mould computation to their perspective or let their view be modified 
by a computational logic. People’s attempts to incorporate computational characteristics 
into their own ways of thinking about and acting towards the world show that the 
coordinates of the social construction of reality have changed since Berger & Luckmann’s 
original analysis. The empirical analysis of social construction within computed sociality 
in this chapter has provided evidence that people routinely direct their everyday practices 
of negotiating and reaffirming reality towards computational agents, thereby recognising 
them as agents that co-shape the world and normalising them as common interlocutors.   
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 Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I have offered a perspective for understanding human agency towards 
computational surveillance. I have formulated a theoretical approach rooted in and 
expanding on the sociology of knowledge and have mapped out empirically how young 
adults in Germany and the UK make sense of, and interact with computational 
interlocutors to shape their lived experience with surveillance. The thesis was motivated 
by an intersecting set of shortcomings in the academic debate to provide such a 
perspective; from the prioritisation in surveillance studies of systems and processes of 
surveillance over its lived experience to the implication of surveillance as a mere feature 
in the much broader role of computation in making up the social world. This dissertation 
has followed Lyon's (2007) call to extend the focus of surveillance research to incorporate 
the perspective of human agents while recognising the changing socio-technical 
coordinates of computation in which surveillance itself takes place. These shortcomings 
in the academic debate were magnified by a growing social urgency to address issues of 
agency amidst the rapid proliferation of computational surveillance and ensuing public 
debate, from tactics to evade the gaze of Facebook in the news media to recommendations 
for self-tracking through digital devices in everyday discourse.  
This motivation has been detailed in Chapter One through a brief survey of the state of 
academic debate and references to popular culture. The next two chapters progressively 
developed a theoretical framework. While Chapter Two reviewed theories of 
surveillance, Chapter Three shifted focus away from a surveillance-centric approach and 
developed an alternative perspective on agency through the social construction of reality, 
theories of algorithms, big data, infrastructure, visibility and communications.  
The methodology to transport this framework into the empirical domain has been outlined 
in Chapter Four. It specified three research questions concerning (1) the role of online 
surveillance in everyday life, (2) how people develop knowledge about the computational 
mechanisms that underpin computational surveillance, as well as (3) the practices that 
people employ to act towards such forms of surveillance and their underlying intentions. 
These research questions were operationalised through a range of methods that include 
sensitising concepts, in-depth interviews, think-aloud protocols, participant observation 
and live interviews. 
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The empirical material has been explored across the next four chapters, which 
progressively addressed these research questions. Chapter Five drew on concepts 
developed in the theoretical discussion of surveillance, whereas Chapter Six to Chapter 
Eight have been supported by the theory of agency developed in Chapter Three. 
Concerned with the role of computational surveillance in everyday life, Chapter Five 
discussed people’s relationship towards surveillance through the naturalisation of the 
surveillance experience, its entanglement with wider everyday online practices and its 
manifestation as a pervasive sense of risk. The next two chapters explored how 
participants query the computational mechanisms that structure their everyday life. 
Chapter Six discussed the general conditions under which the construction of knowledge 
about computational surveillance takes place and how participants as individuals generate 
such knowledge. Chapter Seven documented the collaborative, social practices of 
constructing knowledge about computation and social mechanisms of manufacturing a 
common-sense reality in and of a computational world. Chapter Eight, the last empirical 
chapter, investigated participants' communicative acts towards computational 
surveillance as interlocutors in everyday online life, and how modes of negotiating their 
appearance towards these interlocutors are expressions of the social construction of 
reality. While the empirical chapters were analyses in their own right, they also built on 
each other as each provided groundwork for the next to interrogate different aspects of 
agency, which is most explicit in the last empirical chapter. 
In this final Chapter Nine, I synthesise the findings and highlight noteworthy 
implications. I also discuss the study’s limitations and avenues for future research.  
9.1. De-Centring Surveillance: A New Perspective for Agency 
Framing agency towards computational surveillance required altering the coordinates of 
debate. I have argued in a review of surveillance literature (Chapter Two) to decentre 
surveillance in lieu of approaches embedded in broader social theory. Surveillance studies 
themselves provide the basis for this argument through their reflexive criticism of the 
panopticon as a master concept and departures from grand theories towards situated 
approaches that focus on particular configurations of surveillance. The argument I have 
outlined follows these debates, yet also departs from them. While surveillance theory 
committed to situated approaches incorporates aspects of wider social theory into a 
surveillance framework, such as Haggerty and Ericsson’s (2000) use of Beck's risk 
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society, I have done the contrary by bringing surveillance into a framework of social 
theory that is not primarily concerned with surveillance itself. In doing so, I have 
proposed to disregard surveillance as a phenomenon sui generis, and to consider it instead 
as a manifestation of much wider social transformations. Surveillance studies have 
legitimised this approach. As they have described the pervasive spread of surveillance 
through its computerisation into nearly all aspects of everyday life, my approach has built 
on and reflected this diagnosis by changing the parameters of inquiry. These parameters 
have been consolidated in Chapter Three, which was developed on the premise that the 
prison guard, the physical architecture of the panopticon and the CCTV operator have 
been supplanted or replaced by computing powers as agents of surveillance. This is not 
merely a change of guards, literally and metaphorically, but expression of a fundamental 
change of the role of surveillance in society. As algorithms, big data, software and related 
concepts have come to mediate and constitute lived reality, contemporary surveillance 
merely is a manifestation of the remaking of the world brought about by computation as 
a social force. As a consequence, the question of agency is recast into a broader discussion 
on the ability to act within the reified outcomes of computation. 
De-centring surveillance was not merely a theoretical exercise. Chapter Five has shown 
that participants associate surveillance primarily with the state and not with the 
computational practices of monitoring that they encounter in their everyday lives online. 
I have documented that the pervasive spread of computational surveillance has 
paradoxically contributed to its dissolution as a distinct category of lived experience and 
that it is intertwined with and indistinguishable from wider everyday online practices.  
For instance, participants consider the collection and processing of their personal data as 
part and parcel of being online and have forged an implicit deal where they exchange 
access and participation online for being monitored. Furthermore, participants shape, 
relate to and communicate through their data doubles, appropriating categories of 
surveillance imposed on them as regular and mundane frames through which they 
navigate online life and nurture their self-understanding. Snooping and spying on friends, 
while associated with complex social norms, is commonplace among them. This peer-to-
peer surveillance erodes role distinctions between watching and being watched, 
complicating moral judgement and normalising surveillance as a playful occurrence.  
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However, Chapter Five has also shown that the dissolution of surveillance coincides with 
the experience of a new landscape of risk, where participants struggle to grasp the 
intentions and consequences of computational processes they are surrounded by online. 
This feeling of risk refers to online practices and computational encounters in which 
surveillance plays a part, but which participants do not regard as surveillance-specific 
practices. Risk is framed towards computation as an elusive phenomenon, and not 
towards surveillance as a part of computation. 
9.2. The Changing Parameters of Social Construction 
To provide a framework for understanding agency (Chapter Three), I have combined 
Kallinikos’ diagnosis of the computational rendition of reality (2009) with a 
reinterpretation of Berger and Luckmann’s ([1966] 1991) social construction of reality. 
While Kallinikos emphasises the computational parameters that constitute reality, Berger 
and Luckmann offer a theory about how people create and reproduce reality within the 
bounds of a social world they inhabit. Both approaches stress the engineering of reality, 
which served as a bridging concept to implement the notion of computation into a theory 
of agency on the one hand, and to situate questions of agency within a framework of 
computation on the other. I have summarised the intersection of these perspectives by 
expanding on the concept of computed sociality (Kallinikos & Tempini 2014). 
Agency in a surveillance context is commonly understood in the binaries of resistance 
and complicity. Within the changed coordinates of debate summarised above, the 
theoretical framework I have employed has instead specified agency as the general 
capacity to query and interact with the computational operations that people are 
embedded in to arrive at an understanding of reality and to shape it. This problematises 
the conditions of knowledge, or how people can make sense of a world governed by 
computation. I have introduced a computational logic as a particular way of operating in 
the world and rendering it. I have also outlined that this logic is categorically inaccessible 
to human agents. The capacity to act then is hampered by a communication problem in 
that human agents struggle to relate to computational forces. I have used the notion of 
invisibility, and the dualism of interface and infrastructure to specify the parameters of 
this communication problem. 
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Berger and Luckmann’s social construction of reality has helped to theorise how, despite 
this communication problem, social practices become possible through which human 
agents can interrogate and reclaim the conditions under which knowledge is produced. 
This required revisiting their account of social construction, as the authors could not have 
considered the proliferation of computation at their time of writing. I have shown that the 
introduction of computation as an additional type of agent involved in the creation and 
maintenance of social order reconfigures how human agents can manufacture 
intersubjective common-sense knowledge, which for Berger and Luckmann is the 
foundation for reality. As a consequence, I have proposed that a theory of social 
construction needs to consider not merely communicative acts between human agents that 
render reality, but also acts towards, and involving computational interlocutors.  
While Berger and Luckmann’s theory does not offer such a perspective directly, I have 
demonstrated its adaptability and extensibility by reformulating two of its concepts - 
dissonances and universe maintenance. This demanded a recourse to wider social theory, 
as well as to concepts from other debates. I have specified dissonances, or clashes 
between narratives of reality, through the notion of glitches, a concept predominantly 
used in new media and computer art. Glitches make a computational logic visible to 
human agents, revealing discrepancies in judgement and interpretation of the world. 
Mechanisms of universe maintenance are shared narratives about the world that legitimise 
and reaffirm reality, such as myths, legends and other stories. While Berger and 
Luckmann reference religion as their case study, I have shown that sharing narratives of 
encounters with computation, for instance through glitches, are contemporary expressions 
of universe maintenance. Through Lash’s concept of generative rules and Beck’s notion 
of risk, I have mapped out how the nature of universe maintenance changes in the context 
of computation from the preservation of a given conception of reality, to everyday 
collective practices of updating, changing and reconciling knowledge about computation.  
My reformulation of dissonances and universe maintenance coincided with a change in 
focus for theorising social construction. Dissonances were of marginal concern to Berger 
and Luckmann. As their theory focusses on the maintenance of social stability in mid-
twentieth century Western societies, they saw dissonances as exceptional events in an 
otherwise pervasive and unproblematic social consensus. However, they recognised that 
such a consensus is historically specific and that the make-up of future societies may 
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require a stronger emphasis on dissonances in theories of social construction. The 
introduction of computation as a social force represents such a transformation. By 
ascribing dissonances an instrumental role in the possibility of agency, I have 
reconfigured Berger and Luckmann’s original framework. I have shifted focus on the 
complications inherent in creating consensus knowledge about the world and have framed 
these complications as a default condition, rather than an exception. This new default is 
also apparent in my take on universe maintenance. Consisting of practices to flexibly 
update and recalibrate common-sense knowledge, in my interpretation, universe 
maintenance alludes to a different social disposition than the one Berger and Luckmann 
had in mind. In Berger and Luckmann’s original framework, universe maintenance is 
enacted from a position of social stability where established myths and other narratives 
are merely carried forward. I have instead presented universe maintenance as an everyday 
struggle to prevent a consensus from falling apart, and as the need to continually re-
establish this consensus anew.  
This reformulation of dissonances and universe maintenance exhibits attributes of a 
society where certainties are merely temporal. Such are the characteristics of late-modern, 
or reflexive-modern societies that Beck and other authors have described. In 
reformulating Berger and Luckmann’s theory, I have provided evidence that their 
approach to the social construction of reality is applicable to and relevant for other 
iterations of modern societies beyond the confines of the particular socio-historical 
conditions they were writing in.  
More widely, updating their approach took place in a paradigmatically fluid environment 
where analytical templates for the particular problem of agency I outlined were absent. 
At the outset of this thesis, I justified my choice for an approach informed by sociology 
in the broadest sense with Joas’ (1996) assertion that part of the discipline’s value lies in 
its paradigmatic instability, making it self-reflexive and adaptive to external debates and 
concepts. The integration of computational issues into Berger and Luckmann’s 
framework of social construction is testament to this claim. It supports criticism (boyd & 
Crawford 2012) against pundits (e.g. Anderson 2008) who suggest the demise of theory 
in an age of computation and big data, and instead helps to demonstrate that established 
theoretical frameworks and intellectual traditions are equipped to cope with social change 
and to provide a perspective on computational phenomena.  
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While the notions of a computational rendition of reality (Kallinikos 2009) and computed 
sociality (Kallinikos & Tempini 2014) underpinned this reformulation of Berger and 
Luckmann’s theory, throughout the empirical analysis I have also documented how the 
interplay between these concepts has allowed to expand the idea of computed sociality. 
In Chapter Six I have shown that the computational rendition of reality is already part of 
participants’ everyday lived experience, and that this experience itself is further 
expression of computed sociality. Chapter Seven has demonstrated that the problems of 
knowledge associated with living under conditions of pervasive computation are 
expressed in everyday interaction between people. Reflections about computation and the 
construction of meaning in relation to it establish computed sociality as a general social 
phenomenon that is also negotiated outside of the domain of computation. Lastly, 
Chapter Eight has provided evidence that people themselves consciously establish 
interactions with computational interlocutors and that these intentional interactions 
produce sociality. In this updated sense, this thesis has considered computed sociality as 
the engineering of the social through computation, the embedding of computation into 
people’s lived experience, and the interdependent process of social construction between 
human and computational interlocutors.  
9.3. Approximating a Computational Logic 
Far from imposed by academic diagnoses through abstraction from people’s own 
practice, problems associated with the conditions of knowledge are part of everyday life. 
Participants recognise that they are living in a world governed by computers that produces 
knowledge about them, but which is not accessible as an object of knowledge to them in 
the same way. The computational rendition of reality (Kallinikos 2009) then is 
problematised in the domain of everyday experience. In Chapter Six, I have summarised 
the experience of these problems as conditions of possibility. Most notably, participants 
connect the ability to interact with and intervene in a computational world with the 
capacity to emulate a computational logic by adopting a paradigm of perpetual rationality 
and reflexivity. In this process, these computational attributes are recast as desirable 
character traits that remain unattainable as participants acknowledge their limits in 
aspiring to such a computational ideal. The particular rationality and reflexivity of 
computational agents also remain opaque to participants as the invisibility of computation 
prevents them from a precise understanding of its modus operandi, and limits ways to 
think about and express computational principles in language. The computational 
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rendition of reality then is both present and absent at the same time in people’s lives. 
Participants’ attempts of constructing knowledge and acting towards computation take 
place within these conditions of possibility as constraining factors and are attempts to 
compensate for them creatively. I have argued that the experience of computation as an 
agential force and people’s own limitations and attempts of querying it are themselves 
part of computed sociality. 
A critical theme that emerged throughout Chapter Six and Chapter Eight is how this 
unattainable maxim of rationality and reflexivity manifests itself in participants’ attempts 
to appropriate a computational paradigm in their everyday practices despite such 
adversity. While Chapter Six shed light on the role of emulating computation to shape the 
conditions of knowledge, Chapter Eight showed how such principles translate into 
situated acts to negotiate particular interpretations and judgements of the world with 
computational interlocutors. Douglas Rushkoff (2011) once polemically proposed 
Program or Be Programmed as a narrow dualism for agency in a computational world, 
but participants’ narratives have revealed more complex, nuanced and conflicted 
approaches.  
9.3.1. Exosomatic Organs and Limits of Computational Approximation 
In Chapter Six, I have shown how participants rely on technological tools as exosomatic 
organs that modulate computational forces on their behalf. Recognising their limits in 
understanding how tracking, monitoring and data collection work online, participants 
draw on these tools to compensate for the limits of their human senses and cognitive 
means to remain perpetually vigilant towards computational surveillance. However, I 
have also shown how participants are inherently frustrated by such exosomatic organs, 
and that the technological promise they convey is a broken one. During many interviews, 
participants were worried that the tools they use to stay on top of computational 
surveillance are themselves opaque and inaccessible to human scrutiny, leading them to 
question their merits, and sparking concerns about a power differential between those 
tools on the one hand, and the capabilities of the computational forces they seek to affect, 
on the other. Enthusiasm and disappointment about technological fixes often coincide, 
revealing deeply conflicted attitudes within participants. Although some participants rely 
more on such tools than others, there is a general sense that outsourcing the need to deal 
with computation to technology is a dead end. As participants employ such tools, they 
  
246 
become aware that their own, human logic remains a vital component in constructing 
knowledge about computational principles affecting their lives.  
9.3.2. Practices and Failures of Adaptation 
In Chapter Eight, I have shown how the computational maxim of rationality and 
reflexivity translates into everyday acts of engaging with computational interlocutors. I 
have documented participants’ attempts to gauge how computation ‘thinks’ and how they 
adjust their communicative acts to these assumptions to mirror what they perceive as 
rational, reflexive, planned and calculated acts. Participants query their computational 
interlocutors and become ‘rule finders’ (Lash 2007) that spot patterns and regularities, 
adopting principles of making sense of the world akin to the principles of a computational 
logic itself, but through their human senses, cognitive means and social experiences. At 
the same time, participants' narratives regularly showed failures and shortcomings of 
adopting these principles. Participants expressed awareness that they are not pervasively 
rational and reflexive. Yet many aspire to be so, and condemn their affectual acts as a 
flaw of character, for instance when they forget to imagine the role of computation in a 
given online practice. Through these issues, I have shown how participants’ struggle to 
keep up with the rational and reflexive paradigm of computation is evidence of a 
computational logic creeping into their modes of making sense of the world and how 
people want to understand themselves. 
9.4. Unfolding and Collaboration as Construction of Knowledge 
Despite obstacles of generating knowledge about a computational world, this thesis has 
demonstrated that attempts to reclaim the conditions of knowledge and probe into the 
workings of computation are an intrinsic part of participants’ everyday activities, both 
online and offline. This construction of knowledge is carried out both as individual 
practices, as well as through communicative acts in collaboration with others.  
9.4.1. Unfolding Events 
In Chapter Six, I have shown how the construction of knowledge is both serendipitous 
and reactive, as well as initiated by participants themselves. Participants often obtain new 
insights into the workings of computation through a computational logic that reveals itself 
in unfolding events by converting its processes and assumptions onto the interface of the 
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ruptures of experience by foregrounding issues of computational surveillance into 
consciousness, transforming an ordinary situation into one defined by computation.  
Most participants attempt to gain additional control over the occurrence of these 
unexpected encounters and trigger unfolding events themselves. Throughout my 
interviews, and irrespective of their technological proficiency, participants highlighted 
how they engage in restorative acts to provoke a computational logic to reveal itself. I 
have demonstrated that such unfolding events are bittersweet. On the one hand, they 
create a sense of unease for participants because they defy their stock of existing 
knowledge about the way computation operates and remind them of the limits and the 
fallibility of their knowledge. On the other hand, participants have emphasised how they 
welcome unfolding events as sources of knowledge. Participants live in a constant state 
of coming-to-consciousness, where new unfolding events reveal additional information, 
momentarily enabling a grasp on an otherwise elusive computational logic, yet 
confronting them with the realisation that their knowledge is perpetually incomplete and 
fragile. The experience of unfolding events specifies and deepens participants’ 
recognition that they live within the computational environment that (Kallinikos and 
Tempini (2014) have outlined, and that it consists of ‘discrepant worlds’ (Berger & 
Luckmann ([1966] 1991) that they struggle to reconcile. 
9.4.2. Collective Practices 
In contrast to assertions that the social implications of a computational world are largely 
absent from the public agenda and confined to expert circles (Meckel 2011), I have shown 
in Chapter Seven that a wider collective inquiry into the role of computation and its logic 
is taking place. For instance, news media provide templates for interpretation and 
blueprints for acting towards computational surveillance, offering recipe knowledge. The 
complexity of social construction became particularly evident during the discussion of 
SNS. I have shown how a recurring stream of social media posts on surveillance incidents 
legitimises inquiry into the world of computation by affirming social acceptability and 
social norms around the construction of knowledge. I have also shown how conversations 
about computational surveillance on SNS and face-to-face are acts of meaningful 
reciprocity that help consolidate common-sense knowledge. Taken together, I have 
proposed that collective acts in such communicative areas stand for an emerging culture 
of mediatisation (Hepp 2013).  
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Yet participants’ narratives have revealed that intersubjective common-sense knowledge 
about computational surveillance is inherently unstable and does not translate into a 
coherent picture of social reality at the end of a collaborative enterprise that is solidified 
and finite. Participants have likened attempts to interrogate computational processes to a 
‘puzzle’ and continuously assemble reality as an ongoing construction. This differs from 
Berger and Luckmann’s original theoretical description, who see the social construction 
of reality as an analytical concept and claim that people do not actually experience their 
own reality as constructed. In contrast, I have shown that the experience of construction 
is an intrinsic feature of the computational world that participants live in. The scaffold of 
construction remains visible as people accept reality as a given. 
Reality as an ongoing construction coincides with conflicts of interpretation, where 
multiple truths become available at the same time, leading both to confirmations and 
disconfirmations about assumptions of reality. Participants showed that generating social 
consensus entails reconciling such competing interpretations and to individually find out 
around which interpretation a social consensus is forming, a process that I have called the 
hard work of common-sense.  
Given the unstable nature of common-sense knowledge, my interviews showed how 
participants employ tactics to maintain and solidify a social consensus. Affirmatory tokens 
and folk tales allow participants to assess whether their knowledge is congruent with that 
of their peers. They are also a form of social grooming, and participants use them to 
confirm that they believe in a common set of assumptions about the computational world 
as their peers. This analysis has shown that computed sociality extends beyond the realm 
of computation and is also expressed through intersubjective acts of meaning-making 
between human agents about the role and nature of computation as a constituent part of 
the social world.  
9.5. Imagining and Interacting with Computational Interlocutors 
The intersubjective construction of reality does not just take place between human agents 
that are coming to terms with a reality co-shaped by computation, but also manifests itself 
directly in acts between human and computational agents. I have argued that these human-
machine interactions are themselves part of computed sociality. Attempts to tease out the 
computational logic through provoked unfolding in Chapter Six has already suggested 
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this. This dynamic became more explicit in Chapter Eight, where I documented how 
participants engage in practices to repair glitches between how they see themselves, and 
how computational agents perceive them. I have shown how participants routinely 
reconcile different views of reality through impression management, and either mould 
computation to their perspective or let a computational logic modify their sense of reality. 
I have offered a taxonomy of glitches entailing naïve inferences, normative clashes, and 
computational superiority. Drawing on Goffman’s symbolic interaction (Goffman 1971; 
[1959] 1990; [1967] 2003), I have highlighted that participants strive to overcome 
glitches by establishing a social situation with computational forces as unknown 
interlocutors, whose motives are unclear and where interaction rules are absent. I have 
shown how participants develop assumptions about their computational interlocutors and 
infer a social situation on this basis.  
Participants provided individual narratives on how they create and act in social situations 
with computational interlocutors. Specific tactics were recurring across participants’ 
accounts, but combinations of tactics and how they are enacted are highly personal and 
lack a normative framework. Nevertheless, patterns emerged, and I have grouped 
participants’ practices to repair glitches in three categories called data scarcity, 
obfuscation, and modification. I also introduced a second layer of categorisation as a 
spectrum which enabled a view in how far these practices take place on the interface of 
the screen, or on the level of the computational infrastructure itself. This analysis revealed 
that some participants confine themselves to the interface of the screen and have a 
rudimentary imagination of computation as an interlocutor, whereas at the other extreme, 
participants both take into account the infrastructure in which computation operates and 
even attune their own communicative acts to how they imagine that a computational logic 
works. 
9.6. Defining Agency Towards Computational Surveillance 
In Chapter Three, I have argued that a theoretical understanding of agency towards 
computational surveillance can only outline how agency is possible in principle and that 
it cannot capture all actual manifestations of agency in their nuances and variety. As 
Jonathan Crary (2014) has reminded us, the notion of agency also is subject to historically 
specific interpretations, and as Emirbayer & Mische (1998) have stressed, the term 
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‘agency’ itself is often not sufficiently problematised and specified. I proposed to leave 
the closer delineation of what actually constitutes agency in the context of this study to 
the empirical domain. Abstracting from the specific themes outlined in this concluding 
chapter, participants’ narratives have shown that agency in the context of computed 
sociality is possible despite the constraints I described in Chapter Six as conditions of 
possibility. I have shown this by updating Berger and Luckmann’s framework to 
incorporate the specific conditions of computation through Kallinikos’ work, and by 
locating this agency within an expanded notion of computed sociality. Such agency is not 
monolithic, but has multiple facets: 
At the most fundamental level, agency manifests itself in the ability to reclaim the 
conditions of knowledge. This is a much broader sense of agency than studies focussing 
on resistance towards surveillance (e.g. Toon 2000) or online activism (e.g. Karpf 2010) 
convey. Agency is not steeped in an us-versus-them rhetoric that follows political motives 
or seeks to overturn a regime of surveillance power. It also does not mean that human 
agents ‘win’ over the forces of computation and restore a pre-computational reality that 
they are masters of. Far from such Hollywood dramaturgy, agency emerged as the ability 
to create the conditions to negotiate social order and the common-sense reality of the 
world in accordance with others, including both human and computational agents. I have 
shown that while a computational logic modulates and constitutes the social world, 
people’s interactions with each other about this world establish and consolidate common-
sense knowledge about computation. I have also demonstrated that agency is enacted in 
relationships between human agents and computational interlocutors, and that 
negotiations of reality in direct interactions with such interlocutors is commonplace.  
Agency then also entails the acknowledgement of computational interlocutors as an 
additional type of social agent. This scenario neither appeared to people as a radical 
rupture that uproots them nor did it spark feelings of fear that a cyborg dystopia has finally 
arrived. Despite different degrees of technical expertise and ability to engage with 
computational interlocutors, participants generally recognised and accepted computation 
as an agential force. The intention to overcome glitches helps explain this. As participants 
seek to repair these glitches, they draw on mechanisms of universe maintenance that fix 
and retune, rather than uproot social order. Despite occasional shocking revelations 
through unfolding events, agency towards computational surveillance, therefore, is not a 
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narrative of revolution, but expression of everyday, hardly noticeable, recalibrations of 
social reality. 
Stories of resistance or compliance with computational surveillance persist, but not in a 
binary form. These narratives themselves are rooted in, and extensions of the process of 
constructing knowledge and such acts of recalibration. They are so in a double sense. 
When participants act towards computational agents, they establish a social situation that 
entails assumptions and inferences about them as interlocutors, which are themselves 
expressions of knowledge construction. I have also shown how practices of resistance 
and compliance are linked to glitches between how participants see themselves and the 
world on the one hand, and the perspective of computation on the other. Resistance and 
compliance with computation then are communicative acts of negotiating a shared reality 
between human and computational interlocutors and bringing discrepant ideas about 
reality in tune. 
All these acts take place under the absence of established normative templates that 
participants can draw on. Participants encounter a reality of computation constantly in 
flux, iteratively and collaboratively establish perpetually changing conceptions of reality 
and reflexively seek to approximate the logic(s) of computational interlocutors. While I 
have steered away from a meta-discussion that problematises the concept of agency as 
such due to a matter of focus, the empirical manifestations of agency I have documented 
highlight the merits of framing agency beyond prevalent rational or normative dimensions 
as containing a creative strand (Emirbayer & Mische 1998; Joas 1996). 
9.7. Limitations and Tangents 
While focus enables a manageable scope, it comes with limitations. Below, I outline the 
limitations of this thesis to aid the interpretation of results and place signposts for the 
range of inferences that can and cannot be made. I also highlight areas for future research 
that emerge out of these limitations.  
9.7.1. Socio-Demographics and the Construction of Knowledge 
By focussing on young adults aged between 18 and 29 years old, other age groups have 
been precluded in this study. This choice was made to engage with a set of participants 
who see the internet as an integral part of their everyday life and exhibit a broad range of 
online activities across different contexts from school and university to work and leisure 
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to provide sufficiently rich and diverse narratives about encounters with computational 
surveillance. Despite including participants with a maximum age difference of eleven 
years, this study found no evidence of age-related differences in between them regarding 
narratives or terminology. However, the results do not necessarily translate to other age 
groups. For instance, the Pew Research Center (2015) found demographic differences 
between social media users both concerning presence on SNS and frequency of use that 
may shape exposure and hence perceptions of computation. The engineering of social 
consensus about computational surveillance is heavily informed by exposure to 
communicative areas such as SNS, but also by talk within peer groups, such as anecdotes 
about online failures which presuppose that online and offline cultures are intertwined. It 
must be cautioned that the shared stock of knowledge and social practices of generating 
consensus could be influenced by age. For instance, older demographics might not have 
access to, nor replicate the collaborative practices I outlined in their peer groups. People 
younger than my participants, especially those who do not remember a life before the 
internet, may grow up with a different set of risk assessments and attitudes towards 
computational agents.  
Issues of age also translate to other socio-demographic limitations inherent in this thesis. 
For instance, in a study on marketer’s use of personal data, Turow et al. (2015) found 
statistically significant differences for the variables 'race' and 'education' concerning 
people's willingness to give up their data for supermarket discounts. In this thesis, I have 
not considered race and have only peripherally considered education. While the sampling 
method ensured that participants were recruited from a variety of social backgrounds and 
occupations, it did not afford a systematic analysis of how such differences influence the 
social construction of knowledge.  
In a critique of the notion of ‘digital natives’, Helsper and Eynon (2010) have argued that 
generational differences are overemphasised as determinants of internet literacy and that 
variables such as education, experience and breadth of use are at least equally important. 
In this thesis, I have provided a perspective on the differences between participants when 
it comes to engaging with computational interlocutors through a spectrum that ranges 
from practices on the interface to infrastructure practices. Further research is necessary 
to relate these differences both to age, as well as to other variables such as those that 
Helsper and Eynon have identified.  
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This study has included participants both in the UK and Germany. Differences between 
countries centred around the definition of surveillance which is partly influenced by 
historical experience. The only other observed difference between countries emerged in 
the use of privacy advocacy groups on SNS. While these results offer indications for a 
transnational set of practices, this study has not considered the social construction of 
knowledge in other national contexts, in particular in Non-Western societies. Further 
evidence is required to understand transnational practices and to investigate possible 
national, or historical and cultural differences more widely that may have a larger impact 
on the construction of knowledge than the sample from Germany and the UK that I drew 
on in this thesis. 
9.7.2. Communities of Practice 
This thesis has considered participants both as individuals and as social beings embedded 
in particular social groups. Evidence provided sees them engaged with computed sociality 
alone in front of their computer screens, and as social agents in collaborative exchange 
with others in a range of communicative arenas. Participants’ narratives provided a 
glimpse into their peer groups, and into the social construction of knowledge within those 
peer groups. This became particularly evident in Chapter Seven, where stories of universe 
maintenance showed that some narratives spread over the wider internet (e.g. ‘pig story'), 
whereas others are localised narratives confined to a circle of cohabitating friends (e.g. 
‘pornography failure'). 
It was beyond the scope of this study to systematically explore different practices and 
regimes of knowledge construction specific to such peer groups, and ultimately how 
different social groups live in computed sociality. There are merits for a future study that 
uses a different set of methods, such as ethnography, and other sampling techniques, to 
specifically explore the structure of knowledge production within and between social 
groups. The notion of ‘communities of practice’ (Wenger [1998] 2000) for instance 
would enable such a perspective beyond conventional socio-demographic coordinates.  
An approach rooted in a communities of practice paradigm that builds on the social 
construction of knowledge outlined in this thesis would also create inroads to other issues 
and debates within the wider field of computation and society: 
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Just as Gitelman (2013) has highlighted in the aptly titled Raw Data is an Oxymoron that 
data are always a product of bias, in Chapter Three, I have suggested that a computational 
logic is also informed by human practices. These include values, experiences, lay-
psychological and lay-sociological assumptions encoded by programmers and data 
practitioners into software. A perspective informed by communities of practice could 
shed further light on the social construction of knowledge within those professional 
circles. 
Similarly, such an approach could link the perspective developed in this thesis to debates 
around digital labour in a platform economy. The Financial Times recently headlined an 
article ‘When your boss is an algorithm’ (O'Connor 2016), outlining the struggle of 
drivers for taxi services such as Uber, or delivery services like Deliveroo or Amazon, with 
their algorithmically engineered schedules. Analysing how these workers imagine, 
interrogate and challenge the computational systems they are embedded in would provide 
a timely study within the context of the social construction of knowledge that I outlined.  
9.7.3. Technological and Political Change 
The pace of technological change means that since the fieldwork for this study largely in 
2010, the repertoire of communication tools, both regarding software and hardware, as 
well as the practices they afford, has already expanded and changed.  
While many German participants discussed at length their activities on StudiVZ, this 
German SNS has since fallen into disregard and German media liken it to a ‘ghost town’ 
(Dörner 2015). Similarly, Instagram, which at the time of writing attracts 500 million 
monthly active users (Instagram 2016), had just been launched and Snapchat had not yet 
seen the light of day. Think-aloud protocols and probing interviews took place in front of 
personal computers. While many participants possessed smartphones, mobile devices 
constituted an alternative form of being online that was peripheral to their overall use. 
Conversely, in its earnings report for the quarter ending 30 June 2016, Facebook 
highlighted that 88% of users access Facebook on mobile devices, with 56% using only 
mobile devices (Facebook 2016).  
The proliferation of smartphones has coincided with the rise of an app environment in 
which media experiences are contained that has also colonised tablets and connected TVs. 
Apps are self-contained information appliances (Zittrain 2008) designed for specific 
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devices that are often not open to modifications. However, modifications like ad-blockers 
installed onto a web browser were part of the tools that participants in this study used to 
probe into the workings of computation. At the same time, the introduction of virtual 
personal assistants such as Apple’s Siri or Amazon’s Echo permits a more intimate, and 
immediate communication with computational interlocutors. These applications and 
devices are controlled by the user's voice. They react to natural language and respond in 
a human-like voice which the user can select from a set of options, such as whether the 
voice is male or female.  
A common concern when conducting research about everyday practices that are 
embedded in a particular socio-technical configuration is the applicability of findings 
over time. While this study offered a snapshot of the practices that inform the social 
construction of computational reality around the year 2010, it was, at the most 
fundamental level, also technology-agnostic and provided an analytical template for the 
incorporation of future technologies. Many of the practices and narratives that I discussed 
were not dependent on one particular technology. Participants probe into the workings of 
computation in an environment of perpetual change, where confirmations and 
disconfirmations of reality alternate, and where they are regularly exposed to new 
encounters with computation. They explore creative practices to establish a relationship 
with computational interlocutors and renegotiate the common stock of knowledge about 
a computed world. Further research is required into how the proliferation of mobile 
devices and artificial intelligence like voice-controlled virtual assistants alters and 
supplements the practices around the construction of knowledge and relationships to 
computational interlocutors that I have outlined here. But such research can draw on and 
extend the analysis provided in this thesis.  
In the case of surveillance, political change is as prominent as technological 
transformation. When I conducted fieldwork for this thesis, Edward Snowden had not yet 
disclosed the depth and interconnections of a global surveillance infrastructure which was 
previously inconceivable for many people. The magnitude of his ongoing revelations that 
began in 2013 also had academic implications, prompting leading surveillance scholar 
David Lyon (2015) to write a book probing into Surveillance After Snowden. While this 
thesis could not incorporate these phenomena into the empirical work which predated the 
disclosures, further research is required to understand whether Snowden’s revelations 
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have led to a changed cultural climate, to new perceptions of surveillance, and whether 
these revelations have given rise to new practices. At large, however, the Snowden 
revelations underscore the relevance of this research rather than undermine it, in 
particular as the empirical part of this thesis has been concerned with the role of 
computation in everyday life over the focus on surveillance per se.  
9.7.4. Enlightenment and Computational Providence 
Beyond the empirical limitations and areas for future research, there are much broader 
theoretical implications for the proliferation of computation as a social force that 
exceeded the scope of this thesis. 
Computed sociality presents an obstacle to human agency that society has manufactured 
itself, paradoxically by following the Enlightenment principle of rationality to its ultimate 
conclusion. Max Weber wrote about the disenchantment of the world, where the rule of 
science usurped a worldview steeped in myth and blind belief. He stressed that through 
the rationality of science, in principle, human agents have become able to explain the 
workings of the world:  
“The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not, therefore, indicate 
an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. It 
means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one 
could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious 
incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master 
all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no 
longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, 
as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means 
and calculations perform the service.” (Weber 1946: 139) 
It is the ultimate continuation of these technical means and calculations in the form of 
computation which turns the disenchantment of the world into its opposite. While, as 
Hepp suggests “there is no sense that in the everyday world media technologies appear to 
be the product of ‘divine intervention’” (2013: 59), computation is developing into its 
own, ‘mysterious and incalculable force’ in Weber’s sense that erodes the ability to know 
the conditions under which one lives. Giddens has connected this disenchantment, 
understood as Enlightenment, with trust in human senses: 
“One type of certainty (divine law) was replaced by another (the certainty of our 
senses, of empirical observation), and divine providence was replaced by 
providential progress.” (Giddens 1991: 48) 
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But if Enlightenment stands for replacing divine providence with providential progress, 
providential progress is being superseded by computational providence. I have alluded to 
this issue in my discussion of the communication problem inherent in the conditions of 
knowledge in Chapter Three. Beyond the analysis that I could provide in the limited space 
of this thesis, a much broader theoretical discussion is however necessary on the interplay 
between a logic of modern progress and the resurgence of faith and fate as social 
paradigms. This requires a critical review of the explanatory potential of theories of 
modernity and a reading of their existing critiques in a new light.  
This dissertation could already offer a small step in this direction by showing how 
people’s struggles to relate to a computational world spark explanatory frameworks and 
intersubjective narratives which are not technically correct assumptions about 
computation, but practices of meaning-making to facilitate social order. Berger and 
Luckmann’s original case study for their account of social construction was religion, and 
amidst the denigration of human senses through the computational rendition of reality, 
future analysis of life in computed sociality may revert to that theme. The findings shown 
in this thesis also imply that future theoretical work under such a paradigm can benefit 
from avoiding the conceptual trap of ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault 1977) by taking serious 
from the outset the role of people as creative agents that find possibilities, whatever the 
conditions of reality.   
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 Appendix A 
Below are the information sheet providing written context and the consent form that 
were handed out to participants prior to the interviews. 
INFORMATION SHEET: A STUDY ON  
PERSONAL DATA ON THE INTERNET AND YOUR LIFE WITH COMPUTERS 
About the study 
Hello, my name is Daniel Knapp and I am a PhD student in Media & Communications at the University of 
London. I am doing research on how people deal with personal data on the internet and generally make 
sense of how the internet and computers works. I would like to ask for your help in this research. The aim 
is to better understand how people relate to technology. Anyone can participate, you do not need to know 
anything particular about the internet or computers. It is all about your experience and opinions, so there 
are no right or wrong answers.  
 
You will receive an incentive of £25 for your participation.  
What does taking part in the study involve? 
As part of the study, I am interviewing internet users aged between 18 and 29. You would be asked to 
participate in two interviews. The first interview would be a conversation between us at a place of your 
choice or at my office. If you have a place that you like, it just needs to be quiet enough to have a good 
conversation. After that, we would meet a second time. This second interview would be a bit different and 
involve you commenting spontaneously what your thoughts and aims are while you are using the internet 
in my presence. Afterwards, I would ask you some questions based on what you said. This would last 
about two hours. Again, it can be done at any time place of your convenience where it is not too noisy. We 
will also need internet access. I am happy to invite you to my office for this. I would like to tape-record our 
conversations. You do not have to answer any questions you do not wish to and you can stop the interview 
at any time, without giving reasons.  
What will happen to your answers? 
All comments you give will be made anonymous and are strictly confidential. You will not be identified in 
the final research report. Only I will have access to the raw data arising from this research which will be 
stored in a safe place and all computer-held data will be password-protected. The requirements of the 
Data Protection Act will be observed.  
Further questions and concerns 
This study has been approved by the Department for Media & Communications, Goldsmiths College, 
University of London. If you have any questions about the research, you can contact me at: 
Daniel Knapp 
Department for Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London 
Lewisham Way 
London SE 14 6NW  
E-Mail: cop01dk@gold.ac.uk 
Phone: +44 (0) 794 600 78 13 
 
Should you have any concerns about the conduct of the research, you can contact Professor Nick Couldry, 
supervisor of this study: 
Professor Nick Couldry 
Professor of Media and Communications 
Department for Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London 
Lewisham Way 
London SE 14 6NW  
E-Mail: n.couldry@gold.ac.uk 
Phone: +44 (0) 20 7919 636  
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CONSENT FORM 
 
A STUDY ON  
THE INTERNET AND PERSONAL DATA 
    
Researcher: Daniel Knapp 
 
 
1.)  I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
 
2.)  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.  
 
 
3.)  I confirm that the interview will be recorded with my consent and that in 
the transcript a pseudonym or alias will be used and reference to me as 
an individual will be removed. The data will only be used for the stated 
research purposes.  
 
 
4.)  I understand that any data I provide through taking part in this research 
will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
 
 
 
Please mark as applicable: 
 
I agree to take part in this research   
 
I do not agree to take part in this research   
 
 
 
 
(Signature of participant)        (Date) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Name of participant PLEASE PRINT) 
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 Appendix B 
 
Participant Chart: 
 
Pseudonym Gender Age Occupation Location 
Adam Male 22 Student (Art) UK 
Amanda Female 21 Student (Finance) UK 
Andre Male 29 Car Body Shop Worker Germany 
Anna Female 20 Student (Pedagogics) Germany 
Ann-Kathrin Female 21 Student (Psychology) Germany 
Annegret Female 19 Apprentice (Optician) Germany 
Bashir Male 23 Student (Medicine) UK 
Christina Female 26 Business Journalist UK 
Constanza Female 29 Artist UK 
Dave Male 25 Fitness Coach/Marketing Associate Germany 
Dennis Male 26 Student (Geophysics) Germany 
Enrico Male 28 Student (History) Germany 
Evelyn Female 20 Student (Psychology) Germany 
Fateha Female 22 Event Organiser (Advertising) UK 
Frank Male 27 Administrator (Public Transport) Germany 
Franzi Female 24 Physiotherapist Germany 
Freddy Male 28 Teacher Germany 
Henning Male 22 Student (Engineering) Germany 
Ian Male 25 Charity Worker UK 
Jack Male 27 Planning Officer (Construction Sector) UK 
James Male 28 Barista UK 
Joanna Female 26 Legal Secretary UK 
Josephine Female 21 Hairdresser & Student (Textile Design) Germany 
Karen Female 27 Dental Hygienist UK 
Katy Female 23 Student (Translation Studies) UK 
Lars Male 26 Student (Politics) & Former Police Officer Germany 
Laura Female 23 Student (Development Studies) UK 
Linda Female 25 Recent Maths Graduate/Jobseeker UK 
Luise Female 22 Student (Law) Germany 
Mark Male 25 Office Clerk UK 
Martin Male 26 Sales Manager UK 
Mike Male 27 Graphic Designer UK 
Paula Female 28 Homemaker & Part-Time Yoga Instructor Germany 
Rebecca Female 20 Student (Politics) Germany 
Richard Male 24 Financial Advisor UK 
Sarah Female 21 Student (Linguistics) Germany 
Simona Female 26 Business Analyst UK 
Stefan Male 23 Student (Biology) Germany 
Stuart Male 26 Loans Advisor UK 
Tim Male 26 Student (Anthropology) UK 
 
 
